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1
Introduction
Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke and Jeffrey Gale Williamson
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Ever since the British Industrial Revolution, the transition to modern economic
growth has been associated with industrialization. New labour-saving and energy-
using technologies first originated in Britain, and then spread with a lag to countries
such as Belgium and France in continental Europe and North America (Allen,
2009). The initial impact was a ‘Great Divergence’ in living standards between
Northwestern Europe and its New World offshoots, on the one hand, and the rest
of the world on the other. This divergence is now being eroded as developing
economies rapidly industrialize.
But when did modern manufacturing first begin to spread to the developing
world? Was it only during the ‘second globalization’ which began in earnest in
the 1980s? Or are the roots of industrial catch-up to be found in the long period
of world deglobalization which began in 1914, and saw two world wars, the
Great Depression, the breakdown of formal and informal empires, and import-
substituting industrialization (ISI)? Or might the spread of modern manufacturing
have started even earlier, during the ‘first globalization’ of the late nineteenth
century (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999)?
In both globalization periods, international economic integration may have
helped developing countries import new technologies, exploit their lower labour
costs, and import those raw materials with which they were poorly endowed
(Wright, 1990). Alternatively, trade may have made it difficult for developing
countries to compete with established industries in richer countries (Williamson,
2011). In that case, the breakdown of the nineteenth-century international division
of labour—which saw the industrial core economies export manufactures
and import food and raw materials (Robertson, 1938; Lewis, 1978)—may have
favoured industrial growth in the developing world. So what were the impacts of
globalization and deglobalization on the spread of modern industry to the devel-
oping world? Were the impacts uniform, or did they depend on the characteristics
of the individual countries concerned?
This volume has three goals. The first is to document the origins of modern
industrial growth around the global periphery: those regions in Southern and
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa
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that fell behind the industrial core in Northwest Europe and North America during
the Great Divergence. When did modern manufacturing first emerge in these
regions, what industries did it initially involve, and how did it subsequently
develop? The second is to explain these patterns of industrial development. What
determined the timing of early industrialization? Did it happen spontaneously, as a
result of market forces, or was government intervention required? What sorts of
factor endowments encouraged early industrial development, and what sorts hin-
dered it? How important was access to foreign markets, or alternatively, protection
for the home market? What was the impact of major shocks to the international
economy: world wars, the Great Depression, the spread of Communism, decolon-
ization, the shift to market liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s? How was technology
transferred to these regions? The third aim of the volume is to trace the history of
modern manufacturing in the global periphery through to the present day, and to
understand what determined these long-run trajectories.
We have chosen to address these questions by commissioning a series of country
and regional studies, written by leading experts in the economic histories of these
countries or regions. We believe that the traditional economic history approach
used here has many advantages as compared with more standard cross-country
regressions used by economists, for at least two reasons. First, a strong message
emerging from these chapters is that the impact of factor endowments, country size,
government policies, the international environment, and other factors, all tended to
depend on each other. The impact of protection, for example, depended on the
nature of the economy being protected, and on what other countries were doing.
These interactions were so numerous and important that they would be difficult or
even impossible to incorporate adequately into a standard panel regression. Second,
modern manufacturing consisted of three quite distinct activities: the processing of
commodities (especially for export); the production of import-competing or
export-competing tradables; and the production of consumer goods for domestic
markets which are quasi-non-tradable, because of high transport costs or distinctive
local tastes. The same policies or international shocks could (and did) affect these
three sub-categories in opposite directions, in ways that a regression explaining
aggregate manufacturing output would not capture.
Chapter 2 will deal extensively with the first of these themes, and so this
introduction will focus more on the second. After a brief summary of when and
where modern manufacturing first emerged, we will explore the roles played by
factor endowments, policy, and the international context.
Two additional introductory comments are necessary before we press on. First,
there has been a flood of works dealing with industrialization in the Third World
since Simon Kuznets, W. Arthur Lewis, and other giants were writing in the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s. Why another? The answer is that this volume is about the spread
of modern manufacturing, not industrialization; it deals with the origins and
development of a particular sector of the economy, rather than with patterns of
structural change involving all sectors. Structural change is obviously essential in
explaining the transition to modern economic growth. However, studying indus-
trialization requires an understanding, not just of the manufacturing sector, but of
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an additional 75 per cent of the economy—agriculture and services—as well. The
development of a modern manufacturing sector is essential for industrialization,
but the reverse is not true: a poor country could see its modern manufacturing
sector grow rapidly without this leading to structural change. Such was the case, for
example, in Southeast Europe before 1939 (Chapter 5). Indeed, the manufacturing
sector could grow more rapidly than in rich industrial economies, without the
country concerned converging on them in per capita GDP terms. And yet the
modern manufacturing sector is crucial for long-run economic development,
suggesting that there are intellectual benefits to focusing on it alone.
Second, we need to say something about our definition of the ‘periphery’. As
Marc Flandreau and Clemens Jobst (2005) have reminded us, the definitions of
core and periphery are ex ante unclear, and tend to depend in practice on the
purpose at hand. In our case, we are interested in the gradual spread of modern
manufacturing from its original heartlands in Northwest Europe and the United
States. We therefore include not only regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia,
which were clearly ‘peripheral’ in the context of the late-nineteenth-century world
economy, but also ‘middle-class’ or ‘second-tier’ countries in Southern and Eastern
Europe. Modern manufacturing gained a foothold there rather later than it had
done in countries like Britain and Belgium, and its experience was often less
successful. We have chosen Italy to serve as representative of Southern Europe,
fully mindful of the fact that it was only marginally peripheral: the judgment of
Chapter 6 is that it was still a peripheral industrial nation at the time of unification,
but that it had joined the industrial core by the 1930s at the latest. We feel that
there are lessons to be learned from the experience of a relatively early ‘peripheral’
industrializer such as Italy, and what is true of that country is even truer of a
country like Japan (Chapter 8).
Our five peripheral regions are thus: Southern and Eastern Europe; the Middle
East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Asia; and Latin America. These five
regions were certainly poor. In 1913, their per capita incomes expressed as per-
centages of incomes in the three leading economies (Britain, Germany, and the
United States) were: Eastern Europe 34.4 per cent; Southern Europe 42.3 per cent;
Middle East 22.5 per cent; Sub-Saharan Africa 13.8 per cent; Asia 16.3 per cent;
and Latin America 32.3 per cent (Maddison, 2010).
1 .2 THE BEGINNING OF MODERN MANUFACTURING
Chapter 2 provides a broad quantitative overview of the spread of modern manu-
facturing to the global periphery, bringing together evidence on industrial (where
possible, manufacturing) growth rates from 1870 to the onset of the global financial
crisis in 2007. It shows that developing countries experienced rapid manufacturing
growth surprisingly early, in many cases well before the First World War, although
this fast growth occurred from very low initial levels of modern manufacturing
output. Between 1870 and 1896, industrial output grew at 5 per cent per annum or
more in Austria, Hungary, Russia, China, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico
3Introduction
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(where annual growth was as high as 9.8 per cent). Growth slowed after 1896 in
peripheral Europe and Latin America, but it accelerated in Asia, where Japan,
China, and the Philippines all experienced average industrial growth rates of 5 per cent
per annum or more between 1896 and the First World War. Modern factory
output also expanded rapidly in Bulgaria and Romania during this period. By
contrast, in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa rapid industrial growth only
started in the inter-war period and, especially, after 1950. The ‘golden age’ of
1950–73 was the high point of industrial growth not just in these regions, but
across the global periphery.
The industries involved in the initial spread of modern manufacturing varied.
The classic industries of the British Industrial Revolution were textiles and metal-
lurgy, and these featured prominently during the spread of modern manufacturing
to several peripheral countries as well. Textiles were particularly important in
China, India, and Mexico, and they were also prominent in Austria-Hungary and
Turkey. On the other hand, despite the importance of silk, they only accounted for
10 per cent of Italian manufacturing in 1870, with the engineering sector nearly
twice as large. Iron was important in Mexico from the turn of the century; more
generally, heavy industry was important in Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia.
Early industrialization in Argentina involved a broader range of consumer goods
(not just textiles), protected by tariffs and serving a rapidly expanding local market.
In Southeast Asia and Egypt, modern industry initially focused on commodity
export processing, moving into consumer goods somewhat later.
1 .3 FACTOR ENDOWMENTS
Factor endowments had a profound impact on industrial policy. Labour-abundant
and resource-scarce countries could enter at the bottom of the ladder, producing and
exporting labour-intensive products (e.g. East Asia). Labour-scarce and high-wage
peripheral countries could not exploit that strategy, and thus relied on a tariff-
protected domestic market (e.g. Latin America). Where the labour-scarce economy
had only a small domestic market (e.g. Southeast Asia), industrial growth was difficult.
Modern industry first emerged in high-wage economies: Britain, Northwest
Europe, and North America. According to Allen (2009), this is not a coincidence:
high wages, cheap capital, and abundant energy gave entrepreneurs the incentive to
search for and adopt modern, labour-saving, and capital and energy-using tech-
nologies.1 Initially, these new technologies were only economical in regions whose
factor endowments corresponded with what the technologies had been designed
for. But over time, the technologies improved to such an extent that it made sense
to adopt them even where factor endowments were quite different. In addition, key
sectors like textiles became labour-intensive relative to other industrial sectors, such
as capital-intensive heavy industry. Over time, therefore, cheap labour became an
1 Of course, relative factor prices are what matter. Thus it might have been abundant and cheap
energy (coal) and capital, rather than scarce labour, that favoured Britain’s industrial lead.
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advantage in developing modern manufacturing, at least in those economies where
other required inputs (financial capital, machinery, energy, skilled labour, and
entrepreneurship) were in sufficient supply.
The developing economies covered in this volume were characterized by widely
varying factor endowments. Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Southeast
Asia were resource abundant and labour scarce, and consequently had wages that
were high by developing economy standards. Our authors document these high
wages (that is, high relative to other periphery countries), and show how they
made it difficult to develop modern, labour-intensive manufacturing. That is,
nominal unskilled wages were higher in Southeast Asia than in Japan until the
1920s, and were higher than in India and China for even longer (Chapter 11). In
1911, daily earnings in similar textile mills were 18 US cents in Japan, but 46
cents in Mexico (Chapter 12). Unskilled wages were much higher in West Africa
than in India until 1945 (Chapter 14). Commodity export processing, and later
import-substituting industrialization (ISI), were the typical routes to industrial-
ization for such economies. Another response to high wages was labour coercion,
which kept wage costs low in, for example, South African mining (Chapter 14)
and even Soviet manufacturing (Chapter 3). Over time, however, factor endow-
ments evolved in ways that made it easier to sustain a competitive, modern
manufacturing sector. Populations grew fast, leading to falling relative wages,
and bigger domestic markets; this was the case in Africa, for example, but even
so that continent’s recent rapid growth has in many cases been based more on
commodity exports than on manufacturing.
The supply of educated labour seems to have been just as important as the supply
of overall labour, and perhaps even more so, in augmenting the ability of countries
to develop modern manufacturing. Lars Sandberg (1979) pointed out long ago that
while physical capital can be imported from abroad, it takes much longer to
accumulate human capital. Poor education may thus place an effective constraint
on development—especially since human capital endowments can influence a
country’s ability to adapt foreign technology to local circumstances. From
Abramovitz (1986) on, a vast empirical literature has documented that GDP
convergence is conditional on a host of factors, including schooling, and this
literature suggests that education matters because it allows countries to adopt
best-practice manufacturing techniques. This volume provides ample evidence
that education facilitated the spread of modern manufacturing.
From this perspective, European colonialism damaged many countries: it was
not until they achieved independence that major progress was made towards
providing universal primary (and later secondary) education. Racist educational
policies in colonial Africa hindered development there (Chapter 14). India’s British
rulers viewed the sub-continent as a source of primary products, thus investing in
railroads but not in schools (Chapter 10). Primary school enrolment rates were low
in Southeast Asia in the 1920s, whether the colonizer was Dutch, French or British
(Chapter 11). After independence, a literacy revolution took place almost every-
where around the periphery. In contrast, Japan strongly promoted education from
the 1870s onwards, and this appears to have benefited its Korean and Taiwanese
5Introduction
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colonies (Chapter 8). American colonial rule benefited the Philippines in a similar
fashion (Chapter 11).
When modern manufacturing began its spread to the periphery, a lack of skills was
therefore often an important constraint. It follows that loosening that constraint was
crucial in spurring industrial growth. Sometimes this could be achieved by importing
human capital. Technical workers tended to be foreign in early-twentieth-century
Mexico and Peru; they were imported from Western Europe into Southeast Europe
up until the Second World War; they were also imported from Japan, China, and
India into late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Southeast Asia (Chapters 5,
11, 12); and British mechanics and managers were important in developing early
modern manufacturing in India’s port cities (Chapter 10).
But importing skilled foreign labour was a costly option. A much better (long-
run) solution was to increase the domestic supply of educated workers. All poor
periphery countries, when independent, have tried to change their endowments
and thus their comparative advantage by investing heavily in schooling. Those
which underwent successful manufacturing catching-up also underwent schooling
catching-up, even though it took a few decades for youth enrolment to create a
literate and well-schooled adult labour force. Economists have shown economet-
rically how schooling has raised economy-wide productivity and GDP per capita
growth. The chapters in this volume suggest that schooling’s impact on manufac-
turing productivity has been even bigger.
Education was already improving in Southeast Europe before 1939, but Com-
munist governments in Russia, and later Eastern Europe, invested even more
heavily in human capital (Chapters 3, 5). In Southeast Asia, school enrolment
rates rose sharply from the inter-war decades to the 1970s, contributing to the
late-twentieth-century economic miracles of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Thailand (Chapter 11). Newly independent countries in Sub-Saharan Africa also
improved their educational systems, but not nearly as impressively, and skilled
labour remained scarcer for longer (Chapter 14). India is an interesting case, in that
it has been services, rather than industry, which have tended to employ better-
educated Indian workers in recent decades (Chapter 10).
It is easier to overcome a shortage of financial and physical capital than human
capital. Poor economies tend to have limited supplies of capital, but in periods
when international capital markets are working smoothly, financial capital can be
borrowed from abroad. This was certainly the case in the first global century up to
the First World War for Imperial Russia, for colonial India, and for Latin America.
The diaspora was also a source of financial capital for China, except during the
planned economy period (Chapters 9, 13). But borrowing from abroad was only
possible when international capital markets were functioning properly, which was
not the case from the 1920s to the 1970s. Regions such as Latin America
undoubtedly suffered as a result (Chapters 12, 13; Taylor, 1998).
Even more important than imports of financial capital were imports of equip-
ment and machinery, which also embody up-to-date technology. These imports
were crucial for countries seeking to build a modern manufacturing sector. They
also had to be paid for with export earnings when international borrowing was
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difficult. Otherwise, these constraints would begin to bind, with potentially serious
consequences for domestic manufacturing. A classic case is offered by the Soviet
Union, where between 10 and 30 per cent of equipment investment was accounted
for by imports in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the inter-war period, these
imports had been financed largely by grain exports, while in the post-war period
they were increasingly financed by oil exports (since the USSR had by this stage
become a net food importer). When first grain and then oil prices were weak,
manufacturing growth inevitably slowed down (Chapter 3).
Governments attempted to relax these constraints in various ways. The USSR,
India, Yugoslavia, and Romania all built up their capital goods industries, thus
supplying more of their equipment needs (Domar, 1957). The USSR famously
encouraged high savings rates, attempting to dramatically shift the country’s
factor endowment in a capital-intensive direction. Such policies worked well
initially, at least in terms of boosting industrial output. Eventually, however, the
strategy of prioritizing capital accumulation ran into severely diminishing returns
(Chapters 3, 5, and 10).
1 .4 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND LUCK
By the mid-nineteenth century, the global periphery had become the commodity
exporter to the industrial leaders, so world commodity price trends and their
volatility were central to local manufacturing profitability and performance. That
is, commodity price booms generated what we now call ‘Dutch Disease’: labour
and capital rushed to commodity export sectors and fled domestic manufacturing.
These Dutch Disease forces were powerful as the relative price of commodities
soared up to the 1890s (Williamson, 2011). However, that secular boom turned
into a secular bust from the 1890s to the Second World War. That is, as
commodity prices fell, the relative price of manufactures rose in the global periphery.
If a commodity price boom penalized manufacturing in the global periphery up to
the 1890s, then the bust must surely have stimulated the growth of domestic
manufactures in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. On these
grounds alone, we would expect to find more rapid manufacturing growth in the
global periphery from the 1890s to the First World War, and during the inter-war
decades. And so we do: the numbers in the catching-up club increased during that
half-century, and the average rates of growth of the members rose. But the
catching-up did not occur everywhere, nor was it as dramatic as one might have
expected. The anti-Dutch Disease pro-manufacturing forces were weaker, because
these economies had developed offsets by the 1890s. Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast
Asia, and North Africa were colonies of the industrial imperialists, and imperial
colonial policies, as the chapters here will show, served to suppress domestic produc-
tion of tradable manufactures. In addition, export processing dominated local manu-
facturing by the 1890s, so that a commodity bust damaged manufacturing on those
grounds. Finally, domestic demand for quasi-non-tradable consumer goods fell when
export revenues and incomes fell, further damaging local manufacturing.
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Latin America had gained independence early in the nineteenth century, so local
manufacturing did not have to contend with anti-manufacturing colonial policy,
but rather enjoyed supportive pro-manufacturing tariffs. Still, quasi-non-tradable
consumer goods industries in Latin America obeyed the same laws of motion as
elsewhere in the periphery. Indeed, the chapters that follow characterize these
sectors as a source of endogenous manufacturing growth—positive during the
commodity booms of the late nineteenth century (and the early twenty-first
century) and negative from the 1890s to the Second World War.
The chapters that follow also stress the role of world markets for manufactured
exports. Geography mattered: Mexico’s manufacturing growth has always been
favoured by its big and fast-growing northern US neighbour; Southeast Asia,
Taiwan, and Korea were favoured by Japan’s post-Second World War economic
miracle; the same countries were favoured again by China’s economic miracle after
the 1980s. And Central and Eastern Europe were favoured by the fast growth of
Northwest Europe up to 1913; disfavoured by European disintegration after the
First World War and their membership of the Soviet bloc after 1945; and then
favoured again by their reconnection to the European Union from the 1990s
onwards. These contiguous relationships fostered not only trade, but foreign direct
investment (FDI) and technological transfer as well.
Luck also mattered, both good and bad. Latin America dropped its trade barriers
in the late 1970s, only to have China flood world markets with manufactures
beginning in the 1980s. This was very bad luck. Southeast Asia started its miracle in
the 1970s when Japan shifted from labour-intensive to capital-intensive technolo-
gies and used FDI to move its older technologies to Malaysia, Thailand, and other
Southeast Asian countries. With a well-established competitive industry, the region
was again favoured when China offered a booming market starting in the 1980s.
Thus, the region was twice blessed with good luck.
1.5 POLICY
Policy has always mattered, but the policies necessary to promote modern manu-
facturing varied across regions and over time. We have already discussed policies
designed to shift factor endowments and prices in a direction more favourable to
manufacturing growth, ranging from the unambiguously beneficial (education) to
the ambiguous (policies designed to spur capital accumulation) to the morally
unacceptable (labour coercion). In this section we will focus primarily on trade
and industrial policy.
A major point to emerge from this volume is that the relationship between
openness and manufacturing growth is inherently ambiguous. This should not
come as a surprise, given the extensive empirical literature on the relationship
between protectionism and economic growth more generally. While the correl-
ation between protectionism and growth is negative for the late twentieth century,
it was positive during the late nineteenth century (at least for a sample of relatively
rich countries) and during the inter-war period (Sachs and Warner, 1995;
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Clemens and Williamson, 2004; O’Rourke, 2000). More relevant for the subject
of this volume, industrial tariffs were positively correlated with industrial growth,
as well as with aggregate economic growth, for the same small sample of predom-
inantly rich late-nineteenth-century economies (Lehmann and O’Rourke, 2011).
Not only has the correlation between tariffs and aggregate growth changed over
time; it has also differed across countries. Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List
believed that countries should only resort to protection once they had become
sufficiently advanced that manufacturing was a feasible option. But ‘sufficiently
advanced’ is a bit ambiguous, as the case studies in this book reveal. Certainly the
relationship between tariffs and manufacturing growth has been ambiguous.
By definition, one would expect tariffs to spur the growth of import-competing
manufacturing industry. But, by the same token, you would also expect it to
hamper the growth of export-oriented commodity processing, and early on this
was the most important modern industrial activity in resource-abundant and
labour-scarce regions such as Southeast Asia and Latin America.
More fundamentally, the need for protection when developing a manufacturing
sector depended on underlying patterns of comparative advantage. In labour-
abundant countries, labour-intensive manufacturing had at least a chance of getting
off the ground without the artificial stimulus of tariffs: in labour-abundant China
and India, for example, modern manufacturing first emerged during the late
nineteenth century under conditions close to free trade (Chapters 9, 10). When
post-colonial governments in such countries decided to actively promote industrial
growth, they were fostering the development of sectors with genuine growth
potential. In labour-scarce countries, on the other hand, protection was probably
going to be required if labour-intensive manufacturing were to get off the ground at
all: industrialization in peripheral Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America
typically originated behind tariff barriers, which makes sense given their resource-
abundant and labour-scarce factor endowments (Chapters 5, 12, 13). The long-run
problem, however, was that such protection was explicitly working against the
forces of comparative advantage. When these countries eventually liberalized in the
1980s or 1990s, many lost a good deal of the industry that had been built up under
protection—Eastern and Southeast Europe offer good examples (Chapters 3–5).
The impact of policy was particularly dramatic in those economies which turned
to Communism: Russia after the First World War, and its satellites in Eastern
Europe as well as China after the Second World War. Russia, and especially
Bulgaria and Romania, did not have a natural comparative advantage in manufac-
turing; China probably did, at least when it came to labour-intensive activities.
All promoted capital-intensive heavy industry for ideological reasons, which clearly
went against their initial comparative advantage. To this end, foreign trade was
monopolized by the state, while it promoted rapid capital accumulation via forced
savings. All of these countries eventually suffered massively due to diminished
efficiency. The experience following liberalization in the 1980s or 1990s has
differed greatly across these countries. While the Chinese central planners helped
lay the basis for the subsequent growth miracle, by changing factor endowments,
importing technology, and providing a manufacturing base that would become
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much more efficient, Eastern European countries like Bulgaria and Romania have
deindustrialized since 1989, while even Russia has reverted to being far more of a
resource-exporter (Chapters 3, 5, 9). India, which also pursued capital-intensive
industrialization strategies, saw its services sector—rather than manufacturing or
the primary sector—expand dramatically after liberalization. These examples sug-
gest once again that comparative advantage determined the impact of liberalization.
Protectionism and, more generally, openness had different effects in different
countries. Where technologies were imported from abroad, this was typically done
by importing both machines and skilled foreign workers to operate and maintain
them. This required foreign exchange, so trade openness of some sort was essential.
But whereas Chinese and Indian textiles could be produced under conditions of
free trade, based on cheap labour, and then sold in large local markets, peripheral
European textile industries were protected, and probably had to be in order to
survive import competition from industrial neighbours close by. Consumer goods
industries in Latin America, which relied on the protection afforded by distance
and/or trade policies, and fast-growing local markets, did well when commodity
exports boomed, since this increased local demand. Export processing in labour-
scarce and resource-abundant African and Southeast Asian regions—with small
local markets poorly integrated by transport—relied especially heavily on inter-
national trade. Such conditions made it difficult and in some cases impossible to
begin much local consumer goods production, until the Second World War and
the post-war ISI years offered protection from foreign imports.
During the post-war period, labour-abundant and resource-scarce East Asia
exploited its comparative advantage by subsidizing export-oriented industries.
The ‘gang of four’ (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) led
that charge in the 1960s. Meanwhile, labour-scarce and resource-abundant
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia had to fight against their
comparative advantage if they wanted to develop manufacturing, by protecting
their local market. They led the post-Second World War ISI protectionist charge.
Finally, several of the chapters in this volume document regional industrializa-
tion patterns which suggest the importance of location, irrespective of the country’s
trade policies. Modern industry in Austria-Hungary first emerged in the northwest,
close to West European neighbours, in what is today Austria and the Czech
Republic (Chapter 5). It also appeared in the Italian northwest, also contiguous
with a bigWest European neighbour (Chapter 6). Factory production in China was
initially located in the southeast, especially in the Lower Yangzi coastal area around
Shanghai, with a smaller cluster in Manchuria (Chapter 9). Modern Indian indus-
try first appeared in port cities such as Calcutta and Bombay (Chapter 10). In
Turkey, modern factories initially clustered in Constantinople and Izmir in the
west and Adana in the south, both coastal regions (Chapter 7). These regional
agglomerations were typically linked to trade connections with the rest of
the world: port cities offered access to foreign capital, cheap raw material
imports, entrepreneurship and modern technology (as in the cases of India and
China), or access to foreign export markets (as in the cases of Austria-Hungary and
Italy). Symmetrically, factory production was more regionally dispersed where
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geography inhibited national market integration, as in Mexico, Columbia, and
Chile (Chapters 12 and 13).
1 .6 THE ROAD MAP
Chapter 2 (Agustín Bénétrix, Kevin O’Rourke, and Jeffrey Williamson) offers a
quantitative assessment of manufacturing growth in the periphery from the 1870s
to today. It shows that, on average, the periphery has experienced ‘industrial
catching-up’ on countries with higher levels of industrial output per capita since
at least the inter-war period. The remaining chapters build their narrative inter-
pretations around this empirical summary. The chapters in Part I deal with the
European periphery and the Middle East: Russia (Chapter 3, Andrei Markevich
and Steven Nafziger); East and Central Europe (Chapter 4, Alexander Klein,
Max-Stephan Schulze, and Tamás Vonyó); Southeast Europe (Chapter 5, Michael
Kopsidis and Martin Ivanov); Italy (Chapter 6, Mateo Gomellini and Gianni
Toniolo); and the Middle East (Chapter 7, Ulaş Karakoç, Şevket Pamuk, and
Laura Panza). Part II of the book deals with the biggest part of the periphery,
Asia: Northeast Asia (Chapter 8, Dwight Perkins and John Tang); China
(Chapter 9, Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, and Thomas Rawski); South Asia
(Chapter 10, Bishnupriya Gupta and Tirthankar Roy); and Southeast Asia
(Chapter 11, Jean-Pascal Bassino and Jeffrey Williamson). Two chapters on
Latin America follow in Part III: Mexico and Peru (Chapter 12, Aurora Gómez
Galvarriato and Graciela Márquez Colín) and South America (Chapter 13, Xavier
Duran, Aldo Musacchio and Gerardo della Paolera). The volume concludes in Part
IV with a chapter on Sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 14, Gareth Austin, Ewout
Frankema, and Morten Jerven).
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2
Measuring the Spread of Modern
Manufacturing to the Poor Periphery
Agustín S. Bénétrix, Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke,
and Jeffrey Gale Williamson
2.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter documents the historical origins of industrial growth in the developing
world, drawing on a vast amount of data constructed by economic historians in
recent decades.1 These origins stretch surprisingly far back into the past, in some
countries even before 1890. By the inter-war period, rapid industrial growth can be
found in all major regions of the developing world, and this continued into the
post-war ISI (import-substituting industrialization) years. Indeed, industrial
growth between 1920 and 1990 was faster in developing countries than in the
leading industrial economies.
This chapter also documents per capita manufacturing growth rates in order to
see when ‘industrial catching-up’ on the leaders first began. These per capita growth
rates reflect both manufacturing productivity growth and changes in the share of
the labour force employed in manufacturing.2 The industrial catching-up which we
document here is thus not comparable with the manufacturing productivity
convergence which is the focus of Dani Rodrik’s (2013, 2015) work, or with the
GDP per capita convergence which has been explored by so many economists
starting in the 1980s and 1990s (Abramovitz, 1986; Barro, 1997). When devel-
oping countries experienced industrial catching-up as we define it here, shifting
resources into manufacturing (extensive development) and increasing manufactur-
ing productivity (intensive development), both extensive and intensive develop-
ment played central roles, as they have done ever since the British Industrial
Revolution (Crafts, 1985).
1 This chapter is amuch shortened and extensively revised version of Bénétrix et al. (2015), using revised
country-specific data available at <http://cepr.org/content/trade-depression>. (See also Williamson, 2010
and 2011.) The research has received generous help frommany scholars listed in the 2015 paper, and also
from the authors of the chapters following, whose data is used in this version.
2 They also reflect changes in the labour participation rate.
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2.2 MEASURING INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
Before we press on with the empirical analysis, we need to discuss problems of
measurement. We have already pointed out in Chapter 1 that this volume speaks to
output (and labour productivity) growth, not to industrialization per se. That is, in
contrast with most of the previous literature, we do not measure and analyse the
determinants of manufacturing output or employment shares. This makes our
measurement problems less challenging, since we do not have to worry about the
relative prices of manufacturing and non-manufacturing output. But we face other
problems, especially in measuring manufacturing growth in earlier periods.
Our interest is in the spread of modern manufacturing embedded in large
factories driven by steam, water, and electrical power. Many of the time series in
the chapters that follow and in this one include small-scale, household cottage
industries using traditional labour-intensive technologies. Where that is true,
modern manufacturing output growth is understated, since the rise of factories is
partially offset by the fall of cottage industries. Where we have the evidence for both
sorts of industrial activities, we see that the problem is only manifested in the very
early phases of growth. The inclusion of cottage industry does not seriously damage
any of the conclusions reached here.3
This bias towards understating modern manufacturing growth early on may be
offset by another bias working in the opposite direction. There is a tendency for
output to be better documented in rapidly growing sectors, so that if the docu-
mented sectors are assumed to be representative of all industry, the overall indus-
trial growth rate will be exaggerated. Crafts and Harley (1992) have shown this to
have been true of the British industrial growth rate during the Industrial Revolu-
tion, thus revising the growth rate downwards. Recent work on Japan by the
Hitotsubashi team similarly revises downwards the industrial growth rate during
the early Meiji period. The new data in this book were constructed with an eye to
this problem. While we can hardly claim that it has been purged, we believe it has
been minimized.4
2.3 THE INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT DATA
We have collected manufacturing and industrial output data for as many countries
between 1870 and 2007 as the historical records permit. Since Paul Bairoch’s
(1982) pioneering work more than three decades ago, scholars across the world
have been building pre-1950 historical national accounts that have pushed back our
quantitative knowledge of periphery GDP and its components into the inter-war or
3 It should be emphasized that many cottage industries in the poor periphery were destroyed in the
nineteenth century as Western European factories flooded world markets with cheap goods made by
modern technologies. Thus this measurement problem is more serious in the early stages of the leaders’
history, especially Western Europe, than in the poor periphery which is our focus.
4 The previous footnote applies here as well.
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even the pre-1914 period. This chapter starts with the manufacturing value-added
data provided by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, supplemented
by the United Nation’s Industrial Statistics Database. Other frequently used sources
include Smits, Woltjer, and Ma (2009), the Montevideo–Oxford Latin American
Economic History Database, and the United Nations historical trade statistics
database. As we went further back in time, we relied increasingly on individual
country sources, including those reported in the chapters that follow in this volume.
We focus on eight periods, each with distinctive characteristics. The years before
the First World War are divided into two sub-periods, before and after 1896, both
of which comprised the crescendo of the first global century characterized by the
gold standard, a world trade boom, liberal peripheral commercial policy (with the
exception of Latin America and parts of Eastern Europe), and falling transport
costs. The year 1896 is chosen as the dividing line since it marks the end of a period
of falling prices (especially commodity prices, the exports in which the periphery
specialized), which was followed by rising prices in the decades immediately prior to
the First World War. The years from 1913 to 1920 saw the First World War,
blockades, submarine warfare, the withdrawal of European manufacturers from
peripheral markets, and economic chaos in the immediate aftermath of the fighting.
The inter-war period from 1920 to 1938 contained the Great Depression, the
collapse of world trade and commodity prices, and the rise of anti-global restric-
tions. The years between 1938 and 1950 saw another world war, leading again to a
complete disruption of normal trade patterns. From 1950 to 1973, there was post-
war reconstruction of former belligerents, and decolonization and ISI policies in the
periphery. Following the oil crises and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
agreement, the years from 1973 to 1990 were ones of a pro-global and pro-
market policy transition in the poor periphery, which continued up to 2007.
There are 177 countries in the 1990–2007 sample. Naturally, the further back
into the past we go, the fewer are the countries whose manufacturing growth can
be documented, and the smaller are the samples. Thus, our sample falls to
147 countries in 1973–90, 105 in 1950–73, 62 in 1938–50, 58 in 1920–38, 48
in 1913–20, 43 in 1896–1913, and 36 in 1870–90. The empirical analysis that
follows will make an effort to deal with this issue by using both constant and
variable samples.
Many of our developing country observations before 1896 come from the
European periphery, but for this period we also have data for Japan, China,
British India, Dutch Indonesia, Siam (Thailand), Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
Uruguay, andOttoman Turkey. After 1896, we add Korea, Burma, the Philippines,
Taiwan, Colombia, and Peru to this list. And by the inter-war period, we have
information for six additional Latin American countries, as well as for Egypt, what
was then known as the Belgian Congo, and South Africa. To the extent that other
countries were experiencing modern industrialization before they started to collect
industrial statistics, what we are documenting here probably understates the early
spread of modern manufacturing.
Although the econometric analysis in section 2.7 uses country/time observations,
the tables and figures below typically report the evidence by six regions. The first
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includes the three traditional industrial leaders: the United Kingdom (UK),
Germany and the United States (US). The second includes those in the poor
European periphery to the south and east. The remaining four poor periphery groups
are the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin
America and the Caribbean (hereafter simply Latin America). We will occasionally
refer to these last four regions and the European periphery as ‘the poor periphery’, or
as the ‘followers’, and to the industrial leaders as ‘the core’, or as the ‘leaders’.
2 .4 WHEN AND WHERE DID INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
IN THE PERIPHERY BEGIN?
When did the poor periphery start recording rapid manufacturing output growth?
The growth rates reported in Table 2.1 are computed by regressing the log of real
manufacturing output on a time trend. The regional growth rates are simple
unweighted averages of individual country growth rates.
Table 2.1 uses two definitions of the country groupings. The first uses the same
industrial leaders throughout—the UK, Germany, and the US. The second recog-
nizes that the UK was no longer an industrial leader in the post-Second World War
era, while Japan was. The three industrial leaders from 1950 onwards are thus the
US, Germany, and Japan. Of course, Japan is then removed from the poor Asian
group after 1939.
What do these data tell us? Growth among the leaders was fairly steady between
1870 and 1913, averaging 3.2–3.3 per cent per annum, followed by a decline to
Table 2.1. Average industrial growth rates (per cent, per annum)
Groups 1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38 1938–50 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007
Leaders 3.2 3.3 1.4 1.9 0.9 5.2 1.1 2.1
Leaders* 1.0 7.9 2.4 2.2
European
Periphery
4.6 4.4 6.3 4.7 3.1 8.8 3.1 2.8
Asia 3.0 4.4 4.3 4.3 1.1 8.5 5.8 4.2
Asia* 0.7 8.3 5.9 4.3
Latam and
Caribbean




1.0 1.5 5.4 4.7 5.0 6.3 5.9 4.4
Sub-Saharan
Africa
13.4 4.6 8.6 5.5 3.5 3.9
Note: The table reports unweighted average industrial growth rates by region. Individual country growth rates are
computed as the β coefficient of the following regression: Y=α+βt where Y is the natural logarithm of industrial
production and t is a linear time trend. Leaders are the US, Germany, and the UK while Leaders* are the US and
Germany, plus the UK before 1939, Japan after. Asia* is Asia excluding Japan after 1939.
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1.4 per cent per annum during the First World War and 1.9 per cent during the
inter-war period when the Great Depression did so much damage to their
manufacturing sectors. Table 2.1 confirms the impressive industry-led ‘growth
miracle’ during 1950–73. Still including the UK among the leaders into the post-
war era, the leader growth rate was 5.2 per cent per annum; if instead the UK is
replaced by Japan, the leader growth rate was 7.9 per cent per annum. These were,
of course, the years of the German Wirtschaftswunder and the Japanese post-war
growth miracle. After 1973, however, growth in the three post-war leaders averaged
a little more than 2 per cent per annum, and it was only 1.1 per cent during
1973–90 if the UK is included among the leaders. This leader slowdown must in
part have been due to the fact that war reconstruction forces were exhausted, and
to the poor macroeconomic conditions following the oil crises. But long-term
deindustrialization forces were probably playing the bigger role, as suggested by
the continued slow industrial growth of the leaders between 1990 and 2007.
Our main interest, however, is in the performance of the periphery. The most
striking finding in Table 2.1 is perhaps the strong performance of Latin America
since 1870. Latin America was one of the earliest regions to experience rapid
manufacturing growth, 4.1 per cent per annum from 1870 to the First World
War. Indeed, Latin American manufacturing grew faster than that of the three
original leaders in all periods before 2007. Growth was very rapid during the Second
WorldWar and 1950–73, in excess of 5 per cent per annum.However, after 1973 its
growth rate slowed to less than 3 per cent, and it slowed again after 1990. After 1990,
Latin American manufacturing growth of 2.3 per cent resembled that of a rich
country that had completed its industrialization phase. In contrast, Asia, MENA,
and Sub-Saharan Africa all saw much higher growth rates after 1990—around 4 per
cent per annum—a performance consistent with their late-comer status.
The European periphery was an equally rapid early industrializer, with
per annum growth rates of 4.4–4.6 per cent before the First World War,
4.7 per cent during the inter-war period, and 8.8 per cent during the European
Golden Age. Indeed, the European periphery growth rate exceeded that of the
leaders during every period after 1870, with the exception of the First World War.
While Latin America and the European periphery were both recording rapid
industrial growth from 1870 onwards, other regions joined them after 1896. There
was very rapid industrial growth in Asia, which exceeded that of the leaders in all
subsequent periods except for 1938–50. The years between 1896 and 1913 were
ones of impressive industrialization in the poor periphery: with the exception of
MENA (represented here by Turkey alone), and Sub-Saharan Africa (for which we
have no data), average growth rates were in excess of 4 per cent per annum in all
periphery regions, greater than the industrial core.
Table 2.2 gives some country detail, showing the growth experiences of the first
countries in each peripheral region achieving a ten-year average per annum growth
rate of 5 per cent or higher. Latin America was led by Brazil, Chile, Argentina,
Uruguay, and Mexico, while the European periphery was led by Finland, Russia,
Austria, and Hungary. With the exception of Mexico, these countries first achieved
ten years of 5 per cent average growth as early as the 1880s, implying that rapid
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Table 2.2. Industrial growth in early members of the ‘modern growth club’
Group Country In 1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38 1938–50 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007
European Periphery Finland 1880 4.4 4.2 5.8 6.7 4.4 6.0 3.5 6.4
European Periphery Russia 1880 5.5 3.9 24.4 15.7 0.7 5.9 1.2 1.0
European Periphery Austria 1883 5.0 3.8 9.6 2.3 1.3 5.8 2.6 2.8
European Periphery Hungary 1883 5.0 3.8 10.0 4.0 0.4 7.3 1.9 5.9
Asia Japan 1896 3.3 5.0 6.5 6.7 3.7 12.4 4.1 1.0
Asia China 1900 7.8 7.8 9.4 5.3 2.2 9.2 8.3 9.8
Asia Philippines 1913 6.3 10.1 3.4 9.4 7.0 1.8 3.3
Asia Taiwan 1914 5.1 9.8 4.4 10.4 11.6 8.7 4.9
Asia Korea 1922 8.0 3.2 7.2 1.2 12.8 11.7 7.4
Latam and Caribbean Brazil 1880 7.9 3.6 6.7 3.2 7.0 8.0 2.6 2.1
Latam and Caribbean Chile 1881 6.4 3.9 1.2 2.6 6.5 5.1 2.2 3.5
Latam and Caribbean Argentina 1886 7.6 7.6 2.0 4.2 4.2 4.9 1.0 1.7
Latam and Caribbean Uruguay 1886 4.1 4.0 2.7 3.2 4.8 1.3 1.5 0.1
Latam and Caribbean Mexico 1899 2.0 3.6 0.3 3.4 6.9 7.5 3.1 3.2
Middle East and North Africa Turkey 1927 1.0 1.5 10.7 8.5 0.2 9.5 5.1 4.1
Middle East and North Africa Egypt 1942 0.2 0.9 6.0 5.7 5.8 5.0
Middle East and North Africa Tunisia 1948 1.8 4.0 7.0 4.6
Middle East and North Africa Morocco 1949 12.5 4.8 4.2 2.9
Middle East and North Africa Algeria 1959 9.8 7.4 0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa 1924 13.4 6.7 7.1 7.0 2.7 2.6
Sub-Saharan Africa Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1941 2.4 13.5 3.3 0.6 3.9
Sub-Saharan Africa Zimbabwe 1950 5.2 6.7 2.9 3.7
Sub-Saharan Africa Kenya 1964 8.8 5.4 1.7
Sub-Saharan Africa Zambia 1966 8.3 2.4 2.8
























growth began during the 1870s. Asia was led by Japan and China, with the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Korea following close behind: all but Korea had joined
the ‘modern industrial growth club’ by the First World War.
Industrial production suffered in Turkey and peripheral Europe during the First
World War, but elsewhere it continued growing rapidly. Rapid industrial growth
became universal during the inter-war period: all peripheral regions, with the
exception of Latin America, posted average manufacturing growth rates greater
than 4 per cent during this period (Table 2.1): 4.3 per cent per annum in Asia,
4.6 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa (the data refer only to South Africa and the
Belgian Congo), and 4.7 per cent in the European periphery and MENA. Indeed,
growth rates in MENA and the European periphery bucked the inter-war down-
ward trend in that they were even higher between the wars than before 1914. Only
in Latin America did industrial growth rates decline significantly between the wars,
to 2.7 per cent per annum.
The Second World War led to substantial declines in manufacturing output in
China, Japan, and other countries affected by the fighting, but elsewhere in the
periphery output grew rapidly. Manufacturing growth was even higher in
the periphery between 1950 and 1973: it reached 8.8 per cent per annum in the
European periphery, 8.3 per cent in Asia, 6.3 per cent in MENA, 5.7 per cent in
Latin America, and 5.5 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa. These impressive perform-
ances were generally not sufficient to match post-war ‘miraculous’ growth in the US,
Germany, and Japan (7.9 per cent), but were higher than the average growth rate in
the US, the UK, and Germany (5.2 per cent), and much higher than the leaders’
collective performance between 1870 and 1913 (3.2–3.3 per cent per annum).
Manufacturing growth declined in the periphery as a whole after 1973, and again
after 1990, although it still remained high in Asia, MENA, and Sub-Saharan Africa,
and was considerably higher than in the leaders.
In summary, rapid industrial growth began in Latin America and the European
periphery in the 1870s. It spread to Asia after the 1890s, and to MENA and Sub-
Saharan Africa in the inter-war years. The high point was 1950–73, and since then
industrial growth has been declining.
2 .5 WHEN DID RAPID INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
BECOME WIDESPREAD?
We are interested not only in whenmodern industrial growth began in each region, but
also in when it began to be widespread. Fig. 2.1 addresses this issue. We first calculate
for each country the first year in which it posted a cumulative ten-year growth rate
superior to 5 per cent per annum. That is, we calculate the first year for which we can
document when each country joined the ‘modern industrial growth club’ thus defined.
The share of the countries in each region that had joined the modern industrial
growth club is plotted in Fig. 2.1. The shares are monotonically increasing, since
we are not concerned with the industrially mature as they permanently exit from
the club (like most of the European core in the 1960s and 1970s). After all,
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deindustrialization and a shift to high-tech services is a natural transition for
successful economies to make.
Fig. 2.1 shows the successive waves of diffusion of rapid manufacturing growth:
first the European periphery, then Latin America, then Asia, thenMENA, and finally
Sub-Saharan Africa. By 1913, 28 per cent of the European periphery, 10 per cent
of Asia, and 18 per cent of Latin America had joined the modern industrial growth
club. Since club membership is based on a retrospective criterion, this implies
that these countries had been growing rapidly since well before the First World
War. By 1938, club membership had been attained by half of the European
periphery, 18 per cent of Asia, and 26 per cent of Latin America, but still only
6 per cent of MENA and 2 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africa. By 1973 and the end of
the ISI period, the threshold had been attained by 63 per cent of the European
periphery, 31 per cent of Asia, 56 per cent of Latin America, 44 per cent of MENA, and
16 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Fig. 2.2 provides an alternative perspective: it measures the proportion of
a region’s 2007 population that was living in countries which had attained the
5 per cent growth threshold by any given year. By giving more weight to Brazil than
to Saint Lucia, or to China than to Bhutan, the measured diffusion rates are
increased dramatically. This suggests that population and domestic market size
were an important determinant of industrial performance between 1913 and 1973,
a long anti-global episode. By the First World War, the 5 per cent threshold had
been attained in countries accounting for 49 per cent of the European periphery’s





















































































Middle East and North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Fig. 2.1. Regional diffusion curves: reaching the 5 per cent threshold
Note: The figure shows the proportion of countries for which the ten-year backward-looking average industrial
growth rate exceeded a 5 per cent threshold.
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America’s population—already very large numbers. By 1938, the modern indus-
trial growth club had been attained by countries accounting for three-quarters of
the population in these three poor periphery regions. By 1973, the club had been
attained in countries accounting for 83 per cent of the 2007 population of the
European periphery, 94 per cent of the Asian population, 96 per cent of the Latin
American population, 75 per cent of the MENA population, and even 35 per cent
of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa. Industrial diffusion was virtually com-
plete, according to this population-weighted criterion. In Asia, Latin America, and
the European periphery, the years 1870–1938 were the ones that saw the greatest
diffusion; in MENA, diffusion occurred largely between the Second World War
and the first oil crisis; in Sub-Saharan Africa it proceeded steadily between the inter-
war years and the 1990s, when it dramatically accelerated. Overall, the decades
between 1896 and 1938 saw the most rapid diffusion of industry to the periphery,
at least as measured by output growth.
2.6 WAS THERE HISTORICAL PERSISTENCE?
To what extent were high-growth countries in one period also high-growth countries





















































































Middle East and North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Fig. 2.2. Regional population-weighted diffusion curves: reaching the 5 per cent threshold
Note: The figure shows the proportion of the region’s population in 2007 living in countries for which the ten-year
backward-looking average industrial growth rate exceeded a 5 per cent threshold. Countries for which data are
missing are assumed not to have exceeded this threshold.
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Table 2.3. The top ten performers by region and period
European Periphery
1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina Greece Russia
Serbia and Montenegro Russia Yugoslavia Latvia
Bulgaria Austria Spain Finland
Romania Hungary Romania Romania
Finland Finland Italy Greece
Italy Romania Portugal Bulgaria
Russia Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Ireland
Austria Spain Finland Estonia
Hungary Portugal Bulgaria Hungary
Portugal Italy Austria Poland
Asia
1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38
Korea China Philippines Korea
China Japan Taiwan Japan
Philippines Indonesia China China
Taiwan Thailand Japan Taiwan






1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38
Argentina Brazil Brazil Colombia
Peru Argentina Peru Argentina
Uruguay Chile Uruguay Costa Rica
Chile Uruguay Argentina Peru
Brazil Mexico Colombia Mexico





Middle East and North Africa
1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38
Turkey Turkey Egypt Turkey
Turkey Egypt
Sub-Saharan Africa
1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38
South Africa South Africa
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
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European Periphery
1938–50 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007
Albania Albania Cyprus Ireland
Bulgaria Malta Ireland Lithuania
Ireland Bulgaria Malta Slovak Republic
Poland Romania Portugal Poland
Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Bulgaria Finland
Finland Cyprus Latvia Hungary
Portugal Poland Yugoslavia
Spain Spain Italy Czech Republic
Austria Italy Finland Belarus
Czechoslovakia Greece Austria Estonia
Asia
1938–50 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007
Philippines Singapore Bhutan Cambodia
Thailand Korea Indonesia Myanmar
India Malaysia Korea Afghanistan
Korea Japan Maldives Vietnam
China Taiwan Taiwan China
Japan Thailand Malaysia Kazakhstan




Taiwan Mongolia Tonga Korea
China China Malaysia




1938–50 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007
Colombia Belize Grenada Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela Puerto Rico St. Lucia Costa Rica
El Salvador Panama Dominica Dominican Republic
Brazil Barbados Paraguay Peru
Mexico Nicaragua Belize Honduras
Ecuador Brazil Antigua and Barbuda Belize
Nicaragua Costa Rica St Vincent and the
Grenadines
Nicaragua
Chile Mexico Puerto Rico El Salvador
Honduras Venezuela Cuba St. Kitts and Nevis
Uruguay Peru Ecuador Suriname
Middle East and North Africa
1938–50 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007




Egypt Israel Algeria Oman
(continued )
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region and time period, ranked by their average growth performance over the period
as a whole. Certain countries appear consistently in the table: Russia, Bulgaria, China,
Japan, India, and Brazil being among the most prominent. It appears that the current
BRICs’ rapid industrial growth is a phenomenon with deep historical roots. How-
ever, Table 2.3 shows that there also has been a good deal of churning over time, with
many countries entering and exiting the leader board within a brief space of time
(and, occasionally, re-entering at a later date).
Fig. 2.3 confirms that there has been relatively little persistence over time in
long-run industrial growth rates. It computes the correlation coefficient between
average growth rates in adjacent periods. It does so both using a consistent thirty-
country sample, and using the largest sample of countries for which data exist for
both periods. These correlation coefficients were quite high for the nineteenth
century (0.5 in the fixed sample to 0.62 in the changing sample), and much lower
in the mid-twentieth century (0.16 to 0.19) and since 1990 (0.15 to 0.49),
suggesting that achieving rapid growth in one period was only a weak predictor
of rapid growth in the subsequent period. While there are important exceptions,
rapid long-run industrial growth was not very persistent in the twentieth century.
Table 2.3. Continued
European Periphery
1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38
Tunisia Algeria Saudi Arabia Jordan
Turkey Turkey Tunisia Iran, Islamic
Republic of
Saudi Arabia Syrian Arab Republic Syrian Arab Republic
Egypt Sudan Yemen, Republic of
Morocco Egypt Saudi Arabia
Tunisia Turkey Sudan
Syrian Arab Republic Jordan Egypt
Sudan Morocco Tunisia
Sub-Saharan Africa
1938–50 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007
Congo, Dem. Rep. of Malawi Swaziland Equatorial Guinea
South Africa Central African
Republic
Cameroon Mozambique
Zimbabwe Mozambique Cape Verde Namibia
Kenya Lesotho Uganda
Botswana Botswana Lesotho
Zambia Mauritius Sierra Leone
Cameroon Mali Angola




Zimbabwe Gambia, The Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso Congo, Rep. of Benin
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2.7 UNCONDITIONAL INDUSTRIAL CATCHING-UP
There is a vast empirical literature that asks whether poorer countries grow more
rapidly than richer ones, and thus converge on the richer countries—and it has
found that they do not (Abramovitz, 1986; Barro, 1997; Bourguignon and
Morrisson, 2002). Instead, that literature has only found conditional convergence
(Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple, 2005). More recently, however, Rodrik (2013)
has found evidence of unconditional convergence in labour productivity for indi-
vidual manufacturing sectors. Since we do not have comparable data for manufac-
turing employment, we cannot speak to the productivity issue. Instead, we ask a
different question: did countries with low manufacturing output per capita sys-
tematically experience more rapid per capita growth in manufacturing output than
countries with high manufacturing output per capita?
We begin by comparing rates of per capita manufacturing growth in our
five peripheral regions to those in the core (in previous sections we explored
aggregate rather than per capita manufacturing growth). Table 2.4 gives the differ-
ence between peripheral and leader per capita growth rates, for both definitions of
the leading group. As can be seen, per capita growth rates in the European
periphery exceeded those in the core throughout, except during the First World



















Changing sample Fixed sample (1896–1913)
Fig. 2.3. Cross-country correlations: growth in subsequent periods
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during the Second World War. Latin American per capita growth rates were
uneven, higher than core rates in only three or four of the eight periods. The
same was true of MENA and Sub-Saharan per capita growth rates: they were only
occasionally higher than core growth rates. The period which saw the most uniform
peripheral ‘catching-up’ on the core was the inter-war period.
When did it become true that per capita manufacturing growth rates were
systematically higher in less industrialized countries, and when was this tendency
most pronounced? In order to answer this question, we need to compare levels of
manufacturing output across countries. We use two approaches. First, the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators report comparable manufacturing output
levels for 2001, expressed in US dollars. We extrapolate these comparable 2001
output levels back in time to 1870 using our manufacturing output indices, and
Table 2.4. Catching-up: industrial growth rate relative to leaders
Panel A: Leaders are always the US, Germany, and the UK
Groups 1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38 1938–50 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007
European
Periphery
0.9 0.6 6.8 2.7 1.1 4.0 1.7 0.3
Asia 1.0 2.2 1.4 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.9 0.0
Latam and
Caribbean




1.4 1.0 7.5 2.4 2.1 0.6 2.3 0.4
Sub-Saharan
Africa
9.0 3.5 3.9 0.002 0.3 0.4
Panel B: The US, Germany, and the UK before 1939, Japan after
Groups 1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38 1938–50 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007
European
Periphery
0.9 0.6 6.8 2.7 1.9 2.5 1.0 0.5
Asia 1.0 2.2 1.4 2.5 2.1 1.2 2.1 0.2
Latam and
Caribbean




1.4 1.0 7.5 2.4 2.9 2.0 1.5 0.2
Sub-Saharan
Africa
9.0 3.5 4.7 1.4 1.0 0.2
Note: Average industrial growth rates by region relative to the leaders are computed in two steps. First, we compute
the average per capita growth rates for each region. Second, we subtract the GDP-weighted average of the leaders.
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then divide these output figures by population taken from the World Development
Indicators and Maddison (2010).
There are dangers in extrapolating manufacturing output levels backwards over
such long periods, involving as they do compositional shifts, relative price changes,
and the like. Therefore, we also adopted a second approach, which was to take
Bairoch’s (1982) data on cross-country industrial output per capita for two bench-
mark years (1913, 1928), and then use our annual output indices and population
data to generate comparable absolute levels of per capita manufacturing output for
1870, 1896, and 1920. Similarly, we used UN data for 1967 to generate compar-
able absolute levels of per capita output for 1950, and World Bank data to generate
comparable absolute levels for 1973 and 1990.
Armed with these time series, we can now ask: when was per capita manufac-
turing growth faster in less industrialized countries, where the level of industrial-
ization is measured by manufacturing output per capita? Any industrial catching-up
must have been due either to convergence in economic structure (that is, less
industrialized countries seeing a faster shift of labour out of agriculture and into
manufacturing), or to faster growth in manufacturing labour productivity, or both.
Table 2.5 provides the slope coefficients from regressions of the per annum, per
capita manufacturing output growth rates against initial levels of per capita manu-
facturing output. The first column presents our preferred estimates, using the
Bairoch data for 1913 and 1928, and the UN data for 1967. However, the number
of observations is not constant across time periods in the first column, making the




1870–96 1896–1913 1920–38 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007
1870–96 0.469 0.169
(0.391) (0.173)
1896–1913 0.525 0.024 0.259
(0.353) (0.115) (0.188)
1920–38 0.491** 0.349** 0.398*** 0.537**
(0.206) (0.159) (0.136) (0.232)
1950–73 3.766*** 0.699* 0.688** 0.698*** 0.777***
(0.541) (0.391) (0.304) (0.251) (0.260)
1973–90 0.421*** 0.916* 0.992** 0.749* 0.723** 0.375***
(0.156) (0.469) (0.385) (0.393) (0.285) (0.138)
1990–2007 0.348 0.399* 0.704** 0.452* 0.067 0.233 0.063
(0.222) (0.216) (0.299) (0.252) (0.248) (0.199) (0.156)
Number of countries 27 32 45 57 92 146
Note: Coefficients are obtained by regressing regression-based growth rates of per capita manufacturing output on
the log level of per capita manufacturing output at the beginning of the period. The first column reports coefficients
using period-specific benchmarks; subsequent columns use backward extrapolation from a 2001 benchmark. See
text for details. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels
respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
27Measuring the Spread of Modern Manufacturing to the Poor Periphery
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 16/1/2017, SPi
coefficients difficult to compare.5 The other columns address this issue, using the
data on levels constructed by extrapolating backward from the 2001 World Bank
data. In each column, the sample size is kept constant over time. For example, the
estimated coefficient for the inter-war period, using the sample of countries for
which we have data between 1870 and 1896, is 0.349, which is significant at the
5 per cent level. That inter-war β coefficient can be compared with other periods
which use the same sample, up and down the column.
We find robust evidence—a negative and statistically significant β coefficient—
of industrial catching-up after the First World War. The highpoint of industrial
catching-up in the periphery was the ISI period between 1950 and 1973: while
strong unconditional convergence persisted after the first oil shock and up to 1990,
it was slightly less pronounced than before (both in our preferred specification and
in the larger country samples), and it fizzled out after 1990.
2.8 IMPLICATIONS
Rapid peripheral industrialization is not a phenomenon unique to post-Second
World War ‘miracles’. It took place at least as far back as the 1870s in Latin
America and the European periphery, and was well under way in Asia by the end of
the nineteenth century. It had become widespread in all three regions by the inter-
war period. The highpoint of peripheral industrialization was not 1990–2007, as
modern analysts seem to think, but 1950–73, which was also the highpoint of the
periphery’s industrial catching-up on the core.
As advertised in Chapter 1, the rest of this volume seeks to identify the funda-
mentals explaining the performance documented here.
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3
State and Market in Russian
Industrialization, 1870–2010
Andrei Markevich and Steven Nafziger
3.1 INTRODUCTION
From a low-income, agrarian base, Russia and the Soviet Union experienced an
often-dramatic process of industrial growth from the late nineteenth century into
the second half of the twentieth century.1 While growth emerged from the 1880s,
the economy remained primarily agricultural as late as 1913, with heavy and light
industry contributing 20 per cent of national income, compared to over 40 per cent
in more developed European economies (Gregory, 1982; Mitchell, 1998). After
economic collapse from 1914 to 1922, the New Economic Policies of the 1920s
generated significant recovery but failed to spark the industrial acceleration
demanded by the Bolsheviks. Such a surge did occur following Stalin’s consolidation
of power in the late 1920s. In creating the emblematic ‘command economy’, Stalin
initiated a number of policies that accelerated industrialization, which was accom-
panied by massive changes in all aspects of Soviet society. Stalin’s industrialization
drive entailed enormous human losses and welfare costs. But by the middle of
the twentieth century, the Soviet economy possessed a large modern industrial
sector centred on immense capital-intensive factories utilizing relatively advanced
production technologies, skilled labour, and abundant resources. This impressive
building of industrial capacity allowed for the military expansions of the Second
World War and the Cold War, fuelled resource exploitation in Siberia and
the Far East, and provided the Soviet population with meaningful increases in
living standards.
However, fundamental problems within the Soviet command economy led to a
decline in industrial growth rates from the 1960s onwards. The mobility of cheap
labour from the countryside declined, returns to capital investment fell as misallo-
cations increased, and incentives for innovation and worker effort in an increasingly
complex economy worsened. Although autarkic policies shielded the economy from
1 Andrei Markevich would like to thank the Hoover Institution, Stanford (Stanford, US) and the
Laboratory of Russian Economic History, Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia), with which
he was affiliated when working on this chapter.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/1/2017, SPi
global shocks such as the Great Depression, the limited trade and technological
flows with advanced nations constrained industrial productivity growth, leading
relatively inefficient firms to struggle once the economy opened at the end of the
Soviet period. In contrast, a growing reliance on oil and natural resources
emerged in the post-war period and carried over into the post-Soviet era. By
the twenty-first century, Russia under Vladimir Putin was a post-industrial
economy largely reliant on resource rents.
Our account of the long-run industrial development of Russia and the Soviet
Union centres on the critical role that the state has played. From Alexander
Gerschenkron’s (1965) famous emphasis on substituting for the missing prerequis-
ites of modern growth, to Stalin’s formulation of the command system, to the
autocratic policies of the Putin regime, the state’s guiding (and often dictating) role
in the industrial sector has been a constant theme of Russian and Soviet economic
history. At the same time, we emphasize that even in the Soviet period, markets
and market-like transactions were critical for allocating capital, labour, resource
inputs, and final goods.2 Factor and product markets were sometimes banned or
otherwise inhibited by the state, but even then, informal transactions were of
critical importance. With some exceptions, labour was generally free to shift
towards higher returns throughout the period. Underlying the Soviet veneer of
planning was a system of negotiated horizontal transactions between firms and
vertical bargaining between firms and their industry superiors (Markevich, 2003;
Gregory, 2004). Foreign capital, trade, and technological flows were vital for the
early stages of Tsarist industrialization and continued to impact Soviet industrial
development, even under conditions of professed autarky. The recent industrial
experience of post-Soviet Russia has been characterized by a renewed openness to
foreign capital and trade, a reversal of the emphasis on heavy manufacturing that
characterized the Soviet period, and a growing dependence on resource-based
sectors under tightening state control.
Before proceeding, two definitional issues must be addressed. The first is what
we mean by ‘industry’. In general, we refer to non-agricultural, non-service
production that utilizes capital, motive power, labour, and intermediate inputs to
produce a concrete final product. This encompasses heavy and light industry,
mining, and the processing of agricultural products and natural resources. We
rely on a newly constructed (and consistently defined) time series of per capita
industrial production from 1860 to 2010, which we consider in conjunction with
other qualitative and quantitative evidence of industrial activity over the period.
A second issue is what do we mean by ‘Russia’? Although our core evidence on
industrial output is measured in per capita terms, boundary changes require us to
focus on slightly different geographies over time. By 1870, the Russian Empire
included the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Baltic provinces of ‘European
Russia’ as well as the Caucuses, parts of central Asia, Siberia, Bessarabia (modern
2 Our emphasis on state–market interactions echoes a long literature. For example, Crisp (1991,
p. 260) argues that Imperial industrialization arose out of an ‘interaction between autonomous,
i.e. market driven, and “induced”, that is state initiated or assisted, development’.
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Moldova), Finland, and the Polish provinces. Following standard practices, we
exclude Finland from our account.3 With some exceptions (that is, the Baltics),
the boundaries of the Soviet Union were similar to the Tsarist ones after 1922. The
largest discrepancies emerge in the last twenty-five years. The break-up of the Soviet
Union in 1991 meant the disintegration of a unified statistical record. As a result,
our focus in this last period is on the Russian Federation, which corresponds to the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic within the old USSR.
3.2 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE TSARS
Historians typically date the birth of Russian industry to initiatives of Peter the
Great and his successors in the eighteenth century, which fostered some large
metallurgical and textile operations, based on backward production technologies
and coerced (that is, serf) labour. However, it is really only in the second quarter of
the nineteenth century that substantive signs of modern industrial development can
be observed, and it is only after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 that this
sector’s growth can be even partially documented.4 Although tariff policies and
state demand certainly helped initiate industrial growth, particularly in Poland, the
Baltics, St Petersburg and the region around Moscow, serfdom and the weak legal
environment for business probably did much to hinder industry prior to 1861.5
Defeat in the Crimean War revealed Russia’s economic backwardness, leading to a
slow but accelerating process of economic change that lasted to the Bolshevik
Revolution.
The empirical record is clearer after 1861. The research of scholars like
Goldsmith (1961), Gregory (1982), and others gives us the Imperial component
3 It is impossible to separate out Poland in the Imperial data. According to one estimate, Poland
produced about 8 per cent of Imperial output in 1897, and per capita income was about 5 roubles
more than the mean of roughly 74 roubles (Markevich, 2015a). Our industrial output series includes
Poland for the Imperial period, which was more industrialized than Russia (23 against 14 roubles per
capita in 1897), but we are confident that our interpretations would hold if we were able to exclude
that region.
4 Mechanization only took hold slowly in cotton spinning after Britain began to allow machinery
exports (1830s), while other textile sectors remained backward and largely reliant on peasant home
production. In the Moscow region, peasant households allocated much of their labour to proto-
industrial activities in putting-out systems for weaving cloth, along with artisanal production of crafts
and small-scale artisanal goods. Limited quantitative evidence suggests that the number of factories and
the factory labour force increased steadily over the first sixty years of the nineteenth century, albeit from
extremely low levels. On Russian industrial growth before 1861, see Blackwell (1968) and Kahan
(1967; 1985).
5 Although many peasants were able to move into non-agricultural employment in this period
(Dennison, 2011; Fedorov, 1974), low agricultural productivity, constraints on labour mobility, and
other institutional aspects of serfdom certainly limited domestic demand for industrial output
(Markevich and Zhuravskaya, 2015). The installation of relatively high revenue tariffs on
manufacturing goods from 1811 created some protection for domestic production, which persisted
throughout the Tsarist era (Blackwell, 1968, Chapter 5). Overall, the legal environment for large-scale
industrial firms remained relatively weak in the Tsarist period (Owen, 2002). Incorporation was
expensive and politicized, although firms that did receive a formal charter were able to tap domestic
and foreign capital markets and expand as a result (Gregg, 2014).
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of a Russian/Soviet industrial per capita output series for 1870–2010. This series—
depicted in Fig. 3.1 and summarized in Table 3.1—includes manufacturing, min-
ing, and fuel production, but excludes utilities and transportation.6 While the
Imperial part of the data cover the vast majority of ‘modern’ industrial activities,
they probably miss some less formal, smaller-scale, and more traditional modes of
manufacturing and mining intended for local and household consumption.7 Such
hidden production was more important earlier in the nineteenth century, which













































































































































































Per capita industrial output (Imperial/Soviet) – left axis
Per capita industrial output (Russia) – left axis
Per capita GDP (Imperial/Soviet) – right axis
Per capita GDP (Russia) – right axis
Fig. 3.1. Russian GDP and industrial output per capita
Note: The left-hand axis refers to 1913 roubles. The right-hand axis refers to 1990 Geary–Khamis dollars. One 1913
rouble was worth approximately 12.4 1990 Geary–Khamis dollars. The Imperial/Soviet series refer to GDP and
industrial output per capita in either the Russian Empire (without Poland for GDP and without Finland for both
series) or the Soviet Union (excluding the Baltics between the wars). The Russia series refer to the Russian Federation
only. The breaks during the Second World War refer to missing data. The underlying industrial output data come
from Goldsmith (1961), Gregory (1982), Markevich and Harrison (2011), Suhara (2006), Suhara (1999), and
Smirnov (2013a; 2013b). Smirnov provides the data from 1991 to 2010 for the Russian Federation in the form of
yearly industrial output growth rates. We apply these rates year by year, beginning with the total output number
provided by Suhara (1999) for 1990 for the Soviet Union, dividing by the Russian Federation’s population in each
year. The sources of the GDP data are Gregory (1982) for 1885–1913, Markevich and Harrison (2011) for
1913–28, and Bolt and Van Zanden (2013) for 1928–2010. We index the pre-1928 data to 1913 and then scale
it by Maddison’s corresponding entry for that year to compare it to the post-1928 data.
6 Although a purer manufacturing series would perhaps be preferable, decomposing available
industrial data into constituent sectors is not possible for our entire period. We do not think that
excluding mining or fuels would significantly change the overall patterns.
7 Imperial statistical sources undercounted such production, as it was generally untaxed and
occurred outside of the legal structure surrounding more modern industrial establishments.
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1860–85 and 1885–1913, Table 3.1) might overstate the pace of late-Tsarist
industrialization.
Nevertheless, our aggregate data still reflect the widely accepted time pattern of
Imperial Russian industrial development: slowly accelerating growth punctuated by
several periods of slowdown. If the record is considered decade by decade, the
1870s, 1890s, and post-1905 periods were high growth, with the 1880s and early
1900s showing slower rates of change. Some scholars have dated the initial onset of
Russia’s modern industrialization to the 1840s or the Stalinist surge of the 1930s;
however, we view the beginning of the transition as perhaps best situated in the
early 1890s. This is consistent with Gregory (1972), who notes that the sectoral
composition of the Russian economy evolved roughly in parallel with more
advanced nations after 1900, although traditional production methods continued
to characterize many industrial branches, and the economy remained relatively
agricultural through the Revolution (Table 3.2).
Table 3.1. Russian industrial and GDP growth rates by period, 1860–2010
Period Sub-period Growth rate of per capita
industrial output
Growth rate

























Note: See Fig. 3.1 for the underlying sources. Each period’s growth rate is the compound rate implied by the
end-point values for each series. For example, we take the values in the years 1940 and 1946 to establish implied
growth rates during the Second World War. The 1990–2010 data refer to the Russian Federation. For the
observations marked with *, we use 1992 and not 1991 as the initial points.
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What explains Imperial Russia’s initially slow pace and subsequent acceleration of
industrial growth? Famously, Gerschenkron (1947; 1965) described a sequencing
that emphasized the relative stagnation of the industrial sector through the 1880s,
the state’s role in fostering something like a take-off in the 1890s, and a final period
of high growth following the Stolypin land reforms in the mid-1900s.
In Gerschenkron’s account, the emancipation reforms of the 1860s reinforced
the communal organization of rural society and installed collective redemption
payments in return for communal land rights. These features undermined agricul-
tural incentives, reduced labour mobility, and kept rural demand low. Only when
the state stepped in during the 1890s to substitute for missing aggregate demand
and to provide tariff and credit support did these ‘conditions of backwardness’
begin to disappear, and industrial growth took off.8 Von Laue (1963) and others
have interpreted these interventions as constituting a coherent set of industrial
policies, as formulated by Sergei Witte, the Minister of Finance from 1892 to 1903.
This framework focuses on the Tsarist state’s role in fostering the onset of
modern industrial growth, although this interpretation has come under criticism
from several directions. One important concern is empirical. Returning to the data
of Fig. 3.1 and Table 3.1, the steady increase in industrial growth rates (which is
echoed in the GDP per capita numbers of Table 3.1 as well) from 1861 to 1913
suggests that the discontinuities emphasized by Gerschenkron were perhaps less
relevant than the secular trend. Moreover, Gregory’s (1980) research on rural
consumption implies that domestic demand for light industrial production was
relatively robust well before the 1890s.9 It is incorrect to state that the state played




Per cent Total (millions of
1913 roubles)
Per cent
Agriculture 5,044 58.7 10,294 50.7
Heavy industry 175 2.0 1,632 8.0
Light industry 400 4.6 1,391 6.9
Handicrafts 565 6.5 1,311 6.5
Transportation/
communications
199 2.3 1,173 5.8
Construction 445 5.1 1,035 5.1
All other 1,765 20.5 3,456 17.0
Total 8,594 20,292
Note: Source of these data is Allen (2003, Table 2.1), which draws on Gregory (1982), Kafengauz (1994), and others.
Allen appears to draw on Kafengauz’s definition in defining heavy industry as mining,metallurgy (including oil), machine
building, wood products, chemicals, and motive power (i.e. engines). We aggregate several sectors to derive ‘all other’.
8 State support was particularly directed towards the railway sector. Another component of state
intervention in this period was a conservative macroeconomic policy environment geared towards
establishing convertibility with gold—an achievement reached in 1897.
9 Gregory’s (1980) findings on rural consumption levels contradict the argument that the
rural population faced growing poverty over the late-Tsarist era. While not empirically explicit in
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no role in furthering industrial growth (via railroad subsidies, trade policies, etc.)
over the period, but we emphasize the continuity in policies and the role played by
private sector factors.
Gerschenkron’s interpretation also assumes that the post-1861 communal struc-
ture of rural Russia limited the flow of labour out of the agricultural sector, thereby
raising the costs of industry. In contrast, the findings of Borodkin et al. (2008),
Nafziger (2010), and other researchers imply a substantial level of short- and long-
term labour migration from farms to industrial employment in cities and rural
areas. This suggests that costs of industrial labour remained relatively low through-
out the period, particularly given the high growth rate of the rural population.10
Unfortunately, evidence on industrial wages across space and over time is spotty.
The best information is from the work by Strumilin (1926; 1930) on St Petersburg
construction workers (daily wages) and on factory workers in larger establishments
across the empire (yearly salaries). We present these data in Fig. 3.2 to show that the
period 1870–1913 saw relatively slow real unskilled wage growth (0.8 per cent per
year) in St Petersburg, and that factory salaries were also relatively flat over the
period.11 Furthermore, although literacy was slowly rising (Mironov, 2010),
the gap between illiterate and all factory workers’ salaries stayed constant.12 With
the skilled labour premium remaining high, and the cost of unskilled labour low,
incentives to adopt labour-saving technologies were probably limited. Although
inconsistent with Gerschenkron’s assertions about the commune, such factor prices
perhaps led the Tsarist government to play a more active role in subsidizing, and
generating demand for, more advanced industrial sectors such as armaments and
railroads (Gatrell, 1994).
Late Imperial Russia’s industrial producers not only employed relatively cheap
unskilled labour, but also faced low energy costs due to vast charcoal and wood
resources and emerging coal and oil extraction (Tomoff, 1995; McCaffray, 1996).
Evidence is mixed when it comes to the cost and availability of capital. According to
the calculations of Kahan (1978; 1989) and Gregory (1982), the industrial capital
stock grew as fast as (8–9 per cent per year), if not faster than, other nations
undergoing industrialization between the 1880s and 1913. According to Kahan,
the value of industrial capital per worker increased by 55 per cent over this period.13
Limited evidence on Russian interest rates suggests that they were slightly higher
Gerschenkron’s writings, a high level of, and possibly growth in, rural poverty is central to his
broader view of limited private domestic demand for industrial output. For more revisionist work on
rural living standards, see Dennison and Nafziger (2013) and Mironov (2010).
10 This is probably true compared to the rest of Europe as well, although evidence along these lines
is limited (Khaustova, 2013).
11 The brief spike upward in real wages in the emancipation period was probably due to disruption
and unrest, rather than the end to compulsory labour.
12 There are many possible explanations for this persistent gap, including de-skilling technological
change. Preliminary evidence from Khaustova (2013) suggests that the skilled labour ‘welfare ratio’
was comparatively high in the Russian case.
13 To some degree, this was enabled by financial development over the period, which was at least
partially subsidized by the state. At the same time, securities markets were often quite thin, and many
firms probably faced credit constraints (Gregg, 2014).
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than in most Western European economies between 1880 and 1913, but that
might have reflected greater expected returns as much as a shortfall in domestic
savings.14 Indeed, such returns, along with state investment guarantees and relative
exchange rate stability, drew in huge amounts of foreign capital during the last
decades of the Imperial regime. Russia became the world’s largest foreign debtor
during this period, with both portfolio and direct investment pouring in from
France, Germany, the UK, and elsewhere (Crisp, 1976; McKay, 1970).
Despite the availability of foreign capital (and technology) and slowly improving
capital markets and financial institutions, Gatrell (1986) notes that the construction
costs of a modern textile factory in Russia were 75–100 per cent greater than in
England in the early twentieth century. This is more consistent with Crisp’s
(1991) conclusion that Russian industrial firms were not overly capital intensive,
than it is with Gerschenkron’s (1947) assertion that enterprises maintained high


























































































































































Real annual salary, illiterateReal annual salary
Real daily wages (1913 prices)
Fig. 3.2. Russian day wages and yearly salaries, 1853–1913
Note: All data are taken from Strumilin (1926; 1930). The broad dashed line is the nominal St Petersburg
construction worker daily wage; the line below that marked with squares is that wage deflated by a St Petersburg
price index (the price index in 1913 = 100). The shorter top line marked with triangles is the real average yearly pay
for a factory worker employed by an inspected factory that was fined for some sort of violation. The even shorter solid
line at the bottom is the equivalent for illiterate workers. Real values are all in 1913 roubles.
14 See the short-term rates and bond yields in Flandreau and Zumer (2004). Russian rates were
comparable to those in land-rich and capital-scarce Argentina and Brazil in this period.
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constraints.15 Aside from relatively scarce managerial skills (Crisp, 1976), a key
reason for the high cost of setting up a modern factory in Russia was the system
of protectionism. Not only was the general tariff level rising, but considerable
duties were also placed on metal products, machinery, and capital goods. These
selectively imposed tariffs were generally a response to lobbying by relatively
inefficient domestic producers (McCaffray, 1996). Kahan (1967) argues that
this sharply raised the costs of accessing more modern technologies, thereby
reducing productivity growth in industrial sectors from textiles, to chemicals, to
railroads.16 Such state policies did allow domestic producers to gain market share
and increase output (Allen, 2003), but the longer-run result was a lack of com-
petitiveness, despite access to cheap unskilled labour and energy. High prices
meant that the Russian industrial sector was forced to rely on domestic demand,
which, while perhaps not as limited as often asserted, was still bound by the
agrarian structure of the economy and the low level of income.
In Gerschenkron’s (1965) account, state efforts to overcome ‘backwardness’ were
insufficient, and it took PrimeMinister Petr Stolypin’s reforms of communal property
institutions in the wake of the 1905 Revolution to spark market-driven industrial
development, which was cut short by the war and subsequent revolution.17 In
contrast, Allen (2003) argues that railroads and market development led to booms
in agricultural output and exports (that is, extensive growth), but persistent institu-
tional constraints, technological backwardness, and worsening terms of trade limited
industrial growth through 1917. Allen’s conclusions are relatively pessimistic
regarding the trajectory of a hypothetical Tsarist economy after 1913—Russia
did not and could not match the rapid transformation experienced by Japan before
the First World War. But in our view, a combination of state policies (tariffs,
credit, macroeconomic, and institutional) and market forces (relatively free factor
and goods markets) did foster industrial growth from the mid-nineteenth century
onwards. Change was less episodic and steadier than Gerschenkron asserted, while
convergence in industrial output was more evident than Allen perceived. How-
ever, and as Table 3.2 implies, growth from a very low base did not dramatically
change the structure of the Russian economy by 1913. Low levels of human capital
and relative technological backwardness impeded productivity growth, while low
rural incomes (perhaps linked to incentive structures in the peasant commune)
limited domestic demand for industrial output.
15 It might still be the case that Imperial Russian industrial firms were relatively large (in terms of
labour force) and possessed more market power than similar firms in more developed economies.
Although they provide little evidence on this, Cheremukhin et al. (2014) argue that concentration led
to slower industrial growth than a more competitive economy would have generated.
16 Crisp (1976, Chapters 6–8) and McKay (1970) suggest that a number of multinationals were
granted special allowances for capital goods imports as part of their Russian registration or incorporation
approval. The extent of such arrangements remains unknown, and the literature asserts that tariffs were
typically applied quite indiscriminately and that foreign capital inflows were increasingly in the form of
portfolio investment over the period.
17 Gatrell (1994) argues that industrial growth in 1908–14 was not driven by unleashed market
demand, but was the result of state spending, subsidies, and policies that attracted foreign capital to
armaments and related sectors.
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3.3 INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN THE SOVIET
COMMAND ECONOMY
Following the Bolshevik Revolution, civil war, and economic collapse, substantial
industrial recovery occurred under the New Economic Policy, or NEP, between
1921 and 1928 (Table 3.1). NEP entailed a mixed economy where both state
policies and market relations contributed to reconstruction. Market transactions
dominated in agriculture, cottage industry, and internal trade, while the govern-
ment directly controlled large-scale industry, transportation, foreign trade, and
credit. The dual nature of the NEP economy eventually produced crises in the
relations between the Bolshevik state and self-interested private producers and
consumers. These finally led to the replacement of the NEP by Stalin’s command
economy in the late 1920s.
Despite relatively high rates of accumulation prior to 1913, a key bottleneck for
industrial development in the 1920s was the limited level of capital per worker.
Almost a decade of war and revolution destroyed much of the capital stock, sparked
capital flight, and roughly halved national income (almost to subsistence), which
limited domestic savings. Soviet Russia lost access to international financial markets
after defaulting on Imperial debts. Despite avowed Soviet interest in raising
industrial output, the sector was too small to rapidly (self-)finance recovery.
The pressure to increase investment, in combination with professed Bolshevik
goals regarding state control and the need to surpass capitalist countries, led to
dramatic debates among the Bolsheviks regarding the policies necessary for
industrial and economic growth in the 1920s (Erlich, 1960). Bukharin and his
followers (the ‘right’) came to advocate balanced development with considerable
freedom for markets. Preobrazhensky and the ‘left’ argued for rapid industrial-
ization based on the redistribution of agricultural surplus towards investment in
producer goods via mark-ups for manufactures and fixed grain procurement
prices (the industrial-to-agricultural goods price ‘scissors’). This policy, however,
was difficult to realize without using open coercion toward peasants. Initial
Bolshevik attempts to regulate rural–urban trade and fix relative prices for
industrial and agricultural goods decreased the quantity of agricultural goods
supplied and produced crises in urban procurement (the ‘price scissor crises’ of
1923 and 1926 and the ‘grain procurement crises’ of 1927 and 1928—Johnson
and Temin, 1993; Gregory, 2004).
Eventually, Stalin emerged victorious over both sides and brutally realized the left’s
agenda by launching the collectivization of agriculture in 1929. This entailed harsh
state control over grain production and distribution, and allowed for the redirection of
surplus to finance industrial investment. Rapid industrialization was based on massive
investment in producer goods, along with centralized planning, tight control over
foreign trade with selective technological borrowing from abroad, political repression,
and economic coercion. Thus, Stalin built a command economy—a state-led hierarch-
ical system that attempted to replace markets with plan and coercion, where principals
told agents what and how much to produce, where output should go, and at what
‘price’ transactions should occur. This system generated impressive rates of industrial
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growth from 1928 into the post-war period, leading to rapid (but never complete)
convergence of the Soviet economy on the developed West. However, it is debatable
whether this command system produced a real acceleration in the rate of industrial
growth, rather than simply securing the return of the economy to its long-run
development path (Fig. 3.1).18 Moreover, this economic system ultimately generated
an incentive structure that slowed industrial output growth and led to the demise of the
Soviet Union.
3.3.1 The Stalinist Industrial Revolution, 1928–40
GDP growth under Stalin’s industrialization reached almost 4 per cent per year,
and the industrial sector grew even faster at 10 per cent (Table 3.1). Changes in
composition of national income both by final use and by sector clearly demonstrate
the scale of Stalin’s ‘great leap forward’ (Table 3.3, Panels A and B). Gross
investment per year doubled during the first five-year plan (1928–32) from 10 to
20 billion roubles (in 1937 prices) and increased to about 33 billion roubles by the
end of the decade (Moorsteen and Powell, 1966, p. 387). The net investment share
increased from 10.2 per cent in 1928 to 22.6 per cent in 1937, despite the lack of
access to foreign capital markets. Most investment went into the producer goods
and heavy industry sectors, which the Bolsheviks viewed as the engines of indus-
trialization and necessary for military security. The rapid growth of military output
during the first three five-year plans—from 1.3 per cent of GDP in 1928 to 18.2 in
1940—has led some authors to speculate that military power was one of the key
components of the utility function of Stalin and his successors (Kontorovich and
Wein, 2009), although the transition to the command economy also resulted in an
increase of non-defence government consumption. These changes happened at the
cost of household consumption, which fell to only half of national income by the
Second World War (although per capita consumption rose a bit).
The industrial sector produced one third of value added by the end of the 1930s,
in comparison to 20 per cent in 1928. The Soviet Union managed to launch a
number of new sub-industries that were virtually non-existent in the Russian
Empire, such as automobiles and aircraft production. Enormous growth in electri-
city production (from 5 billion kWh in 1928 to 48.3 billion in 1940, an increase of
866 per cent—Davies et al., 1994, p. 296) accompanied and shaped sectoral
changes, with new facilities characterized by high rates of energy and natural
resource usage. The growth in construction and transportation were other visible
signs of a broader economic transformation.
We generally agree with the argument (Gregory, 2004) that collectivization
redirected surpluses towards industrial investment and fostered cheap food for
the burgeoning industrial labour force. State grain procurements rose from about
18 The recent work of Cheremukhin et al. (2014) downplays the ‘big push’ story of Stalinist
industrialization and argues that Soviet policies from 1928 to 1940 reduced factor market
distortions, particularly by eliminating market power in industrial sectors.
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10 million tons in 1928 to 30 million by the end of the 1930s (Davies et al., 1994,
p. 290).19 On top of that, collectivization reduced peasant incomes, which
contributed to the reallocation of rural labour to the growing modern and more
productive industrial sector (Allen, 2003).20 The overall effect of this massive
inflow of labour from the countryside on the productivity of the industrial labour
force was most likely negative or neutral, despite considerable state investments in
education during the 1920s and 1930s. Value added per worker dropped more
than 25 per cent during the first five-year plan, recovering by the end of the 1930s
(Harrison, 1998). The supply of cheap unskilled labour kept wages fairly low
and redistributed final output in favour of capital owners—that is, the state.21
Table 3.3. Russian/Soviet national income by final use and sector, 1913–40
Panel A 1913 1928 1937 1940
Consumption
By households 80.5 81.6 54.9 52.2
By government:
Defence 4.9 1.3 8.2 18.2
Non-defence 6.0 6.9 14.3 14.9
Net investment
Domestic 11.4 10.2 22.6 14.7
Foreign 2.9 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100
Panel B 1913 1928 1937 1940
Agriculture 50.7 48.3 31 29.5
Industry (including
mining and fuels)
21.4 20.4 32.2 32.8
Construction 5.1 3.2 5.2 4.5
Transport 5.8 3.9 8.3 8.2
Trade 8.1 7.9 5.1 4.7
Services 8.9 16.3 18.1 20.3
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: These data are taken from Davies, Harrison, and Wheatcroft (1994, p. 272). ‘Industry’ in the bottom half
of the table roughly corresponds to the sum of mining, light, heavy, and handicraft industries from Table 3.2. Allen
(2003) slightly adjusts the 1913 numbers in calculating sectoral value-added shares.
19 By reducing the ‘price’ paid to agricultural producers in the collective farms (below that faced by
the urban consumers), the state generated a form of forced savings.
20 With a persistent gap between rural and urban real incomes, approximately 23 million people
migrated from the countryside to the cities in the late 1920s–1930s (Kessler, 2002). Soviet policies also
encouraged females to actively enter the labour force. More than 40 per cent of employees in large
industry establishments were women by 1939 (Davies et al., 1994, p. 284).
21 Real wages were only 60 per cent of the 1928 level by 1937 (Chapman, 1954). Despite the
decrease in industrial wages, average living standards exceeded pre-1913 levels by the late 1930s,
because of the reallocation of labour between sectors and an increase in employment (Allen, 2003).
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Simultaneously, because of scarcity of qualified labour, the state kept the skill
premium relatively high during the 1930s (Shwartz, 1952).
The resulting Stalinist ‘Industrial Revolution’ dramatically transformed the
structure of the Soviet economy, but the overall success of such big push policies
is less clear. There was a substantial gap in marginal labour productivity between
industry and agriculture before Stalin (a factor of six in 1913); however, there is no
evidence of idle labour (zero marginal labour productivity) in the agricultural
sector. Using mass mobilization into the Russian army during the First World
War, Castañeda Dower and Markevich (2014) find that a withdrawal of agricul-
tural labour substantially less than what happened during collectivization caused a
significant decrease in grain production. The scale of these economic costs (let alone
the social and demographic ones) relative to gains from greater labour inputs in
industry is an empirical issue that remains unexplored.
It is also debatable whether agricultural surpluses were really the main source of
industrial capital accumulation. According to Millar (1974), who reconstructed the
1928–32 rural–urban trade balance, the amount of resources shifted from agricul-
ture comprised no more than a third of accumulated capital by the end of first five-
year plan. The rest came from non-rural accumulation. Millar points to two
mechanisms that hindered the extraction of resources from agriculture, and their
employment in industry. First, the state had to compensate for the losses in draught
power caused by collectivization by providing tractors and other agricultural
machines to the countryside.22 Second, urban industrial workers relied heavily on
informal markets to obtain food, and so they were affected by the rise in non-
procurement prices. The consequent drop in real industrial wages meant that
peasants and workers paid for Stalinist industrialization.23
Despite apparent success, especially compared to Western economies harmed by
the Great Depression, the Stalinist command economy suffered from a number of
fundamental flaws that undermined its efficiency and industrial development in the
long run. Non-price mechanisms of resource allocation (often following political
objectives) and the absence of prices reflecting true scarcity led to mistakes and path
dependencies in the setting of targets under central planning, distorted investment
decisions, slowed down innovation and technology adoption, and interfered with
optimal factor allocations. Estimates of the resulting effects vary, but what is clear is
that the scale of efficiency losses was substantial and probably worsening over time
(Gregory and Harrison, 2005).24 For a telling indicator of the long-run effects, the
22 Facing confiscation, peasants preferred to slaughter and consume their livestock; the number of
horses fell from 32.6 million in 1929 to 15.4 million in 1935, and the cattle population declined from
58.2 to 33.5 million (Davies et al., 1994, p. 289).
23 Sah and Stiglitz (1984) show how a movement of the terms of trade against agriculture can
undermine urban worker wellbeing. That collectivization only generated part of industrial capital
accumulation roughly corresponds to Allen’s (2003) view.
24 TFP growth in the 1930s was about 1.7 per cent per annum and fell over later decades
(Table 3.4). Spatial data are also suggestive. Using modern Canada and Imperial Russia as
benchmarks, Mikhailova (2004) estimates that the population in Siberia and the Far East would
have been 35 per cent less in 1989 if development had been entirely market driven.
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industrial structure of the Soviet economy in 1989 was very similar to 1928
(Gregory, 2004).
State ownership meant that a firm could not go bankrupt, since the government
would cover the costs. This inconsistency is often referred to as the soft budget
constraint (Kornai, 1980). Given this, industrial enterprises tended to overinvest in
risky and/or excessively large projects, since they faced fewer downside risks. Such
practices also worsened factor misallocations and led to a general overuse of
resources across the economy. Soviet plants used more electricity and raw inputs
in comparison to similar Western enterprises (Ericson, 2013). Soviet economic
thinking strengthened this effect. In professing a labour theory of value, prioritized
state plants got inputs ‘cheaply’ and received capital assets from the state without
paying market rental prices. Excessive capital intensity—coupled with mispercep-
tions about economies of scale throughout the industrial sector, and the absence of
variety as a policy objective—was associated with extremely high levels of industrial
concentration.
Despite planning and state control of the means of production, quasi-‘market’
transactions were important in the command economy because they eased the most
painful misallocations. First, rather than simply fulfilling plan mandates, producers
participated in the planning process by negotiating and bargaining over output
targets with industrial ministries and the state planning commission (Gosplan).
Such practices led Zalesky (1980) to define the Soviet system as a ‘managed’
economy rather than a planned one. Second, there were extensive secondary
markets for producer goods and raw materials, where enterprises exchanged
resources obtained through the plan. This practice was illegal but allowed in
order to correct for planning mistakes, information asymmetries with the command
hierarchy, and incentive-related bottlenecks (Berliner, 1968). Third, labour market
decisions remained relatively unconstrained during most of Soviet history, subject
to the illegality of unemployment and residency restrictions (Sokolov, 2003).
Moreover, the USSR remained open to some market pressures from the global
economy. Although capital markets and much scientific exchange remained closed,
industrial modernization required foreign technologies that Russia did not have.
Foreign trade—industrial machines in exchange for agricultural products and
commodities—was proposed as an important engine of development in the first
five-year plan (Davies and Wheatcroft, 2004). However, deteriorating terms of
trade and rising trade barriers during the Great Depression put these plans under
pressure.25 Soviet imports reached 80 per cent of the 1913 level in 1931 but fell
back to 20 per cent by the end of the decade (Davies et al., 1994, Table 44). Some
historians argue that adverse conditions in the world economy helped foster the
Soviet choice of economic autarky that persisted after the war (Dohan, 1976;
Sanchez-Sibony, 2014).
25 On the other hand, the Depression may have worsened the bargaining positions of international
firms in negotiations with the Soviet government, thereby easing technological transfers (Shpotov,
2003). The Cold War sharply curtailed technological imports.
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Where market-like incentives did not help, the state used coercion and repres-
sion to ease shortages of the command system. Stalin heavily relied on punishment
and terror to maintain his regime and to realize his policies, but he also used them
to provide additional incentives to economic agents (Markevich, 2015b). Because
of limited scope of monetary rewards in the command system, threats of punish-
ment and criminalization were powerful motivating tools.26 In addition, forced
labour and the Gulag system reduced effective labour costs in some industrial
sectors, especially in remote parts of the country. It seems that the Gulag did lower
the price of producing certain industrial products (especially in mining), but
employing such labour was generally inefficient. Eventually this became clear
even to the system’s senior operators, which led to the dismantling of the forced
labour camps after Stalin’s death (Gregory and Lazarev, 2003).
3.3.2 Post-war Soviet Industrial Development:
Convergence and Slowdown
The Second World War generated enormous costs for the Soviet economy, which
lost about of 25 per cent of the pre-war capital stock (Moorsteen and Powell, 1966,
p. 75). After the war ended, Stalin returned tomassive investments in heavy industry
and producer goods to enable recovery. His successors continued to employ this
extensive development strategy with only a slow shift towards more consumer-
oriented industrial output. The share of investment in Soviet national product
continued to rise and reached almost a third by the 1980s (Ofer, 1987). The growth
rate of industrial output was higher than the growth rate of GDP until the 1980s
(Fig. 3.1), thereby increasing the share of industry in the economy, even as the rest of
the developed world was transitioning towards post-industrial economies.27
Investment-led recovery gave way to the ‘golden years’ of Soviet economic
development in the 1950s and early 1960s, when the economy experienced
catch-up on Western economies in terms of industrial output and GDP per capita.
This golden era did not last long, however. Growth rates of industrial production
were steadily decreasing during the whole post-war epoch, becoming negative in
the 1980s (Table 3.1). What lay behind this slowdown? Why did the policies that
secured the impressive growth rates of the Stalinist industrial revolution stop
working?
One answer is that there were diminishing returns to capital accumulation in the
face of a tightening labour market, especially in industry. Cheap labour resources
were largely exhausted by the early 1960s, with fewer people in agriculture or home
production left to be potentially shifted into industrial employment.28 Moreover,
26 Examples include penalties for managers because of poor-quality output and prison terms
because of poor labour discipline.
27 This rising industrial share occurred alongside a decline of the agricultural sector, which led to
growing food imports by the 1970s (Gaidar, 2006).
28 The urban population exceeded the 50 per cent benchmark around 1960, and female labour
participation reached almost 100 per cent by 1970 (Markevich, 2005).
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the Soviet Union had achieved full literacy and universal basic schooling by the
post-war decades. Facing a slowdown in labour supply growth, an extensive growth
strategy required even more rapid capital accumulation, which was either not
possible or incredibly inefficient. Although it is probably part of the explanation
for industrial stagnation, one problem with this interpretation is that Soviet labour
productivity in industry was only about 20 per cent of the US level in 1950,
reaching only 30 per cent by 1980. This suggests considerable room for capital
intensification over the period (Kouwenhoven, 1996).
Another possible reason for slowing growth was the declining efficiency of the
Soviet economy. Easterly and Fisher (1995) famously find that controlling for the
initial level of GDP and factor inputs, the Soviet Union grew 2.28 per cent more
slowly than the rest of the world in the period 1960–89. Table 3.4 demonstrates
that if one applies a Cobb–Douglas production function to disaggregate growth
components, Soviet total factor productivity (TFP) growth was declining during
the whole post-war epoch and even turned negative around 1970.29
The reasons for the slowdown in Soviet TFP growth were widely discussed and
debated. If one attributes the evolution of TFP purely to changes in technology, then
sustained negative TFP growth would be a rather unique phenomenon. This is
unlikely given that there was some Soviet innovation until the end of the regime.
To explain this anomaly, Weitzman (1970) posited an aggregate production
function with an elasticity of substitution between capital and labour of less than
1. Weitzman’s approach is elegant (and supports a declining labour surplus inter-
pretation), but it is not immediately evident why the elasticity of substitution in the
Soviet Union would be so radically different from that in other countries (Allen,
2003). Given this model, it is also difficult to understand how there could have
been such a break in TFP growth around 1970 (Harrison, 1998).
A likely explanation of the slowdown and eventually negative rate of measured
Soviet TFP growth was a broad decline in the efficiency of resource allocation.
Table 3.4. The growth of Soviet GDP, total factor productivity, and factor inputs,
1928–85
1928–40 1940–50 1950–60 1960–70 1970–5 1975–80 1980–5
GDP 5.8 2.2 5.7 5.2 3.7 2.6 2.0
Labour 3.3 0.7 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.7
Capital 9.0 0.4 9.5 8.0 7.9 6.8 6.3
Land 1.6 1.3 3.3 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.1
TFP 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 0 0.4 0.5
Population 2.1 0.8 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.9
GDP per capita 3.7 3 3.9 3.9 2.8 1.6 1.1
Note: The source is Ofer (1987). Our GDP per capita growth rates in Table 3.1 are slightly different due to
improvements in the underlying data since 1987. All numbers are average percentage growth rates over the period in
question.
29 Data constraints prevent us from repeating this exercise for just the industrial sector, although
we would expect to find very similar results.
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Secular changes in the economic environment confronted the poor incentive
structure of the command system, giving rise to an institutional rather than
technological interpretation of slower TFP growth. The shortcomings of the
command economy already evident in the 1930s deepened during the late Soviet
period. Both ‘market’ factors and state policies contributed to this dynamic.
First, the growing technological and organizational complexity of the economy
made planning, and quasi-market bargaining between (and among) the centre and
economic agents, more difficult. Complexity meant rising information asymmet-
ries, which increased the probability of unbalanced plans, mistakes in the allocation
of investment funds and scarce inputs, and ‘market failures’ in the distribution of
final output. Due to the incentive problems they faced, economic agents were not
able or willing to fully correct for these factors via secondary transactions and were
unresponsive to changing consumer and producer demands. The rising share of
investment spent on the modernization of old plants instead of the construction of
new ones illustrates the growing misallocations. The former was more costly than
the latter (roughly 55 per cent more: see Rumer, 1984); but one of the leading
principles of Soviet industrial policy always was to keep all factories in operation.
The government continued to follow this principle despite growing numbers of
‘old’ enterprises requiring reconstruction (Allen, 2003; Popov, 2007).30
Changes in politics and the political economy of the Soviet economy worked in
the same direction. The government relinquished many of the worst aspects of
economic and political coercion with the death of Stalin. Fitful attempts at
economic reform and political opening from the 1960s onward strengthened the
bargaining positions of economic agents—especially industrial managers—in their
relations with Moscow. This further softened budget constraints because it became
more difficult for the central authorities to credibly commit to not launch risky
projects or to punish managers for plan failures. Moreover, the military lobby was
especially strong because of the Cold War. This led to the allocation of more and
better capital goods, inputs, and innovation resources towards national defence
projects that had low economic payoffs. The share of Soviet military expenditures
was 8–15 per cent of GDP in the 1980s, in contrast to 6 per cent in the US
(Harrison, 2008). Acknowledging that the USSR could not afford the arms race
was one of the factors that induced Gorbachev to initiate reforms (Ellman and
Kontorovich, 1998).
Institutionally driven incentive problems and imbalanced factor allocations were
especially vivid in the consumer goods and agricultural sectors, which lagged well
behind the prioritized heavy industry and military production. As a result, the late
Soviet period saw increasing shortages and worsening consumer goods quality. Kim
(1999) found that the increase in household saving rates (from 5 to 15 per cent)
between the early 1960s and late 1980s was ‘forcibly’ driven by unsatisfied demand
in the face of fixed plan prices. The siphoning of resources from households led
30 The planning process, emphasis on scale, and the geography of Soviet industrial organization
generated a considerable number of one-company towns, which fostered pressures to keep plants going.
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to ‘hidden’ inflation and rising implicit price subsidies, which grew increasingly
costly for state finances (Kim, 2002).31 But these forced savings did not fuel
efficiency gains in industry, and slowing growth made attempts to satisfy growing
consumption expectations of Soviet citizens even more difficult. This under-
mined the political loyalty of the Soviet population and reduced the stability of
the whole system when coercive threats finally became non-credible by the 1980s
(Harrison, 2002).
International economic policy is another example of the failure of late Soviet
economic governance. While the post-war economy was relatively autarkic and
never open to capital inflows, the founding of the Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) in 1949 created a trade bloc that saw Soviet manufactured
goods exported in exchange for agricultural commodities, intermediate goods, and
some imports of capital goods from other Communist countries. This trade did not
entail any real foreign competition for domestic producers, and it occurred in the
absence of market exchange rates and prices, which eventually led to the Soviet
Union effectively subsidizing exports to other CMEA members.32 Following the
OPEC crisis, Soviet leaders took advantage of newly opened fields in Western
Siberia and high international prices to rapidly increase the export of oil and natural
gas ($5 to $25 billion for oil alone during the 1970s—Gaidar, 2006, 2000 dollars).
This financed imports that mitigated growing inefficiencies in the production of
food, consumer goods, and advanced capital goods, although fixed export prices
within the CMEA generated considerable opportunity costs. Overall, importing
technologies from abroad provided between 10 and 30 per cent of Soviet equip-
ment investments, and food imports accounted for between 10 and 20 per cent of
the caloric intake of the Soviet population in the late 1970s and early 1980s
(Hanson, 2003, p.159). However, the growing dependence on commodity
export revenues made the Soviet economy vulnerable to the fall in oil prices in
the early 1980s, constraining increasingly necessary imports and weakening the
state’s budget.33
The Soviet command economy initially saw high rates of industrial growth, as
state-directed allocations and various market and market-like transactions chan-
nelled resources into the sector. Following the conflicting objectives of the NEP
period, Stalinist policies of collectivization, encouraging human capital investment
and relative labour mobility, selective technological adoptions from abroad, and an
investment strategy focused on capital goods generated significant structural
change, although the exact contributions of these and other factors remain unclear.
The resulting industrial growth was particularly impressive in the context of the
Depression, with many Western observers taken by the perceived success of
the Soviet ‘Industrial Revolution’. However, and following pre-Soviet trends, this
31 Obviously, the causality runs both ways—the enforcement of low prices generated excess
demand, which was expressed as shortages.
32 CMEA trade comprised more than a half of all Soviet foreign trade in 1960, rising to 62 per cent
by 1988 (Goodrich, 1989; Hanson, 2003).
33 Adjustment to this adverse commodity price shock was constrained in the absence of true market
prices or exchange rates.
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transformation was extensive in nature, with productivity growth occurring more
through factor accumulation and the transfer of resources between sectors than
through innovation. Constraints on trade and technological flows from abroad
limited competitive pressures on domestic firms, while the growing importance
of resource exports introduced additional volatility and did little to encourage
diversification. The long-run prospects of such accumulation-based growth were
limited due to the incentive and information problems that lay at the heart of
the command system.
3.4 THE END OF THE SOVIET UNION, INDUSTRIAL
DECLINE, AND THE RISE OF THE PUTIN PETRO-STATE
In the mid-1980s, growing fiscal pressure and weaknesses in consumer and produ-
cer goods sectors led Gorbachev and a small cadre of reform-minded officials to
slowly move towards ending planning, enabling the decentralization of decision
making to the firm level, and hardening budget constraints.34 However, this
increase in firm autonomy in the face of still-rigid prices generated significant
hoarding of inputs and final goods by firms, which caused cascading market failures
across the economy. In sharp contrast to the contemporary Chinese approach,
Soviet reformers paid more attention to political rather than economic reforms.
Indeed, the political opening of glasnostmeant that the failures of economic policies
(and the shortages they generated) were increasingly evident to the wider public.
Mounting social and political pressures culminated in the failed coup of August
1991 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union by the end of the year.
The demise of the Soviet Union generated pressure for further economic reforms
in the new Russian Federation.35 Policy-makers took a ‘shock therapy’ approach to
market liberalization by quickly freeing prices and opening up to the global
economy in the winter and spring of 1992. With price liberalization, the release
of forced savings generated a spike upwards in the rate of inflation in 1991–3 (up to
800 to 1,500 per cent, depending on the price index—Table 3.5). Rather than
shortages, markets came to be flooded with goods, even though collapsing incomes
made it increasingly hard for households or domestic firms to buy them.
The collapse of output in the early 1990s is depicted in Fig. 3.1 and Table 3.1.36
As noted by many observers (for example, Gaidar, 2012), the scale of Russia’s
aggregate and industrial decline may be overstated in the available statistics due to
the rise in non-market transactions and the difficulties of valuing output in a high-
inflation environment. Regardless, the early to mid-1990s did see a significant
34 Managerial autonomy and several forms of quasi-ownership (cooperatives, etc.) were allowed
under the Law on State Enterprises (1987) and the Law on Cooperatives (1988) (Aslund, 2013b).
35 We focus on the Russian Federation after 1991. The experience of industry in other former
Soviet Republics was roughly similar (Aslund, 2013a).
36 In comparison to other former socialist countries, Russia’s aggregate growth was better than
Ukraine’s or Georgia’s but worse than Poland’s or Kazakhstan’s between 1990 and 2008 (Bolt and
Van Zanden, 2013).
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decline in per capita industrial output of approximately 40 per cent between 1992
and 1998 (Fig. 3.1), while the share of total value added generated by the industrial
sector steadily eroded from 50 to 37 per cent (Fig. 3.3). Some of this reflected the
sharp end of the Soviet emphasis on industry over other sectors.37 Within ‘indus-
try’, many manufacturing sub-sectors stagnated, with the clear exception of ‘other
manufacturing’ (Fig. 3.3), which included petroleum and metals processing.38
A number of factors help to explain this collapse of Russia’s industrial sector.
Inflation, stagnant nominal wages, and growing uncertainty sharply reduced
demand for consumer goods, especially durables. The collapse of state subsidies
(and falling military expenditures) meant that enterprises found their balance sheets
eroding, even as they struggled to deal with the legacy of obsolete capital stocks and
production technologies.39 Rather than fire workers, firms reduced hours and
wages, a reverse of standard labour market phenomena and the opposite of what
transpired in much of Eastern Europe (Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov, 2013).
The decline in the real purchasing power of wages, coupled with worsening
Table 3.5. Russian macroeconomic indicators, select years
1990 1992 1995 2000 2005 2010
Household final consumption
expenditure, etc. (% of GDP)
48.87 37.46 52.09 46.19 49.36 50.58
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 30.13 34.61 25.44 18.69 20.08 22.62




expenditure (% of GDP)
20.79 13.86 19.08 15.09 16.87 18.73
Military expenditure (% of GDP) 19.09 4.73 4.07 3.56 3.58 3.85
Net exports of goods and services (% of
GDP)
0.22 14.07 3.40 20.03 13.69 8.08
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent) per
$1,000 GDP (constant 2011 PPP)
306.41 341.69 357.19 320.68 250.63 226.94
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 15.90 1,490.42 144.00 37.70 19.31 14.19
Note: These data are taken fromWDI (2014). Household, gross capital, government, and net export expenditures as
shares of GDP sum to 100. R & D is part of gross capital formation, while military expenditures are mostly
contained within government expenditures. Finally, note that a large part of gross capital formation was undertaken
by the state.
37 As Mau and Drobyshevskaya (2013, p. 42) state, the Soviet Union had ‘an ideological
commitment to industrialization’ that fell apart in the late 1980s.
38 Manufacturing as a share of GDP appears to have stayed roughly constant over the last decade—
see the note to Fig. 3.3. However, the rising importance of oil and natural gas rents is also evident in
Fig. 3.3. While the quantity of Russian natural gas exports rose over the period, other sources were
coming online, and Russian production costs remained quite high, thereby reducing rents.
39 Firms continued to hoard inputs and output, and engaged in barter transactions (50 per cent of
inter-firm transactions by 1997—Aslund, 2013b, p. 94). Obsolete technologies and capital vintages,
coupled with deteriorating labour market conditions, generated extremely low factor utilization rates
and industrial productivity that persisted well after 1990 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2009).
Moreover, the legacies of the geographic misallocation of Soviet industrial activity further raised the
costs of inputs, labour, and transportation (Hill and Gaddy, 2003).
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demographic and health conditions and the obsolescence of many skills, reduced
the effective supply of labour in many manufacturing sectors.
In the autumn of 1991, only 2.5 per cent of industrial output was produced by
non-state owned enterprises (Ericson, 2013, p. 60). Reformers quickly moved to
begin the privatization of small enterprises via auctions in early 1992. In June 1992,
efforts moved on to larger firms (roughly 16,500 with more than 1,000 workers) via








































































































Textiles and clothing (% of value added in
manufacturing)
Food, beverages, and tobacco (% of value
added in manufacturing)
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)
Industry, value added (% of GDP)
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) Chemicals (% of value added in
manufacturing)
Machinery and transport equipment (% of
value added in manufacturing)
Other manufacturing (% of value added in
manufacturing)
Oil rents (% of GDP)
Natural gas rents (% of GDP)
Fig. 3.3. Sectoral value-added shares and resource rents, 1990–2010
Note: These data are taken from the WDI (2014). The top three series sum to 100 per cent of GDP. The next five
series sum to 100 per cent of manufacturing, which is equivalent to the industrial sector net of mining, construction,
and utilities. Although earlier comparable data are unavailable, the manufacturing sub-sector of industry varied from
17 per cent of GDP in 2002 to 14.8 in 2010 (a global recession year). The two resource rent series are both equal to
(output valued at world prices—costs of production)/GDP—that is, they are akin to value added.
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for shares’ programme, but the notoriety of these transactions, coupled with the
quick rise of oligarchic control of large firms, led to a significant backlash against
privatization by the late 1990s. This occurred despite evidence suggesting that
oligarchic control and some forms of privatization enhanced productivity within
most industries.40 Overall, privatization did transfer the majority of productive
assets into private hands by the end of the decade, and it helped lay the foundation
for significant subsequent firm entry and exit in the industrial sector.41
Despite privatization, persistent uncertainty over ownership and control rights
within firms increased borrowing costs and reduced investment in the post-Soviet
period. The weaknesses of the embryonic financial system made financing new
investment or upgrading outdated capital expensive. The Russian banking
system was born out of the chaos of the late 1980s, when large parts of the Soviet
banking system were carved up into local and firm-affiliated entities. From
the beginning, the market for bank loans was relatively inefficient and highly
segmented, with personal (and often political) connections of firm owners playing
a central role (Schoors and Yudaeva, 2013). Moreover, unable to entice domestic
depositors, many banks turned to foreign borrowing, which helped translate a
foreign debt crisis into a full-blown financial crisis in 1998. Double-digit lending
rates persisted into the 2000s, and the state has increasingly come to play a role in
subsidizing credit.
The sharp end of Soviet trade and most capital flow restrictions in 1991 meant
an increase in competition from abroad.42 Rising imports of manufactures com-
pounded problems for relatively inefficient domestic firms. This was particularly
true for light industry, but sectors such as automobiles, computing, and aeroplanes
also suffered. Relatively few firms—especially in the early years—were able to
quickly adopt foreign technologies or take advantage of international capital
markets, and Russian manufacturers saw little export growth.43 Fundamentally,
growing trade openness reinforced Russia’s comparative advantage not in manu-
factures, but in commodities.
According to recent growth accounting exercises, the fall in aggregate and
industrial (including mining) output in the 1990s stemmed from declining capital
40 See Brown et al. (2013), who argue that privatization to domestic owners generally led to lower
multi-factor productivity in manufacturing, although this correlation essentially disappears by the early
2000s. For the largest owners, Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) marshal evidence that these owners were
better at accessing new sources of finance, managed their firms more efficiently, and rarely engaged in
debilitating ‘tunnelling’ of assets.
41 See Estrin et al. (2009). On the other hand, the poor institutional environment for businesses has
constrained firm entry and reinforced concentration, especially in connection to a rebound in state
ownership and control in resource-related sectors.
42 Apart from some retrenchment in the late 1990s, Russia experienced growing integration with
the global economy, culminating in accession to the World Trade Organization in 2012. Imports and
exports rose sharply, with the net trade balance positive and constituting between 8 and 20 per cent of
GDP from 1998 onwards (Table 3.5; WDI, 2014).
43 However, studies of the productivity effects of Russian privatization show that enterprises
acquired by foreign owners performed significantly better than state or domestically owned firms
into the 2000s (Brown et al., 2013).
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services, labour inputs, and TFP (Entov and Lugovoy, 2013).44 Fig. 3.1 and
Table 3.5 indicate that the rate of capital formation stabilized and industrial output
rebounded in the wake of the 1998 crisis and subsequent devaluation of the rouble.
Since 1998, industrial output growth has averaged roughly 5 per cent per year,
driven half by capital accumulation and half by TFP growth (ibid.). After
considerable organizational chaos and capital stock rebuilding in the 1990s, the
contribution of oil and natural gas to industrial output began to rise (Timmer and
Voskoboynikov, 2014). Ongoing growth in oil prices aided economic recovery
(directly in terms of output, and indirectly via rising incomes and linkages to non-
mining sectors), even as the installation of Vladimir Putin as President in 2000
appeared to stabilize the political system.
These two phenomena—rising oil prices and Putin’s growing hold on power—
reinforced each other over the 2000s, with growing state involvement in the bur-
geoning oil and gas sectors signalling Russia’s increased dependence on natural
resource-related sectors. By the 2000s, Russia was effectively a ‘petro-state’, as com-
parative advantage, high oil prices, and relative inefficiencies in other sectors served to
reinforce the regime’s growing focus on resource rents (Fig. 3.3) and probably
undermined broader manufacturing competitiveness due to ‘DutchDisease’ effects.45
The sharp downturn in the demand for Russian oil and natural gas due to the global
crisis of 2008–9 and the advent of North American shale production constituted an
enormous negative shock to all parts of the Russian economy. Consequently, 2009
and 2010 saw another significant decline in Russian manufacturing and industrial
output (Fig. 3.1), as direct state support shrivelled, domestic demand fell, and foreign
debt and balance of payments problems raised the costs of inputs and investment.46
Despite improvements in economic policies in the early twenty-first century, this
recent turmoil has been compounded by burgeoning state interference in the
economy. In the strongest form, this reinforcement of state control has entailed
the partial or complete renationalization of firms, as in the Yukos case. Although
hard evidence is lacking (and observed TFP growth has been relatively robust since
1998), state interventions may have reduced the efficiency of resource allocation
within and across industrial firms, limited diversification in the industrial sector,
and increased the perceived risk of investment in state-connected firms, especially
for foreign investors.47 As such, it appears that the impact of Putin’s policies on the
44 Industry is defined here as mining, manufacturing, and utilities, and these estimates include oil
and natural gas production under ‘mining’. Negative TFP growth explains one-third of the aggregate
output slowdown, but less than 10 per cent of industrial output’s decline. Thus, the story of industrial
decline—in manufacturing as well as mining—in the 1990s is much more about the decline in capital
and labour services than about technological factors.
45 There was a rise in the ‘fuels’ share ofmerchandise exports from43 per cent in 1995 to 65 per cent in
2010 (Table 3.5; WDI, 2014). There is considerable evidence for at least some ‘Dutch Disease’ effects in
the Russian case in the 2000s—see EBRD (2009).
46 Despite such adverse shocks, inflation has remained high over the last five years (WDI, 2014),
thus impeding nominal adjustments. However, recent political constraints on trade have possibly
fostered conditions for some growth in domestic manufacturing (Connolly, 2015).
47 R & D expenditures have fallen well behind developed economies and even China as a share of
GDP (Table 3.5).
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industrial sector remains rather mixed (or at least subject to the trajectory of oil
prices), although manufacturing has declined in relative terms (Fig. 3.3).48
Despite Russia’s shift towards a market economy, many institutional and statist
legacies of the previous regime survived. Indeed, a large literature has emerged that
credits the particularly poor performance of the 1990s, and the return to
command-like controls of the Putin era, to the lack of enforceable property rights,
ineffective court systems, and anti-market beliefs left over from the Soviet Union
(Aslund, 2013a; Gaidar, 2012). Specialization in resource-intensive activities has
probably reinforced institutional weaknesses in the industrial sector, especially
through a political form of the resource curse (EBRD, 2009). While labour, capital,
and goods markets have been largely liberalized, and privately owned firms are in
the majority, the state’s influence in all aspects of the economy has hindered and
perhaps even reversed the transition process. Other than in resource-related sectors,
industrial firms have found it hard to improve productivity through innovation or
capital upgrading, and Russian manufacturers generally remain uncompetitive on
global markets.
3.5 CONCLUSION
This history of Russian industrial development considers three distinct periods:
Imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet. Each of these entailed a very different economic
system, with a distinct set of institutions, level of openness to the global economy,
and industrial policy environment. Beginning with the early phase of growth in the
1880s and 1890s, accelerating during the Stalinist industrial drive, and then
collapsing and only partially recovering during the last three decades, these very
different eras would suggest that a unified account of Russian industrialization
might be a misplaced effort.
We would disagree for at least three reasons. First, Russian industrialization
provides an important contrast to the histories of industrial development in other
land-rich, labour- and capital-scarce economies, including the United States,
Canada, and Australia. Unlike these societies (and perhaps more like Brazil and
China), Russia began the process of industrial growth with an economy that was
agrarian, technologically backward, financially underdeveloped, and politically
authoritarian. Russian industrialization required addressing such limitations
(à la Gerschenkron), but it also meant a constant conflict between following
comparative advantage and engaging in active policies to support underdeveloped
sectors with higher growth potential—a theme explored in a number of chapters in
this volume. Thus, understanding the Russia and the Soviet experiences also con-
tributes to the debate over the roots and policy implications of ‘late industrialization’
and ‘de-industrialization’.
48 On the growing role of the Russian state, see the discussion in EBRD (2010, pp. 138–9).
In general, recent Putin policies may be mimicking import-substitution industrialization policies often
associated with Latin American stagnation (Tarr and Volchkova, 2013).
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Second, the three different regimes offer variation to evaluate the role of
‘institutions’ in the development of the industrial sector. We have endeavoured to
highlight a number of different channels in each period, but perhaps looking across
the three regimes offers an even more useful point of systemic comparison. Indeed,
the contrast between authoritarian but market-oriented institutions grounded
in some form of private property rights (Imperial and post-Soviet Russia) and
the authoritarian but non-market and anti-private property rights Soviet system
speaks to the extractive/inclusive distinction recently employed by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012).
Finally, these three periods all provide a useful depiction of markets and
state authority as joint mechanisms for the allocation of resources, information, and
decision-making power within an economic system. Throughout, the Russian/Soviet
state employed a wide variety of interventionist tools—subsidies, planning, coercion,
trade policy, etc.—to drive the industrial development of the economy in a particular
direction; one that markets acting on their own would not necessarily have produced.
This means that the interaction between political objectives and economic efficiency
are necessary concerns, much as scholars of other economies with high levels of state
intervention (China, pre-reform India, etc.—see Chapters 9 and 10) have empha-
sized. At the same time, supply and demand came together very differently across the
three periods, depending on how or whether the state dictated plans, targets, rules,
institutions, and political objectives to influence the underlying benefits and costs for
‘market’ participants. Even in the Soviet economy, market-like transactions formed
fundamental allocation mechanisms. The sharp swings in the relative roles and
characteristics of markets and state authority drove the dynamics of industrial sector
development over the last 150 years of Russian history.
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4
How Peripheral was the Periphery?
Industrialization in East Central Europe since 1870
Alexander Klein, Max-Stephan Schulze, and Tamás Vonyó
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The origins of industrialization in Central and East Central Europe reach back into
the eighteenth century (Good, 1984; Komlos 1983, 1989). Much of this part of
Europe was under Habsburg rule until the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
at the end of the First World War.1 The Habsburg realm’s geographical location at
the crossroads of Europe’s west and east meant that the timing and spatial diffusion
of industrialization mirrored the broader European experience. It was in the regions
adjacent to western Europe, Alpine Austria and the Czech lands that ‘the growth
impulses from England and of the continental northwest found fertile ground first’
(Good, 1984, p. 15), and where the shift from proto-industrial to modern forms of
manufacturing began in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
By the early 1870s, Austrian industrialization was well beyond the transitional
phase that according to Komlos (1983) lasted to the mid-1820s, and was thus well
into the ‘machine-industrial phase’ proper. However, as elsewhere in Europe,
industrialization in the Habsburg lands, its timing and pace, was a process charac-
terized by pronounced regional differences (Pollard, 1986). These gaps initially
widened over the course of the nineteenth century, as industrial activity in Alpine
Austria and the Czech lands gathered momentum. The western parts of Hungary
followed significantly later with a first wave of industrial expansion in the late 1860s
and early 1870s. Industrialization, though by 1913 well advanced in the western
and northwestern regions of the empire, diffused only slowly to its most eastern and
southeastern regions. This had profound implications for the structure and growth
of the East Central European economies throughout the late nineteenth and
1 We use the labels Imperial Austria (or Cisleithania) and Imperial Hungary (or Transleithania) to
distinguish the two main constituent parts of the Habsburg state after the 1867 constitutional
compromise from the far smaller, post-1918 successor states of Austria and Hungary in their new
borders. Following Good (1984, pp. 15–17), the labels Alpine Austria (including the regions of Lower
Austria, Upper Austria, Styria, Salzburg, Carinthia, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg) and Czech lands (Bohemia,
Moravia, Silesia) are frequently used to identify the western and northwestern parts of the Habsburg
Empire that were the most industrialized. Despite post-1918 border changes, these latter groupings
correspond broadly with modern-day Austria and the Czech Republic.
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twentieth centuries. It is the stark unevenness in the extent of industrial activity
across the regions of East Central Europe that prompts the question of how
peripheral this periphery was. We suggest that, at least in a European context,
the imaginary line between the ‘core’ and ‘the periphery’ ran through the Habsburg
economy—from the west/northwest to the east/southeast, reflecting the pattern of
diffusion of modern economic growth emphasized in the historiography (Good,
1984; Pollard, 1986). The empire’s unique position—being both close to and at
the same time far away from the European industrial core—is, on the one hand,
demonstrated by its prominent rank among the world’s leading machinery produ-
cers: by 1913, Austria-Hungary’s mechanical engineering industry, located mainly
around Vienna and in the Czech lands, was in terms of output surpassed only by
the United States, Britain, and Germany (Schulze, 1996). Yet, on the other hand,
the Habsburg economy included large, populous regions in the east where indus-
trialization had made little, if any, headway by the time of the First World War.
Galicia, for example, accounted for about 28 per cent of Imperial Austria’s
population in 1910, but contributed less than 6 per cent of manufacturing output.
In the early nineteenth century, the western half of the Habsburg Empire was
economically in as promising a position as the territories of Germany proper
(Freudenberger, 2003). Around 1820, per capita GDP was about 7 per cent higher
than in Germany; the comparative income lead was even larger for the regions that
form present-day Austria.2 That lead, though, was to disappear fast over the
following decades. In this sense, then, the evidence lends some support to Alexander
Gerschenkron’s pessimistic assessment of nineteenth-century Austria as a case of
‘failure’ (Gerschenkron, 1977, p. 54). Table 4.1 reports GDP per capita for Central
Europe, expressed in percentages of the German level. Four initial, general obser-
vations stand out. First, in the late nineteenth century, the Habsburg Empire,
especially its Austrian half, became considerably poorer in terms of per capita
income than its newly unified German neighbour. To a large extent, this falling-
behind was an outcome of lower output and productivity growth in Cisleithanian
industry which, in turn, was linked to significantly lower levels of human capital
than in Germany (Schulze, 2007a). Second, for the late nineteenth century, there is
a large development gap between Imperial Austria and Imperial Hungary (in pre-
1918 borders) on the one hand, and the empire’s economically most advanced
regions located in what today constitute Austria and the Czech Republic, on the
other. This is a reflection of the comparatively late onset of industrialization in
Hungary and the eastern regions of the empire. Third, there is some evidence of
modest intra-empire catching-up before 1914: the income gap between Cisleithania
and Transleithania declined and so did the differentials between the territories of
modern Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Fourth, over the long run there is a
remarkable absence of significant changes in the relative levels of economic
2 Building on the estimates in Schulze (2000), Imperial Austria’s GDP was extrapolated backward
from its 1870 level, drawing on rates of change in agriculture and services from Kausel (1979) and in
industry from Komlos (1983). Likewise for modern Austria, with the exception of industry, which is
projected backward using Kausel’s rates of change.
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development within the broader region that we study, including Poland for
comparison. Though her initial income lead turned into a lag between 1870 and
1913, Austria was broadly on a par in level terms with the German economy (in its
1990 borders) throughout most of the modern era, with the notable exception of
the disastrous episode of the 1930s. The East Central European economies, on the
other hand, lagged behind both Germany and Austria and, although the size of this
developmental gap did not remain constant over time, it is today astonishingly
similar to what it was more than a hundred years ago.
If there is one message to take away from studying the economic history of East
Central Europe in the era of modern economic growth, then it is this absence of
cross-country convergence in levels of economic development over the long run.
East Central Europe had begun to industrialize before the rest of the global
periphery, and thus it is better described as ‘half-periphery’. However, it has
remained a half-periphery and has failed to catch up to, or even significantly narrow
the gap vis-à-vis, the European core of advanced economies. East Central Europe
thus failed to take advantage of its relative economic backwardness (Gerschenkron,
1962) and to exploit its catch-up potential (Abramovitz, 1986). After the collapse
of the Soviet bloc and the following sharp depression that lasted into the mid-
1990s, the income gap began to decline gradually, but so far this convergence has
only just sufficed to make up for the ground lost during the socialist era.
While some of the general patterns we describe prevailed in the wider region of
East Central Europe, the geographical focus is limited to the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy and its three main successor states, whose post-1918 territory remained
entirely within the borders of the Habsburg Empire. The aim here is to quantify the
level, structure, and trajectory of industrial development between 1870 and 2005
within, as far as possible, the borders of current-day Austria, Hungary, and the
Czech and Slovak Republics. The latter two will be referred to, for the most part, as
Czechoslovakia. Throughout the chapter, industry is defined as the sum of mining,
manufacturing, and public utilities, except when otherwise stated. For the inter-war
period, in particular, currently available data do not allow us to separate manufac-
turing from the rest of the industrial sector. For the years between 1950 and 1989,
Table 4.1. GDP per capita in Central Europe (Germany = 100)
1870 1890 1913 1929 1937 1950 1973 1989 2008
Imperial Austria 77 66 60
Imperial Hungary 52 51 46
Austria 111 95 86 91 67 95 94 99 108
Czechoslovakia 81 73 67 75 62 90 59 53 64
Hungary 59 58 54 61 54 64 47 42 52
Poland 51 53 48 52 41 63 45 34 49
Sources: (a) Imperial Austria, Imperial Hungary: Schulze (2000), with some revisions; (b) Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary for 1870–1913: preliminary new estimates based on revisions of regional GDPs from Schulze (2007b) and
border adjustments; (c) all other: Maddison Project (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm).
The percentages are calculated from figures expressed in 1990 GK dollars and, except for Imperial Austria and
Imperial Hungary, refer to 1990 borders.
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substantial differences in industry classification between the three countries make
such distinction similarly difficult. However, it is not just classification issues that
pose a problem when it comes to setting out long-term patterns of industrial
development: state borders changed after the First World War and with the
formation of the three main successor states. In most cases, the new state-level
borders were not drawn along pre-war region boundaries that typically identify the
contemporary statistical units of observation.
Quantitatively, we have three specific aims. First, we present near-complete time
series on industrial production and compare them to the growth of gross domestic
product (GDP). Second, we account for the level of industrialization by establishing
the share of industry and other major sectors of economic activity in the labour force.
Third, we gather evidence on the changing composition of industrial output to show
how the role of modern manufacturing industries evolved over time. In this third
task, we have to rely on data not entirely consistent between the pre-1914, inter-war,
and post-1950 periods. This limitation is determined by post-1918 border changes,
inter-temporal changes in industry classifications, and, in general, by the extent to
which disaggregated data on industrial production are available. Our discussion of
the evidence is, therefore, structured chronologically focusing on three main
periods: 1870–1914, 1920–38, and 1950–89. In the final section we briefly
consider the years following the fall of Communism and draw general conclusions
about the achievements of industrialization in East Central Europe.
4.2 INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE HABSBURG EMPIRE:
DIFFUSION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE LATE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
The process of industrialization in the Habsburg lands after 1870 evolved within
the context of an empire-wide customs and monetary union and against the
background of the 1867 constitutional settlement that established the Dual
Monarchy. An increasingly dense railway network connected the regional centres
of economic activity, stretching from the empire’s western border with Switzerland
to its eastern border with Russia, and from its northern border with Germany to the
Mediterranean. The sheer geographical expanse of the empire brought with it a
large degree of regional difference in broadly conceived resource endowments and
in access to both domestic and foreign markets. These differences had a major
impact on the location of industry and manufacturing in the empire and, by
extension, its successor states. The broader outlines of the spatial pattern of
industrial activity that came to characterize the second half of the nineteenth
century emerged over the previous hundred years or so. Four factors, in particular,
shaped this regional pattern and its concomitant differentials in manufacturing
activity. First, the western and northwestern regions of the empire, i.e. those
broadly corresponding with the territories of modern Austria and the Czech
Republic, experienced the weakening of feudal institutions earlier than the more
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eastern regions, creating room for the rise of non-agricultural activity. It was here
that domestic industry took hold first, that an entrepreneurial class emerged
comparatively early, that foreign capital and expertise was attracted to, and
where, eventually, modern forms of manufacturing began to develop (Good,
1984, pp. 14–24).3 In 1790, 280 manufacturing firms were counted in the empire
(excluding Galicia, Vorarlberg, and Tyrol). Of these, 50 per cent were located in
Lower Austria and 30 per cent in Bohemia (ibid.)—foreshadowing the two regions’
pre-eminence in Austro-Hungarian manufacturing through to 1914, notwith-
standing the changing composition of regional output over time. Second, at the
time of initial industrialization the western and northwestern regions of the empire
were already significantly more urbanized than the rest of the country (ibid.),
entailing agglomeration economies that were to intensify over the course of the
nineteenth century.4 Third, by 1870 the Alpine and Czech lands had a huge lead in
the stock of human capital, built up over the preceding decades: new estimates
suggest that the difference in average years of schooling compared to the least
advanced regions in the empire was equivalent to about two and a half years, or
60 (75) per cent of the average years of schooling for Imperial Austria (Hungary) as
a whole.5 Finally, access to domestic and foreign purchasing power was crucial for
the development of manufacturing, and in this respect, too, industry in Alpine
Austria and the Czech lands held an advantage over the more remote regions in the
empire’s east.
Manufacturing in both halves of the empire expanded at significantly higher
rates than the aggregate economy. Table 4.2 shows that by 1913, almost one-
quarter of Imperial Austria’s GDP was generated in manufacturing, while in
Imperial Hungary the proportion more than doubled from less than 7 per cent in
1870 to 14 per cent in 1913. This rise in manufacturing’s relative importance was
the outcome of an uneven process of accelerations and decelerations in industrial
activity and investment as well as changes in the output composition broadly in
favour of ‘modern’ sectors such as metal-making, engineering, and (petro-) chem-
icals. Between 1870 and 1913, manufacturing output in Austria grew by about
3 By the eighteenth century, Bohemia and Moravia had become centres of the textiles (linen,
woollen) and glass industries, while an internationally significant mining and metallurgy sector was
located in Styria, Upper Austria, and Carinthia. In the 1760s, for instance, Styria alone produced as
much pig iron as England (Good, 1984, pp. 20–1). The production of textiles in the Alpine lands was
in the main located in and around Vienna, Upper Austria, and Vorarlberg.
4 By 1880 (1910), the proportion of the population resident in towns with more than 10,000
inhabitants had reached 47 (61) per cent in Lower Austria (including Vienna) and 10 (19) per cent in
Bohemia (including Prague) compared to an average of 8 (14) per cent for the rest of Cisleithania; for
the broader regions of Alpine Austria and the Czech lands, the figures are 23 (34) and (10) 18 per cent,
respectively. From the 1860s, Budapest became the major centre of Hungarian manufacturing. Here,
too, a high initial degree of urbanization is observable: in 1870, the capital city alone accounted for
14 per cent of the Danube–Tisza Basin region’s population; by 1910, this proportion had increased to
29 per cent (Bolognese-Leuchtenmüller, 1978, Table 14, pp. 40–1; MSE, 1895, 1913).
5 New approximations of regional average years of schooling were derived using regional enrolment
data and the coefficients from a regression of aggregate average years of schooling in Imperial Austria
and Imperial Hungary on aggregate lagged enrolment; see Schulze and Fernandes (2009) for
underlying data, methods, and sources.
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2.3 per cent per annum compared with 4.0 per cent for the much less industrialized
Hungary. Yet the growth rates of manufacturing (or, more broadly, industrial)
output in Austria and Hungary were out of phase with one another over the period
(Table 4.3): this had to do with the effects of the 1873 Vienna stock market crash.
The crash led to an outflow of Austrian capital to Hungary and was a key factor in
prolonging sluggish growth in Austria whilst stimulating the first major wave of
industrialization in the Hungarian lands (Komlos, 1983). The repatriation of
capital to Austria in the early 1890s sustained the resumption of manufacturing
and aggregate growth there and was associated with a slowdown in the Hungarian
half of the empire. This pattern of deceleration and acceleration was closely
associated with changes in investment demand for plant and equipment, which
are apparent in the temporal evolution of domestic machinery output and changes
in the gross stock of machinery (Schulze, 1997, 2007a).
The pre-1873 upswing in Habsburg manufacturing was fuelled by an expansion
in the money supply to finance the wars with Prussia and Italy and a record
Hungarian harvest in 1867/8 coming at a time of poor harvests elsewhere in
Europe (Matis, 1972, pp. 153–61). Buoyant cereal and flour exports initiated a
dramatic expansion in the empire’s railway network, providing a major stimulus to
the domestic producer and capital goods industries that had developed in the
Table 4.2. Share of manufacturing in industrial, sectoral, and aggregate gross value added
(per cent)
Imperial Austria Imperial Hungary
Industry Secondary sector GDP Industry Secondary sector GDP
1870 96.0 63.9 19.2 89.0 58.6 6.5
1890 93.1 65.5 21.0 90.8 59.5 9.7
1913 91.9 66.6 24.8 89.2 62.3 14.1
Note: Gross value added in constant 1913 prices. Industry: manufacturing, mining, utilities. Secondary sector:
industry, construction, crafts.
Source: Schulze (2000), with some revisions.
Table 4.3. Annual growth, gross valued added (per cent)
Imperial Austria Imperial Hungary
Manufacturing Industry Secondary
sector
GDP Manufacturing Industry Secondary
sector
GDP
1871– 1912 2.34 2.44 2.21 1.81 4.05 4.00 3.77 2.14
1871–95 1.71 1.84 1.55 1.37 4.42 4.30 4.21 2.21
1895–1912 3.23 3.29 3.16 2.43 3.48 3.53 3.08 2.02
Note: Gross value added in constant 1913 prices. Peak-to-peak measurement. Since peaks in the individual series do
not necessarily correspond exactly with one another, the periods of measurement are not always identical.
Source: Appendix, Table A4.1.
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western and northwestern regions since the late eighteenth century. These
industries—engineering and iron and steel, in particular—were located primarily
in Alpine Austria and the Czech lands. As rural incomes rose in response to
increasing grain and land prices, demand for consumer goods expanded and led
to the installation of new productive capacity in manufacturing. The associated
growth in empire-wide demand for machinery provided a fillip not just to Austrian
producers but also to Budapest’s nascent engineering industry.6
Austrian manufacturing output peaked in 1871.7 Yet what started out as the
downswing following the expansionary phase of a regular business cycle was
transformed into a major recession in industry by the impact of the 1873 crash,
which changed longer-term expectations and investment decisions. From the late
1870s Austrian investors, seeking safe assets, engaged in large-scale purchases of
new Hungarian debt. The Hungarian government was thus able to finance its
regular expenditure and investment in infrastructure without crowding out private
domestic investors (as much of the new debt was held in Austria). Further, the
growth in Hungarian disposable incomes and in consumer demand was not
constrained as the government was able to meet its fiscal targets without recourse
to excessive taxation. This provided a major stimulus to both consumer and capital
goods producers in a still largely agricultural economy. Hence, in Hungary the signs
of depression were almost absent (despite a modest dip in activity in the 1870s). In
Austria, though, the effects were rather different: ‘the diminished stock of venture
capital had a negative impact on industrial production until the 1890s. By attract-
ing large amounts of Austrian capital, the Hungarian economy was therefore
influential in prolonging the depression in Austria’ (Komlos, 1983, p. 218). The
overall outcome was a painfully sluggish recovery in Austrian manufacturing from
the 1873 trough through to the mid-1880s and rapid expansion in Hungarian
manufacturing into the late 1880s and early 1890s (Schulze, 2000).
As domestic demand began to pick up again in the second half of the 1880s,
Austrian industrialists started installing new capacity again, going beyond mere
replacement investment which had been characteristic of the preceding decade and
a half. The beginning of this upturn in the late 1880s and early 1890s coincided
with the reversal of intra-empire capital flows. Austrian investors turned to domes-
tic industrial equity again (Somary, 1902, Table II, p. 39) and investment in
industrial machinery was aided by a fall in Austrian long-term interest rates
(Schulze, 1997). While the repatriation of Austrian capital was associated with a
significant increase in Austrian manufacturing (GDP) growth of about 1.5 (1.1)
percentage points over 1871–95, Hungary ‘suffered less’ than ‘Austria gained’:
growth in manufacturing declined by less than 1 percentage point and the observed
decrease in GDP growth is probably within the margin of error (0.2 percentage
6 See Schulze (1996) on the development of Hungary’s machine-building industry.
7 According to Komlos’ (1983, Table E.4) index, Austrian manufacturing grew by 8.7 per cent per
annum during 1867–71 and 1.8 per cent during 1871–84. Whilst also showing a peak in 1871, the
more comprehensive index documented in Table A.4.1 in the appendix increases by less than 1 per
cent over the period.
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points). We hypothesize that this had to do with, first, a much deeper and more
sophisticated Hungarian domestic capital market than there had been in the early
1870s, as a result of significantly higher per capita incomes after more than twenty
years of relatively fast economic growth; second, a shift into higher value-added
manufacturing branches; and, third, comparatively high productivity growth in
agriculture that sustained disposable income growth and demand for manufactured
goods in a still largely agricultural economy. Throughout the late nineteenth
century, agriculture in Hungary had a substantial revealed comparative advantage
in crop production. The sector benefited from ready access to the higher-income
markets in Austria that were largely uncontested by foreign importers due to the
Habsburg customs union’s external tariff (Katus, 1970; Komlos, 1983).8 In add-
ition, not only did crop production lend itself more readily to mechanization and
machinery investment in Hungary than in most parts of the overall more moun-
tainous and rugged Austria, but Hungary ran a trade surplus in both crops and
livestock products with her customs union partner (Eddie, 1989).
While textiles and iron were at the centre of early industrialization in the Alpine
and Czech lands, the process of industrialization in Hungary was driven initially by
the agricultural processing industries, especially flour milling (Good, 1984,
pp. 125–48), which drew on a productive domestic rural sector as the main source
of its inputs. Yet the structure of manufacturing changed significantly in the later
decades of the century in both parts of the empire and became more diversified.
This raises the question of to what extent shifts to ‘modern’ industries were
associated with changes in overall manufacturing growth. Here we consider iron
and steel production, engineering (including mechanical and electrical engineering
as well as transport equipment) and chemicals as representative of the ‘modern
sector’.9 Of course, this is a simplification—technical change, product and process
innovations occurred in other sectors, too. Table 4.4 sets out the comparative
growth rates and the relative contributions to manufacturing growth made by the
‘modern sector’ compared to other manufacturing branches. Three observations
can be made. First, the ‘modern sector’ grew significantly faster than the rest of
manufacturing in both Austria and Hungary. Second, this held over both periods
under review. Third, the evidence for Austria-Hungary conforms broadly with
the general finding that industrialization typically involved a growing share not
only of manufacturing in aggregate output, but also of a rising weight of the
‘modern sectors’ in manufacturing as a whole. In Austria, the proportion of
manufacturing growth attributable to the rise of the ‘modern sectors’ went up
from less than 23 per cent (1871–95) to almost 40 per cent at a time of overall
accelerating manufacturing growth. For Hungary, the corresponding figures are
17 per cent and 25 per cent, reflecting the overall less advanced state and structure
of manufacturing in Transleithania.
8 Cf. Schulze (2007a) on comparative sectoral productivity growth.
9 The category of non-engineering ‘metal-working’ industries, ranging from the production of nails
and screws to metal furniture, has been excluded.
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Table 4.5 reveals some key structural characteristics of the Habsburg economy.
First, throughout the period under review the empire as a whole remained a largely
agricultural economy, especially so in its eastern, Hungarian half. In comparison,
less than half of the labour force in Germany was employed in agriculture in 1871
and by 1910 this proportion had fallen to less than 36 per cent, while manufactur-
ing’s share had risen to more than 29 per cent (Hoffmann, 1965).10 Note, however,
that Imperial Austria had a significantly higher share of manufacturing (or, more
broadly, industrial) employment in 1870 than its southern neighbour Italy and













1871–95 2.73 1.51 0.39 1.32 1.72
1895–1912 6.51 2.46 1.26 1.97 3.23
Imperial Hungary
1871–95 7.57 4.08 0.77 3.65 4.42
1895–1912 5.35 3.13 0.86 2.63 3.48
Note: Measurement from peak to peak in total manufacturing output. For each period, relative contributions to
manufacturing growth are computed as each sector’s growth rate weighted by that sector’s share in manufacturing at
the start of the period.
Sources: See Table 4.2.














Agriculture 62.7 78.3 61.5 79.5 54.0 73.4
Industry 18.1 7.1 19.9 8.0 22.6 11.8
Manufacturing 17.4 6.6 18.9 7.4 21.3 11.0
Mining 0.8 0.6 1.1 0.6 1.2 0.8
Utilities 0.1
Construction 2.2 2.4 0.9 3.3 1.5
Services 17.0 14.6 16.1 11.6 20.1 13.3
Labour force (000s) 10,848.28 8,248.48 12,203.67 9,121.60 14,051.33 10,732.56
Source: Schulze (2007a) with some revisions.
10 Note that Hoffmann’s (1965) figures refer to Germany in its pre-First World War rather than its
post-1990 boundaries. In 1910, manufacturing (including crafts as for the Habsburg Empire)
accounted for 29.1 per cent, mining for 2.8 per cent, utilities for 0.3 per cent, and construction for
5.2 per cent of the total labour force.
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maintained a slight lead until the First World War (cf. Chapter 6, Table 6.2).
Second, the picture looks distinctly different if the focus is on those territories
that after the First World War became parts of either the Austrian Republic or
Czechoslovakia. Here the shares of industry and manufacturing in total employ-
ment were far higher than on average across the empire, on a par with those
prevalent in Germany and well above the corresponding figures for Italy.11
These data, then, confirm the notion of the Alpine and Czech regions as the
industrial heartlands of the empire and as regions of industrial activity close to the
European core.
The level differences in manufacturing and industrial employment shares within
Austria-Hungary reflect the regional differentials in the timing and sectoral basis of
industrialization across the empire.12 Hungary—whether in its imperial or modern
guise—came late to the game. Here, industrialization in earnest had started only
during the 1860s and 1870s, aided by the inflow of Austrian funds after the 1873
stock market crash. Budapest (in the central Danube–Tisza Basin), in particular,
but also the Hungarian regions on the Danube Left and Right Banks as well as the
Tisza Right Bank became progressively more engaged in manufacturing over time.
However, compared to Austria or Czechoslovakia, and even Imperial Austria as a
whole, manufacturing played a markedly less prominent role in the Hungarian
economy right up to the First World War. This is borne out by the evidence on
both regional shares in manufacturing output and regional manufacturing output
per head (Table 4.6).
Clearly, the spatial distribution of manufacturing across the Habsburg Empire
changed over time, broadly in line with the gradual intra-empire catching-up of the
Hungarian on the Austrian economy. By 1910, Budapest was firmly on the map as
a major manufacturing location. Yet just as striking as this is persistence: in terms of
manufacturing output per capita, the most industrialized regions in 1910 were still,
by a large margin, Lower Austria and the Czech lands—just as they had been forty
years earlier. In absolute terms, the per capita output lead of the established
manufacturing regions over the others increased, even if it had marginally declined
in percentage terms. Following New Economic Geography reasoning, regions’
access to domestic and foreign markets (here: transport and tariff-cost weighted
GDPs of main trading partners) is a central candidate factor accounting for a good
deal of inter-regional differences in manufacturing activity. Habsburg regions’
manufacturing output per head over 1870 to 1910 is indeed strongly associated
with access to the home and European markets.13 Further, regional differences in
11 This assessment is grounded in new estimates for the successor states. They are based on the
regional data underlying the reconstructed labour force estimates for Imperial Austria and Imperial
Hungary and border adjustments; for sources and methods, see Appendix A in Schulze (2007a). For
modern Austria and Czechoslovakia, the share of the labour force in manufacturing moves from
c.22 per cent in 1870 to about 28 per cent in 1910; for Hungary, it moves from less than 9 to almost
15 per cent. Note that the 1910 figures deviate slightly from those presented in Table 4.7; this is
mainly due to corrections in the estimated agricultural labour force for 1870–1910.
12 See Table A.4.3 in the appendix for a more detailed breakdown by manufacturing branches.
13 On the underlying Harris-type market potential measures for the Habsburg regions, see Schulze
(2007b).
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human capital endowments (average years of schooling) are strongly associated with
regional differences in manufacturing output per head.14 The critical issue here is
the interaction between the two. The evidence suggests that those regions that were
comparatively well endowed with human capital were in a significantly better
position to exploit their market potential, i.e. to realize benefits of economies of
scale and specialization related to market size. The regions in the landlocked and
remote east of the empire (e.g. Galicia, the Bukovina or Transylvania) were not
only disadvantaged in terms of their limited access to Habsburg or foreign markets,
but also constrained by previous generations’ lack of investment in schooling. The
southern coastal regions had a large market potential because of their cost advan-
tages of sea transportation to growing foreign markets but, in the case of Dalmatia
or Croatia–Slavonia, suffered from a poorly educated labour force. There was, then,
little incentive for manufacturers to locate in these regions despite their favourable
position in terms of market access. Where the human capital stock was higher, the
response to the opportunities afforded by better market access was stronger, as
Table 4.6. Manufacturing gross value added by region (1990 Geary–Khamis dollars)
Output (m.) Regional share Output per capita
1870 1910 1870 1910 1870 1910
Lower Austria 1,295 3,634 0.20 0.18 644.3 1,028.9
Upper Austria 209 471 0.03 0.02 280.7 552.5
Salzburg 41 111 0.01 0.01 266.6 516.6
Styria 243 822 0.04 0.04 211.3 569.3
Carinthia 52 154 0.01 0.01 152.9 389.9
Carniola 47 154 0.01 0.01 98.8 293.0
Littoral 101 423 0.02 0.02 166.2 473.2
Tyrol/Vorarlberg 172 500 0.03 0.03 191.8 458.0
Bohemia 2,266 5,499 0.34 0.28 436.7 812.3
Moravia 710 1,844 0.11 0.09 348.7 703.1
Silesia 180 496 0.03 0.03 347.7 655.7
Galicia 264 852 0.04 0.04 48.0 106.2
Bukovina 24 79 0.00 0.00 47.2 99.1
Dalmatia 7 60 0.00 0.00 15.1 92.4
Danube Left Bank 138 542 0.02 0.03 79.8 249.2
Danube Right Bank 178 585 0.03 0.03 73.3 189.8
Danube–Tisza Basin 198 1,379 0.03 0.07 91.5 365.9
Tisza Right Bank 105 408 0.02 0.02 69.9 230.4
Tisza Left Bank 85 372 0.01 0.02 44.7 143.3
Tisza–Maros Bank 93 394 0.01 0.02 52.9 184.0
Transylvaina 105 482 0.02 0.02 48.5 180.1
Croatia–Slavonia 62 418 0.01 0.02 33.1 156.6
Imperial Austria 5,610 15,101 0.85 0.77 272.5 540.7
Imperial Hungary 964 4,581 0.15 0.23 62.1 219.3
Source: Revised estimates based on sources and methods documented in Schulze (2007b).
14 See n. 5 above on the construction of regional average years of schooling measures.
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demonstrated by the region around Trieste (Littoral). Although enrolment rates
rose faster in the least developed parts of the empire than in the more advanced
regions (where levels were, by Habsburg standards, already relatively high), it took
considerable time before this fed into increases in average years of schooling. Those
parts of the Habsburg Empire that were characterized by initially high levels of
schooling, Alpine Austria and the Czech lands, were still well in the lead by 1910.
Stark inter-regional differences in education investment prior to the 1870s
had a lasting impact on regions’ relative performance in manufacturing up to the
First World War.
4.3 INDUSTRIALIZATION ON HOLD: CENTRAL
EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS
If John Maynard Keynes was correct in arguing that the economic consequences of
the peace after the First World War were detrimental for Germany, then their
impact beyond Germany’s eastern borders can be branded catastrophic. Unlike the
territory of post-war Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary witnessed little,
if any, destruction due to war activity. The only exception is the brief conflict
between the short-lived Bolshevik regime in Hungary and the Petite Entente formed
by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania, that ended with the Romanian
occupation of most of Hungary in 1920. Still, the post-war settlement dislocated
the economies of Central Europe. The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire severely
limited access to markets and resources for industrial firms both within and beyond
the pre-1914 borders (Teichova, 1985, pp. 223–7).
Different regions of the empire differed not only in their level of industrializa-
tion, but also in what branches of manufacturing they had specialized in. Thus the
new borders, coupled with the animosity of the new nation states towards their
neighbours, implied much-reduced market potential for many industries and the
breakdown of crucial input–output linkages between firms. The milling industry of
Budapest, the textile and clothing industry in Austria, or machine-tool producers in
Bohemia and Moravia not only faced difficulties in accessing their once most
important markets, but also in securing necessary intermediate inputs. While recent
research has revealed that the negative impact of economic nationalism on market
integration was already felt before the First World War, it became devastating after
1918 (Schulze and Wolf, 2011, pp. 652–73). As shown in Table A.4.2 in the
appendix, the decline in industrial output across the war was comparable to, and in
the case of Austria was even greater than, that of GDP—in a period when the rate
of industrialization was on the rise in rest of the global periphery.
Between the wars, industrial expansion was very moderate in Central Europe,
following a path quite similar to that of Germany and most of the advanced
Western economies. Following a relatively successful stabilization that brought an
end to hyperinflation in Austria and Hungary and restored state finances by 1924,
all three countries recovered quickly up until 1929. Industrial production grew by
4.5 per cent annually in Austria, and by 8 per cent in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
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However, approximately half of this growth was lost during the Great Depression,
which in both Austria and Czechoslovakia affected the manufacturing sector more
strongly than the rest of the economy. In both countries, political forces prolonged
the slump. While extreme political fractionalization leading to civil war tormented
Austria, the government in Prague tried policies of import substitution while
maintaining the gold standard, which continued to have a deflationary effect
until the mid-1930s. Furthermore, the export-oriented nature of Czech industry,
and its relative success during the 1920s in replacing exports to the former empire
with exports to other markets, made it more susceptible to international trade
shocks (Drabek, 1985, pp. 408, 429–30). Czech industry was hit hard by the rising
tariffs and administrative trade barriers that emerged across Europe during and after
the Great Depression (Pryor et al., 1971, pp. 35–59; Drabek, 1985, pp. 432–33).
As a result, industrial output remained well below 1929 levels until 1937.
Between 1938 and 1943, the expansion of the Nazi war economy gave a large
impetus to industrial growth in Central Europe, particularly in the territories
annexed by Hitler in 1938. In the first two years after the Anschluss, the Austrian
economy grew by more than 30 per cent, and industry by more than a half,
reflecting the priority given to war preparations (Butschek, 1978, p. 65). After
the announcement of rearmament in 1938, Hungary also experienced a growth
spurt driven by industrial expansion. While total employment in the economy
remained constant until 1943, it climbed from 330,000 to 451,000 in manufac-
turing, leading to a 37 per cent increase in industrial production (Ránki, 1964,
p. 225; Berend and Ránki, 1960, p. 140). Recent research has revealed the
staggering growth of German imports from the region after 1939, with particularly
large increases from Austria and the annexed Czech lands (Scherner, 2011,
pp. 79–113). Consequently, wartime industrial expansion focused primarily on
mining and the primary metal industries as well as machinery and armaments.
In terms of structural development, the region did not witness much action
during the inter-war period. Industrialization was put on hold; the occupational
distribution of the labour force remained almost unchanged in all three countries,
as reported in Table 4.7. The most important factor holding back structural
modernization was the fact that agricultural productivity remained very modest,
due to the lack of technological innovation, the slow spread of chemical fertilizers,
and low mechanization. Thus, the farming sector had only a limited potential to
release labour, which was further aggravated by the pro-agrarian political radical-
ization of the 1930s.
The literature, however, has pointed to several other constraints on industrial
expansion. Teichova emphasized the shortage of skilled labour, which was a crucial
factor limiting manufacturing growth in a period when European industry still
relied heavily on craft production methods (Teichova, 1988, pp. 21–2). Eckstein
stressed the decline in capital investment from the pre-1914 period, and more so
after 1929, which increased the technological lag vis-à-vis advanced Western
nations (Eckstein, 1955, p. 220). As shown in Figs 4.1 and 4.2 respectively,
without sufficient investment in new equipment the main drivers of technological
modernization in the inter-war period, electrification and motorization, made very
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little progress in Central Europe. This relative backwardness was noticeable in
comparison not only with the United States, but also with Germany, and it became
more pronounced during the 1930s.
In an environment increasingly characterized by resource scarcity and trade
protectionism, industrialization had several common features across Central Europe:
industrial concentration to achieve economies of scale, cartelization to secure prefer-
ential access to markets and foreign technology, and product specialization to exploit
market potential in niche areas. Both in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the growth of
industrial production was driven by the expansion of large-scale enterprise in primary
metals, chemicals, and engineering. The three largest metallurgical companies in
Czechoslovakia increased their share in steel production from 65 per cent in 1921 to
90 per cent by 1936, and owned all the export quotas allocated to the country in the
International Steel Cartel (Teichova, 1988, pp. 40–1). In Hungary, the leading firms
in the electro-technical industry and railway engineering managed to increase their
global market share despite shrinking domestic demand. They achieved this by
integrating into German-led international cartels and by concentrating on very
specialized products, such as lamp and radio parts, or diesel multiple units used on
small railways in remote regions around the world (Hidvégi and Vonyó, 2012,
pp. 61–2). By contrast, the more traditional branches of manufacturing, such as
the milling industry in Hungary, or the sugar industry in Bohemia, faced relative
decline. Between 1924 and 1937, the share of metals, chemicals, and engineering
products in total industrial output in Czechoslovakia increased from 22.6 per cent to
31.7 per cent (Teichova, 1988, p. 34). The same level of disaggregation is not
possible for Hungary, but the statistical evidence shows that while the contribution
of mining, smelting, handicraft production, and construction to national product did
not change between 1924 and 1938, the share of manufacturing (which did not
Table 4.7. Economically active population by sector (per cent)
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008
Hungary
Agriculture 55.8 58.2 54.2 50.0 51.8 38.1 25.0 18.4 15.3 8.4 4.9
Industry 19.4 18.1 21.7 23.2 23.6 34.8 44.7 43.9 39.7 36.8 35.5
Services 24.8 23.7 24.1 26.8 24.6 27.1 30.3 37.7 45.0 54.8 59.6
Austria*
Agriculture 39.5 39.9 37.5 39.0 34.3 23.7 14.8 9.9 8.0 6.2 5.7
Industry 31.0 33.3 34.5 32.4 36.1 46.4 43.0 42.2 38.4 31.7 27.0
Services 29.5 26.8 28.0 28.6 29.7 29.9 42.2 47.9 53.6 62.1 67.3
Czechoslovakia
Agriculture 42.0 39.6 37.5 37.8 25.7 16.9 13.3 12.8 6.3 3.4
Industry 34.1 33.8 35.7 37.5 46.1 48.3 49.3 45.6 45.0 39.1
Services 23.9 26.6 26.8 24.7 28.3 34.8 37.4 41.6 48.8 57.5
* The entry for 1920 reflects 1923 data; that for 1930 is an estimate based on 1934 figures and sectoral growth rates.
Sources: Austria–Butschek (2011, p. 163); Czechoslovakia–Teichova (1988, p. 9); Hungary–Eckstein (1955); for all
countries after 1950: ILO (1986) and FAOSTAT Classic (http://faostatclassic.fao.org/site/550/DesktopDefault.
aspx?PageID=550#ancor).
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Fig. 4.1. Installed capacity in electrical power generation per head of the population


























Fig. 4.2. Number of residents in the country per registered automobile in 1935
Source: Data from Hidvégi and Vonyó (2012).
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include metallurgy or construction materials) increased from 15.5 per cent to 21.4
per cent (Eckstein, 1955, p. 171).
Despite the overall sluggish industrialization of East Central Europe, the region
recorded some examples of the implementation of modern productivity-enhancing
technologies, though these were exceptions rather than the general rule. The best-
known case is the Baťa works in Zlín, the leading concern in the Czechoslovak
shoe-making industry. The introduction of advanced American mass production
techniques between 1924 and 1927 achieved a dramatic productivity increase that
lasted into the early 1930s. Shoe production jumped from 8.9 million pairs in 1926
to 15.2 million pairs in 1927, while employment expanded by ‘only’ 35 per cent in
the same year. Between 1930 and 1933, average weekly output per worker
increased from 37 to 48 pairs and Czechoslovakia became one of the world’s
leading exporters of footwear (Teichova, 1985, pp. 275–6).
4.4 PLANNED INDUSTRIALIZATION IN
A STATE-MANAGED ECONOMY
If the consequences of the First World War were catastrophic for Central Europe,
the impact of the Second World War was apocalyptic. Hostilities on the eastern
front brought unprecedented destruction. The temporary demise of the German
economy and the East–West tensions emerging from the post-war settlement
untied the input–output linkages between the region’s industries. These were still
partially the legacy of industrial development in the Habsburg Empire before 1914,
but even more so the product of Nazi economic imperialism. From the mid-1930s,
German foreign policy considered the region as its natural backwater and increas-
ingly tied its economies to the Third Reich via bilateral trade agreements. The
economic dependence on Germany increased further during the war, especially for
the territories temporarily annexed by the Third Reich.15 By late 1945, in Austria
and Hungary, industrial production plummeted to levels that had already been
surpassed by 1900 (see Tables A4.1 and A4.2 in the appendix). However, the most
detrimental economic outcome of the war was the immense loss it caused in human
resources. Besides the innumerable military and civilian casualties, more than a
million Jews who had resided in the three countries before 1939 perished in the
Holocaust. Lastly, one needs to account for the expulsion of minority Germans from
East and Central Europe after 1945, in accordance with the PotsdamAgreement. Of
the 16 million who voluntarily fled or were uprooted between 1944 and 1950,
3 million were expelled from Czechoslovakia and 210,000 from Hungary. Most of
the expellees were deported to post-war Germany, many dying in the process, and
370,000 settled in Austria (Reichling, 1989, p. 26).
While these deportations have featured prominently in the literature on the post-
war West German economy, their impact has been largely ignored in the economic
15 See Hirschman (1945), Ránki (1983), and Grenzebach (1988) among others.
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history of Eastern Europe. The combined effect of wartime casualties, including the
permanently wounded and the mentally debilitated, and the post-war settlement,
was enormous. Austria and Hungary witnessed practically no population growth
between 1939 and 1950. During the same period the population of Czechoslovakia
within its post-1945 borders declined from 14.7 million to 12.4million (Maddison,
2006, pp. 416, 474–5). The Sudetenland was largely depopulated, and important
industrial districts thus lost a vast share of their pre-war labour force.16 Across
Central Europe, the war had left behind an ill-balanced demographic structure
with a notable shortage of able-bodied young and middle-aged men, who tradition-
ally constituted the backbone of the industrial workforce. The Holocaust and the
expulsion of minority Germans, in particular, together with substantial emigration
among the bourgeois middle class, bequeathed to the tormented nations of Central
Europe a plethora of industrial and commercial assets without owners, and without
the necessary skills and entrepreneurial know-how to operate them.
To rebuild and re-organize the war-shattered and dislocated economies required
state management, which already materialized under the national-unity govern-
ments during the late 1940s, and under Allied military occupation in Austria.
Popular land reforms were followed by large-scale nationalization in industry. By
1948, all large enterprises and most middle-size firms were brought under state
control; private property only continued to prevail in handicraft production. The
state-managed economy operated with fixed prices and wages, and the centralized
allocation of resources, including both material inputs and investment. Even in
Austria, most assets in heavy industry, public transport, and utilities were publicly
owned, and the rest of the economy was subjected to tremendous red tape. From
the immediate post-war years, governments in all three countries pursued autarkic
industrialization policies with extensive planning. While central planning was never
introduced in Austria, she served as the canonical example of a managed mixed
economy (Berend, 1997, pp. 72–82; Seidel, 2005).
In many ways, during the early post-war period Central Europe followed a
similar path to that of Latin American countries during their flirtation with
import-substituting industrialization. In Austria, multiple exchange rates and tar-
geted industrial subsidies were used to improve the competitiveness of domestic
manufacturing. Although forced industrialization in socialist command economies
applied other tools to steer economic development that often reflected military-
strategic motives, it also aimed at creating industrial self-sufficiency and accelerating
the process of structural change. However, from the late 1950s, industrialization in
Central Europe owed much less to the East–West arms race than was the case in the
Soviet Union. According to data published by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), military spending in Czechoslovakia and Hungary
rarely surpassed 3 per cent of GDP between 1957 and 1989.17
16 The border region with Germany produced about 55 per cent of Czechoslovak hard coal,
93 per cent of brown coal, 61 per cent of textiles, 38 per cent of chemicals, 45 per cent of stone and
clay products, and 30 per cent of engineering products. See Shute (1948, pp. 35–44).
17 SIPRI, Yearbook, diff. vols.
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In establishing the quantitative record of socialist industrialization we need to
treat official output data with more than a modicum of suspicion. Government
statistics were distorted to a large but non-quantifiable extent. Physical output
indicators are considered comparatively trustworthy, but aggregates expressed in
value terms reflect unrealistic producer prices, incorrect weighting inasmuch as
industry was always attributed a higher than actual share in net material product,
and inappropriate methods employed in the computation of index numbers.18
Thankfully, independent Western research revised official figures using data on
physical output indicators exclusively, and applying Western accounting standards.
The most substantial work was carried out by the Research Project on National
Income in East Central Europe under the leadership of Thad P. Alton. A long series
of publications report index numbers on GNP by sector of origin of product, and
industrial value added, for six countries including Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
We use these data to determine the composition of gross value added and of
industrial production using the same industry classifications and compare these
results with statistics for Austria and Germany.
Economic growth in Central Europe after 1945 was industry-driven. From its
post-war nadir, industrial production recovered to pre-1939 levels by 1950 and
grew rapidly for another two decades, significantly faster than the rest of the
economy. In all three countries, industrial value added measured in constant prices
doubled during the 1950s and tripled between 1950 and 1970 (see Table A4.2 in
the appendix). In fact, industrialization reached its peak only in the 1960s and
1970s when industry and construction employed well over 40 per cent of the
labour force. By contrast, the share of agricultural employment declined to less than
half of its initial level during the post-war golden age. In Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, industry remained the largest sector of the economy until the late 1980s.
Table 4.8 demonstrates the impact of forced industrialization in the 1950s and
early 1960s in a comparative perspective. The share of industrial value added in
GDP increased significantly faster in Czechoslovakia and Hungary than in Austria
and Germany (GDR and Federal Republic combined). After 1968, when moderate
economic reforms relaxed authoritarian controls and introduced greater flexibility
for enterprise management, industrial growth slowed down considerably. However,
while the rate of industrialization was declining in Germany after the oil shocks, it
continued to increase until the mid-1980s in Central Europe. East of the Iron
Curtain, this was largely the consequence of the slow development of the service
sector. In Austria, it reflected more the overheating of industrial growth by ever-
increasing state subsidies that began to rock the federal budget by the 1980s and
forced the government to begin privatizing state assets.
Post-war data give us a deeper insight into the structural development of the
economy and the nature of industrialization than what we have been able to
establish for earlier periods. Table 4.9 shows that the share of heavy industry and
18 Net Material Product was the national accounting concept used by CMEA countries. It is
conceptually similar to GDP, but excludes services deemed unproductive, especially housing and the
government.
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of modern manufacturing in gross industrial value added was similar across the
region, but mining and the production of basic materials remained more important
in Czechoslovakia and Hungary than in Austria and Germany. Whereas the
share of modern manufacturing increased throughout the period in Austria and
Germany, it stagnated in the two socialist countries from the late 1960s onward.
This accords with the existing evidence pointing towards a growing technological
lag between Western nations and centrally planned economies after the golden
age.19 This pattern is commonly attributed to inefficient resource allocation
and the ideologically driven preference for material production over services.20
Additionally, the austerity policies introduced to combat the budgetary effects of
rising oil prices and the debt crises that emerged in the 1980s (as a consequence of
lavish borrowing during the 1970s and the worsening terms of trade after 1980) also
led to a reduction in investment levels, particularly investment in new machinery.
Table 4.8. Share of industry* in gross value added in 1975 prices (per cent)
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Austria 27.3 28.7 29.2 30.0 28.7 31.5
Czechoslovakia 26.4 35.9 38,6 40.7 34.6 37.1
Hungary 24.8 32.4 32.4 33.8 35.0 39.6
Germany 32.5 34.9 35.2 33.4 27.5 27.1
* Mining, manufacturing and utilities.
Source: Own calculations based on data from G. Lazarcik (1969), Czirják (1973), Alton et al. (1982), Alton et al.
(1991), DIW (Germany), WIFO (Austria), and EU KLEMS (www.euklems.net).
Table 4.9. The composition of gross industrial value added* in current prices (per cent)
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Heavy industry
Austria 27.3 28.7 29.2 30.0 28.7 31.5
Czechoslovakia 26.4 35.9 38.6 40.7 34.6 37.1
Hungary 24.8 32.4 32.4 33.8 35.0 39.6
Germany 32.5 34.9 35.2 33.4 27.5 27.1
Modern manufacturing
Austria 48.3 52.6 54.5 61.2
Czechoslovakia 56.3 58.4 57.4 63.8 53.4 62.4
Hungary 47.5 53.8 52.4 57.5 55.0 72.2
Germany 52.8 59.3 64.3 68.8 68.4 75.4
* Mining and manufacturing
Note: Heavy industry includes mining, construction materials, chemicals, primary metals, and engineering products.
Modern manufacturing includes only chemicals, primary metals, and engineering products.
Source: Own calculations based on data from Staller (1975), Czirják (1968), Alton et al. (1991), DIW (Germany),
WIFO (Austria), and EU KLEMS (www.euklems.net).
19 See among others Kalecki (1993), and Broadberry and Klein (2011).
20 The perhaps most elegant exposition of this view is by Kalecki (1993).
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In terms of growth, Central European economies performed similarly to other
peripheral regions in Europe, with some notable exceptions. As in Southern Europe
and as in other countries within the Soviet bloc, the growth of industrial produc-
tion slowed considerably from the 1970s and was disrupted by a temporary slump
in the early 1980s. From the 1960s onwards, Central Europe was lagging behind
Southern Europe in terms of average growth rates, and from the mid-1970s Austria
was also pulling away from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. During the golden age,
average rates of industrial expansion were also lower than in Southeast Europe,
which provides evidence for convergence within the Soviet bloc. After 1980,
however, this process of convergence broke down: typically the most advanced
socialist economies performed best, in terms of both aggregate growth and indus-
trial development.
In Russia (not the whole Soviet Union), the increased price of hydrocarbons
created new opportunities for growth in heavy industry, not least thanks to
investment in natural gas exploration and in new transcontinental pipelines.21 In
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, growth could be maintained because the relatively
more advanced economic structure of both countries made them more resistant to
(although by no means unaffected by) the exogenous shocks of the early 1980s.
Given that modern branches of manufacturing, such as electrical engineering, and
services accounted for a relatively larger share of their GDP, they were hit less severely
by the oil shocks than the less developed socialist economies. Czechoslovakia and
Hungary were also much less affected by the debt crises of the 1980s than Poland or
Southeast Europe. Since, unlike virtually every other socialist country, Czechoslovakia
did not borrow extensively during the 1970s, it did not need to tighten the belt after
borrowing costs rocketed following the second oil shock. Hungary would have had to,
but joined the IMF in 1982 (in a secret operation without the prior knowledge of the
Soviet leadership), which improved her position as a debtor.22 By contrast, Poland and
Romania suffered prolonged depressions under severe austerity imposed by the
repressive governments of General Jaruzelski and Nicolae Ceaușescu respectively;
and, even if to a lesser extent, austerity also had harsh economic consequences in
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
4 .5 THE LEGACY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION:
CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER 1990
The collapse of the Soviet bloc and the socialist economic system caused a major
depression in Eastern Europe, affecting both Czechoslovakia andHungary. Between
1987 and 1992, industrial production declined by 37 per cent and 28 per cent in the
two countries respectively. In Czechoslovakia, the reduction in value added was
more than twice as large in mining and manufacturing as in the entire economy.
21 Hence the faster growth in total GDP in Russia (see Ponomarenko, 2002, p. 151) than in the
USSR as a whole (see Maddison, 2006) after 1980.
22 For a more detailed narrative, see Berend (1997, pp. 195 ff.).
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Austrian industry initially received a boost from the opening of Eastern markets and
German reunification, in particular, but this boom was short lived and turned into
recession in 1991. From the mid-1990s, Central Europe enjoyed strong growth
that, not unlike in earlier periods, was propelled by industrial expansion (see
Table A4.2 in the appendix).
Transition to a market economy delivered first a killer blow to and then a
blessing on Central European industry. The liberalization of markets, the removal
of import restrictions, and the introduction of hard budget constraints finally
exposed the inefficiency of state industries, leading to a sharp fall in output and
employment. In subsequent years, however, privatization and a massive inflow of
foreign direct investment (FDI) led to technological modernization and the ration-
alization of production. Industry-level data reported by the EU KLEMS project
shows that productivity growth since 1995 has stemmed largely from modern
manufacturing, the strongly export-oriented engineering industries in particular,
where most FDI has been concentrated. Since the launching of the euro, compara-
tive advantage in manufacturing has shifted from Southern to Central Europe. The
growth impact of FDI was most noticeable in the automobile industry and
electrical engineering, in which the Czech and Slovak Republics as well as Hungary
emerged as major exporters within just a few years.
The quantitative evidence on structural change also reveals the relative import-
ance of manufacturing in the growth of Central European economies. Albeit
declining since the late 1980s, the share of industry in the labour force has
remained considerably higher in the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary than in
Austria (see Table 4.7). As shown in Table 4.8, industry’s share in gross value added
even increased in Hungary, where privatization and the liberalization of capital
markets was completed much faster than in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The
latter pursued more gradual reform programmes, and thus did not attract as much
manufacturing FDI before the late 1990s. In recent years, Central Europe has
experienced a period of re-industrialization and, in fact, has become proportionally
more industrialized than Germany. Table 4.9 also reveals the impact of shifting
comparative advantages on the structure of industrial production. The share of
heavy industry and, to a lesser extent, of modern manufacturing in gross industrial
value added declined sharply following the fall of Communism. By 2005, these
shares had recovered, or even surpassed, their highest previous levels; nevertheless
the share of modern manufacturing in Central Europe has continued to lag
behind Germany.
Although transition to a market economy radically improved the development
prospects of manufacturing in both Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia, the
countries are still tormented by various legacies of socialism. The weakness of
domestic small and medium-sized enterprises remains the main problem for
industrial policy. Whereas FDI helped modernize, restructure, and often reposition
large firms, small companies have had limited access to credit to finance investment
in new equipment, and lack both the technical and industry-specific entrepreneur-
ial know-how necessary to face up to the challenges of a newly globalized market
environment. The legacy of state management has also been manifest in the typical
83How Peripheral was the Periphery?
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 16/1/2017, SPi
responses of governments to this key problem. Tax concessions and direct subsidies
to small enterprises, alongside strategic agreements with foreign multinationals
offering indirect subsidies in exchange for self-imposed limitations on the share
of imported inputs, did not reduce the technological backwardness and lack of
know-how that still limit the growth potential of domestic firms.
Nevertheless, Central European economies weathered the storms of the transi-
tion shock more successfully than most other post-socialist countries, particularly
the former Soviet and Yugoslav Republics. This can be explained by the confluence
of several factors. Both their geographical vicinity to core European markets,
particularly Germany, and their relatively rich endowments of skilled labour, but
also their strong commitments to market reforms from the early 1990s, made
Central European countries initially more attractive to Western investors than East
and Southeast Europe. Czechoslovakia and Hungary, together with Poland, had
already been way ahead of most other socialist countries in terms of economic
reforms during the 1970s and 1980s. However, the comparatively much larger
negative impact that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the violent break-
up of the former Yugoslavia had on Eastern and Southeast Europe during the early
1990s cannot be overlooked.
The quantitative evidence presented in this chapter allows us to derive several
conclusions about the history of industrialization in Central Europe. First, the
region stepped into the industrial age before most of the global periphery, but has
not been able to narrow the developmental gap vis-à-vis the West European core.
Second, economic growth in the region has been and still is industry-driven:
periods of strong growth were marked by even faster industrial expansion, whereas
the major calamities of the twentieth century, the world wars and the collapse of
state socialism, dislocated industry more than other sectors of economic activity.
Economic development in Central European countries during the last one hundred
years has been shaped by these major calamities, and their response was always
strongly linked to industrialization and industrial modernization. Third, growth in
the contribution of industry to gross value added was strongly correlated with a
rising share of heavy industry, and especially modern manufacturing, in industrial
production. Finally, industrialization has always been characterized by more direct
state involvement in Central Europe than in the most advanced Western econ-
omies. In this respect, Gerschenkron was right: under relative backwardness the
state had to substitute for the lacking prerequisites. However, interventionist
policies did not help Central European nations exploit the advantages of their
relative backwardness. Falling behind the European core, not catching-up, was the
experience during periods of strong state management.
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APPENDIX
Table A.4.1. Indices of gross value added (constant 1913 prices, 1913 = 100)
Imperial Austria Imperial Hungary
Manufacturing Industry Secondary
sector
GDP Manufacturing Industry Secondary
sector
GDP
1870 35.4 33.9 36.9 45.8 19.0 19.1 20.3 41.4
1871 41.1 39.2 42.8 48.7 20.6 20.8 23.1 40.5
1872 40.4 38.6 41.9 48.4 19.4 19.8 22.4 40.1
1873 36.4 35.0 37.5 46.4 19.6 19.9 21.3 39.7
1874 36.9 35.6 37.5 48.2 20.1 20.1 20.2 39.3
1875 37.5 36.2 39.0 48.7 18.3 18.5 17.9 39.7
1876 37.4 36.0 38.6 48.8 17.5 18.0 17.4 38.4
1877 38.2 36.9 39.4 50.2 19.5 19.8 19.2 42.5
1878 38.4 37.1 38.6 51.3 24.7 24.5 23.3 43.3
1879 38.8 37.6 39.4 49.7 22.9 22.8 21.9 43.5
1880 37.8 36.8 38.6 49.9 22.3 22.6 23.2 45.8
1881 42.2 41.0 42.8 52.4 26.9 26.7 28.0 49.8
1882 44.0 42.7 44.6 53.0 33.0 32.3 34.7 55.8
1883 45.7 44.5 46.2 54.1 37.2 36.3 41.1 54.9
1884 46.7 45.4 48.7 56.0 37.3 36.5 41.5 56.6
1885 43.2 42.3 44.0 54.7 37.7 36.8 41.2 56.9
1886 43.3 42.4 44.6 55.3 36.2 35.4 40.8 55.5
1887 47.5 46.4 49.0 58.0 37.0 36.2 39.9 58.1
1888 46.6 45.9 48.9 58.0 41.8 40.7 44.9 60.1
1889 48.2 47.5 49.7 58.0 39.1 38.5 43.5 56.8
1890 51.0 50.3 51.8 60.3 41.2 40.4 43.1 59.9
1891 53.1 52.3 54.2 61.4 47.1 45.9 48.5 62.6
1892 54.1 53.1 54.3 62.9 47.6 46.5 47.2 61.6
1893 56.9 56.0 57.7 63.3 56.4 54.6 57.6 66.4
1894 59.6 58.6 60.2 66.6 56.9 55.4 59.2 64.7
1895 61.8 60.7 61.9 67.5 59.8 58.3 63.6 71.6
1896 62.1 61.1 63.1 68.2 60.9 59.7 64.6 71.1
1897 64.6 63.7 66.1 69.4 57.2 56.6 62.3 65.9
1898 68.3 67.3 70.1 73.4 57.5 57.2 60.8 70.8
1899 69.3 68.4 70.9 75.0 62.0 61.4 65.2 73.9
1900 69.4 68.5 70.8 74.6 61.8 61.5 65.0 75.0
1901 70.4 69.7 71.7 76.4 56.4 56.6 58.2 72.7
1902 74.0 73.0 75.1 78.4 60.8 60.4 62.0 77.1
1903 74.6 73.7 75.7 78.8 64.2 63.6 64.8 80.7
1904 76.7 76.0 77.6 80.1 62.8 62.6 64.2 70.8
1905 79.3 78.5 79.9 84.4 67.1 67.0 68.7 80.2
1906 85.4 84.5 86.6 88.5 76.7 76.0 77.3 89.1
1907 92.0 91.4 91.7 91.7 78.6 77.9 80.2 84.7
1908 94.5 94.3 94.7 93.9 79.7 79.4 82.0 86.2
1909 95.4 95.4 96.2 95.1 84.6 84.3 86.6 89.4
1910 94.4 94.3 95.2 94.8 89.3 89.0 90.3 95.3
1911 99.5 98.9 98.8 96.6 95.9 95.4 94.8 94.2
1912 106.1 105.3 105.1 101.5 105.3 104.0 105.0 100.7
1913 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Schulze (2000), with minor corrections.
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Table A.4.2. Indices of gross value added (constant prices, 1950 = 100)
Hungary Austria Czechoslovakia
Industry GDP Industry GDP Industry GDP
1913 37.1 71.0 84.3 91.2 48.7 64.0
1920 30.0 58.7 49.4 60.6 42.5 57.9
1921 30.0 54.4 67.1 45.5 62.5
1922 60.0 73.1 43.1 60.9
1923 59.9 72.4 47.5 65.9
1924 35.2 68.0 68.6 80.7 60.3 72.8
1925 38.5 73.1 75.3 86.2 69.3 81.3
1926 42.2 78.3 77.0 87.7 68.6 81.0
1927 47.2 81.7 78.6 90.3 76.5 87.1
1928 51.2 88.9 83.8 94.5 84.8 94.8
1929 51.2 91.8 85.6 95.9 90.3 97.4
1930 48.3 89.8 79.9 93.2 86.2 94.2
1931 44.5 85.4 71.9 85.8 80.1 91.0
1932 41.2 83.2 63.8 76.9 67.7 87.4
1933 43.5 90.7 60.7 74.4 64.0 83.6
1934 49.5 91.3 62.5 75.0 64.9 80.4
1935 56.8 95.9 64.7 76.5 66.9 79.7
1936 64.6 102.3 65.7 78.7 73.6 86.2
1937 67.0 100.0 70.2 82.9 84.3 95.9
1938 70.5 105.2 82.8 93.5
1939 80.3 113.1 107.6 106.0
1946 32.3 67.2 47.2 53.3
1947 49.3 69.5 54.3 58.8
1948 66.3 87.0 72.4 74.8 88.3 87.9
1949 78.1 94.0 86.6 89.0 91.9 92.7
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1951 113.1 109.7 114.5 106.8 102.8 101.8
1952 129.9 113.4 115.2 106.9 104.3 105.2
1953 136.9 115.4 117.2 111.6 105.2 104.8
1954 141.8 119.5 133.8 123.0 109.3 109.1
1955 152.4 130.3 161.4 136.6 122.7 118.4
1956 139.3 124.4 174.7 146.0 133.3 125.4
1957 154.6 134.7 183.7 154.9 146.8 133.1
1958 170.3 143.7 187.0 160.6 162.9 143.2
1959 183.2 149.5 195.8 165.1 175.7 149.5
1960 198.9 157.3 216.8 178.7 191.6 160.8
1961 216.8 165.3 227.3 188.2 203.9 167.2
1962 232.0 172.2 232.8 192.8 213.3 169.5
1963 243.1 181.6 241.7 200.6 212.3 166.3
1964 261.1 191.8 260.5 212.7 217.3 174.1
1965 275.9 193.3 271.2 218.8 230.7 180.5
1966 295.6 204.3 284.3 231.1 234.1 188.3
1967 305.3 216.1 287.5 238.1 249.1 196.4
1968 311.3 218.7 305.7 248.7 253.3 205.5
1969 314.5 225.2 342.1 264.4 257.7 209.3
1970 327.7 224.4 371.7 283.2 283.0 213.5
1971 333.0 234.4 394.7 297.7 290.4 220.8
1972 337.2 239.5 420.6 316.1 303.3 228.6
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1973 351.0 251.9 443.5 331.6 315.1 236.2
1974 359.2 258.5 462.2 344.7 326.6 244.8
1975 372.9 264.0 436.1 343.4 342.2 252.0
1976 385.2 264.8 460.2 359.1 356.6 256.1
1977 403.1 281.4 481.0 375.9 369.3 267.6
1978 417.6 288.2 484.0 374.6 378.2 270.9
1979 421.7 288.8 511.4 395.0 384.0 273.2
1980 416.1 291.7 528.0 404.1 393.6 280.8
1981 422.4 293.8 509.5 403.7 401.1 279.4
1982 427.7 304.3 510.7 411.4 406.2 284.8
1983 431.8 301.2 530.3 423.0 413.8 289.1
1984 444.1 309.1 533.4 424.4 419.6 295.9
1985 444.4 301.5 560.6 433.9 427.5 298.2
1986 454.5 307.5 579.5 444.1 432.9 303.7
1987 460.9 312.3 575.2 451.5 439.8 305.2
1988 457.5 317.0 595.4 465.8 445.2 312.0
1989 442.6 309.9 619.3 485.5 445.2 314.6
1990 424.4 289.3 655.4 507.6 429.9 305.7
1991 377.7 254.9 668.3 524.6 362.6 267.3
1992 344.9 247.0 665.9 534.5 343.8 261.3
1993 356.2 245.6 654.5 536.5 306.4 262.8
1994 380.2 252.9 668.3 548.4 314.7 271.7
1995 410.2 256.6 694.7 563.7 350.1 287.7
1996 424.2 257.0 708.7 577.6 380.4 302.9
1997 466.4 265.1 734.7 590.9 365.7 305.2
1998 496.6 275.9 765.0 613.3 346.7 308.9
1999 516.6 284.7 806.2 635.0 369.3 312.4
2000 556.2 296.7 855.5 658.3 386.1 322.7
2001 557.9 307.7 882.6 664.0 391.1 333.1
2002 570.7 321.6 893.7 675.2 405.0 342.8
2003 607.9 334.0 900.6 681.1 419.8 356.8
2004 629.7 350.0 926.0 698.7 474.2 374.1
2005 657.2 363.9 949.6 715.5 520.6 399.2
Sources: GDP from Maddison (2006), industrial value added from: WIFO [Austria]; Eckstein (1955), p. 171,
Czirják (1973), and Alton et al. (1982) [Hungary]; Pryor et al. (1971), Lazarcik (1969), and Alton et al. (1982)
[Czechoslovakia]; after 1975, from Alton et al. (1991) and EU KLEMS (www.euklems.net).
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5
Industrialization and De-industrialization in
Southeast Europe, 1870–2010
Michael Kopsidis and Martin Ivanov
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses the development of modern manufacturing in Southeast
Europe (SEE), defined here as Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Serbia/Yugoslavia.1
Modern manufacturing in the region started at the very end of the nineteenth
century. However, industrialization only really took off after the Second World
War. We thus emphasize two major sub-periods: a long preparation for take-off
with two ‘mini-spurts’ on the eve of the First and Second World Wars; and rapid
industrialization from the late 1940s, accompanied by profound structural trans-
formation.
Southeast Europe’s ‘century of industrialization’ occurred between two waves
of de-industrialization. The first one, labelled ‘Ottoman de-industrialization’,
occurred during the so-called ‘first globalization’ and was at its strongest from
c.1815 to 1860; the second, more serious one took place during the second
globalization, notably the 1990s. The connections between de-globalization and
de-industrialization were different in both cases, as will be seen below.
Since large parts of Southeast Europe were in the Ottoman Empire through the
end of the 1870s, we will briefly touch upon the Ottoman de-industrialization.
Much has been written on this, but the literature is still far from reaching a
consensus.2 Suffice to say that the first wave of de-industrialization did not affect
the few more industrial Southeast European regions in a uniform fashion. Large
areas of Asia Minor, the Salonika hinterland, and Thessaly, which had good
connections to supra-regional markets, were affected early in the nineteenth cen-
tury, followed a few decades later by the landlocked Central Balkans. In general,
the Ottoman de-industrialization was mild compared to the nineteenth-century
de-industrialization of other parts of the global periphery.
1 Due to a lack of data or to historical inconsistency, states like Albania and the breakaway republics
of the former Yugoslavia will not be covered.
2 The literature is vast: major contributions include Keyder (1991); Palairet (1983a; 1983b; 1997);
Pamuk (1986); Pamuk and Williamson (2011); and Quataert (1994).
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5.2 INDUSTRIAL GROWTH WITH PARTIAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1870–1945
In his path-breaking overview of Bulgarian economic development, Gerschenkron
(1962) laid the foundations of a broad consensus which still dominates the
literature on industrialization in SEE. It remains widely accepted that high manu-
facturing growth rates in the region, confirmed in Table 5.1, ‘did not reveal the
specific qualities that are usually associated with a great spurt of industrial devel-
opment’ (Gerschenkron, 1962, p. 213). In more recent years, historians have
written of ‘growth without development’ (Palairet, 1997; Lampe, 1986).
These respectable growth rates, however, mask the lack of fundamental structural
transformation, even if modern industry grew much faster than traditional industry.
Almost all scholars agree that the main indicators of structural change (e.g. the
structure of GDP, occupational structure, energy consumption, productivity, fac-
tory size, capital intensity or the share of industrial exports) fail to indicate
any significant transformation of the economy (Lampe and Jackson, 1982;
Teichova, 1985).
Less productive, labour-intensive, low-technology consumer goods industries
like food processing and textile production took the lion’s share of industrial output
in all Southeast European countries over the entire period. Only in Romania did
these shares stay below 50 per cent, but they were high even there. During the
inter-war period, low wages implied a tremendous rise of large-scale mechanized
textile production throughout the region (Teichova, 1985, p. 247). No significant
heavy industry emerged in Southeast Europe (Table 5.2). This was true even for
resource- and especially oil-rich Romania, which according to contemporary inter-
national experts attained full-scale industrialization around 1920. Romania enjoyed
the largest industrial sector and deepest domestic market in the region, as well as
superior domestic industrial entrepreneurship and financing, mainly thanks to
economically active Jewish and German minorities (Turnock, 1977, p. 347;
Lampe and Jackson, 1982, pp. 237–77). However, oil-based industrial develop-
ment in Romania mainly meant primary processing of raw materials for export,
rather than highly profitable oil refining (Teichova, 1985, pp. 255–7; Berend and
Ránki, 1982, p. 127).
Industrial labour productivity in Southeast Europe was perhaps only a quarter or a
fifth of the levels in the most developed European countries, although the available
data only permit a very rough approximation (Teichova, 1985, pp. 278–9). Bulgarian
labour productivity and real wages stagnated between 1904 and 1949 (Teichova,
1985, p. 277; Ivanov and Tooze, 2007). A total factor productivity (TFP)-enhancing
shift of labour from low-productivity agriculture to high-productivity industry only
took place to a very limited extent, and labour productivity in modern manufacturing
remained four to five times higher than in agriculture throughout the inter-war period
(Vinski, 1967, pp. 268–9).
Following Gerschenkron (1962), a broad consensus on the reasons for lethargic
industrialization in SEE was established and remained almost unchallenged for over
fifty years: stagnant and inefficient agriculture; ill-functioning capital markets;
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Table 5.1. Real growth rates of Southeast European industry, 1870–1938
Panel A, 1870–1913
Bulgaria Greece Romania Serbia/
Yugoslavia
Total industry (secondary production: total manufacturing including handicrafts output, mining, and
construction)










(3) 14.3% (1904–11) 7.0% (1901–15) 12.5% (1901–11)





Sources: (1) Axiencuc (2012, vol. 2, pp. 277–8) (1913 prices, exponential trends); (2) Ivanov (2012, pp. 374–7,
458–61, 490–3, 512–23) (1939 prices, exponential trends); (3) Lampe (1975, p. 60); (4) Jackson and Lampe (1983,
pp. 392, 401); (5) Lampe and Jackson (1982, p. 250); (6) Berov and Dimitrov (1990, p. 45).
Panel B, 1920–38*
Bulgaria Greece Romania Yugoslavia
1920–1938 (1) 3.9% 7.3% 1.3%
(2) 6.0% (1921–38)
(3) 4.3%







* Except for Greece (6) and (7) all data roughly refer to modern manufacturing excluding handicraft production.
However, the transition between factory and handicraft production was gradual in Southeast Europe.
Sources: (1) Bénétrix et al. (2015); (2) Ivanov (2012); (3) Axiencuc (2012, pp. 129–30) (1913 prices, exponential
trends); (4) Teichova (1985, pp. 280–2), Teichova’s growth rates for Bulgaria are based on data from Chakalov
(1946) for 1924–38 (Rangelova, 2000, p. 231); (5) Berov and Dimitrov (1990, pp. 130, 138, 141);
(6) Christodoulaki (2001, p. 72); (7) Mazower (1991, p. 311); (8) Stajic (1959).
93Industrialization and De-industrialization in Southeast Europe
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/1/2017, SPi
banks which shied away from investments in manufacturing; insufficient demand;
and, most importantly, states’ failure to develop programmes of rapid industrial-
ization. Two more recent interpretations offer alternative frameworks. Palairet
(1983a; 1983b; 1997) proposes an explanation centred on the alleged cultural,
social, and economic ‘peasantization’ of the newly emerging Balkan nations. Seeing
peasants in somewhat outdated fashion as the antithesis to markets, capitalism, and
growth, Palairet postulates that with the rise of peasant farming following the end of
Ottoman rule, the subsistence sector expanded rapidly in Serbia and Bulgaria. This
caused economic retardation in all sectors, resulting in falling living standards
and decreasing productivity: agrarian ‘immiserizing growth’ occurred, rather than
industrialization (Palairet, 1997, esp. pp. 111, 177–80, 201, 310, 340, 363).
Pamuk and Williamson (2011) suggest another alternative to the iconic
Gerschenkronian model of sluggish industrialization. As world export prices of
agricultural commodities rose and prices of imported industrial goods fell, labour
and capital were diverted from industry into the primary sector: factor endow-
ments, including poorly developed human capital, gave Southeast Europe a clear
comparative advantage in agriculture rather than manufacturing. In other words, it
was not inefficient institutions that prevented Southeast European industrializa-
tion, so much as international price shocks, magnified by increased integration with
world commodity markets.
Indeed, developments in labour and factor markets were hostile to industrializa-
tion. Land was abundant all over SEE, and the new Southeast European states
removed existing obstacles to peasant occupation and settlement of land. Increased
opportunities in agriculture put upward pressure on industrial wages. Rising labour
costs led to a decline in previously flourishing textile proto-industries and a
‘re-agrarization’ of Southeast Europe (Palairet, 1997, pp. 81, 177–81, 189–96;
Petmezas, 2011, p. 37; Lampe and Jackson, 1982, p. 595). In addition, skilled and
educated industrial labour was almost non-existent in Southeast Europe, except in a
very few regions, and had to be ‘imported’ from Western Europe at a high cost
(Lampe and Jackson, 1982, p. 241).
Table 5.2. Sectoral shares in manufacturing output, 1912–38
Bulgaria Romania Yugoslavia Greece
1912 1938 1928 1937 1938 1938
Metallurgy and engineering 5.9 6.4 15.0 16.4 16.5 6.7
Chemicals 3.0 5.6 9.1 18.6 8.5 24.6
Woodworking 1.1 2.4 8.6 5.5 6.2 5.2
Building materials 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.6 9.1 5.1
Food processing 55.0 47.0 30.5 20.1 29.3 7.2
Textiles and clothing 19.8 28.9 14.3 22.2 22.1 36.5
Leather and fur working 5.4 2.9 5.0 4.3 4.6 10.3
Paper making and printing 0.6 2.8 4.1 4.9 3.6 4.4
Sources: Teichova (1985, p. 248); for Greece 1938: Kostelenos (1995, p. 182); for Bulgaria 1912: Berov and
Dimitrov (1990, p. 51).
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Despite these obstacles to industrialization, and the Great Depression, there is
a growing consensus that on the eve of the Second World War SEE economies
were undergoing a deep-seated modernization processes which facilitated rapid
industrialization after 1945 (Lampe and Jackson, 1982, pp. 576–7; Teichova,
1985, p. 239). To acknowledge this is not to deny the lack of industrialization
in Southeast Europe between 1870 and 1940 observed by Gerschenkron (1962),
but helps to explain why sweeping industrialization could occur so quickly
after 1945.
During the 1930s, states all over SEE intervened to accelerate industrialization,
in reaction to the Great Depression. The import substitution required to fight
dangerous external imbalances induced industrial growth in SEE above the
European average.3 Governments also supported industrialization via compulsory
cartels, strict price controls, and the replacement of dwindling private investment
by public industrial finance. Outside Greece a broad consensus emerged among the
region’s elites that only extensive state planning, combined with self-reliance as the
guiding principle of development, would enable successful industrialization. A first
industrialization plan was introduced in Yugoslavia. After the war, the Communists
skilfully exploited this positive view of state control to implement their version of
central planning (Lampe and Jackson, 1982, pp. 461–519; Teichova, 1985,
p. 236; Ránki and Tomaszewski, 1986, pp. 5, 21–48).
During the inter-war years, Balkan societies underwent three fundamental
changes that made rapid industrialization possible after the Second World War.
First, as a consequence of rapidly advancing commercialization, peasant agriculture
began to move decisively towards market-oriented intensification. Second, rural
Southeast Europe experienced the most rapid demographic transition in Europe.
Third, between 1900 and 1945 literacy rates dramatically increased in the entire
region, and higher technical education advanced. For these reasons we prefer to
speak of ‘growth with partial development’ instead of ‘growth without develop-
ment’ for the period before the Second World War (Lampe and Jackson, 1982,
pp. 502–3; Ivanov and Tooze, 2007, p. 698).
5 .3 FROM TAKE-OFF TO DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION:
MANUFACTURING IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE, 1945–2010
During the ColdWar, SEE industrialization occurred no matter what the economic
system: centrally planned (Bulgaria and Romania), ‘market socialism’ (Yugoslavia),
and capitalism (Greece). The degree of pro-industrial state interventionism varied
greatly among Southeast European countries. It is this ideological and institutional
diversity which makes a comparison of industrialization among Southeast European
3 Bulgaria’s modern manufacturing, corresponding to ‘large industry’ in the official statistics, increased
at annual rates of 8.9 per cent during 1924–9, 6.1 per cent during 1929–34, and 16.0 per cent during
1934–9 (Ivanov, 2012).
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countries after 1950 especially interesting. Despite fundamental differences in their
economic systems, all Southeast European countries (SEEs) followed more or less
similar industrial trajectories after 1950 (Tables 5.3 and 5.4).4 Manufacturing
boomed all over SEE until the mid-1970s, but industry only became the largest
economic sector in the socialist states. Around 1975 industrial growth slowed
substantially, and deceleration became contraction in all socialist SEEs at the end
of the 1980s: the huge ‘gains’ of enforced Soviet-style industrialization largely
vanished within a few years. Industrial production fell back to early/mid-1970s
levels during the 1990s.5 Manufacturing growth started accelerating again in all
Southeast European transition economies after 2000.
5.3.1 Stalin’s Long Shadow: Enforced Industrialization
in Romania and Bulgaria
In Romania and Bulgaria the transition to a socialist economy took almost a
decade. The first important steps were taken in 1947–8 when all existing industrial
and mining undertakings, 7,000 in Bulgaria and 35,500 in Romania, were nation-
alized. Many were soon consolidated into larger industrial complexes. Simultan-
eous forced collectivization caused a drain of labour out of agriculture
unprecedented even by Soviet standards. Planners focused on boosting capital
accumulation and channelling as much capital as possible into industry. Already
very low living standards were reduced further in order to accelerate industrializa-
tion. By the mid-1960s structural transformation had been completed, with
‘striking rapidity’ in Bulgaria and Romania (Feiwel, 1982, p. 216; Montias,
1967, pp. 1–86; Tsantis and Pepper, 1979, pp. 562–67; Lampe, 1986,
pp. 139–55). Manufacturing and GDP growth rates strongly exceeded those of
other CMEA members, especially during the late 1940s and 1950s.6 However, in
comparison with non-Communist countries at the same low stage of development,
their growth performance during 1950–73 was unexceptional, and realized at
much higher human cost (Table 5.3; Crafts and Toniolo, 2010).
4 As far as possible we used comparable data on manufacturing based on Western estimates for all
socialist SEEs due to the fact that output and productivity was notoriously overestimated in official
statistics, not least because of confusing Marxist concepts of social product (Alton, 1989; Ehrlich,
1992; Marer, 1993). However, even if the old Western estimates are the best available data on
industrial output in socialist SEEs, they need improvement. Reconstructing manufacturing output
1950–90 according to current international standards is a task which still waits to be done.
5 Own calculation based on data from Mitchell (2003, pp. 425–6). Due to the use of unrevised
official data, the drop after 1990 is partly caused by changes in the official statistics. However, the fact
remains that industrial output shrank by between one-third and one-half in former socialist SEEs
during the 1990s.
6 Around 1950, the low-productive peasant labour surplus of the European periphery was largest in
the Southeast (Moore, 1945). Thus, extensive industrialization based on the forced redirection of
labour from agriculture to industry probably delivered the highest productivity gains in this region,
although further research is necessary to substantiate this hypothesis. The Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance (COMECON or CMEA) was founded in 1949 on the initiative of the Soviet
Union. Its task was to organize economic cooperation between member states.
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Faced with steadily declining manufacturing growth rates from the mid-1970s, the
Communist regimes in Bulgaria and Romania were preoccupied with managing the
transition from extensive to intensive growth.7 However, industrial development
Table 5.4. Share of industrya in GDP, 1950–2010




1965 26.4 29.0 33.6 19.4
1970 35.5 34.1 36.1 22.9





2000 29.0 21.3 23.4/29.0 13.9
2005
2010 29.7 23.2 19.0/24.3 13.8
a Industry comprises manufacturing (including handicraft) and the energy sector (including mining)
but not construction. Due to the low shares of energy, mining, and handicraft, ‘industry’ approximates
closely to manufacturing;
b 1994 instead of 1995.
Sources: for Greece 1950–95: Louri and Pepelasis-Minoglou (2002, p. 334); for Yugoslavia 1950–70:
Moore (1980, p. 23); for Romania and Bulgaria 1965–75: Alton (1981, pp. 41–3); for Romania,
Greece, ex-Yugoslavia (Croatia/Slovenia), and Bulgaria 2000–10: Eurostat.
Table 5.3. Manufacturing growth in Southeast Europe, 1950–2007 (annual rates)
Country Official indexes, 1953–71 Western estimates,
1950-71a
1973–90 1990–2007
Bulgaria 12.6 (11.9) 8.3 2.8c (4.4) 0.1
Romania 12.1 (10.1) 7.8 3.5c (1.0) 0.9
Yugoslavia 10.5 (9.8) 9.2 3.2d (3.7) –
Greece – 8.2b 1.9 1.4
a For Bulgaria and Romania, Moore (1980) calculated growth rates based on revised data from Alton. Moore
himself revised official Yugoslav data on manufacturing output; b 1950–73; c 1973–87, d 1978–88.
Sources: 1950–71: except for Greece and data in brackets, data are from Moore (1980, p. 55); for Greece and data in
brackets, see Bénétrix et al. (2015). 1973–90: for Greece and data in brackets, see Bénétrix et al. (2015); for
remaining data, see Alton et al. (1985), Alton (1989), and SZS/Eurostat (1990). 1990–2007: all data from
Bénétrix et al. (2015, p. 30).
7 According to Western estimates, annual growth rates of Bulgarian manufacturing declined from
12.2 per cent (1948–65), to 6.3 per cent (1965–76), and finally to 2.0 per cent (1977–87) (own
calculation, data from Lazarcik and Wynnyczuk (1968, pp. 7, 9); Alton et al. (1985); Alton (1989)).
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rested to a much larger extent than in theWest on rising factor intensity (Lazarcik and
Wynnyczuk, 1968;Montias, 1988, p. 542).Only after Stalin’s deathwas it possible to
cultivate national development strategies. Whereas Hungary and Poland implemen-
ted far-reaching ‘liberal’ economic reforms, Bulgaria and Romania strengthened
central control and enlarged the scale of production (Berend, 1996; Ivanov, 2008).
Romanian Communists developed their own ‘national Stalinism’, connecting
extreme nationalism and reckless industrialization. They advocated the expansion
of heavy industries with strong linkage effects, rather than what they disdainfully
called ‘calico-industrialization’ based on traditional consumer goods industries. The
explicit target was to build up new high-technology capital goods industries which
were supposed to have the highest growth impact (Montias, 1967, p. 6; Tsantis and
Pepper, 1979, p. 201). Engineering and heavy chemicals were seen as the most
important industries because of their diversity and strong linkage effects to all other
manufacturing branches. From the mid-1950s to the late 1980s, both sub-sectors
remained at the core of Romania’s industrialization strategy (Tsantis and Pepper,
1979, pp. 1–7, 25–33). The strategy implied a harsh clash with the USSR and
the more developed COMECON states, namely Czechoslovakia and the GDR,
beginning in 1958. Until this time every country in the Eastern bloc followed a
policy of ‘processing-self-sufficiency’, producing as many manufactured goods as
possible domestically (Berend, 1996, p. 163). Driven by political and economic
considerations, Khrushchev wanted to establish a productivity-enhancing inter-
national division of labour between all COMECON members. The Soviets
proposed a Common Socialist Market for chemical and engineering products: no
CMEA country should produce the whole range of these industrial products any
longer. What this effectively meant was that Romania should concentrate on a few
industrial products and curb its ambitious industrialization targets, especially
concerning engineering. Romania refused to accept these plans and rejected any
foreign intrusion into its industrialization policies. In retaliation the Soviet Union
put the country under severe pressure by cutting or suspending economic aid.
Bucharest started to look for Western partners to further develop its engineering
and metal-processing industries (Montias, 1967, pp. 203–30; Berend, 1996,
pp. 130–5).
Rising imports of Western high technology required higher Romanian exports.
Initially machine imports were paid for with foodstuffs and raw materials, but
eventually a peculiar triangular trade developed. Romania continued to export raw
materials and basic industrial products to Western Europe in exchange for high
technology. Trade deficits with Western Europe were financed mainly via trade
surpluses with developing countries, and partly via credits. Rising oil imports were
paid for with industrial exports, mainly to the Middle East. Romanian industrial
equipment, including turnkey plants, found customers across the developing world.
Drilling technology and farm machinery enjoyed an especially good reputation. The
cheapness and robustness of Romanian products made them attractive for devel-
oping countries, but not for producers demanding high technology. Second-class
machinery and other industrial products which could not be sold on world markets
were delivered to COMECON partners, mainly the USSR. As a result, Romanian
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foreign trade with Western partners resembled that of a developing country,
whereas trade with COMECON and developing economies resembled that of an
industrialized nation (Tsantis and Pepper, 1979, pp. 109–39, 201–25).
The 1973 oil shock cracked this triangular trade system and aggravated the
deficiencies of socialist planning. By 1975 it was clear that Romania’s dependency
on oil imports was endangering the competitiveness of its energy-intensive indus-
try. Another problem was the planners’ preference for large industrial enterprises,
solving operational problems via strengthened central control. With 1,480 workers
per industrial enterprise, compared with 712 in the USSR and 149 in West
Germany, Romania probably had the world’s largest number of employees per
unit of production (Tsantis and Pepper, 1979, p. 200). Although Romania
imported labour-saving Western technology, its industry remained highly labour
intensive, reducing the productivity-enhancing rationalization effects of modern
technology. Industrial firms were often forced to combine high technology with
outdated machinery. Inefficient use of capital and labour caused enormous losses in
productivity. Due to the inflexibility of oversized enterprises, Romanian planners
preferred ‘production with limited variation of specification, reduced number of
types, and large serial volumes’ (Tsantis and Pepper, 1979, p. 209).
Modern engineering demanded flexible adjustment to customer-specific require-
ments. The transition to post-Fordist production implied abandoning mass pro-
duction which was well suited to the hyper-centralized Romanian system. Romania
could not adapt its industry to these new conditions, and maintained its outdated
industrial structure. Engineering and heavy chemical industries remained the
leading sectors of the economy (Tsantis and Pepper, 1979, pp. 225, 336). The
focus on energy-intensive branches implied copying Western technology of
the 1950s and 1960s, which depended on low energy costs. This imitation strategy
failed after the 1973 oil crisis. Building up a less energy-intensive, post-industrial,
more service-based economy and creating a competitive ICT industry was beyond
the capacity of centrally planned economies. Romania continued to follow an
orthodox industrialization policy, neglecting the service sector and communica-
tions (Berend, 1996, pp. 191–232; Crafts and Toniolo, 2010).
After 1973, manufacturing slipped into structural crisis and long-term decline
across the European ‘periphery’. What aggravated the situation in centrally planned
economies was the fact that their heavy-industry-based industrialization strategies
were still being promoted for ideological reasons. This had fatal consequences,
especially for Romania which adhered to its obsolete manufacturing structure more
than any other peripheral European country (Ban, 2012). Despite rising energy
prices, Bucharest continued promoting energy-intensive industry, notably oil-
consuming chemicals; their expansion, labelled the second wave of socialist indus-
trialization, tripled Romania’s demand for oil between 1975 and 1980 (Ban, 2012,
pp. 757–8). Consequently, Romania could not withstand the second oil price
shock of 1979. Between 1976 and 1981 Romania’s external debts increased from
$0.5 billion (3 per cent of GDP) to $10.4 billion (28 per cent) (Ban, 2012, p. 758).
By 1981 Romania was close to insolvency, but Ceaușescu wanted at any costs
to prevent an IMF ‘intrusion’ into its neo-Stalinist industrialization programme.
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He decided to pay back all debts, without reducing industrial investment. Imports
were cut drastically and exports increased. As a consequence, living standards
collapsed to ‘near war-time levels’ (Ban, 2012, pp. 756–60). These drastic measures
were effective and Romania repaid its debts by May 1989, well ahead of time.
However, by the end of the 1980s Romania’s industrial capital stock was hopelessly
outdated since technology imports had slowed for a decade. Consequently, indus-
trial growth also slowed (Table 5.3). The decade of ‘Stalinist austerity’ (Ban, 2012,
p. 743) severely aggravated the systemic defects of a centrally planned economy
which became clear across Central and Eastern Europe after 1973.8
Bulgaria shared Romania’s vision of a strong national manufacturing sector but
Sofia chose a different route to achieve it. Bulgaria also wished to develop its own
neo-Stalinist heavy industry based on engineering and heavy chemistry, and was
also unhappy with COMECON’s 1958 and 1970 ‘specialization recommenda-
tions’. These envisaged that Sofia could produce only 374 of the 3,000 types of
machinery and equipment manufactured in CMEA (Montias, 1988, pp. 524–5).
Bulgarian party leader Todor Zhivkov attempted to seduce rather than to confront
the Kremlin. Drawing on widespread Bulgarian Russophilia, he proposed in 1963
that Bulgaria should join the USSR as its sixteenth republic. Only Khrushchev’s
removal from power prevented the plan’s implementation. Nevertheless, the
‘sixteenth republic’ proposal had serious economic and political implications.
After 1963 Bulgaria became the Soviet Union’s closest and most obedient ally,
and Moscow was therefore prepared to grant various concessions to Sofia. Bulgaria
obtained a monopoly in the production of hauling and lifting machinery, and could
specialize in food-processing, agricultural and later electronic equipment. These
industries attracted most investment, and dominated Bulgarian exports after 1970.
Thus, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s Bulgaria was able to adopt an export-
oriented industrial policy (Montias, 1988, p. 533; Lampe, 1986, p. 156). Between
1955–7 and 1981–3 the share of machinery in major exports increased from 8.2 to
53.8 per cent (Lampe, 1986, p. 180).
Expanding Bulgarian engineering, petrochemical, and pharmaceutical industries
required increasing amounts of raw materials, fuels, and semi-manufactures. Most,
if not all, of the raw materials and fuels came from the USSR. To pay for them Sofia
increased its exports of machinery, processed foodstuffs, and manufactured con-
sumer goods, but rising exports between 1970 and 1983 failed to keep pace with
imports, and the two oil shocks made it almost impossible to reduce the trade
deficit with the USSR. By 1980 the purchasing power of Bulgarian manufacturing
exports vis-à-vis Soviet oil had fallen six to seven times relative to 1970 (Stoilov,
1986, p. 18). Feeling the mounting pressure, Zhivkov played the ‘sixteenth
republic’ card again. In 1973 a new plan for unification received a warm welcome
from Brezhnev. Five years later Zhivkov appealed to Brezhnev that he should not
treat Bulgaria differently from any Soviet Republic. Sofia received considerable
concessions, most importantly an unspecified amount of Soviet oil far exceeding
8 The prevailing consensus is that TFP growth in COMECON states slowed or was even negative
after 1973, but TFP data are still lacking for all of socialist Southeast Europe.
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its needs. During the early 1980s re-exported Soviet oil accounted for roughly
50 per cent of the country’s total exports to the West (Montias, 1988, p. 548).
Soviet oil helped significantly in resolving Bulgaria’s foreign currency debt
problem. From the early 1970s, bank loans helped Sofia finance its growing trade
deficit with the West. In order to service these debts, Bulgaria resorted to a
triangular trade similar to that practised by Romania. Between 1970 and 1983
the share of developing countries in Bulgarian exports more than doubled from 6.5
to 13 per cent. Most of this increase was based on exports of machinery and
armaments (Montias, 1988, p. 547). However, it soon became apparent that trade
with developing countries was insufficient to overcome the foreign currency
shortage: Bulgarian engineering exports were just enough to pay for oil imports
from Arab countries, leaving a substantial deficit caused by machinery imports from
Western economies. The foreign exchange imbalance was finally closed with large
re-exports of Soviet oil and bridging loans from Moscow in 1977 and 1978.
The programme for industrial modernization after the 1970s oil shocks merits
special attention. In reaction to the deteriorating terms of trade, the Politburo decided
to promote electronics and computing: developing a high-tech sector, it was felt,
would save foreign currency and fuel due to its low energy and capital intensity.
Zhivkov and his team successfully gambled on the CoCom9 embargo, which hit the
Soviet Union very hard but was enforced less restrictively on insignificant CMEA
members like Bulgaria. During the 1980s Sofia embarked on several projects which
envisaged acquiring new technologies, adapting them to Eastern conditions, and
exporting the output to the USSR (Montias, 1988, p. 556).
At first things went well, electronics and computing output tripling in a decade,
and their share in exports more than doubling, reaching a peak of 19 per cent in
1987. Between 1980 and 1989 Moscow absorbed 78 per cent of Bulgarian
electronics exports. But this success was a mixed blessing. The Bulgarian strategy
rested on science-intensive commodities like electronic calculators, micro-
computers, and CDs, but their production relied heavily on semiconductors,
memory chips, and other basic elements imported from Western hard-currency
countries, while the output was sold to the Soviet Union and yielded roubles. In a
daring 1988 analysis, Bulgarian economists accused electronics and other high-tech
branches of bringing larger expenses but not higher efficiency. Even as late as the
1980s many of the quality and incentive problems of the Bulgarian electronics
industry remained. In 1986 Zhivkov himself confessed that ‘the reliability and the
quality of the devices are still the Achilles heel of our electronics’ (Ivanov, 2008,
pp. 253–4).
In summary, Soviet support was essential for Bulgaria’s industrialization.
The USSR provided cheap loans, acted as a guarantor for Western loans, granted
explicit and implicit price subsidies, permitted specialization in several strategic
industries, and offered a vast market for Bulgarian manufacturing exports. Last but
not least, it supplied cheap oil that Sofia could re-export, thus financing, at least
9 Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls.
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partially, its machinery imports from the West. However, in less than one year
Gorbachev ended this industrialization strategy. Soviet oil and trade subsidies flows
dried up. After a decade of significant trade deficits, all interim commercial loans
were swiftly called back and Sofia had to transfer $1.2 billion to the ailing USSR
during the last two years of the Communist regime.
Taking Net Material Product (NMP), the conceptual equivalent of Western
GDP, Romania and Bulgaria posted the highest growth rates of all East European
centrally planned economies during 1950–89, 8.2 and 6.9 per cent respectively
(Kolodko, 2000, p. 9).10 Although they were initially ‘peasant nations’, by 1989
the share of industry in total employment was as high in Romania and Bulgaria as
in long-established industrial countries like Czechoslovakia (Table 5.5). After 1989
both states experienced the strongest contraction of industry of all European
transition economies, apart from the former USSR (Table 5.5). While in Central
European transition economies de-industrialization during 1989–2000 was assoc-
iated with expanding service sectors, agricultural employment shares started to grow
significantly in Bulgaria and Romania. During the 1990s de-industrialization in
SEE did not represent a successful structural change towards a highly productive
modern service economy, but simply economic decline.
In 1990, Bulgaria and Romania displayed by far the highest degree of over-
industrialization in a sample of 28 Eurasian transition economies, matched only by
three other states (de Melo et al., 2001, p. 5). The main reason for the subsequent
severe contraction of industry in socialist Southeast Europe was that these resource-
poor economies had pursued an outdated Marxist-Stalinist industrialization model,
based on energy and raw material consuming heavy industries, more than any other
European COMECON state. The Soviet model was tailored for large, resource-
rich, more or less autarkic economies—quite the opposite of SEE. The adjustment
to new market conditions was thus extremely painful for the Bulgarian and
Romanian manufacturing sectors, and this was exacerbated by delayed reforms to
establish the institutional framework of a market economy. It was not until the end
of the 1990s that industry finally started to recover.
5.3.2 Yugoslavia’s Enforced Industrialization: A ‘Third Way’ to
Industrialization and De-industrialization
Around 1975, economists spoke of a ‘Yugoslav miracle’ (Sapir, 1980; Moore,
1980), but recent accounts describe Yugoslav industrialization as failed modern-
ization (Lydall, 1989; Dyker, 1990; Bićanić and Škreb, 1994; Allcock, 2000). Even
if Yugoslav annual manufacturing growth rates came close to 10 per cent during
1950–73, ‘the Yugoslav record appears to be unexceptional by standards of the
noncommunist countries in the postwar period’, considering the low initial level of
development (Moore, 1980, p. 53). In a global perspective Yugoslavia experienced
the ‘standard postwar growth miracle’ of an emerging economy. In contrast,
10 The Maddison data on GDP per capita fully support these findings.
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Yugoslav manufacturing slowed down after 1973 and even became negative just
before the state’s break-up in 1991 (Table 5.6). In the early 1990s manufacturing
collapsed, during a transition crisis aggravated by civil wars. Manufacturing output
started to increase again in Former Yugoslavia from the mid-1990s.
After 1945 Yugoslav Communists implemented the Soviet model as fast as their
sister parties in other socialist SEEs. Rapid industrialization at any cost was the main
economic priority in a heavily war-damaged country. Industrial production reached
pre-war levels as early as 1947, when the first five-year plan (FYP) was implemented.
Extremely high industrial investment, mainly in the capital goods sector, character-
ized the first FYP. As in other socialist countries, this industrialization strategy
required massive reductions in already low consumption levels, creating the same
perilous economic imbalances as in Bulgaria and Romania (Allcock, 2000, pp. 70–6).
The break with the USSR in 1948 did not endanger industrialization. Yugoslavia
immediately received substantialWestern aid, and cooperation with theWest was seen
as the best strategy to build up a diversifiedmodern industry.Whereas an earlier 1930s
attempt to industrialize rapidly was restricted by an inability to export or borrow, easy
external credit and improved access to Western markets now made rapid industrial-
ization without abnormally low living standards possible (Allcock, 2000, pp. 72–3).
The introduction of workers’ self-management (WSM) in 1950 ended the strict
centrally planned economy and was greeted enthusiastically by non-orthodox
Marxist theorists as ‘third way’ between capitalism and Soviet-style state socialism.
Nonetheless, industrialization in Yugoslavia remained under government control,
and channelling as many resources as possible into industry remained the top
priority of economic policy (Moore, 1980, pp. 15–28, 151–64).11 Before the
economic reforms of the 1960s, central government held real wages low and
retained control of nearly all investment funds via the taxation of corporate profits,
while comprehensive price controls accelerated the growth of manufacturing.




Bulgaria 45.2 28.3 16.9
Romania 43.4 26.2 17.2
Poland 36.9 30.8 6.1
Slovakia 44.9 37.3 7.6
Czech Republic 44.7 39.5 5.2
Hungary 35.0 33.7 1.3
Source: Raiser et al. (2003, pp. 43–5).
11 State enterprises became formally independent but were not privatized. Especially in industry,
Yugoslav ‘market socialism’ prevented free market access of private entrepreneurs, and business
bankruptcies did not occur.
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Interestingly, the first Communist FYP (1947–52) continued the Stojadinović
government’s industrialization plan of 1935–9, which had promoted the develop-
ment of energy production and heavy industry, based on the exploitation of
domestic natural resources. This inward-oriented dual strategy, whose core element
was import substitution, broke with Yugoslavia’s traditional role as an exporter of
raw materials. Following rapid electrification, coal, metallurgy, and metal-using
industries were all developed. The next wave of industrialization comprised chem-
ical branches, more sophisticated metal industries like automotive manufacturing as
well as electrical industries. The emphasis gradually shifted from industrial raw
materials and semi-manufactures to more highly fabricated products. The Marxist
preference for capital goods industries remained, and contributed to extraordinarily
high Yugoslav investment rates (Moore, 1980, pp. 18–20, 40–56, 93–106; Bićanić
and Škreb, 1994, p. 151). Overall, Yugoslavian post-war industrialization resem-
bled that in Bulgaria and Romania.
Until the mid-1960s Yugoslav manufacturing growth was based on a combin-
ation of extraordinary factor intensification—mainly capital deepening—and sub-
stantial technical change.12 After 1965 a growing number of internal (political) and
external (economic) factors mutually reinforced each other to slow industrial
growth. Far-reaching reforms of the WSM system, aiming to decentralize economic
decision making, did not create integrated domestic labour and capital markets but
reinforced ‘economic parochialism’ (Allcock, 2000, p. 77) and economic disinte-
gration. Even if the ‘liberal’ reforms of the 1960s abolished the central General
Table 5.6. Industrial and manufacturing growth in Yugoslavia according to different
sources using official and revised data, 1950–88
Industrial output Manufacturing output Revised manufacturing output
Mitchell Bénétrix et al. OECD Moore Moore and SZS/
Eurostat
1950–73 8.5% 9.8% 1952–65 11.1%
1952–73 10.1% 8.8% 1965–75 6.0%
1973–90 2.0% 3.7% 1978–85 3.2%
1973–88 4.4% 1985–88 0.7%
Sources: Bénétrix et al. (2015); Mitchell (2003, pp. 425–6); OECD, Yugoslavia 1962, 1970, 1974, 1976, 1984/
85, 1989/90, Table: Industrial Output (Appendix); 1952–75: Moore (1980, p. 42); 1978–88: SZS/Eurostat
(1990).
12 The industrial capital stock increased by about 10 per cent per annum until the mid-1960s and
was still growing at around 8 per cent per annum up to the end of the 1970s (Moore, 1980, p. 104;
Lydall, 1989, p. 41). The contribution of technical change to manufacturing growth c.1955–65 was
around 40 per cent (Sapir, 1980, p. 301; Moore, 1980, pp. 125–32), significantly more than in the
contemporary USSR. Further research is necessary to see whether this was due to better access to
modern Western technology, or whether the system of workers’ self-management despite all its
deficiencies was superior to central planning in allocating investment funds.
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Investment Fund, they established special public investment banks controlled by
large enterprises, the biggest debtors, and (local) party and municipal authorities.
Inefficient capital-biased factor allocation got worse since post-reform investment
financing was not governed by economic criteria, and soft budget constraints
persisted. This, combined with low factor substitution elasticities, explains part of
the slowdown in manufacturing growth after 1966 (Sapir, 1980, p. 294).
However, slowing TFP growth after 1970 seems more important in explaining
the Yugoslav growth slowdown (Nishimizu and Page, 1982). With the ‘digital
revolution’ Yugoslavia’s manufacturing sector increasingly lost the ability to imple-
ment ‘best practices’. Moreover, deteriorating terms of trade after the 1973 oil crisis
demanded a swift structural adjustment away from energy-intensive manufacturing
focused too much on outdated heavy industries.
However, excessive politicization of economic decision making at all levels of
society, combined with rising ethnic tensions, prevented economic reforms until it
was too late (Allcock, 2000, pp. 89–90).13 The new constitution of 1974 and the
1976 Law of Associated Labour aggravated the defects of WSM and blocked true
market reforms. According to Allcock (2000, p. 93), ‘the entire tendency of these
legislative changes was to promote rigidity and stasis by bringing into being a set of
organizational forms of truly bewildering complexity’, the opposite of what was
required by a manufacturing sector facing increasing international competition.
Yugoslav industrialization policy aimed to develop the poor South via the
creation of an industrial base. Huge public investment in manufacturing was
supposed to lead to income convergence, but the opposite happened: there was
divergence during 1950–90 (Vojnić, 1996). One reason was that less profitable
heavy industries and mining were promoted in the poor South, in line with Marxist
beliefs, whereas more profitable new industries developed in the North. Moreover,
the lack of an integrated domestic labour market combined with significantly
higher population growth in the South exacerbated regional divergence (Allcock,
2000, pp. 83–6).
The decline of Yugoslav manufacturing showed striking similarities to develop-
ments in Bulgaria and Romania. Yugoslavia’s reaction to the first oil shock in 1973
was not to adjust by improving energy efficiency or raising exports, but to borrow
abroad to bridge allegedly ‘short-term’ liquidity shortages. The continuing expan-
sion of energy-consuming if ‘modern’ heavy industries like aluminium smelting
contributed to a rising external deficit (Allcock, 2000, pp. 93–4). Yugoslavia was
thus particularly hard hit by the 1979 debt crisis. During the 1980s the downward
trend in TFP was for the first time accompanied by reduced gross fixed investment
(Lydall, 1989, p. 41), and manufacturing declined. Industry only returned to
growth after the civil wars of the 1990s; only Slovenia and Croatia had by 2007
surpassed pre-war levels of industrial output.
13 Interestingly, WSM was the unspoken blueprint for many economic reforms aiming at making
centrally planned economies in the Soviet sphere more efficient without introducing market reforms.
The results of these ‘liberal’ reforms during the 1960s and 1970s were as unsatisfactory as in
Yugoslavia.
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5.3.3 From Europe’s Most Dynamic Economy to
De-industrialization: The Case of Greece
No European economy enjoyed more rapid growth than Greece between 1950 and
1973 (Crafts and Toniolo, 2010, pp. 301–2, 306–7).14 In contrast to the other,
non-capitalist SEEs, enforced industrialization was not the cause of this exceptional
growth experience. The share of secondary production and manufacturing in GDP
changed only marginally c.1950–85 (Figure 5.1). Continuing a nineteenth-century
trend, structural transformation in post-war Greece meant the transition from an
agrarian to a service, rather than an industrial economy (Frangiadis, 2007; Louri
and Pepelasis-Minoglou, 2002). An industrial ‘take-off ’ only took place
c.1963–75. From the mid-1980s the Greek economy de-industrialized, and by
2010 it was the only one in the region whose share of industry in GDP was
substantially lower than six decades earlier (Table 5.4). Most experts have inter-
preted Greek de-industrialization as effective structural change, helping Greece to
avoid costly ‘overindustrialization’ and to exploit ‘the opportunities of the ICT era’
(Crafts and Toniolo, 2010, p. 308). However, the ongoing Greek economic crisis
has given rise to doubts regarding this optimistic interpretation: was the rise of the
Greek service sector really a good substitute for modern manufacturing?15
No other Southeast European economy managed the transition from a low-
productivity agrarian economy to modern growth more smoothly than Greece.
There was no forced reduction of living standards to build up a modern capital
stock, because a costly ‘industrialization first’ strategy was rejected. Extensive
American aid was all-important, especially during the critical first years after war,
occupation, and civil war (Stathakis, 1993; 1995). American experts thought that
Greece only had a limited economic potential that did not justify channelling
resources into industry. Macroeconomic stabilization, agricultural development,
the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, and the achievement of energy
security based on domestic resources formed the top priorities. At the time this
prudent ‘neglect of industrial development’ was heavily criticized in Greece by left
and right alike. However, growth was achieved without industrialization. Due to
the fact that savings and exports increased, and import substitution took place to a
limited degree, Greece’s dependence on external sources to offset balance of
payments deficits was reduced substantially (Adelman and Chenery, 1966, pp. 2,
16–19; Ellis, 1964, pp. 238–41; Stathakis, 1995). Thus, Greece’s economic
development in the 1950s represented a successful Western antithesis to Stalinist
heavy-industry-based industrialization at any costs. However, industrialization
returned to the agenda at the start of the 1960s, as an export-led growth strategy
14 We would like to express our deep gratitude to Leda Papastefanaki, who guided us perfectly
through the rich Greek literature on Greek industrialization.
15 The share of total services in Greek GDP increased more or less continuously between 1951–3
and 2010–12, from 43 to 82 per cent. Secondary production’s share roughly stayed constant,
decreasing from 23 to 14 per cent between 1984–6 and 2010–12. Primary production’s share
dropped continuously from 36 to 3 per cent (own calculation based on data from Louri and
Pepelasis-Minoglou (2002, p. 334) and World Bank: World Development Indicators).
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based on manufacturing seemed to be the most promising way to fight the
notoriously high trade deficit (Papandreou, 1962, pp. 101–6; Ellis, 1964,
pp. 240–52).
At the time Greek manufacturing produced low-quality consumer goods almost
exclusively destined for the highly protected domestic market (Ellis, 1964,
pp. 243–5). Making a competitive Greek industry the principal protagonist of an
export-led growth strategy was an ambitious aim. Manufacturing largely involved
pre-modern, family-based, small-scale artisanal production, even though a few
joint-stock companies had emerged. Many business relationships were family-
centred and personalized to a degree that undermined the efficient functioning of
markets (Ellis, 1964; Coutsoumaris, 1963). A system of output, credit, and factor
markets had developed in manufacturing which often created local family-based
monopolies (Ellis, 1964, p. 121). The Greek state protected this system. ‘Greek
mercantilism’ entailed a restrictively managed licence system—the so-called ‘expe-
diency licences’. The state could control prices of manufactured goods. Established
entrepreneurs with good relationships with the administration cooperated with
banks’ representatives in local markets to their advantage, restricting market access
(Ellis, 1964; Coutsoumaris, 1963): ‘economic parochialism’ wasn’t only a problem
in socialist Yugoslavia. Furthermore, an underdeveloped capital market hostile to
industrial finance implied that necessary investments, including foreign direct
investment, failed to be realized (Ellis, 1964).
In the early 1960s the opportunity arose to remove these growth-impeding
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Fig. 5.1. Sectoral composition of Greek GDP, 1951–94 (per cent)
Source: Louri and Pepelasis-Minoglou (2002, p. 334).
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was the Agreement of Association between Greece and the European Economic
Community (EEC) which came into force on 1 November 1962. The following
years saw a substantial reduction of Greece’s extreme protectionism; the agreement
and simultaneous deregulations induced a little Greek ‘take-off ’ between c.1964–5
and 1973/5 (Franghiadis, 2007, pp. 185–6; Louri and Pepelasis-Minoglou, 2002,
p. 333; Ellis, 1964). Greek capital formation accelerated substantially during the
1960s.16 However, the share of industry in total investment was still very low
compared to socialist SEEs, increasing only from 22.0 to 29.2 per cent between
1962–4 and 1972–4. Over the entire period 1961–88, the bulk of investment—
63.4 per cent—went to the service sector.17
In the early 1960s the combination of legislation that was very friendly toward
foreign direct investment (FDI), low wages, and steadily improving access to a large
market attracted substantial FDI in manufacturing.18 In 1962–4 about 62 per cent
of manufacturing investment was of foreign origin (Germidis and Negroponti-
Delivanis, 1975, p. 193; Louri and Pepelasis-Minoglou, 2002, pp. 332–7). Foreign
ownership in Greek industry increased substantially during the 1960s. FDI diver-
sified and modernized Greek industry (Tsaliki, 1991, pp. 123–4). However,
foreign investment was concentrated in a few ‘modern’ branches like chemicals
(including petroleum), basic metals, and transport equipment, but avoided trad-
itional light industries, which nevertheless remained important (Germidis and
Negroponti-Delivanis, 1975, p. 59).19 Thus, small-scale structures and ‘family
bias’ persisted in most Greek industries (Germidis and Negroponti-Delivanis,
1975, p. 192).
The Greek industrial take-off from c.1964–5 to 1973–5 led to export-led growth
with manufacturing featuring prominently.20 However, as in other SEEs, exports
never matched strongly rising imports of consumer and investment goods (Tsaliki,
1991, p. 10; Germidis and Negroponti-Delivanis, 1975, p. 192). The hope that
export-oriented industrialization could end the chronic payments deficit was not
fulfilled.
16 According to Tsaliki (1991, pp. 109–10), the annual growth rate of the real domestic non-
residential net capital stock jumped from 2.4 per cent in 1951–61 to 10.0 per cent in 1961–71.
17 Own calculation based on data from OECD, Greece 1969. In Romania the share of industry in
total gross investment rose from 42.8 per cent in 1960 to 53.0 per cent in 1973 (own calculation; data
for Romania from Tsantis and Pepper, 1979, pp. 562–7).
18 The Greek state confined itself to the creation of good basic conditions for foreign industrial
investment and refrained from any target-oriented industrialization policy (Ellis, 1964, pp. 272–301;
Germidis and Negropontis-Delivanis, 1975, pp. 38–43).
19 Traditionally important consumer industries (food and tobacco; textiles; clothing and footwear) still
produced 45 per cent of manufacturing output in 1975 and their share remained stable during the
subsequent phase of de-industrialization. Industries attracting the bulk of foreign investment (chemicals;
metallurgy; machinery) slightly increased their share in manufacturing during the ‘take-off ’ from
24 per cent (1960) to 31 per cent (1970). This percentage remained fairly stable afterwards (Louri and
Pepelasis-Minoglou, 2002, p. 336).
20 Within only ten years the share of manufacturing products in all commodity exports jumped
from 10 per cent (1960) to 41 per cent (1970), increasing further to 51 per cent in 1980. The share of
exports and imports in GDP increased continuously from 21.8 to 47.8 per cent between 1950 and
1985 (Tsaliki, 1991, p. 10).
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Greek TFP developed favourably during the period 1950–73, stagnated during
the subsequent fifteen years, and rose again after 1990 (Tsaliki, 1991, pp. 151–84;
Crafts and Toniolo 2010, pp. 306–7). Productivity increased in all industrial
sectors during 1958–80, most spectacularly in new branches like metallurgy,
chemicals, rubber-plastics, and electric machinery (Panethimitakis, 1993). During
c.1950–75 technical progress in Greek manufacturing depended almost entirely
on capital imports connected with capital-using, non-neutral technical change
(Lianos, 1976).
By the mid-1970s a decade of rapid industrialization and expanding manufac-
tured exports to new markets in the EEC and the Middle East made experts
optimistic that full-scale industrialization—built on ‘modern’ heavy industries—
was possible and desirable for Greece. The optimism was virtually boundless
(Zolotas, 1976; 1978, p. 49; Germidis and Negroponti-Delivanis, 1975,
pp. 196–9). However, Greece deindustrialized. After 1974 FDI became less
important in manufacturing, which negatively affected technical progress, prod-
uctivity, and capital formation (Tsaliki, 1991, pp. 9, 124–5, 168–9, 180–1). The
rise of Asian manufacturing had a strong adverse impact on FDI flows across
the European periphery, but post-1974 democratic Greek governments did not
encourage FDI, or facilitate the emergence of domestic high-tech industries.
Further research is needed to analyse the ways in which external developments
(e.g. globalization) and internal developments interacted to produce the long
decline of Greek manufacturing. In this context, one has to ask to what extent
‘industrial inertia’ caused by social and political blockages within Greek society
prevented necessary structural change, resulting in radical de-industrialization.
Today even the necessary structural changes in manufacturing could not substan-
tially contribute to short-run economic recovery, simply because of the small size of
the manufacturing sector. But in the long run, a competitive manufacturing sector
could help to achieve self-sustained growth in a diversified Greek economy.
5.4 CONCLUSIONS
By the mid-1970s the rapidly industrializing economies of Southeast Europe
seemed to be catching up successfully to the leading economies of the continent.
In the opinion of contemporary experts it was only a matter of time before they
would develop into mature, diversified industrial economies similar to West
Germany, which in fact served as the role model for successful development in
the region. Internationally competitive manufacturing sectors creating high domes-
tic value added would end once and for all the ‘eternal menace’ of vulnerable
Southeast European economies: notoriously high trade deficits.
However, the end of the long post-war boom disclosed fundamental weaknesses
in the manufacturing sectors of all Southeast European economies which had never
been redressed. Exports rose more strongly than imports during the industrializing
1960s, but the trade deficits never disappeared and rose to threatening levels
following the oil crises. Industrialization never increased manufactured exports
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sufficiently. On the contrary, as Southeast Europe’s industries lost their competitive
advantage during the 1970s and 1980s, manufacturing became a burden, seriously
aggravating balance of payment difficulties to the point of generating fully fledged
balance of payments crises. All emerging industrial economies faced intensified
international competition as a result of globalization, but no Southeast European
country was able to carry out the structural changes required for its manufacturing
to remain internationally competitive.
Of all SEEs, only Bulgaria made serious efforts to manage the transition to less
energy-intensive and more knowledge-based modern industries, but it failed.
Socialist economies were incapable of coping with changing factor prices after the
first oil crisis in 1973, unable to improve their low energy efficiency. To make
things worse, they did not even change their industrialization strategy, further
relying on energy-wasting heavy industries. Under these circumstances, the con-
tinuing adherence to an outdated concept of rapid industrialization was a major
reason leading to trade deficits and international borrowing during the second half
of the 1970s. The debt crisis of 1979 hit all socialist SEEs hard, and initiated a
decade of manufacturing stagnation which later became contraction.
The negative impact of industrialization on foreign trade imbalances, especially
in socialist SEEs, was due to the inflexibility of centrally planned economies
which prevented their adjusting hopelessly outdated industrialization strategies in
a radically changing global context. However, the Greek and Yugoslav examples
suggest that de-industrialization was not simply caused by a ‘system failure’ that
could be easily addressed by ‘setting institutions right’. A deep-rooted cause was
‘economic parochialism’, a tendency to maintain loss-making industries at any
cost and to create ‘closed shops’ of all varieties; social inertia which obstructed
necessary structural change in manufacturing. Under these circumstances the
Greek solution of radical de-industrialization was the most efficient. The former
socialist economies were forced to follow the Greek path during the transition
crisis of the 1990s.
Despite a strongly improving human capital endowment, manufacturing in SEE
never managed the transition from low- to high(er)-quality production. As a result
Southeast European manufacturing lost important markets in the booming Middle
East after 1973. This was especially true for engineering, which was seen as the
leading sector and which despite many efforts never was able to gain a foothold in
Western markets. In contrast, Asian producers conquered the low and medium
price segments of Western markets offering reasonable quality. The inability to
adjust manufacturing to rising quality demands on global markets not only in
socialist economies but in Greece as well suggests historical deficiencies in the
region independent of any economic system.
Since the end of the 1990s, manufacturing in SEE has started to recover. TFP
increases have become the main source of growth all over the region, and restruc-
tured industries have adjusted to world markets (Alam et al., 2008). However,
the great period of Southeast European industrialization is over. Industry is
no longer the most important sector, and the number of persons employed in
Southeast European industry has contracted by approximately one-third since the
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mid-1990s.21 Sufficient alternative employment to compensate for severe industrial
job losses has not yet emerged.
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The Industrialization of Italy, 1861–1971
Matteo Gomellini and Gianni Toniolo
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Between 2007 and 2012, as a result of its longest (and possibly deepest) depression
since the country’s unification (in 1861), Italy’s manufacturing output decreased by
more than 21 per cent (stats.oecd.org).1 Even so, according to UNCTAD, in 2012
Italy was still the world’s sixth largest manufacturer, slightly ahead of the United
Kingdom and France, each of the three countries accounting for about 3 per cent of
total world manufacturing production. This is hardly surprising given Italy’s size
and its natural endowments. Poor in raw materials and (outside the Po Valley) in
agricultural land suitable for modern capitalist agriculture, Italy was bound to rely
on manufacturing for its ‘modern economic growth’. In 2011, value added by
industry still accounted for 18.6 per cent of GDP in Italy as against 16.2 in the
USA, 14.9 in Great Britain, and 12.5 in France (OECD, 2013). In order to
prosper, as Carlo Cipolla famously said, ‘Italy must manufacture goods that please
the world.’
For three centuries (from around 1300 to 1600) Italy was at the core of Europe’s
economic activity, particularly in manufacturing. Over the following centuries the
country gradually slipped to the ‘periphery’. At the time of its political unification
in 1861–70, its GDP per person was about 50 per cent of that of Great Britain. In
the next century, Italy’s convergence with the most prosperous European countries
was broadly as fast as might have been expected given its initial backwardness
(Toniolo, 2013). By the 1980s GDP per person was roughly similar to that of
Great Britain. The history of the Italian economy moving from periphery back to
core is the subject of various works (e.g. Zamagni, 1993; Castronovo, 1995;
Toniolo, 2013): this chapter focuses on the role played by industrial production,
particularly manufacturing, in Italy’s catch-up growth.
The quantitative history of Italy’s industrialization, while not matching that of
Britain and the United States, is as rich as, or richer than, that of most of today’s
OECD countries, thanks to a nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century tradition of
descriptive statistics and to the post-war work of the Statistical Office (ISTAT) and
1 Corresponding author: matteo.gomellini@bancaditalia.it. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors and do not reflect the views of the institutions represented.
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individual scholars such as Gerschenkron, Fenoaltea, Ercolani, Vitali, and Carreras,
to name only those most active in the field of industrial historical statistics.
Industrial censuses were taken in 1911, 1921, and 1936–8. After the Second
World War industrial statistics were routinely produced by ISTAT. Recently,
estimates of industrial productivity growth have been extended back to the 1860s
(Broadberry, Giordano, and Zollino, 2013). In this chapter, aggregate industrial
value added is taken from the most recent reconstruction of national accounts
(Baffigi, 2013);2 sectoral estimates are those by Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2009) for
the period 1861–1913; by Carreras and Felice (2012) for the inter-war period; and
by ISTAT and Golinelli and Monterastelli (1990) for the second post-war period.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 traces aggregate trends in Italian
manufacturing output and productivity growth from 1861 to the early 1970s, a
time when Italy’s industrial system was no longer ‘peripheral’ by any definition.
Section 6.3 focuses on ‘modern’ vs ‘traditional’ manufacturing sectors and on
utilities. Section 6.4 discusses the impact on industrial output of foreign trade,
tariffs, and industrial policy. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 develop a quantitative analysis
of regional industrial growth. The final section pulls the main threads together
to provide an overall assessment of Italy’s industrial growth from the 1860s to
the 1960s.
6 .2 THE AGGREGATE PICTURE
According to Bairoch (1982), at the time of political unification (1861) Italy’s
industrial output per person was less than one-sixth (16 per cent) of the UK’s, a
level roughly similar to that of other peripheral West European countries (Spain,
Denmark, Finland, and Norway) and higher than that of both Eastern Europe
(Russia, Bulgaria, and Romania) and most non-European countries (including
Japan, China, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand). On average
Italy was less industrialized than Bairoch’s ‘developed countries’ and more so than
his ‘third world’. At the same time, Italy’s industrial backwardness relative to the
leading manufacturing power of the day reflected more than proportionally the
country’s overall economic backwardness since, according to Maddison (2010), in
1870 Italy’s GDP per person was about 50 per cent of the UK’s level.
Italy’s economic history in the 150 years following unification has been told as
‘a tale of convergence and two tails’ (Toniolo, 2013). As expected, during this period,
GDP and productivity of this ‘moderately backward country’ à la Gerschenkron
converged to those of the initially most advanced countries. Convergence in GDP per
person, however, took place over the years 1896–1995while the early post-unification
decades and the post-1995 years were characterized by divergence rather than con-
vergence. This section describes Italy’s aggregate industrialization against the backdrop
of its overall economic development.
2 Industry is here defined as including mining and utilities, but excluding construction. It includes
cottage industry and the industrial output of small workshops.
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A feature of Italy’s industrialization is that its share of world industrial output
remained roughly constant over more than two centuries: it was 2.5 per cent
in 1750, remained at that level until the First World War, rose to 2.7 per cent in
1938, and reached about 3 per cent in 1973 (Bairoch, 1982). In contrast, the UK’s
share of world industrial production was 1.9 per cent in 1750, peaked at 22.9 per
cent in 1880, and declined thereafter to 4.9 per cent in 1973. A similar inverted
U-shape curve characterizes Germany’s share of world industry and, to a lesser
extent, France’s. In other words, Italy followed a pattern roughly similar to that of
the overall international industrialization process.
Fig. 6.1 describes the weak unconditional convergence in industrial value added
per capita realized in a sample of 30 countries during 1880–1973 (data from
Bairoch, 1982).3 Italy performs roughly as expected given its initial level of
backwardness, while initially less industrially developed European countries (e.g.
Bulgaria and Russia) seem to converge to the ‘core’ more rapidly than Italy (and
Spain and Portugal).
It is worth noting that, while industrial value added grew faster in Bulgaria and
the former Soviet Union than in Italy, these three countries did not significantly
catch up with Italy in terms of GDP per person, indicating that Italy’s ‘modern
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Fig. 6.1. Unconditional convergence of industrial value added (all available countries)
3 For a similar exercise, see Chapter 2 in this volume, and Bénétrix, O’Rourke, and Williamson
(2015).
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Italy’s manufacturing history between 1861 and 1973 can be divided into five sub-
periods (Table 6.1): (i) relatively slow output growth (1861–96), (ii) growth acceler-
ation (1896–1913), (iii) rapid output and labour productivity growth (1922–9),
(iv) slow growth, protection, currency revaluation, great depression, sanctions, and
autarky (1929–39), (v) a long wave of catch-up growth (1951–73). The two world
wars can both be characterized as ‘lost decades’, albeit involving very different stories
and impacts on long-term manufacturing growth.
6.2.1 Before the First World War
According to Malanima (2007), Italy’s industrial output and labour productivity
gently declined from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the early nine-
teenth century when they began to pick up. At the time of unification a moderate
upward trend was already detectible. Between 1861 and 1896 manufacturing value
added grew on average by about 2.0 per cent per annum. Employment in the sector
remained roughly constant, however, while the economy as a whole created
1.5 million new jobs. In 1896–1913 the growth rate of manufacturing accelerated
to 3.6 per cent per annum. The sector’s workforce increased by about 1 million
(growing by 1.5 per cent per annum as against 1.0 per cent for the economy as
whole). Between unification and the First World War, output per full-time
equivalent worker in manufacturing increased every year by 2.0 per cent
(Broadberry, Giordano, and Zollino, 2013): a respectable rate by nineteenth-
century international standards.
The pattern of Italy’s industrialization prior to 1914, characterized by slow
growth up to the 1880s and growth acceleration thereafter, was the subject of a
heated debate sparked in the late 1950s by Alexander Gerschenkron’s (1962)
attempt to fit the Italian case into his paradigm of European industrialization in
conditions of moderate backwardness, in which ‘agents’, such as universal banks
(created in Italy in the mid-1890s), are ‘needed’ to overcome the ‘stumbling blocks’
that obstruct the path to modern industrial growth. Rosario Romeo (1959) argued
instead that the sluggish growth in the first decades after unification was due to the
‘need’ for social overhead capital to be created before rapid industrialization could
take place. The two scholars had a lively debate in Rome, later published by
Gerschenkron (1962): Romeo spotted an industrial acceleration in the 1880s,
Table 6.1. Average annual growth rates of GDP and manufacturing
GDP Manufacturing value added Manufacturing value added per full-time
equivalent worker
1861–96 1.7 2.0 2.0
1896–1913 2.2 3.6 2.1
1922–9 4.0 6.3 4.2
1929–39 1.5 2.1 0.1
1951–70 5.9 8.8 6.0
Sources: Baffigi (2013); Broadberry, Giordano, and Zollino (2013).
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upon completion of the main rail network, while Gerschenkron dated Italy’s ‘big
spurt’ a decade later, coinciding with the appearance of German-type universal
banks. Bonelli (1978) and Cafagna (1972), on the other hand, saw Italy’s early
industrialization as characterized by slow trend acceleration in industrial output,
beginning before unification, rather than discontinuity at the end of the century.
In the late 1960s, Stefano Fenoaltea began to produce a new set of industrial value
added statistics, which he continuously refined over the following decades. During
the course of this exemplary work, Fenoaltea produced a new interpretation of Italy’s
industrialization pattern, which he saw as driven by the flow of international
investments and therefore following the international business cycle (Fenoaltea,
2006). Recently, the creation of new data on the engineering sector led Fenoaltea
(2014) to doubt his previous assessment of Italy’s industrialization path, arguing,
however, that additional work is needed to produce a new explanation.
6.2.2 The Great War and Inter-war Period
If we accept the most recent estimates (Baffigi, 2013), wartime manufacturing
output grew during 1914–16 by 5 per cent per annum. (Italy entered the war in
May 1915). Thereafter the war-related acceleration was not sustained, and manu-
facturing value added fell during the second part of the conflict and the subsequent
recession. In 1922, manufacturing value added was not significantly different from
1914. The war, however, marked a qualitative turning point in Italy’s industrial-
ization, accelerating technical progress.
A period of exceptionally rapid manufacturing growth followed the post-war
depression and industrial restructuring. During 1922–5, the sector grew at an
average annual rate close to 8 per cent. In spite of the subsequent slowdown, the
1920s saw a remarkable performance of Italy’s manufacturing, with high rates of
output, productivity, and employment growth.
The 1930s can be divided into two periods: the Great Depression and the autarkic
recovery. New estimates (Giugliano, 2011; Giordano and Giugliano, 2012; Carreras
and Felice, 2012; Baffigi, 2013) indicate that the fall in industrial value added and
employment during 1929–32 was deeper than previously believed: in three years,
manufacturing output fell by 22 per cent. Recovery was slow in 1933–4 and rapid
thereafter, partly driven by war-related (Abyssinian and Spanish) expenditure. In
1939 (Italy entered the conflict in June 1940), manufacturing value added was 45 per
cent higher than in 1934. On the whole, Italian manufacturing was highly volatile
during the inter-war years, with spurts of high growth followed by sharp slowdowns
and a slump during the Great Depression. As we shall see, economic policy played an
important role alongside the international business cycle.
Unlike the First, the Second World War had a strong negative impact on Italy’s
manufacturing production, which shrank to a quarter of the pre-war level.
The decline started immediately after the beginning of the hostilities, remained
relatively contained in 1941–2, and accelerated during 1943–5 when war was
waged on Italian soil, and the country was divided into two separate states at war
with each other.
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6.2.3 1945–73
As in other defeated countries, the reconstruction of Italian industry was remark-
ably swift. In 1946, despite shortages of raw materials and the disruption of
transport infrastructure, industrial value added grew by 242 per cent. The pre-
war peak (1940) in manufacturing was reached in mid-1950.
In the twenty-odd years following reconstruction, cyclical stability stood in sharp
contrast to inter-war volatility. The overall picture can be summarized by saying
that in 1970 Italy’s manufacturing sector was almost five times bigger than it
had been in 1950, having grown on average by 8.3 per cent over the two decades.
Between 1950 and 1958 manufacturing value added grew on average by 7.6 per
cent per annum, accelerating to 10.7 per cent between 1958 and 1963. After a brief
slowdown to just 2.4 per cent in 1964, growth resumed at the annual pace of
8.6 per cent until the end of the decade.
To conclude this section with a comparative perspective, Table 6.2 reports the
shares of industrial employment in Italy and five other countries between 1871 and
1973. The comparison with Japan is particularly striking.
6.3 ‘MODERN ’ AND ‘TRADITIONAL ’ SECTORS
In the beginning was silk. So the story goes, as told by a leading Italian economic
historian (Cafagna, 1972). Raw silk manufacturing had a number of advantages for a
relatively backward agricultural country. The cultivation of mulberry trees, for the
production of cocoons, and silk spinning were useful labour-intensive complementary
activities for under-employed agricultural workers, particularly in hilly areas where
land productivity was not as high as at the bottom of the Po Valley. Furthermore,
Federico (2005) finds strong evidence of a beneficial influence of raw silk production
on engineering: already at the time of unification, Italy was the world leader in the
production of silk-reeling machinery, a leadership it kept until the 1920s (Federico,
1997, 2005). In the decade before unification, a silkworm disease had considerably
reduced the production of cocoons (Federico, 1997), sending the rawmaterial price to
Table 6.2. Industriala employment as a percentage of total employment
Yearb Italy UK Germany US India Japan
1871 15.8 42.4 29.1 24.8 12.1 10.5
1911 23.5 44.1 37.9 31.8 10.3
1921 22.5 33.2 19.0
1931 24.5 43.7 37.4 30.2 9.1
1936 25.6 44.5 38.2
1951 31.1 46.5 42.1 32.9 10.2 22.9
1973 38.4 41.8 47.3 28.9 11.1 36.6
a Including construction b Italy; for some other countries, the closest available year.
Source: Broadberry et al. (2013).
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levels only affordable by firms equippedwith steam-poweredmachinery (Federico and
Tena, 1998). Initially, boilers were produced by non-specialized engineering firms
but, as technology became more sophisticated, a handful of new specialized producers
emerged as the result of growing demand and weak foreign competition. A similar
pattern of demand-driven production of investment goods would become common
after the SecondWorldWar in the so-called industrial districts, which often developed
the technology for the machinery used in the production of consumer goods. In the
years immediately following unification, large-scale investment in steam-reeling
resulted in the silk sector’s total factor productivity growth being 3.5 times faster
than the economy’s average.
If silk figures prominently in the narrative of Italy’s early industrialization, one
should not exaggerate its importance: in 1870, the total production of textiles
accounted for only 10 per cent of manufacturing value added, while engineering
made up 17 per cent (Fenoaltea, 2006). If industrialization is to be themain factor in
the process of ‘modern economic growth’, as described by Simon Kuznets, then it
should rely upon industries that generate more innovation, investment, R &D, and
productivity growth—in a word ‘modernization’—than silk. For our purposes,
considering that comparable time series for only thirteen industrial sectors are
available for the entire period under review,4 we take metallurgy, engineering, and
chemical products (including rubber) to make up the bulk of the ‘modern sector’
(Table 6.3). This is admittedly a very rough approximation for at least two reasons:
first, each sector’s innovation, technical progress and R&D varied over time;5
second, seeds of modernity, new products and new production processes abounded
in other sectors (a typical example is the rapid development of viscose rayon
(so-called ‘artificial silk’) within the ‘traditional’ textile sector during the 1920s).
The overall pattern of sectoral growth that emerges from Table 6.36 is pretty
standard in any industrialization process: an increasing share of ‘modern sectors’
within manufacturing accompanied a growing share of manufacturing in
GDP. More specific to Italy is perhaps the very rapid expansion of hydroelectric
power production, which grew from almost nothing (8 million Kw) in 1890 to
2.2 billion Kw in 1913, more than doubled during the Great War (1913–20), and
grew thereafter at a slower pace, close to that of the overall utilities sector.
More interesting than Italy’s ‘normal’ industrial growth pattern over the very
long run is perhaps what emerges from the observation of individual sub-periods.
Before the First WorldWar, ‘modern sectors’made a relatively modest contribution
to manufacturing growth. In half a century, the ‘modern’ share in manufacturing
increased from only a fifth to less than a third of the total. On the other hand, as
mentioned above, from the end of the nineteenth century to the early post-war
4 For 1861–1913, Fenoaltea has provided a much more detailed breakdown of industrial value
added, which cannot be extended to the rest of our period (Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea, 2009).
5 For instance, in the nineteenth century and beyond blacksmiths were included in engineering
value added, and small blast furnaces in that of metallurgy (Fenoaltea, 2014).
6 Table 6.1 is from Baffigi (2013), the most recent and reliable available source. It does not,
however, provide sectoral breakdowns which, in Table 6.3, are drawn from different sources (hence
the discrepancies between the aggregate growth rates in the two tables).
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period, electrification proceeded rapidly, liberally licensed by the state and financed
by equity issues and long-term loans from universal banks, in response to both
industrial and civil demand.
The inter-war period stands in striking contrast to the pre-war years. In 1920–5,
both modern and traditional industry grew at a rapid pace, while after 1925, non-
modern manufacturing almost stagnated. As discussed in the next section, tariff
protection and possibly the overvaluation of the currency were instrumental in
shifting resources from the labour-intensive, export-oriented sectors to the more
capital-intensive ones so that, in 1939, the ‘modern sector’ share in manufacturing
was close to 50 per cent. From this viewpoint, a case can be made that, by that time,
the structure of Italian industry was more similar to that of ‘core’ than ‘peripheral’
countries. The industrialization pattern during the post-Second World War golden
age looks similar to that of other countries (including ‘core’ ones such as Germany,
France, and Japan). Average yearly growth for our ‘modern’ sectors outperforms the
average for total manufacturing by about 1.5 percentage points, indicating that
value added (and probably productivity) growth was by no means limited to the
capital-intensive ‘modern’ industries. In fact, our definition of ‘modern’ itself might
no longer apply to the latter part of the period.
6 .4 TRADE, TARIFFS, AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Among the factors affecting a latecomer country’s manufacturing performance and
catch-up, the most frequently highlighted in the literature are comparative advan-
tages and terms of trade, tariff and industrial policies, and the quantity and
direction of foreign capital inflows (Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson, 2007;





















1890 0.27 1870–90 3.3 2.1 5.1 n.a.
1913 0.29 1890–1913 3.8 3.0 8.3 27.7
1920 0.28 1913–20 11.4
1925 0.35 1920–5 12.4 8.0 9.6 9.1
1929 0.37 1925–9 8.5 1.6 8.6 9.3
1939 0.47 1929–39 10.3 1.5 6.4 5.7
1951 0.45
1973 0.56 1951–73 8.6 7.3 7.8b 7.6
a Metal making, engineering, and chemicals (incl. rubber).
b Energy only.
Sources: 1870–1913, Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2009); 1920–39, Carreras and Felice (2012); 1951–73, Golinelli and
Monterastelli (1990).
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Williamson, 2008, 2011). In what follows we briefly discuss the impact of these
factors on Italy’s industrialization.
Since unification in 1861–70, Italy has always been a medium-sized economy,
one of the eight to ten largest in the world. Not nearly as large as those of the
United States, China, or the German and British Empires, Italy’s domestic market
was nevertheless large enough to provide potential economies of scale for ‘modern’
industrial sectors. Italy’s openness ratios (trade/GDP) rose from 0.2 to close to 0.3
in the second half of the nineteenth century, declined to 0.1 in the 1930s, and rose
to about 0.4 in the 1970s. Throughout our period Italy’s openness was lower than
Germany’s, higher than Spain’s, and close to that of France (Federico and Wolf,
2013). Given the medium size of the economy, the choices between free trade
versus protectionism, or fixed versus floating exchange rates, were less straightfor-
ward than in smaller countries. Industrial policy, which mainly took the form of the
state directly or indirectly allocating resources to specific manufacturing sectors,
could count on relatively large state budgets and domestic capital markets. In a
word: size mattered in shaping policy options.
Touring Italy soon after unification, Richard Cobden advised the new Italian
rulers to capitalize on Italy’s comparative advantages (climate and art), leaving
manufacturing to countries north of the Alps (possibly north of the Channel). At
the time, Cobden’s recommendation might not have been far off the mark. When
measured by the Lafay (1992) index, a commodity-specific net exports measure of
comparative advantage, until the turn of the twentieth century Italy did not enjoy
a comparative advantage in manufacturing when raw silk production is excluded
(Federico and Wolf, 2013, pp. 239–40). However, Lafay’s index moves from 10
to 0 between the 1880s and the late 1890s, indicating that Italy was ‘building’ a
manufacturing comparative advantage. Poor in coal, iron ore, and oil, Italy did not
suffer from the ‘curse of raw materials’: sulphur, tomatoes, olive oil, and citrus fruits
were not sufficient to develop a serious curse.
Throughout the twentieth century, by Lafay’s measure, Italy had a clear com-
parative advantage in manufacturing production. The share of manufacturing in
Italian exports rose from only 20 per cent in the 1870s and 1880s to almost 40 per
cent in 1914, 50 per cent in the late 1930s (including colonial trade), and about
80 per cent in the mid-1970s. Following a standard pattern in most industrializa-
tion processes, Italy’s exports, initially concentrated in a few products, became
progressively diversified.
After the Second World War, Italy’s share of world exports increased consid-
erably. The composition of manufacturing exports changed, without however
fully converging on that of the more advanced countries (Gomellini, 2004;
Gomellini and Pianta, 2007). In particular, the country’s export success was to
a large extent based on goods of mid-innovative content, produced mainly by
medium-sized firms. At the end of the 1960s, Italy’s manufacturing still lagged
behind in science-based and scale-intensive production, while exhibiting a lead-
ership in more traditional manufacturing industrial products. The specialization
in mid-tech productions that emerged in the 1960s persisted in the following
decades.
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Italian economic historians have largely neglected the terms of trade, possibly
reflecting the belief that they did not matter much one way or the other for GDP
and manufacturing growth. A recent quantitative analysis covering the period from
unification to the eve of the Second World War concludes that trade diversification
‘improved the Italian terms of trade but did not reduce volatility’ (Federico and
Vasta, 2010, p. 236). Scarcely endowed with basic industrial raw materials, Italy
was exposed to the vagaries of international prices for basic commodities, for which
the country was an international price taker. There are no estimates available of the
impact of terms of trade volatility on the rate of growth of manufacturing; a likely
guess is that it had a very moderate negative effect.
Italy’s tariff history follows the European continental pattern. Born a free trader
in the political and intellectual climate of the Cobden–Chevalier treaty, the Italian
state leaned towards a more protectionist mood from the late 1870s onward, in
tune with the main continental countries. In an effective protection framework,
Gerschenkron (1955) argued that the 1887 tariff was detrimental to industrial
growth because of its protection for wheat growers and the high duty on iron and
steel—inputs to the promising engineering sector. Toniolo (1977) concurred
but argued that the impact of the steel duty on the rate of growth of engineering
was empirically modest. Other scholars (Romeo, 1959, 1988; Zamagni, 1993)
were more sanguine about the tariff of 1887, invoking infant industry arguments
and approving of the active involvement of the government in the promotion
of industry. More recently, Fenoaltea—the leading scholar of pre-1914
industrialization—showed that the 1887 tariff and the subsequent periodic
increases in the duty on wheat had a non-negligible negative impact on the
growth rate of Italy’s manufacturing (Fenoaltea, 2006, Chapter 4). Federico
and Tena (1998) estimate that the tariff of 1887 brought the average rate of
Italian protection to 50 per cent above the European average. However, while
manufactured goods accounted for about 32 per cent of all imports, they
accounted for only 20 per cent of the tariff revenue increase. The nineteenth-
century debate on tariffs and growth went on to the present day: the prevailing
view is that protection—of both agricultural and industrial goods—slowed Italy’s
manufacturing growth before the First World War, but the size of the damage
done by the tariff is still being debated.
The 1887 tariff was introduced when a slowdown in GDP and manufacturing
growth was beginning to take place. From the end of the nineteenth century to the
outbreak of the Great War, industrial protection was consistently eroded by the
signing of commercial treaties (Toniolo, 1990) and by a decline in the undervalu-
ation of the real exchange rate (Di Nino, Eichengreen, and Sbracia, 2013). The
period coincides, as we have seen, with an acceleration of industrial growth. By
1914 Italy’s average manufacturing tariff (estimated at 18 per cent) stood at a level
close to Germany’s and France’s, lower than Spain’s and Sweden’s, but much
higher than that of small open economies such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland (James and O’Rourke, 2013, p. 41).
A new protectionist turning point took place in 1925: high import duties on
wheat and sugar were re-introduced, and metallurgy and a number of heavy
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engineering activities regained the customs’ favour. A discussion of the underlying
political economy of the protectionist U-turn of 1925 is beyond the scope of this
chapter,7 but it is enough to recall that 1925 was the year when Mussolini’s
dictatorial powers were sanctioned by law.
Italy’s protectionist turn antedates by a few years the international triumph of
tariffs, quotas, and exchange controls in which the country fully participated, first
proclaiming a national ‘battle for (domestic) wheat’ and later embarking on an
official programme of autarky. The latter relied on an array of allocative tools,
among which import duties were just one of many.
Post-1945 tariff history closely followed the European pattern, first in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and then in the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Economic Community (EEC)
frameworks. The swift reconstruction of the Italian industrial base took place under
a heavy protective shield, which included import duties, quotas, restrictions on
capital movements, cumbersome authorization procedures, and managed exchange
rates. The panoply of protective devices began to unwind in the late 1940s,
following the Annecy conference, when Italy joined the GATT. In 1950, a tarif
de combat was introduced, in the time-honoured tradition of entering into nego-
tiations from a high ground. Progressive liberalization followed and, by 1957, Italy
was ready to join the European Common Market and to make its currency
convertible. From then onward, Italy’s import duties were set in Brussels as trade
liberalization in manufacturing, both among the six original members of the EEC
and with the outside world, proceeded faster than was originally agreed upon in the
Rome treaty.
To sum up: Italy’s tariff history followed the ebbs and flows of European trade
policy. Both the 1887 and 1925 duties on manufacturing were aimed at shielding
so-called heavy industry from foreign competition. The former also protected
cotton textiles, which were neglected in 1925. The prevailing consensus among
scholars is that in both cases tariffs had a negative impact on manufacturing growth
which, on the other hand, was enhanced by post-1945 trade liberalization.
When not raised mainly for fiscal purposes, which was never the case in
Italy, tariffs serve two political economy purposes: consensus building (as with
the notorious pactum sceleris between agrarian and industrial constituencies in
Germany, but also in Italy) and ‘industrial policy’. The latter is a broad and often
ill-defined concept: for our purposes we define ‘industrial policy’ as the use of the
state’s power to influence resource allocation in order to promote industrialization
(wartime policies being the extreme case in point). For better or worse, industrial
policy looms large in Italy’s industrialization drive. The tariff hikes of the 1880s,
and 1920s and 1930s, were both part of broader policy drives aimed at promoting
‘strategic’ industries.
The (liberal) left that came to power in 1878 had a more hands-on attitude to
industrialization than the ‘Historical Right’, which had been in government since
7 Among recent contributions see Salsano and Toniolo (2010).
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the Risorgimento.8 Besides the tariff, a number of industrial policy tools were used:
‘ad hoc legislation, procurement, grants, fiscal privileges, bail outs, state guarantees
[ . . . ] all administered with large discretion, and to changing ends’ (Ciocca, 2007,
pp. 116–17). Lack of transparency resulted in the exchange of favours between the
private and the public sectors, cutting corners, and careerism, all captured by the
novels of Maupassant in France9 and De Roberto in Italy.10
Metal making saw double-digit growth in the 1880s (12 per cent per annum, up
from 2.9 in 1861–80). Engineering, already the second largest manufacturing
sector after food processing, grew annually by 5.3 per cent (up from 2.3). But
the textile sector, not a target of government activism, also grew faster than the
manufacturing sector on average. How much of the manufacturing growth accel-
eration can be attributed to the new activism by the left government? Probably not
much of it, if other favourable factors are taken into account. Major institutional
progress had been made in monetary and financial market unification (Toniolo,
Conte, and Vecchi, 2003), and in the creation of business-friendly institutions
(notably the Commercial Code of 1882). Foreign capital flowed in (Fenoaltea,
1988) as the result of a balanced state budget and the return to gold convertibility
of the lira in 1883. A construction boom (4.5 per cent per annum, up from a
negligible and volatile 0.36 per cent per annum during 1861–80) created consid-
erable private demand for iron and steel, unrelated to government policy.
All in all, the government’s chaotic panoply of support to manufacturing either
slowed down growth, as maintained by economists at the time, or contributed little
to it. Moreover, the brief cyclical expansion (1880–8) was followed by a slump in
1888–96, during which manufacturing grew by a meagre 0.84 per cent per annum
while metallurgy, engineering, and textiles, as well as construction, all saw negative
growth rates. If industrial policy is to be judged by its long-term impact, the left’s
activism does not pass the test.
As we have seen, during 1896–1925 Italy made a major quantitative and
qualitative jump in modern industrialization, narrowing the gap with the core
countries. Did industrial policy matter?
Giolitti, who directly or indirectly ruled the country from the end of the century
to 1913, did not put an end to previous practices of the government paying
excessively close attention to the needs of individual sectors and even of particular
business groups. An active industrial policy, however, began to be conducted by the
universal banks.
8 In 1884 a steel-making company was created in Terni using electrically powered Bessemer
converters and Martin–Siemens furnaces. A typical example of the industrial policy of the left, Terni
was created by a group of private entrepreneurs, enjoying the state guarantee of substantial
procurement, particularly for the navy. A government committee chose the location, taking into
account, among other things, its distance from the border and from the sea (given the maximum
reach of naval guns at the time). The largest banks provided most of the needed financial resources.
9 See among others Guy De Maupassant’s masterpiece, Bel Ami (1885).
10 Long underrated, Federico De Roberto (1861–1927) is one of the great Italian novelists. His
I Vicerè (1894) is a scathing critique of business corruption, as is his posthumous L’Imperio (1929), set
at the same time.
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It is impossible here to even review the vast literature on the contribution of
German-type mixed banks to the manufacturing growth acceleration in Italy after
the mid-1890s. The prevailing consensus (Confalonieri, 1994) is that, while Banca
Commerciale and Credito Italiano introduced innovative banking practices and
played an important role in the development of some sectors (notably hydropower),
in underwriting equity and bond issues, and more generally in developing the
financial market, they did not play the pivotal role as ‘agents of industrialization’
(i.e. as industrial policy-makers par excellence) assigned to them by Gerschenkron.
The most important developmental role of the government during the Giolittian
period was a time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy, which stabilized expect-
ations by both domestic and foreign investors, lowered interest rates, crowded in
private capital, and favoured a hefty inflow of emigrant remittances.
In every war economy, industrial policy is pushed to the extreme. Every tool
available to the state—selective credit and taxation, price controls, licensing, tariffs,
labour laws, and many others—is used to allocate resources to the production of
war-related goods. Policy is enforced by special legislation, including the extension
to civilians of the tough military penal code. For all its deficiencies and shortcom-
ings, both military and industrial, Italy’s wartime economic performance was quite
satisfactory, given the relative backwardness of the economy, the inefficient public
administration, and the social and political fractures that had emerged in the
previous years. As far as industrialization is concerned, the First World War (unlike
the Second) generated leaps forward in technical progress. There were two main
drivers: economies of scale and import substitution. As for the former, the huge
government demand for arms, ships, vehicles, and ammunition led to the creation
or expansion of conglomerates, such as Ansaldo, for the vertically integrated
production of steel, engineering products, warships, guns, trucks, and railway
equipment. Another instance can be found in the wartime expansion of FIAT,
the main producer of transport equipment. Import substitution was particularly
relevant in fostering growth in the chemical industry, previously largely dependent
on German imports. Montecatini developed the production of such products as
superphosphates, nitrogen, synthetic colours, and sodium carbonate for the prep-
aration of caustic soda. In several cases these products were inputs to other
industrial processes, particularly explosives (Caracciolo, 1969; Galassi and
Harrison, 2005). Some of the largest companies were downsized in the transition
to the peace economy, and excess capacity emerged in some sectors (notably
shipbuilding), but most of the qualitative changes to manufacturing induced by
wartime ‘industrial policy’ were not lost in the transition. In particular, as engineers
and skilled industrial workers had been largely exempted from serving in the
trenches, the wartime manufacturing effort resulted in a permanent increase in
the country’s human capital through learning by doing and tacit knowledge.
The next relevant chapter in industrial policy was inaugurated by the protec-
tionist U-turn of 1925, which favoured capital-intensive sectors (particularly steel
making, engineering, chemicals, and sugar refining). Besides import duties, the
usual allocative tools were employed: procurement, long-term credit at favourable
conditions, grants and state guarantees. The revaluation of the lira, which started in
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the summer of 1926, was part of the new policy orientation. It helped in attracting
foreign capital and, even more, in aiding large companies to repay foreign debts on
favourable terms. Contrary to a widespread belief both at the time and among
historians, the nominal revaluation had a relatively minor impact on the real
exchange rate as it was accompanied by tight wage controls, and even by ‘wage
cuts’ imposed by decree (Toniolo, 1980; Di Nino, Eichengreen, and Sbracia,
2013). The losers in this game were labour-intensive, export-oriented industries,
which had led the post-war industrial boom, among them the rapidly expanding
‘artificial silk’ (rayon) sector in which Italy had a worldwide leading position as the
second largest producer after the US.
The inward-looking nature of industrial policy was progressively reinforced in
the 1930s. Administrative controls on capital movements and bilateral clearing
agreements were added to the panoply as particularly effective allocative devices. An
official autarky programme was eventually launched in 1935 as a reaction to the
sanctions imposed by the League of Nations when Italy invaded Ethiopia.
The large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is one of the most distinct-
ive features of Italy’s industrialization. SOEs originated in the inter-war years
mostly as the unintended consequence of government bailouts. In the 1900s, the
government nationalized the railway companies, merging them into a single state-
owned company, as well as life insurance, but no SOEs existed in manufacturing
before the First World War. Government intervention to ease the transition from a
war- to peace-time economy in the socially explosive conditions of 1919–22
resulted in the state gaining indirect control of Ansaldo, a large metal-making
and engineering conglomerate. In 1931 the government secretly bailed out the
three largest universal banks of the country which, in the 1920s, had progressively
turned themselves into holding companies: their combined equity portfolios held
controlling stakes in about 50 per cent of the listed companies on the Italian stock
exchange. As a condition for the supply of last resort liquidity, the government
required a commitment by the banks to henceforth confine their business to short-
term lending; holding of industrial stakes was explicitly forbidden. In 1933, the
equity portfolio of the banks was ‘provisionally’ taken over by a state-controlled
holding company, the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI).11 As far as
‘industrial policy’ was concerned, IRI coordinated and rationalized production
within the group by directing financial resources where it deemed useful as well
as by mergers and downsizing, the latter with little social cost as manpower could to
a certain extent be reallocated within the group. From the very beginning, IRI also
took responsibility for managerial training and selection for the entire group; a role
efficiently performed, which particularly yielded fruit in the 1940s and 1950s.
During the post-war golden age of manufacturing growth, as tariffs rapidly lost
importance, two main tools were used in industrial policy: credit allocation and
public investment in manufacturing, largely but not exclusively channelled by
SOEs. Active credit policies took place in the context of financial repression that
11 On IRI see the six volumes edited by Pierluigi Ciocca (Ciocca, 2011–14).
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characterized Italy and the rest of Europe from the 1930s through the 1970s and
beyond. Under such conditions, Battilossi, Gigliobianco, and Marinelli (2013)
argue that during 1948–70 Italian banks effectively promoted growth in the Italian
economy. Co-integration analysis ‘shows that the volume of credit to the industrial
sectors tended to adjust to changes in the growth opportunities [of individual
industries] as proxied by price/earning rates’ (Battilossi, Gigliobianco, and
Marinelli, 2013, p. 513). Credit allocation under financial repression was possibly
not particularly detrimental to industrial growth. In the golden age, SOEs made a
huge contribution to industrial investment, produced considerable R & D, and are
credited with creating positive externalities for the private sector. ‘IRI helped the
development of the machinery industry by providing cheap intermediate inputs,
compensating for the weakness of private firms in the field’ (Crafts and Magnani,
2013, p. 80). It also created an extended network of superhighways (autostrade),
which lowered transportation costs and favoured the rapid expansion of the car
industry. ENI developed gas fields in the Po valley and freed the country’s oil
supply from the ‘Seven Sisters’ oligopoly.12 Between 1958 and 1969 IRI’s invest-
ments grew on average by 8.7 per cent per annum, and employment by 3.2 per cent
(to 295,000), producing profits year after year (Ciocca, 2014, p. 147).
6.5 THE REGIONAL DIVIDE
An outstanding feature of Italy’s modern economic growth is the stubborn persist-
ence of regional inequalities in GDP per person. Whereas the country as a whole
converged with the initially most advanced countries, a similar process did not take
place within the country itself. Regional divides are observed in almost every
country, but nowhere else is the phenomenon as deep and persistent as in Italy.
Moreover, in contrast to other countries such as Spain, Italy is characterized by a
persistent geographical pattern of inequality, with a ‘continuing dominance of one
area of the country’ (see A’Hearn and Venables, 2013, p. 626).
An enormous literature exists on the ‘SouthernQuestion’ (QuestioneMeridionale)
dating back to the late nineteenth century.13 In recent years, various estimates of
regional GDP from 1861 to the present have produced some consensus about the
evolution of the regional income gap. However, regional historical industrial stat-
istics are still under-researched, with the exception of the painstaking analysis
12 In 1963, at the peak of the ‘economic miracle’, a macroeconomic ‘democratic planning’ was
designed ‘to tackle the main structural problems of the economy [ . . . ] On the whole the program was
heavily influenced by a dirigiste approach not uncommon in European economic culture of the time’
(Crafts and Magnani, 2013, p. 81). Incomes policy proposals ran up against the weakness of the reform
culture of the Communist Party (Magnani, 1997); the targets set by the programmazione were hardly
compatible with the inefficiency of public administration; and the antitrust regulation and company-
law reform proposals were defeated by the consolidated interests of large industrial groups (Barca,
1997; Ciocca, 2007).
13 Among some of the most recent contributions are Iuzzolino, Pellegrini, and Viesti (2013),
A’Hearn and Venables (2013), Felice (2013), and Daniele and Malanima (2007; 2014).
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by Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2009, 2014), which unfortunately covers only
1861–1913.
In this chapter we begin to bridge the statistical gap. To do so, we rely for
1861–1913 on the series by Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2009).14 For subsequent
years we follow Fenoaltea’s methodology by attributing to each region, at census
benchmark years, a share of the national industrial and manufacturing production
equal to the share of the regional labour force in the two sectors, using data
produced by Vitali (1970).15 This yields regional industrial and manufacturing
value added at constant prices for sixteen Italian regions at benchmark years from
1871 to 1971.16
In Table 6.4 regional per capita industrial value added is shown in Geary–
Khamis 1990 dollars to allow for comparisons with a selected number of countries.
It shows that the Northwest, comparable in population size to Sweden, was as
industrialized as the Scandinavian country by the 1930s, while the other Italian
macro regions lagged behind most of Europe’s countries.
The geographical pattern of Italy’s industrialization can be summarized as
follows: a large gap in per capita industrial value added between the Northwest
and the rest of the country already existed in 1891; during 1891–1938 the South
lagged behind in industrial growth per capita, while the Northeast and Centre
progressed very similarly, losing some ground to the Northwest; the Second World
War deepened the North–South divide while during 1951–71 all three other
macro areas caught up with the Northwest.
A striking feature of Italy’s industrialization is the concentration of manufactur-
ing in the Northwest: in 1971, with about 27 per cent of Italy’s population, the
region produced more than half of the entire country’s manufacturing value added.
Note that the North–South divide in manufacturing is more pronounced than in
industry as a whole. The Southern divergence began in 1911, when the area
produced about one-third of the country’s manufacturing value added, a share
that dropped to one-eighth sixty years later. In 1891 manufacturing made up about
80 per cent of total industrial production in all four macro areas. A century later,
the manufacturing/industry ratio was still 0.8 in the Northwest, but had fallen to
around 0.7 in the Northeast and Centre, and had plummeted to 50 per cent in the
South. One of the reasons for the weak Southern industrialization is its dispropor-
tionate reliance on construction and utilities rather than manufacturing.
A similar pattern is revealed when we consider the spatial distribution of the
‘modern’ manufacturing sector, defined, as above, by the chemical, engineering,
and metal-making industries (Table 6.5). Up to the end of the nineteenth century,
14 Data are at 1911 constant prices, which may affect the shares of manufacturing and construction
presented below.
15 This is the methodology Fenoaltea used in his ‘first generation’ estimates (see Ciccarelli and
Fenoaltea, 2009). There are, obviously, two major flaws in this procedure: it does not take into account
unknown but potentially large productivity differentials between regions, and it assumes the same ratio
of labour force to employment across regions.
16 For 1971 we rely on the Centre for North South Economic Research (CRENoS) dataset:
www.crenos.it.
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Table 6.4. Industrial value added per inhabitant: Italy, four Italian macro areas, and selected countries, 1891–1971 (Geary–Khamis 1990 dollars)
Year ITA NW* NE* CEN* S* FR SP JAP BEL FIN SW NL
1891 332 402 278 295 256 968 484 137 1,440 282 341 1,070
1911 497 761 472 380 391 1,231 555 287 1,637 491 719 1,337
1931 647 1,047 494 569 396 1,676 703 574 1,965 631 995
1938 653 1,273 695 675 520 1,486 809 1,995 1,076 1,310
1961 1980 4,102 2,065 1,884 1,009 2,484 2,942 2,532 3,022
1971 3,515 5,869 3,596 3,023 1,919 3,991 2,581 3,423 4,395 3,777 3,840 4,607
Δ% 1891–1971 3.0 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.6
* NW = Northwest; NE = Northeast; CEN = Centre; S = South.
Source: Regional GDP/per person in Italy, Felice and Vecchi (2013); Regional Industry/GDP, Table 6. Other countries: GDP per capita: Maddison (2010); Ind./GDP, Mitchell (2007);

























over one-third of ‘modern’ industries were located in the South, with the Northeast
and Centre lagging behind. The Southern share had more than halved by 1951. By
the 1970s, over 50 per cent of manufacturing produced in the Northwest was in the
‘modern’ sectors, which accounted for two-thirds of the total ‘modern’ production
of the country.
The rapid concentration of the modern sectors in the Northwest began with
the post-1896 industrial growth acceleration, and was favoured by the wartime
demand for typically modern products and by post-1925 tariff and industrial
policies. After the Second World War, large enterprises remained the engine of
growth in the Northwest, while the Northeast and Central regions developed
their own idiosyncratic industrialization pattern based on small and medium-size
enterprises, often clustered in ‘industrial districts’, typically—if by no means
exclusively—oriented to the production of medium- rather than high-tech
goods. SOEs were largely responsible for the development of modern sectors in
the South.
By focusing on just four macro areas, one misses at least one important feature of
Italy’s industrial (and general economic) growth, namely the large within-area
dispersion of income levels. Fig. 6.2 shows modest convergence in industrial
value added per person (upper graph) and divergence in income per capita (lower
graph) for the sixteen original (1861) Italian regions. The scatter plots highlight the
wide regional dispersion in both initial values and growth.
Regional divergence in per capita GDP (and in per capita manufacturing, as we
shall see in the next section) is a well-known feature of Italy’s modern economic
growth. Little attention, however, has been paid so far to the difference between the
industrial and GDP stories, which suggests that industrial growth was probably a
necessary but not sufficient condition for regional GDP convergence. The quality of
the industrial mix (e.g. manufacturing vs construction, modern vs traditional sectors)
mattered.
Table 6.5. Distribution of value added by modern sectors across macro areas
NWa NEa CENa Sa Total
1871 31.4 17.4 16.5 34.6 100
1881 35.8 16.6 15.4 32.2 100
1891 38.0 15.8 14.9 31.3 100
1901 40.7 14.9 14.4 30.0 100
1911 45.5 15.9 14.1 24.4 100
1921 49.5 14.4 13.4 22.7 100
1931 53.7 14.1 14.9 17.4 100
1936 52.8 15.0 14.5 17.7 100
1951 59.2 13.9 12.8 14.2 100
a NW = Northwest; NE = Northeast; CEN = Centre; S = South.
Sources: Our calculations; see text for data sources.
Matteo Gomellini and Gianni Toniolo132





















3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4
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5.6 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.4
Log of per capita GDP, 1871
Growth of per capita GDP, 1871–1961 Fitted values
Fig. 6.2. Convergence in industry, divergence in GDP, 1871–1961
Note: Abbreviations refer to the sixteen Italian regions: ABR = Abruzzi; BAS = Basilicata; CAL = Calabria; CAM =
Campania; EMI = Emilia; LAZ = Lazio; LIG = Liguria; LOM = Lombardia; MAR =Marche; PIE = Piemonte; PUG
= Puglia; SAR = Sardegna; SIC = Sicilia; TOS = Toscana; UMB = Umbria; VEN = Veneto.
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6.6 DRIVERS OF THE UNEVEN REGIONAL SPREAD
OF MANUFACTURING
As already mentioned, regional differences in per capita manufacturing output
widened over the period under consideration (Fig. 6.3). In 1871, per capita value
added by manufacturing in the South was about 70 per cent of the Northwest’s; in
1961 the figure was just 30 per cent.
What drove this divergence? Deep history, government policies, institutions,
geography, and human and social capital have all featured in the debate on the causes
of the uneven spread of modern industry in Italy since the late nineteenth century.17
Galasso (2005) argued that Frederic II’s centralization of state functions weak-
ened the autonomy of the Southern cities, which could not match the industrial
vitality of their Central and Northern counterparts: a weakness that was not
redressed for the following six centuries. In the same vein, Putnam (1993) goes
far back in history to find the roots of the North–South divide in the persistently
low level of social capital (trust) that seems to characterize the Mezzogiorno.
A problem with attributing the relative weakness of Southern industrial growth
to historical and geographical factors dating back several centuries is its inconsist-
ency with the initially (1861) relatively small gap in GDP per person. Why did
geographical, entrepreneurial, and social capital disadvantages not result in a wider
income wedge long before unification? One (unfalsifiable) answer could be that
those factors only became important in the context of modern economic growth.
The role of policies never ceased being debated ever since the famous polemical
exchanges between Nitti and Fortunato at the turn of the twentieth century, with
Nitti (1905) blaming the unified state’s policies for the widening gap between
North and South, and Fortunato stressing the original weakness of the Southern
economy. The ‘colonial conquest’ of the Mezzogiorno by the Northern elites is
where some authors lay the blame for the subsequent economic and social ills of the
former kingdom of Naples (for a recent, sophisticated, revival of this approach, see
De Oliveira and Guerriero, 2014). As already mentioned, tariff policies have taken
centre stage in the debate, as have the various ‘regional policies’ aimed at promoting
economic and industrial development in the South.
Some authors (see the reviews in Felice, 2013; Federico and Tena, 2014) explain
the North–South divide in terms of a Southern lack of natural resources, and a
lower level of human and social capital. A new economic geography approach
stresses the importance of natural resources in combination with market access
(A’Hearn and Venables, 2013; see also Missiaia, 2014).
All of these factors have probably contributed to the regional divide. To inves-
tigate their relative impact, we conducted several correlation exercises.18 The
general relationship we tested takes the following form:
17 See Toniolo (2013) and the contributions therein.
18 Correlations are obtained by regressing final-year levels (or the decadal growth) of per capita
manufacturing on initial-year levels of each explanatory variable. These correlations are robust to a
series of controls.
Matteo Gomellini and Gianni Toniolo134
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/1/2017, SPi
Yit = α + βXit  10 + Λi + εit
where Yit, our dependent variable, is per person value added in manufacturing in
region i and year t, andΛi are regional controls. The period of investigation runs from
1871 to 1961, and Xit10 are five possible explanatory variables lagged by ten years:
the degree of water availability, which according to many authors (e.g. Fenoaltea,
2006; data from Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea, 2009) had a huge importance in allowing
early industrial production (like silk) and in defining its location; the ease of access
both to domestic and foreign markets, measured by a Harris (1954) index of Market
Potential, which measures the distance-weighted potential demand faced by each
region given its geographical location;19 and endowments of human and social capital,
two characteristics of the population often seen asmajor drivers of economic growth.20
All in all, these correlations suggest that geography-related variables are the most
relevant in explaining regional divides. Over the entire period (1881–1961), almost














































3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2
Log of per capita manufacturing value added, 1871
Growth of per capita manufacturing value added, 1871–1961 Fitted values
Fig. 6.3. Divergence in per capita manufacturing, 1871–1961
Note: Abbreviations as in Fig. 6.2.
19 Proximity to foreign markets reduces transportation and information costs, and facilitates
imitation and the transfer of technology.
20 A more accurate description of the variables and details on the econometrics is in Gomellini and
Toniolo (2015).
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be explained21 by differences in the ease of access to foreign markets. Proximity to
domestic markets can explain, at most, a quarter of the final divide; human and
social capital turn out to be less relevant in explaining the divergent paths in
manufacturing.
6.7 CONCLUSIONS
In the late nineteenth century Italy was often regarded as the ‘least of the great powers’
(Bosworth, 1979). Sometimes it was demoted to the rank of ‘first of the small powers’.
The same ambiguity existed, at least until the 1960s, regarding Italy’s relative economic
position. As Federico and Vasta (2010, p. 229) noted, ‘authors find it difficult to nail
Italy down in a simple dichotomy betweenCore and Periphery: Blattman,Hwang and
Williamson (2007) list it among the core countries, alongside the United Kingdom,
while Williamson (2008) demotes Italy in the European periphery, with Russia and
Spain’. In economic history the meanings of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ vary according to
research goals and time frame, as does the meaning of ‘power’ in political science: for
much of the period covered in this chapter, Italy, or parts of it, would fall in the
‘periphery’ or ‘core’ according to the chosen variable of interest.
At the time of unification (1861–70), Italy’s industrial sector was underdeveloped
not only in absolute but also in relative terms:while Italy’sGDPper personwas about
half that of the UK, industrial production per person was only 16 per cent of the UK
level. Starting from this condition of typically peripheral industrial backwardness, in
the following century Italy realized a pretty much ‘normal’ convergence with the
‘core’ in terms of both industrial output and GDP per person. Given its significant
demographic size, Italy remained throughout one of the eight to ten largest world
economies, and by the 1980s it had become the fifth or sixth largest world manu-
facturer.
After a slow start, Italy’s industrialization process broadly followed the path taken
by the main European countries: the pace of industrial output accelerated during
1896–1914, proved quite resilient to the shock of war, which brought about
significant qualitative changes, increased significantly in the 1920s, and slowed in
the 1930s while undergoing major structural changes. Italian industry participated
fully in the second post-war golden age of the European economy. Throughout the
century, Italian industry grew on average only marginally faster than industry in the
world as a whole. The ebb and flow of protectionism also followed a general
European pattern. Industrial policy was probably as invasive as, but less efficient
than, those in France and Germany. State-owned enterprises and ‘industrial
districts’ stand out as idiosyncratic Italian institutions fostering industrialization.
The lack of convergence in regional GDP per person is a well-known peculiarity
of Italy’s modern economic growth. While a number of studies exist on regional
21 The potential explanatory power can be interpreted as the highest share of the North–South
differential in the dependent variable that can be explained by a single variable. It is calculated as in
Campante and Glaeser (2007).
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GDP, we have produced for the first time consistent estimates of regional industrial
and manufacturing output from 1861 to 1961. Industry progressively concentrated
in the Northwestern regions, with the Northeast and Centre roughly maintaining
their share of national industry. The South consistently lost ground from 1911
onward. A similar pattern holds for the geographical distribution of the ‘modern’
manufacturing sector (chemical, engineering, and metal-making industries). At the
same time, Southern industrial output became increasingly dependent on construc-
tion, while manufacturing lost its initial relative weight. When we investigate the
causes of the uneven geographical distribution of manufacturing, correlation ana-
lyses suggest that the degree of exposure to internal and foreign markets has a better
chance of explaining differences in regional per capita manufacturing output than
variables such as natural resources, and human and social capital, commonly
associated with industrialization.
We have found evidence of a weak convergence among Italian regions in
industrial (but not manufacturing) output per capita, which stands in contrast to
the lack of convergence for GDP per capita.22 The reasons for the different
behaviour may not be the same in the case of peripheral countries, on the one
hand, and peripheral regions within Italy, on the other. They form a large research
agenda for economic historians, given the emphasis traditionally placed on indus-
trialization as the main driver of modern economic growth. Our findings suggest
that the composition of industrial output may impact on the growth of non-
industrial sectors: Southern industry did converge on the North’s, but its heavy
reliance on construction and traditional labour-intensive industries may not have
produced the same effects on agriculture and services as did the modern manufac-
turing located in the other areas.
To conclude, in 1861–71 Italy was definitely a peripheral industrial country,
even if—given its population—it produced about 2.5 per cent of the world’s
industrial output. Its movement towards the ‘core’ did not start until the 1890s,
but it then progressed ‘as expected’ by its initial backwardness. Japan is possibly the
country most similar to Italy in the pattern of per capita industrial growth: its much
larger population (about twice that of Italy throughout) made it possible to wage
ten years of war against industrially weaker neighbours and four years of total war in
the Pacific, starting from a relatively low but nonetheless substantial per capita
industrial base. When did Italy (and Japan) join the ‘core’ of the industrial world?
There are several possible answers to this question, depending on the yardstick
employed. It can be argued that, by the eve of the Second World War, several
qualitative features of Italian (and Japanese) industry, in particular the share of
‘modern sectors’ in manufacturing output, were similar to those of the core
countries, even though the overall output level lagged behind. Alternatively, one
may suggest that by the 1930s, the Northwest was a ‘core’ industrial country, the
size of the Netherlands, while the South always remained on the edge between core
and periphery.
22 On the distinction between convergence in GDP per capita and manufacturing output per
capita, see Rodrik (2013).
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Industrialization in Egypt and Turkey,
1870–2010
Ulaş Karakoç, Şevket Pamuk, and Laura Panza
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the industrial performances of two large countries in the
Middle East—Turkey and Egypt—during four historical periods: the period from
1870 to the First World War when industrialization remained very limited under
open economy conditions; the inter-war era when industrialization began with the
help of protectionism; the three decades after the Second World War when the
import-substituting industrialization (ISI) model was adopted and rates of indus-
trialization peaked in both countries; and trade liberalization and export orientation
since 1980 when the performances of the two countries diverged significantly. In
addition to providing brief accounts of Egypt and Turkey’s performance, we will
offer a comparative analysis of the outcomes in each period.
Egypt and Turkey have accounted for about half of the total population of the
Middle East since 1870. Their combined populations have grown more than
sevenfold from about 18 million in 1870 to more than 150 million in 2010
(Table 7.1). Egypt’s borders have remained mostly unchanged since the nineteenth
century. Turkey, on the other hand, was part of the Ottoman Empire until after the
First World War and did not have borders of its own. For the sake of consistency,
the narrative and all the quantitative series we present in this chapter will refer to
the area inside the present-day borders of Turkey.
Per capita incomes in these two countries were roughly similar at the beginning
of the period under study. Purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted GDP per capita
in 1990 international dollars was close to $800 in Egypt and Turkey in 1870. The
two countries have diverged significantly since. While Egypt’s GDP per capita rose
more slowly, to $1,050 in 1950 and to about $4,000 in 2010, Turkey’s GDP per
capita almost doubled to $1,600 by 1950 and rose more than fivefold to 10,500 in
2010. As result, per capita incomes in 2010 were more than 150 per cent higher in
Turkey than in Egypt (Table 7.1).
Egypt and Turkey embraced industrialization policies earlier than others in the
region. They also achieved higher rates of manufacturing growth than most, if not
all, other countries in the region from the 1930s. A comparative study can provide
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insights into the impact of these policies. In contrast, in Iran, the other large
country of the region, large oil revenues led to Dutch Disease effects which pulled
resources away from industry, leading to lower manufacturing growth rates from
the first half of the twentieth century.
This chapter will draw on official manufacturing series for the post-Second
World War period and on recent value-added estimates for the inter-war era
(Karakoç, 2014). For the pre-First World War years, we extrapolate backwards
using the best available estimates of population, trade, and per capita income
(Pamuk, 2006). The manufacturing value-added indices we present include factory
production and traditional handicrafts, but not utilities, construction or mining.
The inclusion of handicrafts is likely to lower measured manufacturing growth
rates, since factory output grew much faster in the early stages of industrialization.
Egypt and Turkey adopted broadly similar trade and industrialization policies in
each of the four historical periods we will identify below. Moreover, the trajectories
of manufacturing in the two countries were similar to the pattern in many other
developing countries. Neither country had tariff autonomy before 1914, since the
Ottoman Empire, including Egypt, had committed to free trade treaties in 1838.
It is likely that manufacturing output increased very slowly under these conditions
(Table 7.1 and Fig. 7.1). During the second period, 1914–50, both countries
adopted selective tariffs and moved towards protectionism, Turkey more strongly
than Egypt. In both countries the beginning of industrialization can be dated to the
1930s, but manufacturing growth remained slow except in the 1930s. During the
third period, 1950–80, both countries embarked on ISI policies. Average annual
growth rates were close to 6 per cent in Egypt and 8 per cent in Turkey, and the
share of manufacturing industry in GDP increased. Manufacturing exports
remained limited, however, and most, if not all, of the output was directed towards
the domestic market. After 1980 both countries liberalized their trade policies
and attempted to promote manufacturing exports, with mixed results. Annual
Table 7.1. Long-term trends in Egypt and Turkey, 1870–2010
Population GDP per capita Manufacturing value added, annual




Egypt Turkey Egypt Turkey Egypt Turkey Egypt Turkey
1870 6.4 11.5 750 880
1914 12.1 16.5 950 1,100 1870–1913 n.a. 1.2 n.a. 0.4
1950 21 21 1,050 1,600 1913–50 3.0 2.6 1.4 1.9
1980 45 44 2,100 4,750 1950–80 5.7 8.5 3.2 5.8
2010 79 73 4,000 10,500 1980–2010 4.1 5.2 2.2 3.3
Sources: GDP and population: Maddison (2007), Pamuk (2006); value added (Egypt), 1945–75: Ikram (1980,
pp. 239–40); 1975–93: Radwan (2003); 1993–2010: World Bank indicators; value added (Turkey): Pamuk (2014)
and Karakoç (2014).
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manufacturing rates of growth slowed, while the differences in the industrial
performance of the two countries became more pronounced. Per capita manufac-
turing output, the share of manufacturing in GDP, and the share of manufacturing
in total exports were higher in Turkey in 2010 (Table 7.1 and Fig. 7.1).
We will identify a number of causal factors explaining these divergent trends.
One was resource endowments. A significant difference between Turkey and Egypt
was the availability of land. Egypt reached the limits of cultivable land before the
First World War, but after that its population increased sixfold. In contrast, plenty
of additional land was still available in Turkey in 1914. While population grew
more than fourfold in Turkey during the twentieth century, this was matched by a
threefold increase in cultivable land. This important difference in initial endow-
ments helps explain part of the divergence between the two countries regarding not
only agricultural but also industrial performance.
Another difference in initial conditions was social structure and the related
political economy. Before 1945 private sector manufacturing was small scale and
politically weak in both countries. As a result, agrarian interests were important in
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Fig. 7.1. Value added in manufacturing in Egypt and Turkey, 1870–2010
Sources: Egypt, 1919–45: Karakoç (2014); 1945–75: Ikram (1980); 1975–93: Radwan (2003); 1994–2010: World
Bank indicators. Turkey: Pamuk (2014), Karakoç (2014).
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favouring specialization in cotton, which helped delay the onset of industrialization.
The British colonial administration in power from 1882 through the inter-war
period also strongly favoured agriculture over industry. After the 1952 military
coup, Egyptian governments started to eliminate the power of large landowners
by distributing their land, and economic policy became strongly pro-industry.
In Turkey, where small-scale family enterprises were more important in agriculture
and landed interests were not as strong politically, government support for indus-
trialization emerged earlier. While the Ottoman government did not and could not
support industrialization, the new nation state strongly embraced protectionism
and supported industrialization during the inter-war era, and again in the 1960s.
Government interventionism and the quality of the related institutions also
mattered in explaining trends in the two countries. Government interventionism
was important in creating high rates of manufacturing growth in both countries,
especially during the ISI era. Yet, its content, goals, and implementation varied
greatly over time. Perhaps most importantly, rather than being based on well-
defined, impersonal rules, government support for manufacturing often involved
support for individuals and firms close to the ruling party. As a result, the pursuit of
favouritism or privileges from local and national governments remained a more
popular activity for the private sector than productivity improvements or compe-
tition in international markets. There were also important differences between
Egypt and Turkey in the impact of government interventionism on the private
sector. The private sector was not promoted in Egypt, especially between the 1950s
and early 1970s, at the height of Nasser’s Arab socialism. In contrast, while the
private manufacturing sector was initially quite weak in Turkey, it benefited from
government support and steadily gained both economic and political strength from
the end of the Second World War. However, here as well the private sector
remained strongly dependent on government subsidies and tariff protection until
the 1980s.
In terms of investment in human capital, both Turkey and Egypt lagged behind
countries with similar levels of GDP per capita in Latin America and East Asia. This
made it more difficult for manufacturing to move towards higher-technology,
higher-value-added goods and sectors requiring higher skills. Low levels of
human capital also help explain, at least in part, why the two countries did not
have much success in increasing total factor productivity (TFP).
7 .2 LIMITED INDUSTRIALIZATION UNDER OPEN
ECONOMY CONDITIONS, 1870–1914
The sweeping changes transforming industrial production worldwide during the
long nineteenth century also had a far-reaching impact on Middle Eastern manu-
facturing. The region, most of which belonged to the Ottoman Empire, became an
exporter of primary commodities and an importer of manufactures, in common
with most of the poor periphery. Increased integration with the world economy, in
part due to steamships and railroads, accelerated the process of manufacturing
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decline (Issawi, 1982, p. 151), with the impact of the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Treaty
being much discussed in the literature (Pamuk, 1987). A terms of trade shift in
favour of primary commodity exports also explains much of the timing, extent, and
spatial pattern of de-industrialisation (Pamuk and Williamson, 2012).
The collapse of Egyptian industry dates back to the 1840s, when Muhammad
Ali’s policy of state-led industrialization was replaced by one of laissez-faire (Panza
and Williamson, 2015). The subsequent lack of any industrial strategy, coupled
with very low external tariffs, persisted until 1914, discouraging manufacturing
investment. From 1882, British rulers discouraged economic activities likely to
compete directly with the homeland. Thus the Ottoman tariff rate increases in
1905 and 1908 did not apply to Egypt, and imported raw materials and machinery
were taxed at the same rate as finished products. Excise duties were levied on a
variety of locally produced goods, notably the 8 per cent duty on local cotton goods.
This offset the 8 per cent import tariff, leaving the industry de facto completely
unprotected (Panza, 2014, p. 161).
Egypt represented an extreme case of agricultural specialization. Cotton account-
ed for more than 80 per cent of total exports in the 1880s, and over 90 per cent at
the turn of the century (Panza, 2014, p. 158). The American Civil War increased
the central importance of the raw fibre, and its share of government and private
investment. Unsurprisingly, the second half of the nineteenth century saw only
minimal industrial progress, despite considerable foreign investment and dramatic
improvements in Egypt’s transportation network (El-Gritly, 1947, p. 366): the share
of industry (both mechanized and non-mechanized) did not exceed 2.3 per cent
(Radwan, 1974). Agriculture, construction, finance, and trade attracted most foreign
and domestic investment, being most profitable and relatively less risky.
Egyptian industry between 1870 and 1914 consisted of a small traditional
manufacturing sector, co-existing with an even smaller mechanized sector, produ-
cing for the low end of the income distribution. Employment was dominated by
textiles and clothing (53 per cent of employment), both largely non-mechanized.
Food processing, which ranked third (17 per cent), was also dominated by small,
mostly unmechanized, family firms (Radwan, 1974, pp. 172–3).
Between 1899 and 1907, mechanization started in a few manufacturing
sectors, mainly related to elementary raw material processing. Most important
were sugar refining and cotton ginning/pressing, accounting for 65.6 per cent
of capital invested in industry in 1899 (Radwan, 1974, p. 170; El-Gritli, 1947,
pp. 367–9). Apart from these two sectors, there was very little modern indus-
trial development.
Turkey’s manufacturing production also declined during the nineteenth century,
but less than in Egypt. Cotton textiles provide the most dramatic example, with the
share of domestic producers falling from 97 to 25–35 per cent between the 1820s
and the 1870s.More than half of the decline involved spinning and weaving by rural
households. Most other branches of manufacturing shrank to a lesser extent or were
not affected at all, either because the productivity increases in the European core
were more limited, and/or because high transportation costs continued to protect
Ottoman producers. Finally, exceptional cases such as carpet making and silk reeling
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saw increases in employment and production, due to growing demand in developed
countries.
After 1870 Ottoman trade growth slowed, and the decline in textile manufac-
turing moderated and was even reversed in some areas, despite low tariffs. This
slower manufacturing decline, which in some regions and sectors led to an incipient
process of re-industrialization, was consistent with a reversal in the terms of trade.
While these rose strongly in favour of primary commodities up to the mid- to late
nineteenth century, they fell gradually thereafter, giving local industry some relief
(Pamuk and Williamson, 2012). In some regions, small-scale urban workshops
began using imported yarn to expand their output of cotton and mixed cotton
cloths to meet local demand. Moreover, while hand spinning continued to decline,
the volume of weaving rose, probably doubling between 1880 and the First
World War. Significant amounts of textiles were shipped to long-distance markets
elsewhere in Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt.
The decades before the First World War saw the establishment of a small
number of factories in Turkey, mostly in the western part of the country, in
Istanbul and Izmir but also in the Adana region in the south (Panza, 2014).
Cotton, woollen and silk textiles, food processing, and construction materials
such as cement and brick, were the most important branches. Nevertheless, the
output of these mechanized factories remained limited when compared with
domestic handicraft production. Total employment in large-scale manufacturing
enterprises did not exceed several thousand during the 1910s (Quataert, 1993).
While we can identify many obstacles to the rise of manufacturing in Turkey, such
as limited availability of capital and a semi-skilled labour force, low tariffs and open
economy conditions were the main determinants of the country’s weak industrial
performance before the First World War. Nor did the Ottoman (or Egyptian)
currency provide any support for domestic manufacturing, being linked to gold.
Compared with the rest of the periphery, Egypt and Turkey were industrial
laggards during this period (Bénétrix, O’Rourke, and Williamson, 2015). For
example, while manufacturing production also declined in India, the latter started
to re-industrialize earlier (Chapter 10). Unlike other major commodity suppliers,
such as Argentina and Brazil (Chapter 13), Egypt and Turkey’s specialization in
primary commodity exports did not provide a platform for industrial development
via Hirschman-type linkages. Low levels of industrialization in Egypt and Turkey
before 1914 can thus be explained by the interaction of global and local dynamics.
Low tariffs exposed domestic manufacturing to strong competition from abroad.
Both countries remained vulnerable to international price shocks: improving terms
of trade up to the 1870s contributed to manufacturing decline. The reversal of this
trend from the 1870s onwards provided some relief to the import-competing
sectors and can help explain the late nineteenth-century resistance of handicrafts
in Turkey and to a smaller degree Egypt (Pamuk and Williamson, 2012).
Domestic tastes also afforded local handicrafts some staying power. Although
British companies attempted to imitate local styles, often they could not do so
satisfactorily, and thus there was still demand for domestic cloth, including cotton,
woollen, and mixed varieties. Knowledge of local preferences helped domestic
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manufactures survive in the short run, while imported foreign techniques and
foreign managers increased their efficiency and competitiveness in the longer run.
Finally, Issawi argues that ‘weavers were able to cut their costs greatly by using
imported yarn; thus the Industrial Revolution, which had wiped out the spinners,
gave the weavers a precarious reprieve’ (Issawi, 1982, p. 152).
This was true particularly for Turkey, which experienced not only a stronger
survival of domestic handicrafts, but also the beginnings of mechanized manufactur-
ing production. Turkish geography offered more protection to domestic producers.
Foreign goods were unable to penetrate regions distant from major trade routes or
ports, especially before the railway boom late in the century. High transportation
costs also provided considerable protection to domestic producers of bulky, non-
textile goods, even in some coastal areas. On the other hand, Egyptian geography left
the country more exposed to import penetration. The Nile valley in Lower Egypt,
which included the vast majority of the population and cultivated land, represented a
more compact and homogeneous area, and was thus easier and less costly to access.
Large investments and improvements in transportation networks further facilitated
import competition.
Finally, British colonialism was opposed to manufacturing development, imply-
ing no industrial policy and zero tariff protection in some sectors, like cotton
textiles. Most government investments targeted agriculture and infrastructure.
Moreover, the various Khedives who ruled the country were in no position to aid
industry, not only because their power was subject to the colonial administration,
but also because state revenues were tied to debt servicing. For all of these reasons,
while manufacturing virtually collapsed in Egypt, Turkish handicrafts and industry,
although badly hurt by foreign competition in the first half of the nineteenth
century, resisted and adapted thereafter.
7 .3 BEGINNINGS OF PROTECTIONISM
AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1913–50
The period 1913–50 brought major changes to the structure of the world economy,
together with deep political and social dislocations. The first wave of globalization
resulted in a spectacular increase in the production and export of agricultural
commodities and raw materials in the periphery. Two world wars, the instabilities
of the 1920s, and the Great Depression largely disrupted this pattern. Although
world production recovered by the end of the 1930s, world trade became fragment-
ed within trade blocs and failed to recover (Feinstein et al., 2008). Political and
economic rivalries and a lack of cooperation led many primary producers to adopt
protectionism and more government intervention. Inter-war Egypt and Turkey
were no exception.
Yet, there were crucial differences between Egypt and Turkey. Large-scale
commercialization in agriculture, a lack of export diversification, land scarcity,
and the existence of powerful landed and foreign interests continued to characterize
the Egyptian economy until the 1940s. By 1914 the country had already reached
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the end of extensive growth based on the expansion of irrigation and cultivable
land. Land became scarce and cotton yields fell from the turn of the century. Rapid
population growth and persistent price declines from the mid-1920s put further
pressure on per capita output, despite government-sponsored drainage projects and
improved agricultural techniques.
Egypt gained nominal independence in 1922 but constraints on economic policy
remained. First, the Egyptian pound remained tied to the British pound at a fixed
rate until 1962. This may have been beneficial in the 1930s since Britain was still
one of her main major trading partners, but whether the Egyptian pound was
overvalued or not is far from clear (Hansen, 1991, pp. 79–83). Second, the tax
system remained intact until the Capitulations were abolished in 1936, so the
inefficient system based on land taxes, devised by the British before the turn of the
century, remained a powerful constraint on the government’s fiscal capacity.
Finally, Egypt only regained tariff autonomy in 1930. The ensuing tariff reform
introduced a three-tier scheme, based on mostly specific tariffs. The ad valorem
equivalent for raw materials, fuel, and machinery was set at 4 per cent, while semi-
manufactured goods were tariffed at 6–10 per cent and final goods at 15–30 per cent
(Tignor, 1984, pp. 110–11). These rates were revised a number of times during the
1930s, and a depreciated currency surtax of 40 per cent was imposed in 1935 on
imports of cotton and rayon piece goods from Japan, in order to stop a heavy inflow
of cheap textiles from that country. The average nominal protection rate increased
from 20–5 per cent in the 1920s to 40–50 per cent in the 1930s, rising five- or
sixfold for cotton and woollen fabrics and even more for silk goods.
These measures reduced imports and boosted domestic manufacturing. Total
imports declined by half in the first half of the 1930s and remained at these levels
until the Second World War. The share of cotton textile imports in total domestic
consumption declined steadily from 80 per cent in the 1920s to less than 40 per cent
by 1939. Cotton textile imports were almost completely replaced by domestic
production during the Second World War.
There were other developments that worked in favour of industrial growth as
well (Hansen and Nashashibi, 1975, p. 4). Landowners looked for alternative
investment outlets in the 1930s due to low and erratic cotton prices; relative prices
moved in favour of manufactures; and wages remained low. Yet, tariff-induced
industrial growth faced a serious constraint: limited domestic demand due to
stagnating incomes. Direct national income estimates do not exist for this period,
but estimates of consumption (e.g. of cereals, tobacco, passenger kilometres, and
cotton textiles) and indirect income estimates (Yousef, 2002) confirm the largely
accepted hypothesis that per capita national income remained stagnant between the
eve of the First World War and the end of 1930s, due to the ongoing agricultural
crisis (Hansen, 1979; Karakoç, 2014).
The SecondWorldWar brought significant dislocation. Foreign troops stationed
in Egypt generated additional demand for manufactures. At the same time, imports
were disrupted, particularly after Italy entered the war (Issawi, 1954, pp. 141–2;
Tignor, 1984, pp. 176–9). Industrial output increased moderately during the 1920s
(1.2 per cent per annum), accelerated slightly in the 1930s (2.8 per cent), and
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accelerated again during the war. Output growth during the 1930s and wartime was
largely due to textiles whereas food-processing sectors stagnated. Furthermore, the
share of modern factories in total output increased during the 1930s; more than half
of cotton fabrics were produced by factories in the second half of the 1930s, though
the trend was less pronounced in other sectors (Karakoç, 2014).
Turkey was different. Commercial agriculture was limited to the Aegean and
Mediterranean coasts; the share of exports in national income was smaller; the
export basket was more diverse and land was relatively abundant. Moreover,
the political changes of the 1920s had a dramatic impact on state capacity as the
military and civilian bureaucracy was able to pursue a nationalist and intervention-
ist economic agenda throughout the inter-war period. Neither local wealthy elites
nor foreign powers remained influential in policy making.
Industrialization was the primary objective of policy-makers from the very begin-
ning, but the tools and results varied over time (Tezel, 1994, pp. 135–9). During the
1920s, the policy menu was rather small due to restrictions on import policies and
limited state capacity. The 1923 Lausanne Treaty fixed tariff levels and prevented any
revisions until 1929 for Turkey’s main trade partners (Kurmuş, 1978). The average
tariff rate thus remained around 16 per cent until 1929, implying negligible import
protection. Policy-makers attempted to promote industry by trying to raise industrial
loans and promulgating the 1927 Law for the Encouragement of Industry. This
provided tax exemptions for domestic manufacturing enterprises (Tezel, 1994,
pp. 263–6). A modest increase in output was achieved during the 1920s, mostly as
a result of recovery from wartime disruptions (Karakoç, 2014).
In 1929 the government introduced a new tariff schedule. The average tariff
rate increased from 15 to 35 per cent within a year. However, since the new duties
were systematically biased in favour of final goods at the expense of raw materials
and intermediates, effective rates increased more than nominal ones (Tezel, 1994,
pp. 145–6). The tariff revision coincided with the advent of the Great Depres-
sion, which forced the government to take additional measures. Exchange con-
trols and import quotas were immediately introduced in response to rapidly
declining export revenues and deteriorating terms of trade. The main priority
was to maintain the trade balance, avoid currency depreciation, and maintain a
balanced budget. After 1933, clearing arrangements strengthened Germany’s
importance in Turkish trade.
From 1933, the government assumed a bigger industrial role, acting as entre-
preneur and investor in industries such as textiles, leather working, mining, and
sugar refining. State intervention reached such proportions that many scholars have
classified the 1930s as an exclusively ‘etatist’ period (Boratav, 2011; Tekeli and
Ilkin, 2009; Tezel, 1994). Large-scale state enterprises contributed to the rise of
modern factory output at the expense of traditional handicrafts during this period,
though it is hard to quantify the extent of this. However, the ‘etatist’ label is to a
certain extent misleading, as the share of the state sector in total industrial
employment did not exceed 10 per cent in 1938. Industrial growth was led
overwhelmingly by the private sector, which benefited from backward and forward
linkages with new large government enterprises (Pamuk, 2001).
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Inward-looking policies had a significant impact on the domestic market,
reducing imports, whose share in GDP fell from 12 to 8 per cent during the
1930s. The share of imports in the consumption of cotton fabrics fell from roughly
60 per cent in the 1920s to 20 per cent by the end of the 1930s. Furthermore, the
composition of imports moved away from final goods towards raw materials and
intermediate goods.
Textiles, food-related industrial output, and aggregate industrial output rose at
8.8, 7.9, and 7.9 per cent per annum, respectively, between 1925 and 1939
(Karakoç, 2014). However, since agricultural and services value added also rose,
industry’s share of GDP changed only slightly (Fig. 7.2). During the SecondWorld
War, manufacturing value added contracted by one-fourth, recovering to the 1939
level by the end of the 1940s. This wartime decline was the result of the large-scale
mobilization of labour and draft animals, the collapse of world trade, and a
downturn in domestic demand.
The industrial expansion of the 1930s was due to various factors. First, higher
nominal and effective tariffs, exchange controls, and quotas allowed local producers
to achieve boosted market share and prices in the domestic market. Second, the
domestic terms of trade moved in favour of industrial goods in the 1930s, lowering
the cost of raw materials in comparison with final goods prices. High tariffs






















Fig. 7.2. Share of manufacturing in GDP in Egypt and Turkey in current prices,
1870–2010 (per cent)
Sources: Egypt, 1913 and 1939–53: Hansen and Marzouk (1964), Hansen (1979); 1954–9: Issawi (1963);
1960–74: UN indicators; 1975–2010: World Bank indicators. Turkey: Pamuk (2014), Karakoç (2014).
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agricultural output in the second half of the 1930s boosted farm income and
manufacturing demand (Pamuk, 2001). On the supply side, firms enjoyed not
only relatively lower raw material prices, but also wages. Real wages increased
rapidly between 1929 and 1933 due to nominal wage rigidity and intense deflation,
but lagged behind manufactured goods prices after 1933. The share of wages in
total industrial output declined from 28 to 22 per cent during the 1930s (Boratav,
2011, p. 77).
Neither country used exchange rate policies to support manufacturing during
the inter-war period. Egypt did not have exchange rate policy autonomy until the
end of the Second World War. Turkish policy-makers avoided expansionary
monetary or exchange rate policy, largely due to memories of high inflation during
the First World War, and opted instead to adhere to an overvalued lira. Turkey’s
lack of exchange rate activism and strong protectionism is also consistent with
Eichengreen and Irwin’s (2010) argument that countries which avoided devalu-
ation in the 1930s opted for more protectionism.
Summing up, the inter-war era saw an acceleration of industrial production in
both countries but more so in Turkey. Both countries embarked on import
repression policies after 1929–30 but policy support for industrialization was
stronger, and protectionism more extreme, in Turkey, where tariff increases were
complemented by various non-tariff barriers. Manufacturing was helped in both
countries by low raw materials prices and real wages. An important difference was
that Egyptian agriculture suffered from a secular constraint due to its closed land
frontier, while an open land frontier made it possible for Turkey to increase
agricultural production despite persistently low commodity prices. In both coun-
tries textiles led the growth acceleration, but food processing also contributed to
overall growth in Turkey. Manufacturing output growth was around 2 per cent in
Egypt and as high as 8 per cent in Turkey during the inter-war period, placing
Turkey above and Egypt below the averages for Latin America and Asia during the
inter-war years (Chapter 2). Because Turkey’s population, economy, and manu-
facturing were hit much more powerfully during both world wars, however, overall
growth between 1914 and 1950 was similar in the two countries.
7.4 THE ERA OF IMPORT-SUBSTITUTING
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1950–80
The three decades after the Second World War saw rapid industrialization and
economic growth in most developing countries, where manufacturing growth was
faster than in the industrial core (Chapter 2). Global political and economic
developments, institutional arrangements such as the Bretton Woods system, and
local political developments, all contributed to the acceleration of industrialization.
In the Middle East, medium-sized and especially large countries such as Egypt and
Turkey experienced the most rapid industrial growth (Fig. 7.1).
There were important common elements in the post-1945 industrialization
experiences of Egypt and Turkey. In both countries governments pursued ISI
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strategies, promoting industrialization via strong protectionism, public sector
enterprises, and tax exemptions and subsidies for industrial firms. Government
policy and support focused on large-scale enterprises, although medium and even
small-scale firms continued to contribute to manufacturing output. Textiles, food
processing, and consumer durables accounted for a large share of manufacturing
output. Large-scale public sector enterprises played a major role in the production
of key intermediate goods such as steel, aluminium, and chemicals, while manu-
facturing technology was mostly imported. At the same time, however, the indus-
trialization experiences of Egypt and Turkey were also marked by significant
differences.
As the Second World War ended, Egypt remained overwhelmingly agrarian,
with industry accounting for only 10 per cent of GDP (Fig. 7.2). Policy was still
predominantly laissez-faire. The Free Officers’ coup in July 1952, led by Gamal
Abdel Nasser, ushered in a new regime that radically re-oriented Egypt’s institu-
tional settings towards Pan-Arabism and Arab socialism. The state’s role in the
economy increased sharply after the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956.
Economic policy became more radical and ties with the Soviet bloc were strength-
ened. Ownership of the main sectors of the economy was transferred to the state,
and foreign ownership was almost completely eliminated. The agrarian land reforms
of 1952 and 1963 led to massive land confiscations, a considerable redistribution of
wealth, and a drastic reduction in income inequality (El-Ghonemy, 2003,
Chapter 4). The regime spent large sums on welfare, including health and educa-
tion, and provided large numbers of public sector jobs (Owen and Pamuk, 1998,
p. 132). Nevertheless, advances in literacy rates and overall educational attainment
remained minimal (Hansen, 1991, pp. 228–9). In the 1970s average years of
schooling were lower in Egypt than in many sub-Saharan African and Southeast
Asian countries (Van Zanden et al., 2014).
Industrialization via import substitution represented another cornerstone of
economic policy. Tariffs on competing manufacturing imports were raised, while
those on raw materials and equipment were lowered. Rates of effective protection
rose sharply, exceeding 100 per cent in cotton textiles and some foodstuffs (Mabro
and Radwan, 1976, pp. 56–7; Hansen andMarzouk, 1964, pp. 191–8; Hansen and
Nashashibi, 1975). Unlike in East Asia (Chapter 8), there was no deliberate indus-
trial export promotion strategy, as the large domestic market was regarded as the
main outlet for the country’s industries (Hansen, 1991, p. 130). State control of
manufacturing deepened and was formalized in five-year plans. Industrial output
was dominated by basic consumer goods (textiles, shoes, food, beverages, and
cigarettes) and essential intermediate goods (building materials, fertilizers, chem-
icals, paper, petroleum products, and some metals). In the late 1960s more than
30 per cent of the industrial labour force was employed in the textiles sector. Cotton
yarn and fabrics represented 20 per cent of all merchandise export earnings, and
accounted for two-thirds of manufactured exports (Mabro and Radwan, 1976).
Manufacturing investment and output increased by more than 9 per cent per
annum until the early 1960s. Industry’s share in GDP rose from 13.4 per cent in
1952 to 21.7 per cent in 1963 (Fig. 7.2). However, warfare, and particularly the
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defeat in the Six Day War (1967), had far-reaching and negative implications for
the economy as a whole, including manufacturing (Owen and Pamuk, 1998,
p. 134). One strategy for industrial recovery was a limited relaxation of state
regulation and some encouragement for the private sector. This siyasat al-infitah
(open door) policy became the cornerstone of Anwar Sadat’s agenda, laying the
foundations for liberalization and openness. While Egypt’s industrial strategy
shifted towards the private sector, the state remained the central planner, major
employer, and resource allocator in industry, as government subsidies to manufac-
turing persisted (Djoufelkit-Cottenet, 2008).
After the infitah, Egypt’s economy enjoyed a period of growth, with GDP
growing bymore than 5 per cent per annum until 1980. Growth was predominantly
driven by the oil sector, which benefited from the return of the Sinai oil wells in
1979. Rising oil prices generated Dutch Disease dynamics, shifting resources from
agriculture and manufacturing, whose share in GDP declined steadily during the
1970s (Figs 7.1 and 7.2). Oil accounted for as much as 75 per cent of total exports,
while the share of manufactures fell from 35 per cent in 1972 to 11 per cent in
1980 (Fig. 7.3). The share of manufactured exports in GDP remained well below
5 per cent throughout this period.
Overall, while the post-SecondWorld War years saw industrial growth in Egypt,
TFP did not improve significantly. It declined between 1964 and 1973 due to
difficulties in importing spare parts and raw materials, in turn related to foreign
currency shortages. In the following decade, increasing oil revenues and foreign





















Fig. 7.3. Share of manufactures in total exports, 1870–2010 (per cent)
Sources: Egypt, 1919–54: Egypt, Annual Statement on Foreign Trade; 1954–73: Mabro and Radwan (1976);
1974–2010: World Bank indicators. Turkey: Pamuk (2014).
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human capital accumulation, reflected in low literacy and enrolment rates, and
reinforced by policies guaranteeing employment for graduates discharged from
military service (Hansen, 1991, pp. 160–1, 229–30).
After 1945, domestic and international forces brought about major political and
economic changes in Turkey as well. Domestically, many social groups had become
dissatisfied with the single-party regime during the Second World War. The
opposition demanded greater emphasis on private enterprise and the agricultural
sector, and a more open economy. The emergence of the United States as the
dominant world power after the war also shifted the balance towards a more open
political and economic system. As the country was increasingly drawn into the
American sphere of influence, the single-party regime abandoned its earlier
emphasis on state-led industrialization.
Large increases in agricultural output were achieved after the Democrat Party
came to power by winning the 1950 elections. However, the government tried to
maintain high agricultural prices and incomes by printing money and buying wheat
and other crops. The ensuing inflation and balance of payments crisis ended the
experiment of agriculture as the leading sector. One criticism frequently directed at
the Democrats was the absence of any coordination or long-term perspective in the
management of the economy. As a result, one of the first initiatives of the military
regime that toppled the Democrat Party in 1960 was to establish the State Planning
Organization (SPO).
The economic policies of the 1960s and 1970s aimed to protect the domestic
market and promote industrialization through import substitution, as in the 1930s.
The five-year plans were binding for the public sector but only indicative for the
private sector. In practice, however, the SPO played an important role in private
sector decisions as well, since its approval was required for all investment projects
that sought to benefit from subsidized credit, tax exemptions, or access to scarce
foreign exchange. The agricultural sector was mostly left outside the planning
process. Effective rates of protection remained very high in key sectors such as
textiles, consumer durables, and some intermediate goods, and quotas were
often set at low levels. Overvalued exchange rates served as another mechanism
for subsidizing domestic industry (Hansen, 1991, pp. 352–3; Barkey, 1990,
Chapter 4).
With the resumption of import substitution as the main strategy, family holding
companies, large conglomerates which included manufacturing and distribution
companies as well as banks and other services firms, emerged as the new leaders.
State enterprises were directed to invest in large-scale intermediate goods industries,
while private firms took advantage of the opportunities in the heavily protected and
more profitable consumer goods sectors. From food processing and textiles in the
1950s, the emphasis shifted increasingly to radios, refrigerators, television sets, cars,
and other consumer durables.
ISI policies were successful in accelerating the rate of economic growth, especially
early on. GDP per capita increased by more than 4 per cent per annum on average
during 1963–77. The rate of growth of manufacturing value added was considerably
higher, averagingmore than 10 per cent per annum.On the supply side, manufacturing
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growth depended overwhelmingly if not entirely on input growth. TFP growth
remained well below 1 per cent per annum (Altuğ, Filiztekin, and Pamuk, 2008).
Foreign direct investment in the ISI industries remained modest. Most new tech-
nology was obtained through patent and licensing agreements.
The large domestic market stimulated manufacturing output during this period.
Despite the apparent inequalities in income, large segments of the population could
buy consumer durables. Small and medium-sized agricultural producers were able
to share in the expansion of the domestic market thanks to the growth in agricul-
tural output and government price support programmes. In urban areas, real wages
almost doubled during this period (Fig. 7.4), due to market forces as well as
political and institutional changes. Most importantly, the rights obtained under
the 1961 Constitution supported labour unions at the bargaining table (Keyder,
1987, Chapter 7; Barkey, 1990, Chapter 5; Hansen, 1991, pp. 360–78).
An important development with implications for Turkey’s industrialization
during this period was the emigration of several million, mostly male workers to
Western Europe from 1961 until the 1973 recession. The remittances sent by these
workers amounted to more than half of total earnings from commodity exports and
kept the domestic market buoyant during the 1970s. They also began to create
Dutch Disease effects during the mid-1970s, making it more difficult for ISI to
proceed towards backward linkages. No study is available on the extent to which
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Fig. 7.4. Real wages in manufacturing in Egypt and Turkey, 1870–2007
Sources: Egypt, 1943–79 and 1987–2010: nominal wages (Mitchell, 1982) deflated by CPI (UN indicators);
1980–7: Radwan (2003). Turkey: Pamuk (2014).
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absolute and relative importance of remittances declined, as the savings behaviour
of workers began to change and Turkey’s export earnings increased.
The years from 1963 to 1977 thus represented for Turkey what Albert Hirschman
called the easy stage of ISI (Hirschman, 1966). By taking advantage of backward
linkages, manufacturing value added increased in both final and intermediate
goods, but not the technologically more difficult stage of capital goods. Both the
relatively low education of the labour force and the related reluctance of the private
sector to move into higher-technology sectors contributed to this outcome. The
average years of schooling of the population above age 15 edged up from 1.5 in
1950 to only 4.2 in 1980. Literacy rates increased from 33 to 68 per cent during
the same period. In both indicators, Turkey was well behind East Asia and Latin
America as well as Eastern Europe, but above South Asia and Africa (Van Zanden
et al., 2014). Moreover, manufacturing exports were also ignored until 1980,
largely because of the sizable domestic market, and this proved to be the Achilles
heel of Turkey’s ISI. Even though the share of manufacturing in total exports
reached 35 per cent in the 1970s, the low share of exports in GDP meant that the
share of manufacturing exports in GDP remained less than 2 per cent. Boosting
exports required a new government policy and institutional environment, but
protection strengthened vested interests in favour of the old policies. Moreover,
political conditions became increasingly unstable during the 1970s. As a result, no
attempt was made to adjust even after the oil shock of 1973. Coalition govern-
ments chose to borrow abroad under unfavourable terms, and encouraged the
private sector to do the same, leading to a major balance of payments crisis at the
end of the decade (Keyder, 1987, Chapter 8; Barkey, 1990, pp. 109–67).
The three decades after the Second World War thus saw rapid industrialization,
unprecedented economic growth, and rising living standards for broad segments of
the population in both Egypt and Turkey. Governments played a key role in
industrialization, through protectionism, public sector enterprises, and tax exemp-
tions and subsidies for private industrial firms. Industrialization also produced
problems similar to those experienced by many economies embracing ISI during
this period. Like in Latin America (Chapters 12 and 13), Middle Eastern industri-
alization was mostly oriented towards the domestic market, not exports. The large
domestic markets largely explain this, as does slow TFP growth. In short, exports
were uncompetitive; as a result, foreign exchange shortages were chronic.
Manufacturing and GDP growth were higher in Turkey than Egypt during these
three decades. Turkish growth was close to the Asian average, and above the Latin
American average, during this period, while Egypt’s manufacturing growth lay
below Asian rates, close to those for Latin America (Table 7.1 and Chapter 2).
A larger GDP, and thus domestic demand, led to a larger and more diverse
manufacturing sector in Turkey. Agriculture played different roles in the two
countries. While strong protectionism raised manufactured goods prices in both
countries, the single-party government in Egypt supported industry and low food
prices in the cities. In contrast, since agricultural producers made up more than half
of Turkey’s population and were an important voting bloc, agricultural prices were
supported through large scale, multi-crop programmes. These policies boosted
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agricultural demand for manufactures but also helped delay the shift towards
manufacturing exports.
Contrasting resource endowments in Egypt and Turkey also help explain differ-
ences in manufacturing performance. Rates of population growth were broadly
similar in the two countries during most of the twentieth century (Table 7.1).
However, Egyptian population–land ratios were much higher from the nineteenth
century, and the limits to cultivated land had been reached by 1914. As a result,
increases in agricultural production were much more difficult to achieve in Egypt,
which lost its food self-sufficiency and had to spend large amounts of foreign
exchange on imported cereals and other foodstuffs from the 1950s. On the other
hand, Turkey remained under-populated, with a large proportion of empty if less
productive land, whose limits were reached only in the 1960s. As a result, Turkish
agricultural income could grow much more rapidly and contribute more strongly to
domestic demand for manufactures. Turkey has remained self-sufficient in food
since the 1930s. The other important difference in resource endowments between
the two countries relates to oil. Large Egyptian oil revenues from the 1970s
alleviated foreign exchange shortages but also generated Dutch Disease dynamics.
In contrast, Turkish oil resources remained modest and only met a small fraction of
the growing domestic demand for hydrocarbons from the 1960s.
7.5 TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND EXPORTS, 1980–2010
Egypt’s policy shift towards a more open economy began with the rise of oil exports
in the 1970s. The economy began to expand thanks not only to oil exports and
high revenues from transit dues charged on Suez Canal traffic, but also to increasing
remittances and Arab aid. However, the symptoms of Dutch Disease were unmis-
takable: an overvalued currency, rising wages, high inflation, and negative real
interest rates. This promoted investments in housing, electricity, and transport,
rather than in industry and agriculture (Owen and Pamuk, 1998, p. 136). With the
drop in oil prices in the mid-1980s, the boom quickly came to an end, leading to a
long recession characterized by high levels of inflation and declining real wages at
the end of the decade (Fig. 7.4).
In response, the Mubarak regime agreed to launch a new round of economic
liberalization and structural adjustment in 1991 under the direction of the World
Bank, promoting privatization, deregulation, and greater market orientation. As a
consequence, the private sector’s contribution to the economy expanded consider-
ably. By 2001 the private sector accounted for 67 per cent of total investment,
compared to only 8 per cent in the 1980s and practically zero in the 1960s
(El-Ghonemy, 2003, Chapter 4). The economic reforms also radically changed the
structure of Egypt’s manufacturing. With state ownership declining due to privat-
ization, the private sector accounted for over 70 per cent of value added and over
60 per cent ofmanufacturing employment in 2003 (Djoufelkit-Cottenet, 2008, p. 8).
Trade liberalization boosted imports. Rates of protection dropped drastically; the
overall rate of effective protection fell from 51 to 32 per cent between 1994 and 1998
Ulaş Karakoç, Şevket Pamuk, and Laura Panza158
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/1/2017, SPi
(Cassing et al., 1998). In spinning andweaving, effective tariff rates dropped from788
per cent in 1986 to 48 per cent in 1997 and 10 per cent in 2004 (Galal and
El-Megharbel, 2005, pp. 19, 27). Non-tariff barriers were eliminated, as required
for Egypt’s admittance to theWTO.On the other hand, no effective policy was put in
place to promote exports or achieve export-led growth. The share of manufacturing in
the Egyptian economy remained much lower than inMiddle Eastern countries where
active industrialization policies were adopted, like Tunisia and Turkey.
The composition of manufacturing changed considerably during this period.
The share of textiles in value added fell from 30 per cent in the early 1970s to
15 per cent in 1990, while the share of petrochemicals jumped from 2 to 30 per
cent. This shift was mirrored by a similar change in the composition of manufac-
turing exports, with the agri-food sector’s share falling from 12 per cent in 1973 to
4 per cent in 1990 and 2 per cent in 2005 (Djoufelkit-Cottenet, 2008, p. 8).
Manufacturing exports remained well below 40 per cent of total exports, and were
around 2 per cent of GDP in the 1990s and 2000s (Fig. 7.3). Two decades after the
second round of liberalization, it is clear that manufacturing’s importance has been
shrinking and liberalization has not promoted its growth. Indeed, in 2010 manu-
facturing value added accounted for less than 15 per cent of GDP, compared with
over 20 per cent in the 1960s (Fig. 7.1). In 2010 only 11 per cent of Egyptians were
employed in manufacturing, a share only marginally higher than that at the
beginning of the twentieth century. Manufacturing investment dropped signifi-
cantly and TFP did not improve, in the absence of effective polices to foster
investments in education or innovation.
In Turkey, the severe economic crisis at the end of the 1970s made it impossible
to continue with inward-oriented industrialization policies. Against a background
of falling imports and output, commodity shortages, and strained relationships with
the IMF and international banks, the government announced a comprehensive and
unexpectedly radical stabilization and liberalization package in January 1980. The
military regime that came to power after a coup in September of the same year
endorsed and continued the new programme. The aims of the new policies were
threefold: to improve the balance of payments, to reduce the rate of inflation in the
short term, and to create a market-based, export-oriented economy in the longer
term. The package began with a major devaluation followed by liberalization of
the trade and payments regimes, elimination of price controls, substantial price
increases for the products of the state economic enterprises, elimination of many
government subsidies, freeing of interest rates, and subsidies and other support
measures for exports. Privatization of the state economic enterprises was delayed
until the 1990s and even later, as this proved to be a very contentious issue
politically. Reducing real wages and the incomes of agricultural producers was an
important part of the new policies. The parliamentary government of Demirel had
little success in dealing with labour unions due to strikes and other forms of labour
resistance, but the military regime prohibited union activity and brought about
sharp declines in labour incomes (Aricanli and Rodrik, 1990; Boratav, 2011).
Turkey’s total exports rose sharply, from a mere $2.3 billion or 2.6 per cent of
GNP in 1979 to $13 billion or 8.6 per cent of GNP in 1990, and to more than
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$150 billion or more than 15 per cent of GDP in 2010. Equally dramatic was the
rising share of manufactures in total exports, from about 35 per cent in 1979 to
more than 95 per cent in 2010. Exports were encouraged by a more realistic and
managed exchange rate and direct subsidies in the early 1980s, though the subsidies
were soon abandoned. Another important factor in the long-term expansion of
Turkey’s manufacturing exports was the signing of the customs union agreement
with the European Union in 1995, ensuring access to the large EU market.
Turkey’s most important exports included textiles, along with clothing in the
early period, and iron and steel products and cars in later years (Yilmaz, 2011).
The EU’s share in Turkey’s exports remained around 50 per cent from the 1960s
until the crisis of 2008.
The expansion of exports was accompanied by the rise of new industrial centres
across Anatolia. The industrial enterprises in these emerging centres were mostly
small to medium-sized family firms with limited capital, employing few profes-
sional managers. They began production in low-technology and labour-intensive
industries: textiles and clothing, food processing, metal industries, wood products,
furniture, and chemicals. Labour productivity in manufacturing in these new
districts remained below the level in more established industrial areas such as the
Istanbul region; the rise of these centres was closely connected to their low wages
(Filiztekin and Tunali, 1999; Yilmaz, 2011). Manufacturing wages in Turkey rose
between 1980 and 2010, but by less than per capita incomes in the urban sector
and the economy as a whole.
Beginning in the late 1990s, the growth of Turkish manufacturing based on
market- and export-oriented policies began to stall. While exports continued rising
and GDP per capita rose by more than 30 per cent, manufacturing’s share of GDP
declined from 24 per cent in 1998 to less than 16 per cent in 2010. The movement
of relative prices against Turkish manufactures contributed to this trend. The
decline in manufacturing’s share of total employment must have been equally
strong, although official statistics do not provide a sufficiently accurate picture.
This appears to be an example of the premature de-industrialization observed in
many developing countries in recent decades (Rodrik, 2015).
One problem for Turkish manufacturing is that it continues to produce mostly
standard goods, attempting to take advantage of low wages and costs. The techno-
logical sophistication of Turkey’s manufacturing output and exports remains low.
As a result, firms have been increasingly forced to compete with Chinese and
Southeast Asian manufacturers enjoying even lower wages. One cause of this
problem is that manufacturing companies have been reluctant to invest in product
development and innovation ever since the 1960s. This is at least partly related to
the shortcomings of the education system, which has not delivered a labour force
with the skills necessary for a more diversified and technologically more advanced
industrial sector. Turkey still lags behind East Asia and Latin America, if not South
Asia and Africa, in basic measures of education such as average years of schooling
(Van Zanden et al., 2014). In addition, government policy for the support of
manufacturing industry has been very weak, if not non-existent (Taymaz and
Voyvoda, 2012).
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Trade liberalization, privatization, greater reliance on markets, and exports of
manufactures were the basic goals in both Egypt and Turkey during theWashington
Consensus era. Manufacturing growth in the two countries was broadly similar
during this period, close to that in Asia excluding Japan and above that of Latin
America (Table 7.1 and Chapter 2). At the same time, however, the manufacturing
and GDP per capita records of the two countries diverged considerably during these
three decades. One striking example of the growing contrast is the ratio of manu-
factured exports to GDP, which averaged below 5 per cent in Egypt but was slightly
above 15 per cent in Turkey during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Oil
exports and Dutch Disease effects were not the only reason for the slower growth
of manufacturing and manufacturing exports in Egypt. A weak private sector, a
poor institutional environment, and low investment in schooling also played
important roles. In Turkey, manufacturing industry was supported by a stronger
private sector, a stronger manufacturing base from the ISI era, and easier access to
EU markets after 1980.
7.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the industrialization experiences of two large countries
in the Middle East from 1870 to 2010. Trade and industrialization policies in
Egypt and Turkey were strongly influenced by global forces and were broadly
similar in each of the four periods studied here. Since neither country had tariff
autonomy during the nineteenth century, industrialization remained limited before
the First World War. It was only after gaining tariff autonomy in 1929 (Turkey)
and 1930 (Egypt) that they could adopt protectionist policies and increase manu-
facturing output. The degree of protectionism, and consequently of industrializa-
tion, was stronger in Turkey during the 1930s. Manufacturing output in both
countries was further behind that of the early core industrializers in 1950 than it
had been in 1870 or 1914.
Manufacturing in Turkey and to a lesser extent Egypt grew faster than in the core
countries between 1950 and 1980, a period of unprecedented economic growth
and rising living standards in both countries. Governments played a key role in
industrialization, via protectionism, tax exemptions, and subsidies. Public sector
enterprises played a major role in industrialization in Turkey from the 1930s and in
Egypt after the Second World War. Government policy attempted to transfer
resources from agriculture to support manufacturing in Egypt during this period,
but less so in Turkey. Protectionism and various other government policies tended
to shift the domestic terms of trade in favour of manufacturing. However, indus-
trialization continued to be oriented mostly towards the domestic market in both
countries and exports remained weak. Moreover, increases in output were achieved
primarily by increasing inputs, with TFP growth being limited.
Manufacturing growth slowed in both countries after 1980, as they moved in
the direction of trade liberalization, privatization, and manufactured exports. The
divergence between the two countries’ manufacturing performances also became
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more pronounced, although manufacturing growth has been similar in recent years.
In Egypt, oil created Dutch Disease effects, diverting resources away from manu-
facturing. On the other hand, more export-oriented policies and freer access to EU
markets helped Turkey expand its manufacturing exports after 1980. The two
countries’ growth rates also differed. Between 1950 and 2010 Turkey’s GDP and
GDP per capita increased at annual rates of above 5 and 3 per cent respectively,
about 1 per cent per annum faster than in Egypt. Faster economic growth led to
faster growth in domestic demand for manufactures; manufacturing industry both
contributed to and was supported by more rapid economic growth in Turkey.
A number of factors can explain the industrial performance of these countries as
well as the differences between them. Since economic policies in the two countries
were broadly similar, they are not the key to understanding the differences. Initial
differences in resource endowments, namely the relative scarcity of land in Egypt
and the abundance of land in Turkey, contributed to the differences in industri-
alization outcomes from the end of the First World War until the 1980s, when the
divergence between the two countries was strongest.
Turkey and Egypt lagged behind countries with similar levels of GDP per capita
in Latin America and East Asia when it came to education and human capital,
making it harder for manufacturing in both countries to transition towards higher-
technology, higher-value-added goods and sectors requiring higher skills. Low
investment in human capital also helps explain, at least in part, why the two
countries have not had much success in improving TFP.
Finally, an important explanation for the long-term trajectory of industrializa-
tion as well as the low rates of TFP growth in both countries lies in the nature of
government interventionism and the quality of related institutions. Intervention-
ism spurred economic growth and development in many late industrializers,
notably East Asia after the Second World War, by protecting infant industries
and more generally by supporting the private sector. While government interven-
tionism also played an important role in raising manufacturing growth in Egypt
and Turkey during the ISI era, its content, goals, and implementation varied greatly
over time. The military played an important role in the economy in both countries,
especially Egypt, establishing close links with both the state apparatus and private
enterprises. Perhaps most importantly, rather than being based on well-defined
rules, government support for manufacturing industry or a specific sector often
became support for individuals and firms close to the government. As a result, rent
seeking, rather than productivity improvements or competing in international
markets, often became the preferred strategy for the private sector. Individuals
and firms preferred using their resources to stay close to and seek favours from the
government, rather than invest in education, skills, and technology to improve
competitiveness in domestic and international markets.
The impact of government interventionism on the private sector differed in the
two countries. In Egypt, government policy reduced the size of the private sector
via nationalizations and other means after the Second World War, so that the
private sector was slow to become an important player in manufacturing, and more
generally in the urban economy, after 1980. Private firms preferred investing in the
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oil or service sectors instead. In contrast, while the private sector was quite weak in
Turkey at the end of the Second World War, its economic and political strength
has risen steadily since then. A more solid manufacturing base inherited from the
ISI era played a key role in Turkey’s stronger export performance after 1980. Yet
the private sector remains dependent on government favours in Turkey as well.
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East Asian Industrial Pioneers
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
Dwight H. Perkins and John P. Tang
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Many scholars have attempted to fit the East Asian industrialization experience into
what is often called the ‘flying geese pattern’ of development. Japan in this view was
the leader and innovator and the other economies of East Asia followed the leader.
When this model was applied to all of East and Southeast Asia, however, it fitted
poorly. Hong Kong and Singapore followed a much more laissez-faire approach,
and while many Southeast Asian economies at times attempted an approach similar
to that of Japan, the results were often failures. Korea and Taiwan, however, were
colonies of Japan (from 1910 to 1945 and 1895 to 1945 respectively) and there is
no doubt that their post-1960 industrial development policies and the nature of the
associated supporting institutions were influenced by the Japanese experience,
probably more so in Korea than Taiwan. Korea’s post-independence leadership,
for the most part, grew up under Japanese rule, while Taiwan’s political leadership
after 1945 came from the Chinese mainland.1
When Japan initiated its industrialization drive, however, it faced a different
context from that facing Korea and Taiwan a half-century or more later. Japan was
a true pioneer in that it was the first non-European/North American economy to
achieve sustained industrialization and modern economic growth. In a broader
sense, of course, Japan was a follower country that learned from the first pioneers of
industrialization, notably England. The context Japan faced in the latter decades of
the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth, however, was very
different from the context that faced England and the United States, although it
had more in common with Germany.2
When Japan began to modernize its economy, it faced a world dominated by
British free trade views and practices. Japan was forced to accept those views in the
treaty that opened up the economy—mercantilist policies pushing exports and
tightly restricting imports were impossible until much later. Japan’s economy was
1 These issues are the discussed at length in Perkins (2013).
2 For a comparison of the German and Japanese development experiences, see Landes (1965).
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influenced by the First World War, which cut off Asia from most trade with
Europe. There followed a decade of comparative prosperity in much of the
industrialized world, which then turned into the Great Depression of the 1930s
and the Second World War. Facing a similar world situation after 1914, many
economies in South America began an industrialization drive based heavily on
import substitution behind high trade barriers. Japan followed a very different
path, one that before 1914 took advantage of the world’s open trading system,
followed then by the trade protection provided by the First World War, but done
without recourse to high tariffs and other trade restrictions. Japan changed course
during the trade wars of the 1930s and this change was further reinforced by
the country’s decision to become a major colonial power in Asia with the help of the
Japanese military.
The international context in which Korea and Taiwan began their industrial
drive was different from that facing Japan earlier, in a number of ways. To begin
with, a quarter-century had passed from the time when Japanese industrial
development was governed by and then destroyed by war. During that time
there had been steady industrial expansion and technological innovation, particu-
larly in North America. The backlog of untapped technology available to newly
industrialized nations was thus substantially larger than it was in the mid-1930s.
Japan itself took advantage of this backlog and it is likely that it accounts for a
significant part of the rapid growth spurt that Japan experienced between recovery
from the Second World War, usually dated as 1953, and its slowdown to more
normal high-income country growth rates in 1973. The backlog of technology
available to Korea and Taiwan had accumulated not just for twenty-five years, but
for more than half a century, and this was a major reason why industrialization in
those two economies, once it started, proceeded at double-digit growth rates for
three decades.
Korean and Taiwan’s industrialization, unlike the earlier Japanese one, did not
face a Great Depression and they could export into the wide-open economy of the
United States during their first growth spurt. Also unlike Japan, they were not
subject to a treaty prohibiting them from raising protective barriers for their
domestic markets. Mercantilist policies promoting exports and limiting imports
were possible in Korea and Taiwan in ways that they had not been in Japan before
the Great Depression, because of Japan’s treaty obligations on tariffs until 1899 and
the implicit rules of the inter-war world economy thereafter. Nor did Korea
and Taiwan face anything remotely comparable to the trade wars and build-up to
all-out war in Europe and Asia that characterized the 1930s. South Korea and
Taiwan, however, controlled territories that were determined by the outcomes of
post-1945 civil wars, civil wars that to this day have not been formally ended.
Industrialization policies in both economies were as a result heavily influenced by
the possibility that economic failure could lead to their being swallowed up by the
opposing sides in their civil wars.
In what follows we begin with a discussion of the Japanese industrialization
experience before the Second World War. This is followed by an analysis of the
industrialization of Korea and Taiwan after the Second World War.
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8.2 JAPAN
Unique among emerging peripheral countries in the twentieth century, Japan began
its industrial development in the late 1800s and successfully maintained the
momentum over the following decades to become fully industrialized in the first
half of the next century.3 This transition is especially remarkable given the country’s
starting point: politically fragmented; agrarian; reliant on handicrafts and traditional
techniques for manufacturing; and relatively isolated from international markets. By
the early 1900s, however, the country had an integrated domestic market connected
by railroads; was a leading exporter of textiles and light manufactures; and had
burgeoning modern sectors in metal processing, machinery, and chemicals. Institu-
tional and political change was also vigorous over this period, with the country
adopting foreign practices like central banking, commercial and civil codes, the gold
standard, and an overseas empire following wars with China and Russia.
While the contours of Japan’s transition from a traditional to an industrial
economy have been studied in great detail, identifying turning points in the process
remains an active subject of scholarship.4 Moreover, there is revived interest in the
factors contributing to the country’s successful industrial performance and their
relative importance.5 This chapter adds to the literature by providing an overview
of Japan’s pre-war economy, but focusing on the changes to its industrial structure
and other features coinciding with the country’s development.
8.2.1 Early Modern Period and Historical Background
The historical context of modern Japanese economic growth is well known.
Following the opening of the country in the mid-1800s, the Tokugawa and
Meiji governments rapidly adopted foreign technologies for national defence and
to ‘catch up’ on leading industrial nations like the United Kingdom and United
States.6 Political centralization via institutional reform, infrastructure investment,
and military conscription by the Tokyo-based Meiji government contrasted with
the semi-autonomy exercised by domains in the Tokugawa period, facilitating the
spread of literacy, legal institutions, and finance.7 Universal primary education,
3 Pre-conditions for modern industrial growth preceded the Meiji period, dating back to the
Tokugawa era (1603–1868). These included a well-developed internal market for commodities and
finance and significant human capital in terms of education and literacy; see Crawcour (1974; 1997a)
and Lockwood (1954).
4 E.g. Lockwood (1954), Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973), and Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979).
Historical data collections include the Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan since 1868
and those produced by the Japanese Statistical Association (2007).
5 Rousseau (1999), Morck and Nakamura (2007), Mitchener and Ohnuki (2009), and Tang
(2011, 2013).
6 The regime change from the Tokugawa (1603–1868) to Meiji periods and its underlying causes
are discussed in Lockwood (1954), Gordon (2009), and Crawcour (1997a). Much of the following
discussion is based on these sources.
7 The current division of the country into 47 prefectures began from 1871, when nearly 300
hereditary domains were consolidated and assigned governors (initially, many of the former lords)
chosen by the Meiji government, through 1888.
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funded by local authorities, was announced in 1872 and made compulsory in 1890,
and institutes were established to disseminate agricultural and technical best
practices.8 The 1873 tax and land reform, which also discontinued samurai
stipends in lieu of government bonds, provided a more reliable public revenue
stream to finance the modernization programme as well as model enterprises in
engineering, arsenals, shipbuilding, and textile production.9 However, only after
the Matsukata deflation in the early 1880s did public finances stabilize, which
followed a period of currency debasement and experimentation with a national
banking system.10 Major policies pursued by successive administrations included
promulgating a constitution with limited suffrage; colonization of Taiwan and
Korea; and renegotiating treaties with Western nations on extra-territoriality and
tariff autonomy.
Straitened finances in the late 1870s resulting from trade deficits, modernization
costs, and civil unrest suppression forced the government to privatize many of its
model enterprises, providing a fillip to the private sector. Entrepreneurs like
Shibusawa Eiichi and the zaibatsu conglomerates of Mitsui and Mitsubishi led
the expansion of industry and technology, while many ex-samurai used their
commutation bonds to invest in the nascent banking sector.11 These banks and
other intermediaries in turn provided local sources of financing for modern enter-
prises.12 Private business also benefited from public investment in infrastructure
and industries, with the government’s share of capital investment averaging 30 to
40 per cent of the national total between the late 1890s and the First WorldWar, at
which point the country had emerged as an industrial economy.13
8.2.2 Timing of Japan’s Industrialization
To date the onset of Japanese industrialization, scholars have used various metrics
including growth rates for national output, industrial value added, and capital
formation.14 Based on these measures, Japan entered its ‘modern economic growth’
period in the early 1880s, the 1890s, or the early 1900s, respectively.15 All these
series have strengths and weaknesses, but share the objective of timing significant
shifts in Japan’s economic performance. National and per capita output by them-
selves abstract away from the composition of production, while industrial value
8 Taira (1997), pp. 273–4, and Crawcour (1997b), p. 67. Pre-Meiji literacy rates were unusually
high, approximately 40 and 10 per cent for males and females, respectively, and are implicated in the
country’s economic growth.
9 Crawcour (1997a), pp. 43–4, and Onji and Tang (2015). Japan also accessed international
capital markets, with its first bond offering of £1 million in 1870 used to finance the first railway and
other public outlays.
10 Ibid., pp. 46–7.
11 Morikawa (1992), Odagiri and Goto (1996), Tang (2011), Yamamura (1997).
12 Tang (2013). 13 Crawcour (1997b), p. 52.
14 Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979), Bénétrix et al. (2015), and Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973),
respectively. These studies relate to the economic convergence literature, such as Barro (1997) and
Rodrik (2013).
15 Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979), p. 12; Bénétrix et al. (2015), Table 3; Ohkawa and Rosovsky
(1973), p. 31.
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added and capital formation growth rates are both relative measures that do not
adjust for developing countries’ varying initial stocks of industrial output and
investment, especially when compared with leading economies that made their
transition in an earlier, but more developmentally similar, period of time.
An alternative approach, useful for marking the country’s full-fledged arrival to
industrialized status as opposed to its take-off, would be to compare industry’s
share of output in Japan and in leading economies at a time when the latter would
be recognized as being industrialized.16 For example, using the United States
as reference, its average share of manufacturing and construction output in
total output between 1895 and 1914 was 11.8 per cent. Japan reached a similar
stage of industrial performance in 1897. Similarly, Japan’s share of machinery
and transport equipment in total manufacturing exceeded 5 per cent in 1907,
which was the average for the United States in the pre-First World War
period (Fig. 8.1).17
This focus on the decade spanning 1897–1907 coincides with existing studies
and highlights a familiar pattern of industrial development. Heavy industries like
machinery manufacturing in Japan followed the same trajectory as the United
States, with the two countries shifting toward more capital and resource intensive
sectors over the sixty years leading up to the 1930s. In the case of the United States,
the shift was from processed food products and textiles to lumber products and
wood furniture, with a dramatic increase in the machinery output share in the early
1910s coinciding with the First World War. Similarly, Japanese food processing
declined relative to higher-value products like silk and cotton textiles. At the same
time, stone and mineral processing and chemical manufacturing grew steadily, with
the former and machinery accelerating in trend starting in the early 1900s.18
While Japan remained far behind the United States in terms of the absolute and
relative output of heavy sectors through the pre-Second World War period, its
industrial structure increasingly resembled those of leading countries rather than
those of peripheral ones. This is true not only in terms of the share of output among
industrial sectors, but also in terms of the relative speed with which they grew to
economic importance. In particular, technological diffusion in manufacturing was
faster in Japan than the United States in the late nineteenth century, which is
striking given the former’s much lower initial per capita output.19 To explain these
16 Bénétrix et al. (2015) identify 1899 as the year when Japan joined the ‘modern growth club’,
based on having ten years of average industrial growth exceeding 5 per cent.
17 For Japan, manufacturing comprises ten sub-sectors: food products; textiles; lumber and wood
products; chemicals; stone, clay, and glass products; iron and steel; non-ferrous metals; machinery;
printing and publishing; and other manufacturing (Shinohara, 1972). For the United States,
manufacturing and construction materials include 44 categories, which are then mapped into the
broader industry classification equivalent for Japan (Wattenberg, 1976).
18 See also Crawcour (1997b), pp. 51–2. The three sub-sectors of stone, clay, and glass products;
iron and steel; and non-ferrous metals are grouped together in the Japanese data as they individually
overlap with their more detailed American equivalents, which are also aggregated to the higher level of
classification.
19 Tang (2015).
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dynamics, the remainder of this section presents evidence regarding the contribu-
tions of trade, investment, and shocks to both the domestic and global economies.
8.2.3 The Impact of Trade
Although not colonized, Japan was subjected to numerous predations on its
sovereignty, especially in its economic relations.20 Besides extra-territorial privileges
for foreigners residing in its eight treaty ports, Japan relinquished tariff autonomy,
opening its domestic market to foreign manufactures and reducing potential
revenues from its exports.21 Import tariffs averaged 3.75 per cent between 1868

















































Fig. 8.1. United States and Japanese industry shares, 1885–1914
Sources: Wattenberg (1976), series F3 and P318-374 in constant 1913 dollars; Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto
(1974), Table 25, and Shinohara (1972), Table 2, in constant 1934–6 yen. All series reported as five-year moving
averages.
20 Gordon (2009), p. 51.
21 Tariffs were set at a maximum of 5 per cent ad valorem until 1899, when Japan began to
successfully renegotiate its treaties; full autonomy was not negotiated until 1911, before which Japan
could set a maximum of tariff of 15 per cent (ibid., p. 117).
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of 7.65 per cent up until the eve of the First World War.22 Low barriers meant that
trade grew rapidly over the Meiji period, averaging a quarter of national output in
the early 1900s and increasing thereafter.
Given its undeveloped manufacturing sectors, Japan initially ran persistent trade
deficits as foreign firms gained market share, especially in capital equipment.23 This
changed, however, as the economy shifted towards higher-value-added goods,
which was reflected in the composition of Japanese trade. As shown in Table 8.1,
starting from the Meiji period and up until the Second World War there was a
marked decline in processed food products exports, while textiles grew to become
the top foreign exchange earner for virtually the entire half-century. Machinery
exports also increased, albeit more modestly. The pattern for imports is more
ambiguous: textiles were steadily replaced by food products in the last two decades
before the turn of the century, and then by stone and mineral products as well
as miscellaneous commodities afterward.24 This suggests that while domestic
industries were producing more valuable goods for export at the inter-sectoral
level, demand within the economy shifted from household consumption toward
intermediate products used by firms. However, given the growth of Japanese
Table 8.1. Disaggregated trade shares by manufacturing sector, 1880–1930
Exports 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
Food products 39.0 27.5 14.3 12.8 10.9 9.1
Textiles 44.8 44.4 52.4 55.1 57.1 70.4
Chemicals 3.1 4.7 5.4 4.4 4.5 2.2
Stone and mineral products 6.4 14.0 15.0 12.7 10.7 5.3
Machinery 0.9 0.9 0.8 2.1 6.0 2.8
Printing and publishing 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.6 1.6
Other manufacturing 5.5 7.8 11.3 11.7 9.2 8.7
Imports 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
Food products 18.2 25.8 27.4 20.0 11.8 19.8
Textiles 57.1 44.3 40.2 39.0 40.6 36.4
Chemicals 4.8 5.0 5.1 7.2 7.2 7.6
Stone and mineral products 7.3 5.9 7.6 11.5 21.3 13.3
Machinery 5.6 12.7 12.9 10.7 6.9 8.4
Printing and publishing 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.3 1.4 1.5
Other manufacturing 5.8 5.1 5.3 9.3 10.8 13.1
Source: Japan Statistical Association (1987), Table 10-2-a in current yen. All series reported as five-year moving
averages.
22 Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1979), Table 22. Exchange rates did not play a significant role in the
period between 1897 and 1914 as Japan was on the gold standard.
23 Japan’s low-tariff, high-growth experience in the pre-war era contrasts with that of most other
countries; see Clemens and Williamson (2004).
24 Note that the food products category for trade does not directly correspond with that for industry
output, in that the former also includes unprocessed food items like grains and livestock.
175East Asian Industrial Pioneers: Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/1/2017, SPi
machinery and its relatively constant import share over this period, the country was
moderately successful in substituting away from foreign capital goods.
This movement into capital-intensive, higher-value-added production is illus-
trated by the two major sectors of textiles and metal processing. Since trade data are
available at a more detailed level than those reported for industrial output, one can
examine shifts in domestic demand and supply of traded goods to infer broader
structural change among industries and the national economy. For instance,
Table 8.2 shows trends for the three categories of textiles, which indicate that
exports moved away from yarn and thread toward finished cloth between the
1870s and the Second World War. The change in shares was particularly rapid
in the two decades prior to 1900, coinciding with the period when Japan’s share of
manufacturing in output matched that of the United States. After 1900, the third
category of clothing and accessories began to grow, although the overall contribu-
tion remained in the single digits for most of the pre-war period.
For the heavier industries of metal goods and processing, the three categories of
metal ores, metalworking, and machinery show a similar pattern of increasing value
added over time. As Table 8.2 shows, the export share for machinery rose gradually
in the 1880s before a rapid increase in the late 1910s, mirroring large decreases in
ore exports in the same years. Import trends are less clear, with metal ores having
high shares in the 1870s, then falling in the next two decades before rising
thereafter. In contrast, machinery imports were highest in the 1880s and 1890s
before declining until the 1920s. The First World War boosted domestic machin-
ery exports, but this was a continuation of a rising trend during the previous decade.
The war’s impact on imported metal manufactures is also apparent, but much
shorter lived.
Table 8.2. Disaggregated trade shares in textiles and metal goods, 1880–1930
Textiles 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
Yarn and thread Exports 99.4 89.1 73.2 69.1 57.2 54.2
Fabric 0.4 10.3 25.3 26.3 34.4 39.7
Clothing 0.1 0.6 1.4 4.6 8.3 6.1
Yarn and thread Imports 35.3 53.5 68.3 77.9 95.7 94.6
Fabric 63.2 43.4 30.6 21.0 4.1 5.0
Clothing 1.4 3.2 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.3
Metal goods 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
Ores Exports 76.2 86.1 86.2 75.3 47.4 25.3
Metalwork 23.8 12.4 9.8 10.5 19.7 31.2
Machinery 0.0 1.5 4.0 14.3 32.9 43.6
Ores Imports 52.4 28.4 34.6 47.3 72.9 54.7
Metalwork 8.4 27.9 19.1 14.8 7.2 5.7
Machinery 39.2 43.7 46.2 37.9 20.0 39.6
Source: Japan Statistical Association (1987), Table 10-2-a in current yen. All series reported as five-year moving
averages.
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Taken together, while capital- and energy-intensive sectors like machinery were
important for Japan’s sustained development into a mature industrial economy,
the country relied on exports of its lighter manufactures to industrialize within the
global economy. Furthermore, the decomposition of textiles and metal goods trade
indicates that Japan moved away from import-substitution manufacturing to
internationally competitive exports around the turn of the century. For textiles,
the value of raw material imports exceeded that of finished cloth and clothing in the
late 1890s, while for metal goods the change occurred in the 1910s. As discussed
later in the chapter, both import and export shares by trade partner region also
remained largely constant during this period, indicating the country’s competitive
success in these markets.
8.2.4 Domestic Factors
Shifts in industrial and trade composition are consistent with domestic trends in
capital investment, firm size, and labour. Japanese firms grew in capitalization and
workers, particularly in manufacturing. In terms of overall capital shares, there
appear to be three distinct phases: before 1900, there was major investment in the
transport and manufacturing sectors, led by railroads and textiles; high growth in
commercial services like banking and trade in the early 1900s; and a resurgence of
manufacturing after 1910, led by heavier industries like metal processing and
machinery.25 Average firm size also indicates the concentration of capital in the
transport and mining sectors, while both manufacturing and commerce grew in
firm numbers and capitalization.
The distribution of the labour force also changed during this period, with the
share engaged in agriculture steadily decreasing between 1880 and 1920 in favour
of manufacturing.26 A comparison with the increase in manufacturing output
indicates rising labour productivity in industrial sectors, maybe due to the greater
availability of capital, which started from a low base and remained below levels in
more advanced economies.27 Lower Japanese industrial productivity, however, was
mitigated by lower pay, with a large wage differential between male and female
workers, and labour repression in the form of legislation curtailing unionization
and strikes.28
8.2.5 Changing World Conditions
Shifts in Japanese industrial structure may have been partly due to conditions
outside the control of domestic policy-makers. While Japan’s involvement in the
global economy and relatively free trade were externally imposed, exports (and to a
lesser extent, capital inflows) helped finance its modernization programme and
25 See Rousseau (1997) and Tang (2013; 2014). Data for capital investment and firms by major
industry are from Japan Statistical Association (1987), Tables 10-5-a and 10-5-b.
26 Data for industry labour shares from Umemura et al. (1988), Tables 5, 10, 12, 13, and 18.
27 Gordon (2009), p. 97. 28 Ibid., p. 99.
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build the capacity to produce more sophisticated goods.29 The unexpected victories
in the Sino- and Russo-Japanese wars boosted domestic investment in related
sectors and increased access to nearby markets.30 Reparations paid by China in
the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki enabled Japan to finance its adoption of the gold
standard, while the integration of Taiwan, Korea, and parts of northern China
provided primary products to supply its heavy industries and feed the population.31
Similarly, the First World War was fortuitous for the Japanese economy in
leaving the country physically unscarred while providing opportunities for its
manufacturers and traders. European withdrawal from East Asian operations
during the war meant Japan could readily substitute for shipping services and
exports to the region, including India, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.32 Shown in
Table 8.3, Japanese exports to its colonies and the rest of Asia rose quickly in the
1910s, eclipsing those to industrial markets in Europe and North America shortly
after. Japanese imports also shifted toward the Asia-Pacific as its economy took in
Table 8.3. Export and import shares by region, 1880–1940
Export shares 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
Korea 1.6 3.5 5.6 5.6 12.2 21.5
Taiwan 2.5 4.9 4.0 5.5 7.3
Northern China 3.3 5.1 4.4 19.4
Rest of Asiaa 24.6 22.8 37.9 31.5 37.0 31.8 22.8
Europe, North America 74.5 73.1 54.0 51.9 42.8 41.0 19.8
Rest of the world 0.9 2.4 2.1 2.7 5.4 5.4 9.2
Import shares 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
Korea 2.9 2.8 2.5 6.7 11.9 15.6
Taiwan 1.2 6.3 6.7 8.2 10.3
Northern China 2.1 6.0 5.6 8.6
Rest of Asiaa 22.3 31.5 37.8 35.9 34.3 27.2 20.3
Europe, North America 77.6 65.3 57.6 51.8 39.5 40.6 35.5
Rest of the world 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.3 6.7 6.6 9.8
a Rest of Asia includes China, Hong Kong, Asiatic Russia, Southeast Asia, and other parts of Asia; Korea, Taiwan,
and northern China (Kwantung and Manchuria) separately reported over time.
Source: Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1979), Tables 13 and 14 in current yen. All series reported in five-year moving
averages.
29 Import tariffs comprised a minor share of government revenues: less than 2.3 per cent before
Japan regained tariff autonomy in 1899, and less than 6 per cent from then until the war with China in
1937; see Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1979), Table 22.
30 The 1872 Treaty of Kanghwa gave Japan access to three Korean treaty ports, which allowed for a
significant expansion of bilateral trade (Gordon, 2009, p. 113). Korea was later annexed in 1910, while
Taiwan was colonized in 1895 following the war with China.
31 Matsukata (1899). Japan dominated Korean and Taiwanese trade, with about 90 per cent of
Korean exports going to Japan in the 1870s and remaining high thereafter; Taiwanese exports grew
from under 30 per cent in 1900 to 80 per cent in 1910, and exceeded 90 per cent for most of the 1930s
(Gordon, 2009; Odaka et al., 2008, Table 9.1).
32 Lockwood (1954), p. 38.
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greater quantities of raw materials, continuing the trend from the turn of the
century. As a share of total output, manufacturing nearly trebled over the 1910s,
exceeding even American growth rates. The resumption of international peace
tempered export growth, with its share of national output not returning to the
pre-First World War high until after the Second World War. Higher machinery
exports, however, continued and demand for imported metal ores resumed after a
downturn in the 1920s.
Unlike industrialized economies in the inter-war period, Japan’s experience of the
1920s and 1930s was neither roaring nor depressed. In March 1920, the Japanese
stock market fell sharply due to investor uncertainty about post-First World War
growth and was immediately followed in April by a series of bank runs.33 The rest of
the decade was punctuated by the 1923 Kanto earthquake, which killed an esti-
mated 100,000 to 140,000 people in the greater Tokyo region and destroyed large
numbers of industrial facilities and residences; and a financial panic in 1927
stemming from a reconstruction boom, bad loans, and bank failures. Compounding
the problems was government interest in re-adopting the gold standard (abandoned
in 1916), which led to fiscal austerity and tighter monetary policies.34
Recovery began in the early 1930s, in part due to the dramatic expansion of
exports and industrial production in the first half of the decade. While Japan’s
military aggression in China was the most obvious feature of this period, the
economy also experienced significant changes, starting with the depreciation of
the yen in 1932 to 42 per cent of its value in the previous year.35 This depreciation
came months after the government reinstated an embargo on gold exports, pro-
moting import substitution and industrial rationalization, and was followed by
looser monetary policy and higher military and public works spending. While the
value of trade doubled between 1932 and 1936, the volume of exports increased
sixfold compared to imports, though the overall trade balance remained in slight
deficit over these years. Exacerbating the deficit were the shift in textiles from silk to
cotton goods, since the latter required raw materials imported from abroad; the
need for metal ores and fuel for heavy industries; and the rise in protectionism
against Japanese products.36 Nevertheless, the patterns of economic restructuring
and composition of trade persisted, in that textiles remained important but were
steadily replaced by higher-value-added metal products and machinery. Hostilities
with China and later the United States meant that capital-intensive sectors sup-
porting the war effort received considerable investment at the expense of consump-
tion, with significant government intervention to rationalize production.
8 .3 KOREA AND TAIWAN
Japan surrendered its control of Korea in 1945 and the southern half of the Korean
peninsula regained its independence in 1948 when the brief US occupation came to
33 Shizume (2009). 34 Nakamura (1987), pp. 59–61.
35 Ibid., pp. 62–4. 36 Ibid., pp. 68–9.
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an end. War between the north and south broke out in June 1950 and continued
for three years. During that time Seoul and Pyongyang and most other cities on the
peninsula were reduced to rubble. Most of the physical infrastructure built by the
Japanese colonial administration prior to 1945 was also destroyed. Most Japanese-
built industries were in the north, as were what few mines existed on the peninsula.
The south was cut off from these even before they were destroyed during the war.
What South Korea inherited from the Japanese colonial period was mostly some
human capital resulting from the Japanese colonial education system and some
experience working in enterprises, many of which were owned and managed at the
upper levels by Japanese. The Japanese colonial education system, for all of its
inequities and its emphasis on the Japanese language, together with Korea’s
traditional high Confucian value placed on education, clearly gave the nation a
stronger human capital base than that found in most low-income countries in the
early 1950s. This base made it possible at the high end as early as the 1960s to send
thousands of students to top universities abroad for advanced degrees in fields such
as engineering and the natural sciences. At home it made possible the rapid
expansion of an education system of steadily increasing quality at all levels.
There have been suggestions that import-substituting industrialization occurred
during the period 1945–62, prior to the reforms that generated Korea’s high-
growth decades, and that this laid the foundation for what followed. Hyundai
Corporation, for example, was founded in 1947 and did a great deal of construction
work rebuilding what war had destroyed. Samsung began even earlier (in 1938) as
a small export company in Taegu, selling dried fish and vegetables. Daewoo,
however, was not founded until 1967. Thus much of the experience gained during
the 1945–62 period was in business, but not particularly in starting and operating
industrial enterprises. Nevertheless there were workers and even a few lower-level
managers who had acquired experience in the few manufacturing establishments
that did exist in the south before the Korean War, and others with experience in the
north who migrated south at partition or during the war.
There were some modern food-processing and textile mills and a few other light
industries, but the total value of manufacturing value added as late as 1961 was only
8 per cent of GDP. There were also traditional village handicrafts and food
processing, but there is little data on these and no reason to think that their
activities played a role in the development of modern manufacturing. There were
virtually no exports of manufactures and very few exports of any kind, while
imports were mostly financed with US aid. Thus there was some experience gained
by running and working in industrial establishments but the total manufacturing
workforce as late as 1963 was only 610,000 and that was mostly unskilled labour.
The Korean chaebol and many other businesses would soon demonstrate that they
could build and operate a much larger and more complex industrial economy, but
the experience most of them brought from this earlier period was experience in how
to do business, to buy and sell for a profit, and to mobilize construction crews.37
37 The Korea data in this paragraph are mainly from Economic Planning Board (1980).
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Taiwan did not suffer the same amount of destruction of its physical infrastruc-
ture, although destruction during the Second World War from Allied bombing
was considerable. The years from 1949 until 1960 were mostly dominated by the
retreat of the Kuomintang from the Chinese mainland, and then the settlement of
1.6 million mainlanders that accompanied that retreat. As in the case of Korea, most
of the cost of imports was paid for by US foreign aid, and the NT$, like the Korean
won, was seriously overvalued. Installed electric power capacity in 1960 was
260 megawatts, up from 61.5 megawatts in 1954. Manufacturing did grow rapidly
after 1952, averaging 16 per cent per year, but from a tiny base, led by sugar, canned
pineapples, alcoholic beverages, cement, cotton yarn, and cloth (Economic Planning
Council, 1974). There were a few industrialists, notably those from the state-run
China Petroleum Corporation plus a few private entrepreneurs who had joined the
retreat of the Kuomintang government to Taiwan, but most of the business people
were local Taiwanese, some of whom may have gained some relevant experience
during the Japanese colonial period. All of these firms were very small in scale and
that remained true for some time after the reform period began.
Taiwan’s change in policies beginning in 1959–60, which led to the manufac-
turing and export boom of the 1960s and after, was driven by a number of
considerations. Some of these were similar to what Korea would face two or three
years later, but the Taiwanese change was more complex. There was no change in
government in Taiwan; the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek were in charge
before, during and after the changes. The government economic officials who
had come from the Chinese mainland were mostly from the state enterprise sector
and many were imbued with a state-led planning model of growth that emphasized
import substitution. The main changes in policy that ultimately had the most
influence were those dealing with improving incentives for the private sector,
unifying the multiple exchange rates then in force, reforming the banking system,
and introducing measures to increase exports. The motivation for this last point was
the desire to become less dependent on US aid. No one at the time, however, had
any idea of how this last goal would come to dominate all of the others. And it was
immediately apparent that exports mainly meant the export of manufactures.
Taiwan had few minerals to speak of, and land reform along with other measures
had reduced rice exports, a major export during the colonial period, to 3 per cent of
total exports by 1960.
Thus a whole series of policies were introduced, and some of them, such as the
devaluation of the exchange rate, began before 1960. In addition there were import
tax rebates, low-interest loans for exporters, Export Processing Zones, and the
‘Statute for Encouraging Investment’. This latter measure included everything
from tax deductions for exporters to easing the then difficult process of obtaining
land for manufacturing establishments. The export-processing law was not in place
until 1965 but many of the other changes were implemented almost immediately.38
38 For a more in-depth discussion of the process that led to the change in development policies,
see Hsueh, Hsu, and Perkins (2001).
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The changes in policy in Korea were if anything even more abrupt. US pressure
did lead to a semblance of civilian democratic rule, but it also greatly reinforced the
Korean government’s desire to become less dependent on US aid. Even more
clearly than in the case of Taiwan, increasing exports meant manufactured exports.
Land reform in Korea had led the former rice surplus to be consumed domestically,
Korea did not have a semi-tropical climate that could grow sugar and pineapples,
and there were no minerals in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. That left
only manufactures and Korea began to promote the export of manufactures with a
series of measures that will be described in the next section. Korea also introduced
banking and interest rate reform and a variety of other economic reform measures.
The governments of both Korea and Taiwan thus reached a decision to funda-
mentally change the direction of their economic development policies at roughly
the same time (Taiwan a bit earlier) and for many of the same reasons. Both wanted
to reduce their dependence on US aid. Both had few natural resources or agricul-
tural products that could increase exports sufficiently to accomplish this goal of
reduced dependence. It is also the case that both had experienced four to five
decades of Japanese colonial rule. While Korea deeply resented this period and
Taiwan did not, they both saw what Japan had accomplished decades earlier with a
policy of industrialization that had manufactured exports as a major component.
Finally, both understood that they had to create a more modern and efficient
economy and society if their governments, and even their states, were to survive.
It was therefore the political logic of the situation they found themselves in that led
Korea and Taiwan to pick the development strategy that they then implemented.
It was certainly not the dominant paradigm of development economists at the time.
8.3.1 Export-Led Industrialization: Korea, the First Phase
The changes in policy that led to the boom in manufactured exports and the
accelerated growth of manufacturing were similar in both Korea and Taiwan,
although there were differences in the specifics. The first key characteristic that
the reforms had in common was the fact that both economies began their export
push with a major devaluation. The second was that neither country pursued a
broad liberalization of foreign trade. Their policies were geared to the promotion
of exports through specific interventions that would overcome the many barriers
to exporting that previously existed. Imports and the use of foreign exchange
remained tightly restricted. Import substitution for a wide range of industrial
sectors remained in place.
Devaluation of the won and the NT dollar came first. The changes in the
exchange rate were dramatic. The NT$ lost half of its value relative to the US
dollar, and the Korean won lost two-thirds of its value relative to the US dollar.
Both maintained this level of devaluation through the 1960s and most of the
1970s. Neither the overvalued nor the undervalued exchange rate should be
thought of as equilibrium rates. In addition to that, both systems remained riddled
with state interventions in their international commerce on both the import and
export side. The exchange rate that resulted from the devaluations of the late 1950s
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and early 1960s was in a sense undervalued and it remained that way through the
1960s and 1970s. Undervalued in this context, however, only means that both
Korea and Taiwan probably could have promoted exports with a less pronounced
devaluation. It was some time (the mid-1980s) before either economy could be said
to be in a balance of payments equilibrium and at that point both economies
experienced revaluation vis-à-vis the US dollar.
Given the numerous state interventions in international trade in both Taiwan
and Korea, it is perhaps surprising that some analysts have argued that basically
these two economies ‘got their prices right’: that is, they recreated what amounted
to free market prices in a very un-free market environment. This argument was
made in the book on Korea by Frank, Kim, and Westphal (1975) that was part of a
set of studies on foreign trade regimes and economic development.39 The alterna-
tive argument, made notably by Alice Amsden (1991), was that Korea deliberately
‘got the prices wrong’—that is, Korea used trade barriers and other measures to
ensure that infant industries, notably in the heavy industry sector, were protected
from international competition and received prices well above world market prices
for those products.
Frank, Kim, and Westphal’s conclusion was based on a careful calculation of
the effective rate of protection on a wide range of Korean products. Given the
number of export subsidies and trade restrictions in Korea, this was a formidable
undertaking. Their primary concern was to determine whether all of these restric-
tions and subsidies led to an efficient or inefficient allocation of resources for
economic development. Since Korea’s overall economic performance and its per-
formance in industry in particular, during this period and the period that followed,
involved very high growth rates, their conclusion that these restrictions and
subsidies led to a relatively efficient outcome is no doubt correct. Their implicit
argument that trade interventions produced a domestic price structure that was
similar enough to the world price structure to produce a similar outcome is more
questionable. There is not room to address their full analysis here, but other data
developed for a different purpose were published around the same time.
As part of the early efforts to calculate the purchasing power parity GDP of
various countries, the UN compared the prices in Korea with world (basically US)
prices for 103 sectors (Fig. 8.2). As the figure makes clear, the domestic prices of
roughly two-thirds of the tradable products listed had domestic prices below, and
often far below, world prices. The commodities at that end of the spectrum
included virtually all clothing items and all shoe categories, with PPP exchange
rates often below 200 won/$1. At the other end of the spectrum were passenger
automobiles (761 won/$1), ships and boats (519 won/$1), communications
equipment (543 won/$1), construction machinery (387 won/$1), and refrigerators
and freezers (980 won/$1). Alice Amsden’s research focused particularly on the
steel industry. Steel is not in the list because it is an intermediate product and
39 The influential book by the World Bank (1993), Chapter 6, makes a similar argument that while
a number of East Asian economies did promote import substitution, basically they distorted prices
much less than in most other developing economies.
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purchasing power parity calculations use only final demand consumption and
investment products, but steel was highly protected at this time. Many of these
highly protected sectors became the focus of the Korean Heavy and Chemical
Industry Drive of the 1970s and many of these highly protected sectors by
the 1980s were a major component of Korean exports and no longer required
protection.
This suggests that what Korea was pursuing was a classic infant industry strategy,
where the government provided protection for industries in the learning phase but
expected them to bring their costs down steadily and become exporters.
There was a major change in Korea’s approach to industrial development in the
1970s. Government interventions in the 1960s were generally designed to help all
exporters. The government did not target particular exporting firms or exporting
industries. Most of the subsidies were available to anyone who met the criteria. This
approach changed in a dramatic way with the Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive of
the 1970s.40 That drive was initiated by President Park, who empowered a govern-

























































Fig. 8.2. Sector PPP per dollar for Korean tradable sectors, 1970
Note: The official won/US$ exchange rate in December 1970 was 316.65 won/US$1.00 and the rate in December
1969 was 304.45 won/US$1.00.
Source: Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1978), pp. 146–52.
40 This discussion of the Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive is based mainly on Stern et al.
(1995).
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to draw up a plan for a drive by Korea to promote a range of major heavy industrial
products, beginning with steel, shipbuilding, certain types of machinery, petrochem-
icals, and other chemicals. It was at that point that the government went to individual
companies, typically the large chaebol such as Hyundai and Daewoo, and asked them
to take on the task of developing one of these industries.
The incentives to do so were considerable. The government had already decided
to provide much of the related infrastructure through the construction of a heavy
industry industrial park, loans at below market rates were available, and in many
cases the chaebol were given temporary monopolies over the domestic market for
the particular item. Added to specific support measures was the general proposition
that, given the active role played by government in directing and controlling the
economy, companies wanted and needed to be seen as cooperative by that govern-
ment. Thus government industrial policy decisions during the 1960s and 1970s
were made mostly using technocratic criteria. That was to change as the country
moved beyond the 1970s.
The performance of Korean manufacturing throughout the 1960s and 1970s
was impressive by any standard. GDP grew at 9.2 per cent per year (1979/1961)
while manufacturing grew at 17.9 per cent a year and the share of manufacturing in
GDP rose from 13.5 per cent in 1961 to 27.7 per cent in 1979. Total exports from
Korea in nominal US dollars grew at 42.7 per cent a year (1979/1964) and
the share of manufactures in these exports rose from 55 per cent in 1964 to
89.9 per cent in 1979 (Table 8.4). The US market took 29 per cent of these
exports in 1979, the Japanese market took 22.3 per cent, and the next largest
economy, Germany, took only 5.6 per cent.
There were also rapid and large changes in the structure of industry and exports
(Fig. 8.3). The producer goods industry surpassed the consumer goods industry
by the late 1970s and exports of machinery and transport equipment surpassed
those of the more labour-intensive consumer industries. The dominance of
machinery and transport equipment exports increased further in the 1980s
and beyond.












1967 14.0 31.7 4.4 30.4 19.5
1970 9.6 26.4 7.4 42.2 14.4
1975 13.2 29.4 15.0 35.8 6.6
1980 7.3 35.7 20.3 29.9 6.8
1985 4.1 23.3 37.6 27.6 7.3
1990 3.3 22.1 39.3 28.6 6.7
Sources: Economic Planning Board (1986), pp. 227–8; Economic Planning Board (1987), pp. 213–14; and National
Statistical Office (1993), pp. 250–1.
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8.3.2 Industrial Development in Taiwan, 1960–79
Taiwan’s manufacturing experience in the 1960s had many features in common
with Korea, some of which, notably the devaluation of the currency and unification
of the multiple exchange rates, have already been discussed.41 Taiwan put up high
tariff walls on products mainly produced for the domestic market and introduced a
variety of subsidies and other incentives for exporters. The motive of the govern-
ment was to earn foreign exchange. Any firm that could contribute to that end was
given access to the various export support measures. Taiwan made somewhat
greater use of Export Processing Zones, but in 1971 all of the zones together






































































Consumer industry Producer industry
Fig. 8.3. Korea: the share of producer and consumer goods industries (per cent)
Note: The data up through 1979 are for light and heavy industry and only after that are derived from data on
producer and consumer goods industries.
Sources: Economic Planning Board (1980), p. 281 and (1986), p. 104.
41 The discussion in this section is drawn mostly from Hsueh, Hsu, and Perkins (2001).
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fallen to 5.2 per cent. The real value of such zones is to provide lessons in how to
create a supporting environment for private exporting firms in the country at large,
and they probably played that role in Taiwan.
Like in Korea, Taiwanese exporting industrial firms mainly produced labour-
intensive products such as shoes, textiles, and garments. Most were very small in
these early years. In 1974 there were 111 ‘big business groups’ with an average of
seven firms in each group but with an average employment of only a little over 300
per firm. These business groups were the larger economic organizations on the
island. There were over 25,000 registered factories on Taiwan in the late 1960s,
most of them quite small. However, many and perhaps most of these factories were
not completely autonomous enterprises. Most were subcontractors to a central
enterprise or to several enterprises that would assemble the various components
into a product that could be exported.
Taiwan began to move beyond labour-intensive consumer manufactures at
much the same time as Korea began its Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive.
This heavy industry push in the 1970s was called the ‘Ten Major Development
Projects’. Petrochemicals were a priority, as was steel. Machinery and electronics
remained mostly in the hands of small private enterprises. All of these government
efforts in the heavy industry sector involved the establishment or expansion of state-
owned enterprises. The China Petroleum Corporation, which had been founded
on the mainland but had moved to Taiwan, was given a monopoly over upstream
naphtha cracking plants and the corporation built two large plants in 1975 and
1978. The government also created two new state-owned enterprises, the China
Petrochemical Development Corporation and Chung-Tai Chemicals, to produce
mid-stream petrochemical products. There were also private firms in the sector,
mainly involving mid-stream synthetic fibres, but 43 per cent of all investment in
petrochemicals went to state-owned firms. Efforts to develop a shipbuilding indus-
try were less effective. A state enterprise, the Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation,
already existed but could only build 100,000 ton cargo ships. The goal was to
become a major producer of oil tankers of several hundred thousand tons and to
that end the government provided 45 per cent of the investment in a new state
enterprise, the China Shipbuilding Corporation, with the rest provided by foreign
investors. Despite a variety of subsidies provided by the government, however,
the China Shipbuilding Corporation never became internationally competitive.
Korea’s shipbuilding effort ran into similar head winds in the late 1970s, but the
Korean government made a decision to provide what amounted to subsidies to
companies that imported petroleum into Korea on Korean-made tankers. That
saved Hyundai, the builder of the first supertankers, and Hyundai and Korea went
on to become one of the largest shipbuilding countries in the world. A similar
measure by Taiwan (to persuade ship owners flying the Chinese Nationalist Flag to
buy Taiwanese-made ships) was not successful.
The Taiwanese government also made efforts to build an automobile industry to
replace the small-scale producing units that already existed from the late 1960s, but
which were only one step up from the assembly of imported parts that constituted
the automobile sector in so many developing countries (there was a 60 per cent
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local content requirement in the Taiwanese case, beginning in 1965). Unlike
Korea, Taiwan never became a producer of an internationally competitive product.
These efforts in Taiwan did, however, produce an internationally competitive
automobile parts sector. Automobile parts, in contrast with name brand complete
automobiles, probably fitted the then small scale of most manufacturers on the
island. In addition, the parts sector was largely private and producers either
became efficient or went out of business.
The impact of these changes on the structure of Taiwan’s industrial sector and its
exports was rapid. By the late 1970s the share of machinery and transport equip-
ment plus chemicals and petroleum far surpassed the share of textiles and apparel,
which had begun to decline (Table 8.5). The shift in the structure of exports to the
producer goods sector was not quite as rapid as in Korea, but by the mid-1980s
these sectors combined had surpassed the share of the consumer goods sectors
combined (Table 8.6).















1952 8.6 83.6 0.8 0 0 0 6.9
1955 5.7 84.6 2.4 0 0 0 7.3
1960 9.8 58.5 17.1 0.6 0.6 0 13.4
1965 14.9 39.1 26.2 2.7 2.4 0.4 14.2
1970 8.4 13.0 42.2 12.3 5.1 0.9 18.1
1975 5.1 11.2 37.6 14.7 6.1 2.1 23.1
1980 2.5 6.7 31.1 18.2 8.1 3.2 30.2
1985 1.7 4.5 27.6 21.0 9.8 4.1 31.3
1990 0.8 3.3 17.5 27.3 13.5 5.0 31.1
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development (1994), pp. 192–3.
Table 8.5. Taiwanese shares of industrial sectors in industry and mining (per cent)
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986
Food, beverages, and tobacco 21.4 14.0 9.2 9.7 6.5 6.1
Textiles and apparel 12.8 12.8 20.8 19.0 15.7 13.8
Lumber bamboo 3.0 2.4 3.3 2.5 2.5 3.1
Paper printing 5.6 3.8 3.3 2.1 2.8 3.2
Chemicals, petroleum rubber 17.1 22.2 22.2 20.6 21.1 24.8
Machinery, electrical machinery, transport
equipment, metal products
6.9 10.8 17.3 22.5 26.1 25.0
Electricity, gas, water 8.8 9.8 8.8 6.6 8.2 7.7
Construction 1.0 3.1 3.7 5.0 5.0 2.4
Note: These shares are based on the weights used to construct Taiwan’s industrial output index.
Source: Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (1990), p. 288.
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8.3.3 Changing Industrial Policies and the Increasing Role
of Market Forces
Opposition to the highly interventionist approach to industrial policy peaked in the
late 1970s in both Taiwan and Korea. The 1970s industrial policy that targeted
specific industries and individual firms within those industries was the first to decline
sharply, although it did not disappear altogether. The declining use of government
policy to promote specific industries and firms began even before President Park’s
assassination in 1979 and continued under the Chun Doo-hwan government in the
1980s, a government more concerned with reining in inflation than in promoting
heavy industries. In the case of Taiwan, its weakened international political situation
together with the OPEC price increases of 1978 and 1979 led to concern by the
government that Taiwan’s heavy industry-oriented industrial policy in the 1970s was
making the island overly dependent on petroleum imports that could be cut off or
sharply reduced. By the mid-1980s opposition to petrochemical plants also became a
source of major demonstrations against new plants, as Taiwan was making the
transition to a more democratic and open political system.
A further consideration in the shifting approach to manufacturing was that wages
in both economies and unit labour costs (Figs 8.4 and 8.5) were rising rapidly,
making the labour-intensive industries of the 1960s and 1970s less and less
competitive in international markets. In Taiwan there was a government-led shift
in emphasis toward high technology. To educate the broader population in the
importance of computers and information technology, the government took the
lead by rapidly expanding the role and use of computers and information technol-
ogy within the government itself. Universities were required to revamp their
curricula to give greater emphasis to training relevant to high technology. The
government directly sponsored research in a wide range of high-technology fields.
Companies that started up firms in this area also received various direct incentives
such as reduced taxes and easier access to credit, as had been the case with earlier
export-oriented industries, but these incentives were secondary to the main effort.
An important element in this effort was to encourage people who had left Taiwan
to further their education abroad, mainly in the United States, to return home and
set up firms in these high-technology sectors.
In Korea, the relative power of the chaebol had changed dramatically over the
course of the 1960s and 1970s. By the mid-1980s they were less dependent on the
government and the government was becoming more dependent on them as illegal
sources of campaign funding among other things. This kind of corruption, how-
ever, does not appear to have had a major impact on industrial policy during the
presidencies of either Chun Doo-hwan or Roh Tae-woo. A bigger issue facing the
government was what to do about companies that had done what was asked of
them during the Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive, but where the results of their
efforts had produced large losses and threatened bankruptcy. There was an implicit
assumption that if the company did what was asked of it, the government would
help them out of any trouble that resulted. Much of the early 1980s was thus
devoted to cleaning up various unsuccessful efforts of the 1970s campaign.
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Unlike in Taiwan, there was never in Korea a clear decision to move away from
heavy industry to an emphasis on information technology. On the contrary, heavy
industries had become the mainstay of Korean exports by the 1980s and remained
so into the next century. Machinery and transport equipment, for example, saw
their share of Korean exports rise from 20.3 per cent in 1980 to 42.5 per cent in
1992, the last year of President Noh’s term in office. Heavy industry products
overall were 41.6 per cent of total exports in 1980 and 59.5 per cent in 1992 (and



























































Real wages Unit labour cost
Labour productivity
Fig. 8.4. Taiwanese manufacturing real wages, unit labour costs, and labour productivity
Source: Various issues of Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book.
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part of heavy industry exports later, but they grew rapidly and accounted for
33.4 per cent of all heavy industry exports and 27 per cent of total exports in 2001.
Korea’s government, like that of Taiwan, was concerned from the 1960s on with
the fact that Koreans were increasingly being trained in high-technology areas
mainly in the United States, but few were returning home to work in Korea.
In an attempt to change this situation, the Korean government first created the
Korea Institute of Science and Technology in 1966, a multi-disciplinary research
institute mainly in the sciences and engineering. The Korean Advanced Institute of
Science (KAIST) was established in 1971 as an educational and research institution,
and rapidly rose to be among the highest-status universities in Korea (and in
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Fig. 8.5. Indices of Korean manufacturing real wages, own wages, and labour productivity
Source: Various issues of National Statistical Office, Major Statistics of Korean Economy.
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Overall research and development expenditures in Korea rose from 0.29 per cent of
GDP in 1973 to 0.57 per cent in 1979 at the end of the Heavy and Chemical
Industry program, before doubling to 1.02 per cent of GDP in 1982 and doubling
again to 2.01 per cent in 1991.
Finally, by the 1980s and 1990s there was no longer a foreign exchange
constraint in either Korea or Taiwan that could justify tight restrictions on imports,
while the United States was becoming increasingly intolerant of trade restrictions as
a means of infant industry protection, particularly given that most of the industries
were no longer infants. Both economies thus greatly reduced the use of import
restrictions as an instrument of industrial policy. Keeping the exchange rate
undervalued was also no longer tolerated or justified and in both economies the
currency was revalued to something closer to a market-driven exchange rate.
8.4 CONCLUSION
The Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese governments played leading roles in
their respective industrialization drives, but the nature of those governments and
their evolution from one kind of leadership to another differed. In Japan the Meiji
restoration that began in 1868 kept much of the pre-modern elite in control, but
fundamentally changed most of the institutions that had characterized the semi-
feudal Tokugawa period. After that, however, that same elite ruled for six decades
while experimenting with reforms that would facilitate Japan’s catching-up with the
world powers of Europe and North America. It was not until the Japanese military
came to dominate the government that the nature of the ruling elite that governed
economic policy changed fundamentally. The nature of the government and the
manufacturing strategies pursued were also influenced by the external environ-
ment, notably the First World War that cut Europe off from active economic
involvement with Asia, the Great Depression that was accompanied by rising
protection and trade wars, and then the Second World War from which Japan
did not recover until the early 1950s.
Korea and Taiwan were ruled by Japan until 1945. During that period Japan
pursued economic development strategies that were driven by colonial interests
and emphasized agriculture and mining exports. Independence in 1945 brought
completely new governments to these countries, which were initially more
interested in political and military goals than in industrialization or economic
development. External pressures, due in part to their over-dependence on US aid,
and the threat to their very existence, led to fundamental changes in policy in
both economies in the early 1960s. What followed was similar, in that both
governments led manufacturing development efforts that transformed their econ-
omies in a matter of decades.
Manufacturing development in Korea and Taiwan from the 1960s to the early
1990s was much faster than the growth of Japanese manufacturing in the pre-
SecondWorldWar period, although Japan’s own continued manufacturing growth
after economic recovery from that war was equally rapid for two decades, and its
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pre-Second World War experience was more rapid than in most other industrial-
ized economies at that time. A plausible hypothesis is that higher growth from the
mid-1950s onward in all three countries was due in part to a large backlog of
unused technologies, as well as of knowledge about what development strategies
worked and which did not, allowing these economies, particularly Korea and
Taiwan, to leapfrog ahead. Korea and Taiwan had the added advantage of being
able to learn from Japan’s experience starting from a similar economic foundation,
whereas Japan had to figure out what would best fit. Korea and Taiwan’s manu-
facturing growth (and Japan’s after the Second World War) also benefited
from being able to pursue an export-oriented strategy in an increasingly open
world market.
The faster pace of manufacturing growth in Korea and Taiwan also meant that
the structure of industry and of industrial exports changed more rapidly than in
Japan, although the nature of the structural changes was similar. All three countries
began their industrial development drives with a focus on exports of labour-
intensive products, but Korea and Taiwan experienced a more rapid shift from
labour-intensive products to producer goods, notably machinery and transport
equipment, with this occurring less than two decades after their rapid growth
began. In Japan this shift began at the turn of the century, increased with the
military build-up of the 1930s, and peaked in the post-Second World War era.
The industrial organization structure differed between the three economies, with
the differences being between Korea and Japan, on the one hand, and Taiwan on
the other. There were large business groups in both Korea and Japan—zaibatsu in
Japan before the Second World War and keiretsu after the war, and chaebol in
Korea. In Taiwan, most industrial firms during the first two decades of industrial
development were small in scale, and business groups were looser combinations of
these smaller firms, usually with a lead firm. Over time, this has changed as large
groups have arisen, but these have not reached the level of dominance of the
business groups of Korea and Japan.
Finally, rapid manufacturing growth is a transitional phase in all countries, and
this was the case in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The starting point is an economy
dominated by agriculture and handicrafts plus supporting commercial and financial
services; there follows a period in which industrial growth dominates the economy.
At purchasing power parity per capita incomes in the $14,000 to $17,000 range,
however, industrial growth is increasingly replaced by services, including many
modern services that did not exist in earlier periods.42 In Korea and Taiwan, this
transition into and then out of a focus on manufacturing took place over three
decades. In Japan it took much longer, both because growth generally was much
slower in the first half of the twentieth century than in the latter half, and because
of the impact of the Second World War, which set Japan back for over a decade.
42 The lower figure is the purchasing power parity per capita GDP (in 2011 prices) in Korea in the
early 1990s and the higher figure is that for Japan in the early 1970s. This is when the share of
manufacturing (in Korea) and of industry (in Japan) began to decline as a share of GDP (World Bank,
2014).
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In Japan it took roughly seven decades from when industrialization started to when
the share of industry in GDP began to fall.
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Industrialization in China
Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, and Thomas G. Rawski
9.1 INTRODUCTION
China’s recent economic boom, although widely viewed as a contemporary
phenomenon, is the outcome of long-term processes with deep historical
roots.1 Here, we apply this perspective to analyse the trajectory that has trans-
formed China from hesitant nineteenth-century experimentation into the world’s
largest manufacturer.
Table 9.1 summarizes our central quantitative results. The unusual speed of
China’s post-1978 industrial growth is well known. Much less appreciated is that
rapid industrial growth extends back at least to 1912. Over a period spanning
nearly a century, Chinese manufacturing has grown at an annual rate of more than
9 per cent. Table 9.2 provides further comparative perspective.
China’s experience demonstrates, however, that industrialization is not simply
the multiplication of commodity flows in and out of furnaces, mills, and machine
shops. How growth occurs, the relative roles of the intensive and extensive margins,
and more generally, the underlying microeconomic processes are key to maintain-
ing long-run momentum, and to industrialization’s economy-wide impact. Similar
growth rates of manufacturing can conceal wide differences in the progress of
industrialization, which we see as a fundamentally microeconomic process that
enables firms and individuals to accumulate and deepen the technical, operational,
managerial, and commercial skills that enable them to compete in ever more
demanding markets, releasing multiple benefit streams that then reverberate
throughout the economy. China’s planned economy period, covering roughly
1952–78, recorded impressive rates of output growth, but did so under a policy
and institutional environment that ultimately restricted the pace of change to a
fraction of its potential, and carried high costs for the rest of the economy.
Institutional and policy constraints similarly obstructed early industrialization
efforts in the late nineteenth century.
1 The authors have benefited from Guenther Lomas’ dedicated research assistance, from data
supplied by Bishnupriya Gupta, James Kung, Steven Nafzigar, and Li Nan, and from the comments
and advice of Daniel Berkowitz, Kyoji Fukao, Hiro Good, Kevin O’Rourke, Dwight Perkins, Evelyn
Rawski, Yingjun Su, Jeffrey Williamson, Haihui Zhang, Xiaodong Zhu, and Xiuying Zou. The usual
disclaimer applies.
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Two factors have consistently served as important drivers of Chinese industry’s
global rise: openness to the international economy and domestic market liberal-
ization.
Openness is important for the access it allows to new technology and know-
how through foreign direct investment (FDI), imports of intermediates and
capital equipment, and the movement of people and ideas. For a huge continental
economy like China’s in which the domestic market has typically absorbed
upwards of 85 per cent of industrial output (Table 9.3), openness defined solely
in terms of access to overseas markets cannot claim paramount importance.
Domestic market liberalization is the crucial source of new opportunities and
competitive pressure on incumbents and entrants to upgrade through product
improvement and cost reductions, thus channelling resources to firms and sectors
with high returns.
For latecomers like China, modern industry initially involves labour-intensive
production requiring only modest capabilities. Over time, upgrading propels a shift
into more skilled-labour and capital-intensive products and processes. Our review
of a century and a half of Chinese industrialization shows that upgrading occurred
most rapidly when the policy environment provided ample opportunity for the
complementary interaction between openness and market liberalization, and
helped roll back the institutional barriers that have often hindered the deepening
of industrial capabilities.
While the past 150 years have seen wide variations in both international
openness and domestic liberalization, we can identify several major dimensions of
industrial development that have operated continuously throughout the period
under review, albeit at different levels of intensity.
Table 9.1. Comparative growth of industrial output, 1912–2008
China Japan India USSR/Russia
1912–36 8.0 6.7 3.4 4.8
1912–49 4.1 2.5 3.9 3.9
1912–52 6.2 4.0 n.a. 4.8
1952–65 12.3 14.3 8.2 6.4
1965–78 10.2 8.2 4.3 3.8
1978–95 11.6 2.8 6.8 n.a.
1995–2008 13.8 0.7 7.8 3.1
1952–2008 11.9 6.1 6.8 n.a.
1912–2008 9.5 5.2 5.5 n.a.
Sources: China: calculated from authors’ file ‘Table 1 China Growth Rates 1912–2008_7.10.15’, available on
request. Index for 1912–49 from Minami and Makino (2014, Annex Table 4.D); link with 1952 from Liu and
Yeh (1965, p. 66); index for 1952–2008 based on official data on industrial gross output; all output figures have
been converted to 1980 prices. India: for 1911/12 to 1999/2000—data compiled by S. Sivasubramonian, courtesy
of Bishnupriya Gupta for manufacturing (excluding small industry), in constant 1946–7 prices; for 2000/01 and
thereafter, GDP originating in manufacturing (at 2005 factor cost) from India Data-Book (2014). Japan: linked
index of production growth based on: for 1912–36: Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979, Tables A21–A22); for 1936–95:
Statistics Japan (2012, Table 8-16); for 1995–2008: Statistics Japan (2011, Table 8-28). Russia: 1912–90 industrial
output for the Russian Empire/USSR in constant 1913 roubles; 1991 and thereafter, industrial output for the
Russian Federation, also in constant 1913 roubles. Data courtesy of Steven Nafziger.
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First, manufacturing activity and industrial capabilities have gradually spread across
China’s vast landscape. Factory production initially clustered along China’s south-
eastern coast, particularly in the Lower Yangzi region surrounding Shanghai, and
subsequently in Manchuria. The war years (1937–49) brought a surprisingly large
expansion of industry in China’s interior (Table 9.4). The planned economy era
(1949–78) modestly extended regional dispersion, most notably through the
Third Front policies, as the state limited investment in previously dominant
regions, which were seen as both militarily vulnerable and ideologically suspect,
and developed industrial capacity inland. Although the post-1978 reform era
allowed coastal regions once again to leverage their favourable location and
Table 9.2. Comparative industrialization: China, India, Japan, and Russia/USSR,
1912–2008
1912 1933 1952 1965 1978 1995 2008
Cotton yarn production (m. lbs)
China 221 990 1,445 2,860 5,240 11,928 38,214
India 647 1,268 1,452 2,068 2,006 3793 6,774
Japan 400 1,261 635 1,065 985 473 145
USSR/Russia 660 3,580 436
Electricity production (bn kWh)
China 0.1 2.8 7.3 67.6 256.6 1,007.0 3,496.0
India 2.1 6.1 31.4 110.1 396.0 841.7
Japan 1.1 19.5 52.0 179.6 564.0 990.0 1,146.0
USSR/Russia 2.0 16.4 119.1 506.7 1,293.9 860.0 983.0
Ingot steel production (m. tonnes)
China 0.0 0.4 1.4 12.2 31.8 95.4 503.0
India 0.0 0.5 1.6 6.4 9.9 22.0 57.8
Japan 0.0 3.2 7.0 39.8 102.1 101.6 118.7
USSR/Russia 4.2 8.9 34.5 91.0 151.5 51.6 68.5
Cement production (m. tonnes)
China 0.1 0.8 2.9 16.3 65.2 475.6 1,423.6
India 0.0 1.1 4.6 10.6 19.4 74.0 177.0
Japan 0.3 4.2 8.9 32.5 84.9 90.5 62.8
USSR/Russia 1.6 2.7 13.9 72.4 127.0 36.4 53.6
Industrial employment (m.)
Chinaa 0.7 1.1 5.3 16.6 53.3 147.4 126.3
India (formal only) 0.9 1.5 3.2 4.7 5.4 5.9
Indiaa (formal + informal) 37.3 46.0
Japan 1.6 4.2 7.2 11.5 13.3 14.6 8.3
USSR/Russia 2.3 6.2–9.3 16.8 27.4 29.0
a Employment data for manufacturing only.
Note: USSR/Russia data for 1995 and 2008 are for the Russian Republic.
Sources: List of sources available from the authors.
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Table 9.3. Chinese exports of manufactures: scale and share of production and overall
exports, 1933–2008
Unit 1933 1952 1965 1978 1995 2008
Total exports RMB bn 0.898a 2.71 6.31 16.76 1,245.18 10,039.49
of which: Manufactures RMB bn 0.247a 0.41 2.84 9.22 1,065.24 9,492.50
Share of manufactures in
exports
per cent 27.5 15.0 45.0 55.0 85.5 94.6
GVIO, current prices RMB bn 34.9 140.2 423.7 9,189.4 60,737.92243
Manufacturing share in
GVIO
per cent 83.4 88 88 88 88 88
GVIO manufacturing RMB bn 2.645a 30.7 123.4 372.9 8,086.7 53,449.4
Share of manufacturing
output exported
per cent 9.3 1.3 2.3 2.5 13.2 17.8
Trade ratio [X+M]/GDP per cent 8.8 9.6 6.9 11.8 38.7 57.3
a 1933 data in billions of current pre-war yuan. GVIO: gross value of industrial output.
Sources: Exports: for 1952–2008, Compendium (2009, 60); for 1933, authors’ calculations combining Republic of
China exports with separate Manshūkoku data from Yamamoto (2003). Exports of manufactures: authors’ file ‘PRC
Manufactured Exports’, available on request. Manufacturing share in GVIO: authors’ estimate based on file ‘Share of
Mining and Utilities in GVIO 1933–2008’, available on request.
Table 9.4. Share of industrial output by region, 1933–2008
Region 1933 1952 1965 1978 1995 2008
NE 11.8 21.6 21.0 17.1 9.7 7.4
North 13.6 20.8 21.4 23.0 20.4 24.2
SE Coast 65.7 36.6 32.8 30.0 40.7 45.8
Central 7.9 11.0 12.3 15.0 16.0 12.9
NW 0.0 2.5 4.9 5.6 3.7 2.7
SW 0.9 7.5 7.6 9.3 9.6 7.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Herfindahl
index
0.23 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08
Regions:
NE Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning
North Beijing Tianjin Inner Mongolia Shanxi Hebei Shandong
SE Coast Jiangsu Shanghai Zhejiang Fujian Guangdong Hainan
Central Henan Anhui Hubei Hunan Jiangxi
NW Shaanxi Ningxia Gansu Qinghai Xinjiang
SW Sichuan Chongqing Guangxi Yunnan Guizhou Xizang
Sources: 1933: unpublished compilation by T. Kubo, Q. Guan, and F. Makino based on Liu (1937). We incorporate
figures for Guangzhou, Qingdao, Chahaer, and Suiyuan into the provinces of Guangdong, Shandong, Hebei, and
Inner Mongolia respectively. We add data for 1933 factory output in Manchuria compiled by Liu and Yeh (1965,
p. 428), and partition the regional total among the three northeastern provinces in proportion to provincial
electricity production in 1949 (Compendium, 2009, pp. 273, 307, 341). 1952–78: compiled from official PRC
publications. 1995 and 2008: compiled from individual firms’ 1995 (industrial) and 2008 (economic) census
records.
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superior resources of education, skill, and market experience to regain their share
of national production, nationwide infrastructure expansion along with steeply
rising land and labour costs in coastal cities encouraged growth in the central and
western regions.
Second, the industrial product mix has expanded. Even without tariff protection,
import substitution is visible from the late nineteenth century, particularly in
cotton textiles. Import replacement on a more modest scale appeared elsewhere,
particularly in segments of machine building, where the 1930s saw Chinese firms
producing small quantities of textile machinery, machine tools, transportation
equipment, and light armaments. Socialist planning grafted whole sectors, includ-
ing trucks, petroleum refining, telecom equipment, nuclear fuel, and many others,
onto the inherited industrial base. Although reform allowed market forces to exert
growing influence over China’s industrial product mix, government agencies
continued to promote import replacement in computers, chemicals, machine
tools, and other sectors that officials perceived as either essential building blocks
for future development or militarily important.
Third, domestic upgrading has reduced the gap separating leading Chinese
producers from global standards. Even without strong official support, progress in
this direction became visible during the 1920s and 1930s, especially in cotton
textiles. Chinese yarn producers moved beyond the coarsest grades of cotton yarn,
improved labour and machine productivity, and absorbed management practices
from British and Japanese rivals, while new academies offered training pro-
grammes in textile technology and civic organizations hired foreign technicians
to facilitate the production and dissemination of Japanese-style equipment for
handcraft weaving.
Beginning in the 1950s, the government of the People’s Republic (PRC),
tapping its new fiscal strength and the availability of technical support from its
Soviet and East European allies, initiated what was then the largest technology
transfer in human history. While the characteristic Soviet focus on production
volume limited quality improvements and innovation, the accumulation of know-
ledge, resources, and experience under the planned economy created upgrading
potential that could be captured once post-1978 reforms encouraged the revival of
incentives and allowed greater flexibility in the allocation of resources.
Upgrading accelerated after 1978, spurred by the growing presence of foreign-
invested firms, the unfamiliar demands of new export markets in rich countries,
and the opportunities arising from growing access to international supply chains
and cross-national information flows. The result was a growing dispersion of
capabilities, as successful firms gradually moved toward global frontiers, leaving
weaker units floundering in often overcrowded domestic markets for inferior
goods.
Fourth, despite wrenching political discontinuity, successive advances built on
prior developments. Early industrial efforts often involved individuals with
modern education and/or overseas experience—both linked to international
openness. Personnel from the pre-1949 National Resources Commission and
from Japanese-controlled development efforts in Manchuria contributed
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disproportionately to early socialist planning. Even though the planned economy
diverted investment away from Shanghai, China’s pre-war industrial leader, the
great metropolis figured centrally in the new system as a source of revenue from
the profits of its consumer manufactures, and as a source of expert personnel—
especially in textiles. Interior development was seeded with whole factory com-
munities transported from Shanghai and other coastal locations. Reform-era
development drew in similar fashion on the experience and skills accumulated
within the plan-era state enterprise system, which became a source of expertise for
both the township-village (TVE) firms and emerging private sector manufacturers
(Li, Bathelt, and Wang, 2012; Dinh et al., 2013).
Finally, the Chinese diaspora has acted as a substantial source of financial and
human capital in all periods except for the planned economy era. Its prominence
reflects the unusual entrepreneurial propensity of ordinary Chinese, which
survived several decades of intense anti-business propaganda under Mao and
emerged as a key element in the astonishing reform-era expansion of private
business (Table 9.5). Large numbers of micro-entrepreneurs in Wenzhou and
other localities helped to propel Chinese exports to dominant positions in global
market segments—an unusual, perhaps unique, phenomenon in global econom-
ic history.
Following a brief quantitative overview, we review development during three
periods: the decades prior to the establishment of the PRC in 1949; China’s era of
socialist planning, which extends from the early 1950s to the late 1970s; and the
succeeding period of economic reform, which begins shortly after the death of Mao
Zedong (1976) and continues today.
Table 9.5. Breakdown of industrial output by ownership, 1933–2008 (per cent)
Foreign firm shares Domestic firm shares Per cent of
domestic non-state
Sector 1933 1985 1995 2008 1933 1985 1995 2008 1985 1995 2008
Metallurgy 3.3 0.0 3.4 8.0 96.7 100.0 96.6 92.0 32.4 25.6 40.3
Power 100.0 0.0 5.1 4.6 100.0 94.9 95.4 8.0 13.8 6.5
Coal and coke 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.5 100.0 100.0 99.9 98.5 18.6 22.2 21.1
Petroleum 100.0 0.0 4.1 4.5 100.0 95.9 95.5 5.5 3.7 13.9
Chemicals 22.7 0.1 8.5 17.2 77.3 99.9 91.5 82.8 37.9 41.6 52.8
Machinery 20.6 0.6 15.7 35.0 79.4 99.4 84.3 65.0 28.4 43.9 55.7
Building materials 3.8 0.0 4.9 7.2 96.2 100.0 95.1 92.8 57.5 69.9 70.1
Timber 52.1 0.0 10.4 10.3 47.9 100.0 89.6 89.7 46.5 78.2 84.3
Food and drink 20.9 0.2 5.7 17.9 79.1 99.8 94.3 82.1 14.6 28.0 52.0
Textiles 25.6 0.1 13.7 10.8 74.4 99.9 86.3 89.2 33.6 76.1 74.3
Paper 13.0 0.1 5.8 15.3 87.0 99.9 94.2 84.7 62.7 47.0 70.5
Total 21.9 0.2 9.8 23.3 78.1 99.8 90.2 76.7 30.1 41.6 52.7
Sources: 1933: Liu and Yeh (1965), for China proper only (excluding Manchuria). Estimates for 1985 are from the
industrial census summary volume, Industry (1989). Estimates for 1995 and 2008 are based on individual firms’
records from the 1995 (industrial) and 2008 (economic) censuses.
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9.2 QUANTITATIVE OVERVIEW
Table 9.1 provides a comparative perspective on China’s long-term industrial
growth ending with 2008, the most recent census year for which firm-level data
are publicly available.2 With the sole exception of Japan during its heyday of
accelerated growth, the pace of Chinese industrial expansion exceeded that of
India, Japan, and USSR/Russia during every sub-period for which meaningful
comparison is feasible. Table 9.2 uses information on physical commodity output
and industrial employment to provide crude comparisons of the scale of industrial
activity in China, India, Japan, and USSR/Russia during the century beginning in
1912. These data portray early-twentieth-century China as an industrial pygmy,
trailing India’s production of cotton textiles and lagging far behind Japanese and
Russian/Soviet production of electricity, steel, and cement.
Data for 1933 and 1952 suggest rough parity between Chinese and Indian
industrial activity. An international comparison of industrial energy use during
1936/7 provides a clear ranking: industries in China (including Manchuria) and
British India each absorb the equivalent of 19 billion kWh of electricity per year,
one-third of the figure for Japan and one-sixth of the total for the USSR (US
Department of State, 1949, pp. 96–7).
Manufacturing contributed 2.1 and 3.2 per cent of China’s 1933 and 1952
GDP respectively (in 1933 prices); adding mining and utilities (but not handi-
crafts) raises the 1933 figure to 3.3 per cent (Liu and Yeh, 1965, p. 66). PRC
compilations show a rapid increase in the GDP share of industry (including mining
and utilities), which rises to 44.1, 41.0, and 48.6 per cent in 1978, 1995, and 2008
(Compendium, 2009, p. 10).
Beginning in the mid-1950s, Chinese industry rapidly outpaced India’s. China’s
scale of industrial operations overtook Japan’s shortly before the turn of the
century, and surpassed the USSR’s peak levels soon after 2000.
9.3 CHINA ’S PRE-1949 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
9.3.1 Overview
We observe three phases of pre-1949 industrialization: slow development during the
late nineteenth century, including both officially inspired and private commercial
efforts, followed by a more dynamic, market-driven expansion triggered by the
Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), which eroded barriers to private factory ventures.
2 Unless otherwise noted, industrial growth rates are based on measures of gross output value
(GVIO) rather than the value-added data used in conventional national income accounts. Following
Soviet practice, GVIO has served as the standard metric for industrial output since 1949, whereas value
added is a recent addition to the Chinese statistical repertoire. PRC materials use the term ‘industry’ to
describe aggregates that include mining and utilities as well as manufacturing. We follow this
convention: unless otherwise indicated, measures of GVIO and ‘industrial’ production or
employment include mining and utilities as well as manufacturing.
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Subsequently, Japanese military pressure culminating in the Sino-Japanese War
(1937–45) and civil war (1945–9) prompted growing state intervention. Over this
period, government became the chief driver of industrial development, leading to a rise
in the share ofmilitary-linked activity and an enlarged output share for interior regions.
The Treaty of Nanking, which ended the Opium War (1839–42), obliged
China to open five ports to unlimited trade, to limit tariffs to 5 per cent, and to
exempt foreigners from Chinese law. Later agreements multiplied the number of
‘treaty ports’ and awarded similar privileges to citizens of multiple European
nations as well as the United States and Japan. The resulting regime of obligatory
free trade lasted until China regained tariff autonomy in 1929.
Falling international transport and communication costs complemented by
rising trade volumes gradually aligned China’s price structure, which displayed
substantial domestic integration before the OpiumWar (Wang, 1992), with global
values (Brandt, 1985). The resulting changes included price reductions (cotton
yarn, ferrous metals) and increases (cotton, silk, tea), as well as the appearance of
new products (machinery, kerosene, matches) that impacted prices of domestic
substitutes and complements for traded goods.
9.3.2 Slow Development during the First Half-Century
of Openness
Openness elicited a strong response in some segments of China’s economy, such as
Fujian’s tea growers (Gardella, 1994, pp. 74ff). Development of manufacturing,
however, was slow, both for semi-official initiatives directed by prominent regional
leaders and for private ventures, some involving foreign entrepreneurs, that focused
on processing of silk and other farm products. While the Jiangnan Arsenal
impressed Japanese visitors, and China’s Hanyeping complex initiated modern
ferrous metallurgy ahead of Japan’s Yahata works, the officially linked initiatives,
most focused on defence-related production, delivered limited results and produced
virtually no spillovers for the private sector.
An earlier literature mistakenly linked this slow growth to the supposed inability
of modern factory goods to compete with the products of China’s traditional sector
(Murphey, 1977; Huang, 1985). In reality, modern technologies enabled factory
products to outcompete many traditional products in price and quality. Given
Japan’s faster industrial advance under similar trade and treaty arrangements,
attributing limited manufacturing growth to Western imperialism is equally un-
persuasive (Esherick, 1972; Moulder, 1977).
Institutional and ideological constraints that drained potential profits from embry-
onic industrial ventures posed a key obstacle to modern industry. Shannon Brown
(1978, 1979a, 1979 b) and others demonstrate how these difficulties undermined
initiatives in soybean and silk processing. Entrenched local interest groups, possibly
strengthened under the decentralization that accompanied the Taiping Rebellion
(Brandt, Ma, and Rawski, 2014), thwarted potential competition by blocking new-
comers’ access to materials (soybeans, cocoons), storage facilities, and transport.
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9.3.3 Accelerated Growth from 1896 to 1937
In addition to opening the growing roster of treaty ports to foreign-owned manu-
facturing activity, the stunning military defeat at the hands of Japan, a small and
lightly regarded neighbour, prompted a sweeping reconsideration of traditional
attitudes and structures. Rapid retreat of formal and, perhaps more important,
informal restrictions and prejudices became the order of the day as even conservative
leaders endorsed sweeping reform. A new company law introduced limited liability;
the traditional examination system gave way to a new drive toward modern educa-
tion; Confucian-educated gentry turned to constitutionalism, parliamentary democ-
racy, and chambers of commerce as possible avenues to reverse China’s decline.
This ferment facilitated a rapid acceleration of industrial enterprise formation.
Table 9.6 shows the number of newly established modern Chinese private factories
more than doubling between the 1880s and 1890s from 42 to 99, before increasing
to 437 during the first decade of the twentieth century. This wave of entry,
complemented by growing FDI (Remer, 1933; Hou, 1965) initiated several
decades of rapid industrial growth that persisted through periods of disunity, war,
and depression. Halting only with the outbreak of full-scale war with Japan in
1937, pre-war industrial growth outstripped that in Japan as well as India and
Russia/USSR (Table 9.1). Work by Chinese scholars finds similarly high growth
for Shanghai—the centre of pre-war manufacturing—between 1895 and 1912
(Ma, 2008).
Rapid growth from a minuscule base could not transform China into an
industrial nation. At its pre-war 1936 peak, factory output accounted for only
3.1 per cent of GDP—far below the comparable Japanese figure of 25.1 per cent.
Even with a substantial downward adjustment to the Liu-Yeh estimates of 1933
production,3 handicrafts contributed nearly half of industry gross output (and value
added) in 1933, comparable to Japanese circumstances during 1900–10 (Ohkawa
and Shinohara, 1979, p. 37).
9.3.4 Key Features of Early-Twentieth-Century Industrialization
Labour-intensive production of consumer goods dominated China’s early industrial
landscape. Textiles, garments, and food processing accounted for two-thirds of 1933
industrial output with or without the inclusion of handicrafts (Table 9.7).
Industrial activity was regionally concentrated. Nearly two-thirds of 1933
industrial production was located in the southeast coastal provinces (Table 9.4),
with half more narrowly clustered in Shanghai and the adjacent Jiangsu province.
3 Liu and Yeh assign all non-factory production for food processing and textiles to the handicraft
segment of China’s 1933 industrial sector. Their estimate of ‘industrial’ output thus includes non-
commercial household production for self-consumption. Our attempt to remove non-commercial
handicrafts from the industrial total focuses on the largest segments, textiles and food processing. We
assume that commercial handicraft textile production in 1933 amounted to 90 per cent of factory
textile output and that commercial handicraft food processing activity amounted to 100 per cent of
factory output in that sector, with output measured by gross value in both sectors.
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Table 9.6. Number of domestic, privately owned modern factories established, by region and decade, 1841–1915
Region 1841–50 1851–60 1861–70 1871–80 1881–90 1891–1900 1901–10 1911–15 Pre-1911 total Pre-1911 share
NE 1 6 47 47 54 9.1
North 1 3 11 77 90 92 15.6
SE Coast 1 4 3 3 37 69 203 209 320 54.1
Central 1 11 66 38 78 13.2
NW 1 5 1 0.2
SW 1 2 43 49 46 7.8
Total 1 4 3 5 42 99 437 438 591 100.0
Source: authors’ tabulation of materials in Zhang [Chang] (1989).
Table 9.7. Breakdown of industrial output by sector
Year Coverage Metallurgy Power Coal and coke Petroleum Chemicals Machinery Building materials Timber Food and drink Textiles Paper
1933 Total 1.9 0.9 4.4 0.5 1.4 5.2 1.8 5.4 30.9 42.4 5.0
Modern only 3.8 1.8 8.5 1.0 1.9 5.7 1.2 0.8 30.0 43.4 1.9
1952 Total 5.4 1.4 4.6 0.6 1.9 6.2 2.8 9.2 31.4 34.5 2.2
1965 Total 13.0 3.5 4.8 3.6 7.3 16.0 3.2 4.6 20.0 21.6 2.3
1978 Total 10.3 4.1 3.8 6.8 12.1 25.7 4.2 2.4 12.9 16.3 1.5
1995 Total 8.7 3.6 1.6 2.4 15.0 29.9 6.9 1.5 11.6 15.9 2.6
2008 Total 8.1 3.5 0.8 0.8 12.7 49.1 4.1 1.4 7.4 10.0 2.0
Notes: All data have been converted into 1980 prices. This classification reflects two-digit categories used in Chinese industrial data during the planned economy period. ‘Machinery’ includes
metal products; ‘Textiles’ includes manufacture of garments and shoes. We omit a residual sector identified as ‘other’ (qita) in the sources.
Sources: For 1933, authors’ rearrangement of gross output data compiled in Liu and Yeh (1965) into twelve-sector structure used for post-1949. We adjust their estimates of handicraft, food
























A further 10 per cent was located in China’s northeast (Manchurian) region, largely
tied to Japanese investments. Data on newly established private factories prior to
1911 (Table 9.6) show a similar pattern of regional clustering.
Extreme geographic concentration resulted in large variations in industry’s GDP
share. For Shanghai and the adjacent Lower Yangzi region, an area with a popu-
lation of 60 million, the GDP share of modern industry during the early 1930s may
have reached 15 per cent, three times the national total and comparable to the role
of industry in Japan by the late 1920s.4 Vast regions, especially in the west,
experienced very limited development of modern industry prior to 1937.
Domestic entrepreneurs succeeded in rapidly overcoming their initial
disadvantages—inferior technical knowledge, poorer financing, and treaty provi-
sions exempting foreign firms from many Chinese taxes. Table 9.8, which decom-
poses 1933 factory activity in China proper,5 puts the share of Chinese-owned
firms in output and employment at 78 and 83 per cent respectively.6
Even though 90 per cent of 1933 factory production was sold domestically
(Table 9.3), global market forces powerfully affected Chinese manufacturing
throughout the pre-war period. New domestic producers usually faced the task of
wresting market share from foreign manufactures, which attracted domestic buyers
by offering alternatives for traditional products (manufactured yarn substituting for
handicraft, cigarettes replacing pipe tobacco, kerosene being used for lighting rather
than vegetable oil) and ‘new’ goods (matches, steam engines). As a result, China’s
pre-war factory output closely paralleled the economy’s comparative advantage.
Cotton textiles, pre-war China’s leading industry, illustrate this tight link
between global markets and pre-war factory development. Imports of manufac-
tured yarn and cloth established market niches that were subsequently captured by
local producers. Imports of yarn declined steeply after peaking in 1903 and again in
1914, and China emerged as a net exporter of cotton yarn beginning in 1927.
Fabric imports peaked in 1913; by 1932–6, their share in domestic consumption
had dropped from over 25 per cent during 1901–10 to only 8 per cent (Hsiao,
1974, pp. 38–9, 86; Kraus, 1980, pp. 116, J-3; Feuerwerker, 1970; Brandt, 1989).
International influence permeated the development process. Chinese textile
entrepreneurs hired foreign-trained technical staff, purchased imported equipment
with advice from Shanghai-based foreign specialists, dispatched their sons to study
abroad, and borrowed from foreign banks.
4 Factories account for 15.8 per cent of Japan’s 1929 GDP; calculated from Ohkawa and Shinohara
(1979, p. 279), Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974, p. 205) and Nakamura (1983, p. 80).
5 Table 9.5 excludes Manchuria. Applying the 1931 share of Japanese-owned firms in Manchurian
factory production (41.2 per cent—see Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, 1933, pp. 568–9) to Manchuria’s
1933 factory output (Liu and Yeh, 1965, pp. 427–8) reduces the share of Chinese-owned firms in
nationwide factory output for 1933 to 69.6 per cent.
6 For earlier decades, scattered data suggest wide variation in the share of foreign firms. We do not
have data for all of industry for earlier years, but for textiles, Feuerwerker (1970) suggests long-term
stability in the proportion of foreign ownership. Data assembled by Yan Zhongping shows foreign
dominance in pig iron, Chinese dominance in matches, and fluctuating shares in cigarettes and cement
(Yan et al., 1955, pp. 127, 130).
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Competition among imports and domestic goods from foreign- and Chinese-
owned factories spawned market segmentation, with Chinese firms initially serving
the lower price/quality segments of contested product markets (Sutton, 2012).
Chinese textile entrepreneurs initially produced yarn rather than fabric, and con-
centrated on low-count varieties, leaving the finer grades to foreign rivals (Hou,
1965, p. 153).
Market evolution and competitive pressure pushed firms to upgrade. During the
1920s, access to Japanese machinery and shifts in local demand encouraged
spinning firms to shift their focus from ‘coarse low count yarn to . . . fine, high-
quality, high-count’ varieties (Köll, 2003, p. 265). Forcing out independent shop
bosses and installing technically trained managers enabled some firms to secure
steep productivity increases (Cochran, 2000, pp. 191ff; Zeitz, 2013). Chinese yarn
producers matched the rising productivity of China-based Japanese firms and
outperformed British-owned rivals during 1924–36; in factory weaving, incom-
plete data show Chinese firms raising output per loom from 59 to 84 per cent of the
levels recorded by Japanese-owned industry leaders (Zeitz, 2013, p. 125; Chao,
1977, p. 313).
Matches present a similar picture, with imports giving way to domestic produc-
tion first by foreign and then by Chinese-owned firms. Liu Hongsheng, China’s
Table 9.8. Gross output value and employment in manufacturing by type of firm, China
proper, 1933

















Million yuan Share Thousands Share
Metallurgy 83 2.8 96.7 3.3 20.1 0.9 95.7 4.3
Power
Coal and coke 0.5 100.0 0.0 0.2 100.0 0.0
Petroleum
Chemicals 86.7 25.5 77.3 22.7 42.3 8.9 82.6 17.4
Machinery 68.8 17.9 79.4 20.6 52.2 8.2 86.4 13.6
Building materials 45.8 1.8 96.2 3.8 36 1.1 97.0 3.0
Timber 5.6 6.1 47.9 52.1 1.7 1.7 50.0 50.0
Food and drink 597.8 158.1 79.1 20.9 72.8 28.3 72.0 28.0
Textiles 793.6 272.7 74.4 25.6 505.6 108.3 82.4 17.6
Paper 74.9 11.2 87.0 13.0 43.8 3.8 92.0 8.0
Other 13.8 1.5 90.2 9.8 7.9 1.4 84.9 15.1
Total 1,770.5 497.6 78.1 21.9 782.6 162.6 82.8 17.2
Note: This table excludes data for Manchuria, for which Liu and Yeh estimate 1933 output at 376.7 million yuan
and 1933 factory employment at 129,500. In Manchuria, the share of foreign (i.e. Japanese) firms in 1931 gross
output value for manufacturing was 41.2 per cent (Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, 1933, pp. 568–9). If 41.2 per cent of
Manchuria’s 1933 manufacturing output came from foreign-owned firms, the share of foreign firms in total
manufacturing output for that year would be 30.4 per cent.
Source: Liu and Yeh (1965, pp. 426–8). Totals may not sum due to rounding.
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‘match king’, built his business in small cities ignored by foreign rivals, where
customers put a premium on price over quality, and only later challenged the
Japanese and Swedes in the Shanghai market, China’s largest (Cochran, 1992,
p. 61). Liu’s strategy foreshadows the recent success of PRC start-ups in telecom
equipment (Huawei) and construction machinery (Sany, Zoomlion, Liugong) that
used capabilities accumulated through selling lower-quality goods to less demand-
ing markets to break into high-end global markets that were initially dominated by
prominent multinationals like Caterpillar and Ericsson (Brandt and Thun, 2010).
9.3.5 Impact on Handicrafts
Estimating the scale and growth of handicrafts is difficult, but several propositions
are clear.
Enforced free trade and factory expansion disrupted some craft sectors while
giving new life to others. The overall effect was probably beneficial: exports of
selected handicrafts grew at an average rate of 2.6 per cent per annum during
1875–1928, while combined exports of sixty-seven handicrafts rose by an average
of 1.1 per cent annually during 1912–31 (Hou, 1965, p. 171).
Cotton textiles illustrate this mixed outcome. Handicraft spinning, squeezed by
the dual blows of falling prices for factory yarn and rising cotton prices, suffered a
steep decline (Feuerwerker, 1970). But the same low prices of factory yarn
strengthened handicraft weaving, which thrived by combining factory and home-
spun yarns (Reynolds, 1974). Grove (2006) describes the critical role of Japanese
advice and Japanese intermediate technology (wooden handlooms with iron gears)
in expanding small-scale cloth production in north China.
Despite rapid factory growth, handicrafts persisted as an important component
of industrial output as late as 1955, when they accounted for nearly 20 per cent of
overall industrial production (Chen, 1967, p. 210).
9.3.6 Wartime Developments
Japan’s 1931 takeover of China’s northeast region, followed by a brief but intense
attack on Shanghai in early 1932, focused attention on the need to prepare for war
with Japan. The response included the establishment of official planning bodies,
efforts to develop a network of state enterprises in defence-related industries, and
monetary and banking reforms aimed at strengthening official control over money
and credit. With the Japanese-led breakaway state of Manshūkoku adopting its
own planned economy regimen, the approach of war initiated a nationwide shift
from private to public enterprise and from market to government allocation that
presaged the socialist system of the 1950s.
Once full-scale combat began in 1937, the combined effects of physical destruc-
tion, disruption of commercial and transport networks, fiscal difficulties arising
from the westward retreat of China’s national government, and hyperinflation
undermined private manufacturing and limited the implementation of industrial-
ization plans, especially for Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government. Consumer
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manufacturing centred on Shanghai suffered catastrophic reductions in capacity
utilization: operating rates in flour milling fell by nearly 90 per cent between 1936
and 1945; in textiles, the decline was even steeper (Minami and Makino, 2014,
Annex Table 4.D).
Official industrialization efforts, however, moved forward despite the travails of
war. Indeed, rapid manufacturing growth immediately following the cessation of
civil war in 1949 reflects substantial wartime increases in manufacturing capacity—
expansion that pushed 1952 output to double the 1933 level and 65 per cent above
the 1936 figure. Wartime investments also altered China’s industrial structure,
raising the share of producer goods from 25 to 42 per cent of manufacturing
output, increasing the share of central, southwest and northwestern regions from
8.8 to 21 per cent, and sharply reducing the Herfindahl index for provincial
industrial output from 0.25 to 0.09 between 1933 and 1952 (Table 9.4).
9.3.7 Pre-1949 Outcomes
A century after British arms imposed a regimen of free trade, China in 1949
remained a primarily agricultural economy. Although industry grew rapidly during
the early decades of the twentieth century, the share of manufacturing in overall
output remained small. Even so, China recorded substantial progress along the path
to industrialization. Following several decades of slow expansion, the shock of
military defeat and the 1895 treaty provisions allowing foreign-owned factories in
China’s treaty ports unleashed a wave of reform. The ensuing acceleration of entry
and growth provided China with a modest array of manufacturing industries, some
of which—notably cotton textiles—achieved global visibility, that employed over
1 million workers in 1933 (Liu and Yeh, 1965, p. 428).
China’s leading industrial regions, the Shanghai area and the northeast, reflected
divergent sources of growth. In the Lower Yangzi region centred on Shanghai,
private business was the main driver of pre-war industrial growth. Beginning
around 1900, rapid expansion of consumer goods manufacturing powered an
economy-wide transformation that paralleled Japan’s earlier path. Expanding pro-
duction of cotton goods, foodstuffs, matches, and other consumer goods promoted
backward linkage into engineering and chemicals, stimulated the development of
commodity and financial exchanges, and prompted banks to extend financing to
manufacturing and even agriculture (Rawski, 1980, 1989; Ma, 2008). Prior to
1931, government involvement was mostly indirect; support of modern banks, ‘the
sector . . . that benefited most from its dealings with the government’, was particu-
larly significant (Kirby, 1984, p. 80). This changed after 1931 as the threat, and
then the reality, of war with Japan pushed the Chinese state to assert growing
control over industries and markets previously influenced mainly by private activ-
ity, and to inject itself directly into the allocation and operation of industrial
resources.
In Manchuria, by contrast, government direction was evident throughout, with
much factory investment coming from Japanese-controlled companies whose
actions responded to Tokyo’s economic priorities. Reflecting this circumstance,
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chemicals, machinery, and, from 1936, metals—the central components of detailed
official plans that extended into the 1950s—stand out as the largest contributors to
factory value added (Chao, 1982, p. 83).
These developments occurred in an open economy, with free trade (from 1842),
substantial price integration with global markets (from the 1880s), minimal
restriction of FDI (from 1895), rapid expansion of new forms of education and
overseas study, and considerable return migration by overseas Chinese. Extensive
openness magnified both the disruption (e.g. to handicraft spinning) and the
opportunities resulting from the growth of international links.
Gradual emergence of growth-promoting institutions contributed to China’s
pre-war industrial growth. Private actors banded together to promote common
interests. Köll (2003, p. 76) describes the spread of technical schools offering
courses in textile engineering, the proliferation of technical journals and the
emergence of an engineering profession, all foreshadowing developments that
were vastly accelerated under state auspices after 1949. Local chambers of com-
merce facilitated the dissemination of know-how and provided ‘voice’ for newly
emerging entrepreneurs (Chan, 1977).
State action, initially focused on sponsorship of semi-official enterprises during
the late ninteenth century, subsequently emphasized indirect actions that smoothed
the path of private ventures: passing a corporation law, identifying and dissemin-
ating commercially promising technologies, and pursuing tariff autonomy.
As a result, China’s pre-war economy displayed many features of a market system.
Prices were flexible and generally market-determined. There were few man-made
obstacles to domestic or international mobility of goods, people, information, and
ideas. Formal and informal entry barriers declined over time. Low revenue and, after
1911, weak central control restricted the state’s ability to regulate and intervene.
This began to change soon after the Guomindang established the Nanjing govern-
ment in 1927. Although restricted byweak finances and limited territorial control, the
new administration set out to follow Japan and other rising powers by systematically
deploying the levers of state power to build a modern industrial economy. Japan’s
assault on China’s territorial integrity, which signalled a growing likelihood of all-out
war, hastened the Guomindang’s shift from supporting a largely private economy
toward an emerging vision of a planned economy in which official direction of
investment and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would occupy leading roles.
The outbreak of war in 1937 led to ‘an enormous expansion of Nationalist
China’s economic bureaucracy’, nationalization of many existing industrial oper-
ations, and planned production and distribution of essential war materials (Kirby,
1990, pp. 127–8). By 1944, public sector firms accounted for more than half of total
industrial output and an even higher share of heavy industry (Bian, 2002, p. 85).
While the defeat of Japan brought a renewal of China’s long-smouldering civil
strife, the Guomindang and Communists shared a common vision of an industrial
sector oriented toward military strength, directed by government technocrats, and
dominated by state-run firms. When Communist forces routed their Guomindang
rivals, ‘the large majority of Nationalist industrial planning personnel’, including
the ‘entire senior leadership’ of the National Resources Council, the KMT’s lead
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agency for economic planning, ‘remained on the mainland’, imparting a strong
element of continuity to the establishment of Soviet-aided socialist planning by the
incoming PRC government (Kirby, 1990, p. 134).
9 .4 CHINESE INDUSTRY UNDER SOCIALIST
PLANNING, 1949–78
The Chinese economy recovered quickly with the end of hostilities and the
establishment of the PRC in 1949. By the mid-1950s, China had succeeded in
further institutionalizing and extending the system inherited from the preceding
wartime era. In industry, two features were especially prominent: state ownership
and the substitution of a planning system for markets.
Industry under socialism is as much a story of continuity as it is of change. State
ownership had come to the fore during the 1940s. Nationalization of remaining
private firms in the early 1950s and the concentration of new investment in the state
sector simply reinforced this dominance. Between 1957 and 1978, the state sector
consistently delivered over 80 per cent of gross value of industrial output (GVIO),
with the remainder coming from a large number of small urban collective firms and,
beginning in the late 1950s, from an even larger number of rural collective enterprises.
Through an enlarged and integrated version of separate planning bureaucracies
inherited from the former Guomindang and Manshūkoku governments, China
moved to fully replace markets with administrative resource allocation. Decisions
about output, input use, and investment were now all in the hands of the planners.
Although China’s plan system resembled its Soviet counterpart, there were
important differences. The number of commodities for which planners constructed
nationwide allocations was smaller than in the USSR. China’s system was more
decentralized, with substantial resources under the control of provincial and sub-
provincial governments (Wong, 1985). This decentralization reflected a succession
of initiatives that began during the mid-1950s and continued through the next two
decades. Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) argue that this feature of the pre-1978
economy had important consequences for the system’s reform-era trajectory.
A central objective of the new system was to mobilize resources that planners
could direct toward strategic objectives. Control over prices was critical: by setting
prices of final goods high relative to those for inputs, including wages, planners
could concentrate profits in the hands of SOEs. Low profit retention rates—firms
were required to remit more than 95 per cent of their profits—provided a revenue
stream for the state that accounted for a large share of fiscal receipts.7
Security concerns and the desire to narrow the gap with the West put a high
premium on investment and the expansion in China’s producer goods sector, such
as steel, machine tools, and chemicals. As in the USSR, and in sharp contrast to the
7 Hsiao (1987, p. 12) gives annual fiscal ‘receipts from enterprises’ (including, but not limited to,
industrial firms); this category accounted for over 50 per cent of budgetary revenue in fourteen of
sixteen years between 1959 and 1974.
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first three decades of the twentieth century, Chinese planning pursued industrial
development without reference to comparative advantage. Moreover, with the
notable exception of the sizable inflows of equipment, technology, and expertise
from the Soviet bloc during the 1950s, Chinese leaders limited the country’s ties to
global markets. International isolation, which reflected a combination of ideological
conviction and the impact of a US-led trade embargo, pushed China’s trade ratio
far below the levels attained during the 1930s (Table 9.3).
9.4.1 Achievements
These institutional arrangements delivered three decades of rapid industrial expan-
sion, surpassing earlier rates of growth. After doubling between 1949 and 1952
with the revival of the economy, industrial output grew more than 11 per cent per
annum between 1952 and 1978 (Table 9.1), while employment grew nearly
tenfold, from 5.3 million in 1952 to 53.3 million in 1978 (Table 9.2).
In line with planners’ objectives, quantitative expansion brought a pronounced
shift in the structure of industry, which moved away from formerly dominant
consumer manufactures toward intermediate and producer products. Entirely new
industries appeared—for example, manufacture of trucks, tractors, radios, telecom,
and power-generating equipment. The rise of machinery, from only 6.2 per cent of
industrial output in 1952 to 25.7 per cent in 1978 (Table 9.7), highlights the
direction and magnitude of structural change. By the 1970s, the sectoral compos-
ition of industry resembled that of a country with significantly higher GDP per
capita, such as Japan in the late 1950s.
Declining spatial concentration, a trend already visible between 1933 and 1952,
continued in the socialist plan environment (Table 9.7). China’s first five-year plan
(1953–7) concentrated investment in inland provinces, bypassing coastal regions
that had dominated pre-war manufacturing. Planners also relocated personnel and
factories from militarily vulnerable coastal cities to interior regions. Dispersion
continued during the 1960s under the ‘Third Front’ programme, which situated
industrial facilities in remote interior locations to guard against potential US or
Soviet attacks (Naughton, 1988). With these shifts, the Herfindahl index for
provincial industrial output continued the decline begun during the 1930s, falling
from 0.09 in 1952 to 0.06 in 1978 (Table 9.4).
Beyond the cities, and largely outside the formal plan, development of rural
industry represents an unusual feature of Chinese industrialization. Rural enter-
prises, most run by agricultural collectives, aimed to serve agriculture and to use
local resources to satisfy local demand for cement, fertilizer, machinery, electricity,
and coal. Promotion of rural industry began in the mid-1950s, experienced
explosive but hugely wasteful growth during the Great Leap Forward (1958–60),
and re-emerged in the late 1960s following major post-Leap retrenchment. By
1978, rural industry (including mining and construction as well as manufacturing)
employed 19.7 million workers (Thirty Years, 2008, p. 248). Rural industry was
particularly successful in the suburbs of major coastal cities that had also developed
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the largest non-agricultural sectors prior to 1949—that is, the regions disfavoured
by both the early PRC investment plans and then by the Third Front policy.
By the 1970s, Chinese manufacturing, no longer limited to the production of
low-end, labour-intensive consumer products, spanned virtually the entire range of
industrial activity, including sophisticated operations involving petroleum refining,
nuclear weapons, and earth satellites. Despite its brief duration, the flow of aid and
trade from the USSR and its East European allies provided an unprecedented cross-
national technology transfer that accelerated China’s effort to broaden the span of
domestic manufacturing.8 Beyond the growth of output and extension of the
product mix, socialist planning brought a vast expansion of industrial capabilities.
The accumulation of production experience and the spread of mass education
multiplied the stock of factory-level technical capabilities and human capital. In
addition, the plan system underwrote a massive expansion of institutions, resources,
and personnel for high-level technical training and research efforts. Ministries and
major SOEs established networks of universities, technical schools, and R & D
facilities. By the late 1970s, there were over 700 R & D institutes with over
500,000 scientists and engineers, nearly as many as in the United States (Gu,
1999, pp. 56–8; Nolting and Feshbach, 1981, p. 44).
9.4.2 Shortcomings
Despite important advances, the achievements of Chinese industry during the plan
era fell far short of potential. The most obvious indicator is slow productivity
growth (World Bank, 1985, p. 110; Kuan et al., 1988), despite a long list of
favourable circumstances: unprecedented official promotion of industrial develop-
ment, large inflows of Soviet technology and capital goods, huge increases in public
expenditure on R & D, and rapid expansion of primary education and basic
health care.
Rising capital per worker—the consequence of steep increases in investment
spending, much of it directed toward industry9—coincided with surprisingly
slow growth of industrial output per worker—with several sectors, including
metallurgy, suffering declines in labour productivity between 1965 and 1978
(Field, 1982). Factoring in improvements in human capital suggests negative
TFP growth (Zhu, 2012). This ‘disappointing’ outcome meant that ‘rapid
expansion of output came almost entirely from massive growth of labour and
especially capital inputs’ (Chen et al., 1988, pp. 585–7). The obvious implication
is that the beneficial impact of multiple sources of productivity growth was
8 During the 1950s, imports constituted nearly 20 per cent of newly added producer durables
(Field, 1980, p. 233).
9 The share of gross capital formation in aggregate expenditure, which Rawski (1989, pp. 260–1)
places at 10.3 per cent during 1931–6 (excluding inventory accumulation), is estimated at 22.2, 25.4,
28.4, and 38.2 per cent for 1952, 1957, 1965, and 1978 respectively. Industry’s share of basic
construction, the largest component of investment spending, was 31.3 per cent in 1953, 43.9 per cent
in 1956, and at least 50 per cent throughout 1957–78 with the exception of 1965, when the figure was
49.1 per cent (GDP, 2007, p. 19; Investment, 1987, p. 97).
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overwhelmed by institutional blockages and policy failures.10 With a rising share
of GDP directed to investment to offset declining TFP, consumption languished.
Chinese observers were quick to highlight the institutional sources of poor
outcomes. A 1982 editorial explained that ‘the basic causes of low [industrial]
labour productivity’ included poor morale, bureaucratism and lax discipline ‘in
many factories’ (Field, 1982, p. 656). Shigeru Ishikawa (1983, p. 275) highlight-
ed shortcomings in the ‘investment goods sub-sector’, the core of the planned
economy, which, despite receiving ‘an extremely high proportion of investment
funds . . . [and] scarce foreign currency’, delivered weak results. ‘The marginal
output-capital ratio . . . decreased considerably over time and hence the expected
rise in the growth rate of national income [and other important results were] . . .
not realized.’
Rawski (1975) and others replicated previous work on Soviet industry which
showed how material-balance planning and ambitious physical output targets led
managers to pursue quantity at the expense of quality, variety, innovation, cost, and
customer satisfaction; to systematically overstate input requirements and understate
production capacity; and to hoard materials, labour and backup production facil-
ities. Naughton (1995, pp. 49–50) found that the accumulation of inventories and
unfinished construction in China was considerably worse than in the USSR.
Specific Chinese policies added further impediments. Of particular importance
in this connection was enforced self-sufficiency at the national, regional, and even
local level, which limited both international and domestic trade and moved
investment priorities far away from comparative advantage. Suspicion of intellec-
tuals and technical expertise, which periodically stripped firms, government offices,
schools, and research institutions of scarce and valuable talent, also came with
high costs.
9.5 CHINESE INDUSTRY DURING THE
REFORM ERA, 1978–2008
Beginning in the late 1970s, a succession of reform initiatives gradually led to a
hybrid that combines important elements of planning, state ownership, and official
direction with a revival of the open, private, market-based system of the 1920s and
1930s. This novel arrangement has extended the rapid growth attained under the
former plan system, but combined quantitative expansion with market liberaliza-
tion, deep integration with global markets, and rapid upgrading that has enabled a
growing array of Chinese manufacturers to approach global frontiers of technical
sophistication and product quality.
We separate the reform era into two periods, with 1995 as the break point.
10 Lardy (1983) makes a similar point regarding agriculture.
215Industrialization in China
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 16/1/2017, SPi
9.5.1 Early Reforms, 1978–95
China’s initial reforms included selective opening to the global economy, most
notably through the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that wel-
comed foreign investment and allowed duty-free import of materials used to
manufacture export goods, as well as incremental reform of state-owned enterprises.
The critical element in early-stage reform, however, was market liberalization,
which advanced along multiple axes.
Price and quantity determination, formerly the near-exclusive preserve of official
plan bodies, moved toward market outcomes. Separate initiatives empowering
firms to arrange the disposition of above-quota output and establishing ‘dual
pricing’, i.e. market pricing of non-plan exchanges, injected scarcity-based marginal
values into a formerly rigid pricing system (Naughton, 1995). By 1991, ‘market
forces’ had surpassed ‘state order’ in determining prices of ‘production materials’; in
1995, the share of market forces reached 77.9 per cent (Rawski, 2000, p. 320).
Introduction of partial profit retention (for firms) and bonuses (for workers)
reversed the plan system’s destruction of incentives and weakened the corrosive
impact of soft budget constraints among state-owned firms.
Reforms began to dismantle plan-era restrictions that had limited the mobility of
people, goods, technology, funds, and information across China’s internal and
international boundaries. These initiatives sparked what developed into vast flows
of migrant labour to coastal industrial centres; they also undermined protectionist
policies aimed at retaining local materials and blocking inflows of manufactures.
Finally, early reforms reduced impediments to entry and exit in a growing array
of industries. Although SOE monopoly persisted in some sectors (Haggard and
Huang, 2008), others opened up for entry by non-state actors—urban collectives,
rural township and village enterprises (TVEs), private domestic ventures, and
foreign-invested firms.
9.5.2 Outcomes to 1995
Notwithstanding the continuation of plan allocations and prices, the revival of
incentives, domestic trade and market-determined prices allowed producers some
scope to modify their product mix, choose among alternative suppliers or extend
sales efforts into new markets without cumbersome bureaucratic approvals. New
entrants, operating outside the plan system, could occupy market niches over-
looked by the plan apparatus. Growing availability of materials and services outside
the plan encouraged specialization, reversing the excessive vertical integration
developed in the plan environment.
At the same time, growing openness steadily enlarged the global impact on China’s
formerly isolated and largely self-reliant industrial sector, which faced the prospect of
accessing a backlog of overseas innovations dating back to the 1930s. Manufactured
exports rose over 100-fold in US dollar terms between 1978 and 1995 (Table 9.3).
Imports were heavily weighted with capital equipment, raw materials, and, reflecting
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China’s growing participation in global supply chains, industrial components, most
delivered to the factory sector.
FDI increased dramatically (Tables 9.5 and 9.9). Firms with Hong Kong and
Taiwan ties, run by entrepreneurs with long experience in producing and exporting
consumer products, were especially prominent, constituting the majority of enter-
prises in the SEZs. Specializing in the assembly and export of textiles, apparel,
footwear, and electronics, these firms became the leading source of China’s exports.
Nonetheless, the share of foreign-linked firms in industrial output (Table 9.5), the
share of exports in sales of manufactured goods (Table 9.3), and the share of FDI
in overall investment (Fixed Assets, 2002, p. 20) remained below 15 per cent
throughout this period.
However, tariff and non-tariff barriers, remnants of the industrial plan system,
ad hoc disruption of (especially private) business, and inadequate infrastructure
(frequent power shortages, overcrowded railways, poor roads, primitive telecom-
munications) limited the economy’s response to these opportunities, just as similar
domestic constraints had restricted the responsiveness of private actors during the
decades prior to 1937.
Industrial growth during the early reform years was somewhat higher than
during 1965–78 (Table 9.1), with big increases in the growth of textiles and food
processing (Table 9.10). Although the share of machinery, chemicals, and metal-
lurgy changed little between 1978 and 1995 (Table 9.7), industry shifted toward
the same coastal provinces that had led the development of private sector manu-
facturing prior to the Second World War (Table 9.4) and, reflecting the tripling of
China’s trade ratio from 11.8 to 38.7 per cent between 1978 and 1995 (Table 9.3),
toward sectors and products in which China held a comparative advantage.
Growth occurred primarily outside the state sector, reducing the SOE output
share from 80 to 49 per cent between 1978 and 1995 (Industry, 1985, pp. 31–2;
Table 9.5). TVEs emerged as a key source of fresh momentum. Concentrated in
Table 9.9. Inward and outward FDI (US$ billion)
Year 1990 2000 2010
FDI inflow 3.48 40.71 105.70
FDI sources:
Asia 25.48
Hong Kong 1.91 15.50 60.60
Japan 0.50 2.92 0.71
Korea 1.49 2.70
Europe 4.76
Germany 0.02 1.04 0.89
UK 0.01 1.16 0.71
North America 4.78
US 0.46 4.38 3.02
Canada 0.41 0.28 0.71
FDI outflow 0.83 0.92 68.81
Source: Yearbook, 1991, 2001, 2011.
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the once again dynamic coastal regions, these firms, largely owned and managed by
township and village governments (although some were in reality private), absorbed
labour released by the productivity growth that accompanied agricultural reform
(Lin, 1992) and tapped expanding domestic trade networks to sell their products
and obtain equipment, materials, and expertise. Powerful incentives, limited tech-
nical expertise, and hard budget constraints (Whiting, 2001) led TVEs to focus on
labour-intensive consumer products. Flexible, ambitious, and aligned with China’s
comparative advantage, TVEs quickly entered international markets, accounting
for 16.3 per cent of aggregate exports in 1990 and 28.9 per cent in 1995 (Thirty
Years, 2008, p. 326; Yearbook, 2014, p. 329).
As waves of new entrants slashed returns in the consumer sector, China’s leaders
began to rethink the position of the state sector. Sectors like garments and beverages
were designated as ‘competitive industries’—meaning that market competition
could determine the fate of SOEs in those product lines. Planning increasingly
focused on a limited array of ‘strategic’ sectors seen as deserving special attention
and support. Despite the reforms, state firms in the secondary sector (industry and
construction) absorbed over half (and often much more) of aggregate investment
outlays in every year between 1981 and 1995.11 SOEs enjoyed priority access to
bank lending. Licensing of advanced technology and joint ventures with overseas
multinationals—for example, Beijing Jeep and Shanghai-Volkswagen—provided
additional support for the expansion of SOE technical capabilities and competi-
tiveness. Despite these advantages, SOEs lagged behind other firms in both
financial returns (Holz, 2003, pp. 165–70) and productivity growth (Jefferson
et al., 2000, pp. 797–804). This motivated efforts beginning in the mid-1990s to
expand the reform effort.
Table 9.10. Real annual growth rates for gross output value, 1952–2008 (per cent)
1952–65 1965–78 1978–95 1995–2008
Sector
Metallurgy 18.4 7.4 10.3 14.7
Power 18.8 10.7 10.5 15.0
Coal and coke 10.9 7.5 5.9 9.5
Petroleum 27.4 14.8 4.7 5.9
Chemicals 22.8 13.6 12.7 13.9
Machinery 19.0 13.4 12.3 19.8
Building materials 11.9 11.6 14.7 10.7
Timber 4.9 3.9 8.5 14.8
Food and drink 6.8 5.7 10.7 11.4
Textiles 6.7 7.0 11.2 11.3
Paper 10.8 5.8 15.2 13.1
Total 12.3 10.2 11.6 13.8
Sources: Table 9.1 and data underlying Table 9.7.
11 See authors’ file ‘Investment-by-sector-ownership’, compiled from official statistical publications.
Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, and Thomas G. Rawski218
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 16/1/2017, SPi
9.5.3 Reforms since 1995
On the domestic front, the government privatized (largely to insiders) or shut down
large numbers of small, inessential or poorly performing SOEs: more than 75,000
SOE firms disappeared, and, with them, the jobs of 15–20 million workers. The
state sector’s share of industrial output fell from 48.6 to 24 per cent between 1995
and 2008 (Table 9.5). The remaining SOEs were larger and increasingly concen-
trated in sectors like steel, precision machinery, and chemicals that the state
identified as strategic or ‘pillar’ industries.
A series of policy initiatives sought to make the SOEs more commercial and
more innovative. A State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commis-
sion (SASAC) was established to consolidate management of the state’s ownership
interests and take the lead in restructuring major SOEs to boost their competitive-
ness (Naughton, 2015). The government poured resources into the promotion of
‘indigenous innovation’ that would establish China as a producer (rather than, as in
the past, a purchaser) of cutting-edge technology. The state also pushed Chinese
firms, with SOEs again in the forefront, to ‘go outward’ by increasing overseas
direct investment (Table 9.9) in order to deepen market experience and accelerate
both the absorption and the development of advanced technologies.
Legal reforms that explicitly affirmed the legitimacy of private enterprise encour-
aged the rapid expansion of privately owned manufacturing, involving both new
enterprise formation and privatization of TVEs and urban collectives. Restrictions
on the movement of people and goods were further eroded.
On the external front, multiple initiatives—falling tariffs and non-tariff barriers,
fresh measures to encourage FDI, allowing large numbers of firms to engage in
international trade, and more generous currency retention rights for exporters—
culminated in China’s 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (Lardy,
2002; Branstetter and Lardy, 2008). Reform leaders like Zhu Rongji saw a strong
link between external and internal reforms. They viewed China’s WTO agreements
as a ‘credible commitment’ to the continued pursuit of market outcomes to which
domestic players, especially major SOEs, would be compelled to adjust. From this
perspective, the domestic impact of external reforms may have exceeded the direct
benefits of WTO entry.
9.5.4 Outcomes since 1995
Industrial growth accelerated during this period (Table 9.1). The output share of
textiles and food processing continued to decline, while machinery’s share rose to
almost half (Table 9.7).12 The southeast coast continued to advance, raising its
output share to 45.8 per cent by 2008 (Table 9.4).
While manufactured exports grew rapidly, China’s rapidly expanding, highly
competitive, and increasingly demanding domestic market absorbed over 80 per cent
12 The extraordinarily high share of machinery in GVIO in 2008 may in part reflect inaccurately
recorded relative price trends.
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of incremental manufacturing output during both sub-periods of the reform era
(Table 9.3). Formostmanufacturers, the opportunity to sell into this domesticmarket,
the world’s largest for products ranging from autos tomobile phones and nuclear power
equipment, provided the biggest boost to growth. Although market opening has
allowed foreign-linked firms to gain ground in a number of sectors, domestic enter-
prises have achieved strong competitive positions, in some cases—beer, home appli-
ances, heavy construction equipment—recapturing market share initially ceded to
foreign operators. As of 2008, domestic firms accounted for over three-fourths of
industrial output (Table 9.5).13
The reforms increased the incentives for firms to invest in capability building, as
well as their ability to upgrade. Incremental innovation and upgrading allowed
firms to narrow the productivity gap vis-à-vis domestic and international leaders,
similar to recent developments elsewhere in Asia as well as China’s longer-term
catch-up dating from the late nineteenth century. FDI, which accelerated following
Deng Xiaoping’s southern trip (1992) and continued at high levels thereafter, was a
major contributor (Table 9.9). A significant portion of the FDI originated from
relatively small firms based in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Large multinationals like
Boeing, General Electric, Hitachi, and Volkswagen also established substantial
Chinese operations.
Foreign firms initially focused on using Chinese land and labour to reduce
production costs for components and final goods sold overseas. ‘Processing’
exports, an arrangement that allows duty-free importation of materials and com-
ponents, propelled Chinese engagement with global production chains. As foreign
firms gained familiarity with the rising capabilities of Chinese manufacturers, they
turned to domestic suppliers to source an increasing range of components and help
lower costs. This multiplied the dispersion of international standards and advanced
business practices (inventory management, production scheduling, quality control,
etc.) among domestic manufacturers, as the supply chain of a single assembly plant
for vehicles or electrical equipment can involve thousands of component and
material vendors. Finally, in anticipation of rapidly rising incomes and a growing
middle class, FDI was increasingly directed toward serving the growing domestic
market, a shift that intensified competition in many domestic product categories.
The experience of Chinese firms in telecoms and construction equipment
illustrates the contribution of openness and liberalization to industrial upgrading.
Huawei, initially dismissed as technically weak by both Chinese planners and their
MNE partners, followed the path of China’s pre-war ‘match king’ by building
expertise in neglected markets—first in small cities in China’s interior and then in
Africa—to develop innovative products that subsequently penetrated high-end
markets both within and outside China (Brandt and Thun, 2013). Reflecting
13 PRC statistics classify the entire output of firms with any offshore (including Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Macao) ownership, no matter how small, as ‘foreign’. The practice of ‘round-tripping,’ in
which domestic funds are moved offshore and then repatriated to take advantage of regulatory
provisions favouring foreign capital, leads official data to overstate output from foreign-linked firms
by an undetermined, but probably declining, amount.
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spillovers from China’s growing R & D expenditures (Hu and Jefferson, 2008),
research engineers designed inexpensive concrete pumps that allowed Sany, an
obscure Hunan start-up, to develop into an internationally competitive manufac-
ture of construction equipment (Brandt and Thun, 2015).
Growing market penetration and rising unit values confirm the growing sophis-
tication and rapid upward migration of Chinese manufactured exports along
international price/quality ladders (Schott, 2008; Mandel, 2013). The domestic
(Chinese) content of exports has increased significantly, reflecting a deepening of
local supply chains and capabilities (Kee and Tang, 2016). Manufacturing prod-
uctivity growth, largely coming from the entry of new firms, now parallels the
achievements of other successful economies during periods of similarly rapid
industrial expansion (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012). The most
dynamic outcomes are in sectors that are highly contested and readily accessible
to foreign investors, and which obstruct neither entry nor exit by domestic firms
(Brandt, Rawski, and Sutton, 2008; Brandt and Thun, 2015; Brandt et al., 2012,
revised 2015).
At the same time, there is large-scale inefficiency within individual sectors: Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) conclude that reducing efficiency gaps between firms within
sectors to levels observed in US manufacturing could have raised productivity in
China’s factories by 30–50 per cent during 1998–2005. Preferential access to
capital, energy and other key inputs is the likely culprit for these costs, which
often show up in the form of excess capacity in firms and sectors. Table 9.11 reveals
big differences in productivity dynamics between sectors with 1998 SOE output
shares above or below 50 per cent. For sectors in which SOEs contributed the
majority of 1998 output, outcomes are uniformly weak: continuing firms contrib-
ute negatively to productivity growth, as do new entrants, including new private
firms—meaning that new firms enter with productivity levels below those of
incumbents. For sectors with 1998 SOE shares below 50 per cent, the picture is
Table 9.11. Sectoral SOE shares and TFP growth, 1998–2007
Sectors Total change in in TFP Sources of change in TFP
Within Between Entry Exit
SOE share > 0.50 0.117 0.048 0.007 0.080 0.004
SOE share < 0.50 0.208 0.050 0.024 0.175 0.007
All sectors 0.107 0.019 0.014 0.096 0.006
Notes:
1 Changes in TFP are based on estimates for a gross output function. TFP growth on a value-added basis can be
obtained by multiplying these estimates by 1/V, where V is value added as a percentage of gross output. A value-
added ratio of 0.25 implies TFP growth on a value-added basis that is four times higher than on a gross output basis.
2 Sector shares for SOEs are based on data for 1998.
3 ‘Within’ represents the growth in productivity amongst firms operating in both 1998 and 2007; ‘between’ is the
growth in TFP coming from the reallocation of resources to more productive firms; ‘entry’ is from new firms not in
the sample in 1998 but present in 2007; and ‘exit’ is from firms operating in 1998, but no longer operating by 2007.
Source: Calculations based on firm-level data.
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the opposite, with productivity rising, primarily because entering firms deliver
above-average results, thus boosting sector-wide outcomes.
Our survey ends with a profound contradiction. As China navigates the fourth
decade of a transition that produced results beyond anyone’s wildest dreams, the
strategy of placing state-owned firms at the core of the nation’s development plans,
a constant feature of economic policy making dating from the Chiang Kai-shek
administration of the 1930s, emerges yet again as an obstacle to the achievement of
ambitious economic goals. With the current administration seemingly committed
to the traditional policy of populating the economy’s commanding heights with
state enterprises, we must ask whether the economy’s forward momentum will be
sufficient to carry the costs associated with state ownership.
9.6 CONCLUSION
Since its inception during the second half of the nineteenth century, modern industry
in China has amassed an enviable record of rapid growth. Only the Second World
War halted the long-term expansion of output, and even then on-going capacity
growth pushed output to unprecedented levels once hostilities came to an end.
China’s initial forays into manufacturing clustered around Shanghai and the
southeastern coastal provinces, regions that subsequently maintained their lead-
ing position even as modern industry spread across China’s cities and penetrated
into the countryside. Nineteenth-century industrialization combined official
ventures oriented toward defence-related sectors and private efforts focused on
mechanized processing of farm products. Following several decades of mainly
private initiatives oriented toward labour-intensive consumer manufactures,
Japan’s annexation of Manchuria in 1931 prompted a shift toward military-
linked producer products and public ownership that continues to occupy a
major plank of Chinese economic strategy.
Industrial expansion has involved qualitative change along with growing output
volume. The initially narrow range of domestic manufactured goods has expanded
dramatically. Chinese firms now populate every industrial segment. In a growing
array of sectors, leading Chinese manufacturers can compete with leading multi-
nationals. In sector after sector—yarn, machine tools, power generating equipment,
computers—the transition of Chinese goods from laggards to formidable rivals
follows a common path. Imports of novel products establish a market that domestic
firms seek to penetrate. Their efforts, initially based on imitation, result in the
production of cheap, low-quality domestic substitutes. Some of these producers of
inferior goods mobilize sufficient capabilities to upgrade their products, thus
beginning the ascent of that particular sector’s price–quality ladder.
Crucial for growth, capability accumulation, and upgrading are openness to
international flows of goods, capital, people, technology, and ideas; domestic
market liberalization; and supportive institutions. We see these as mutually reinfor-
cing, although Chinese reality defies simple analysis, and there may be substitutes
for these essential ingredients (for example, personal networks extending into the
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ranks of government and Communist Party officials may partially offset the absence
of secure property rights in today’s PRC). The 1910s and 1920s saw substantial
growth with minimal official support. Between 1949 and 1978, the PRC’s planned
economy delivered both rapid growth and considerable expansion of capabilities
with limited openness and no domestic liberalization. And the current reform era
has produced an astonishing burst of growth and upgrading in the face of massive
institutional deficits and considerably less openness or liberalization than existed in
the early twentieth century.
The objective of ‘enriching the nation and strengthening the army’ motivated
official behaviour throughout our period, though the capacity of the state to
underwrite militarily significant industrial efforts expanded hugely under the
PRC. The shift from market dominance toward state control, conventionally
attributed to the inception of Soviet-type planning during the 1950s, actually
began much earlier. Chiang Kai-shek’s Nanjing government began to embrace
planning and state ownership from 1931; in the northeast, Japanese influence
propelled a similar shift as early as the late 1910s. The question of the benefits
and costs of state ownership, management, and control has thus permeated Chinese
policy discussions during the past eighty years, and remains central today.
Looking ahead, we can anticipate continued deepening of industrial capabilities
through multiple channels: domestic and overseas education, accumulation of
production and marketing experience, increasing domestic R & D outlays, learning
from large-scale inward and outbound FDI, and energetic, well-funded promotion
of officially mandated nodes of ‘indigenous innovation’. At the same time,
immense industrial advance coexists with staggering inefficiency, an outcome that
extends across multiple institutional settings—extensive planning with near-total
public ownership prior to 1978, the initial reform period of the 1980s and early
1990s, and the more open and further liberalized system of the last two decades.
This chapter resonates with a larger body of work that highlights state-owned
industry as the chief contributor to the vast inefficiencies that litter China’s
development path. It is not simply that SOEs, led by Communist Party appointees
who must juggle (often conflicting) commercial and political objectives, have
recorded consistently weak cost, profit, and productivity performance. We now
have ample evidence that state ownership slows overall growth and impinges on
financial stability and structural change.
China’s leaders are well aware of these costs, and presumably understand that on-
going efforts to attack corruption, encourage strong firms to absorb weak rivals, and
exhort participants to follow official priorities cannot succeed where past reforms
have failed. However, the value to Chinese elites of a large and growing state sector,
which provides a treasure house of patronage and rents as well as an army of
powerful and responsive subordinates, banishes serious consideration of sweeping
SOE privatization from the current policy agenda.
Will China’s on-going momentum continue to override the current system’s
immense costs, maintaining something approaching the rapid progress of the past
several decades? Might SOE giants slow the pace of innovation by blocking or
absorbing potential rivals? Will SOE service oligopolies escalate system costs as
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the integration of telecoms and other services with manufacturing advances? Only
time will tell.
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From Artisanal Production to Machine Tools
Industrialization in India over the Long Run
Bishnupriya Gupta and Tirthankar Roy
10.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter documents India’s transition from artisanal production to a modern
industrial economy. India’s comparative advantage as the dominant producer and
exporter of cotton textiles in the world in the eighteenth century was based on
cheap labour and skills acquired through family-based artisanal production over
generations. This advantage disappeared with the advent of the capital-using
technology of the Industrial Revolution. The increased output per worker achieved
by substituting capital for labour dramatically reduced the cost of cotton yarn and
cloth. Over the nineteenth century British producers displaced Indian handloom
products, first in the world market and over time in the Indian domestic market,
leading to the decline of Indian artisanal production. The share of local products in
total consumption declined to 40 per cent by the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. From this trough a recovery was led by a modern textile industry,
organized in factories and using new technology imported from Britain. At the
same time, other industries such as jute and tea also began to adopt new technology
borrowed from the industrial countries. In the early twentieth century there were
signs of revival and growth in artisan industries as well.
The fortunes of cotton textiles reflect the path of Indian industrialization: rise
and fall of artisanal production followed by import substitution in simple consumer
goods during the colonial period. A more mature phase saw a rise in the share of
machinery and equipment including machine tools. The fortunes of this industry
in the world market in part reflect the policy regimes of various governments: from
merchant-ruler (the East India Company) and British colonial government to the
more developmental state of independent India. This chapter focuses on the
emergence of a modern industrial sector. It is both a narrative history of what
happened and an attempt to explain the specific features of Indian industrialization.
10.2 1800–1947
Indian industrialization can be conveniently divided into two stages. The first was
the colonial period (1858–1947) when the economy was open to trade, migration,
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and foreign investment, and state regulation was limited in scope. The second stage
began with the post-colonial period, when import-substituting industrialization
was implemented under state intervention (1947–c.1985).
The historiography of Indian industrialization in the colonial period tries to
explain three long-term processes, each one directly or indirectly connected with
the defining features of the time—openness and limited state intervention. These
three processes are: de-industrialization or decline of the handicraft industries in the
early nineteenth century, modest revival of the handicrafts in the twentieth century,
and the rise and growth of factories from the 1860s. The latter process had a few
peculiar features: (a) industrialization was concentrated in a few cities and towns,
and until the First World War, almost entirely confined to Bombay, Calcutta, and
Madras; (b) the composition of products manufactured was narrow, and there was
little production of machines or intermediate goods; (c) none of the textbook
preconditions for industrialization—cheap capital, high saving, agricultural revo-
lution, or an activist state—were present in India in the 1850s, and (d) despite the
growth in manufacturing, politicians and businesses after 1947 decided to change
the paradigm completely from the one that had produced the industrialization.
10.2.1 De-industrialization
First, let us consider de-industrialization. Indian artisans had the largest share of the
world cotton textile market in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The onset
of colonialism and the adoption of free trade as a tenet of British economic
policy in India coincided with the Industrial Revolution, which shifted the
balance of advantage in cotton textile production from Indian artisans to British
factories (Broadberry and Gupta, 2009). A recent paper suggests that political and
ecological crises in eighteenth-century India may have contributed to that shift
(Clingingsmith and Williamson, 2008). Depending on the scale and availability of
alternative employment, the resultant de-industrialization could have caused a
consumption crisis and general economic decline, in addition to a decline in India’s
relative position in the world economy.
Reliable and direct measurement of the extent of the decline in handicraft
employment cannot be found, because during the peak period of the decline
(1820–80) few data were collected on employment and production. Indirect
measures by Bagchi (1976) and Twomey (1983) suggest that the decline was
large. There is some evidence also of a general economic depression between
1820 and 1840 in southern India, especially the Deccan uplands, which the fall
in artisanal employment may have exacerbated. Reports on famines in 1876 and
1896, again in the Deccan plateau, mention textile artisans coming to relief camps
in large numbers and enlisting for emigration to British colonies abroad. However,
such facts and the available research do not add up to a detailed picture of what
happened after Manchester textiles began to be imported into India in large
quantities, c.1820.
We can do slightly better by working backwards from the state of the artisanal
textile industry in 1900. It is possible to say that the impact of imports was
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significant on hand spinning of cotton yarn, and modest on handloom weaving
of cloth. With the fall of spinning, an industrial activity that was once present in
many regions and employed several million women disappeared. By implication,
craft employment concentrated and became more male-biased. Possibly because
so many of those displaced were part-time female workers, direct testimony of
those made unemployed remains exceedingly rare. Outside cotton textiles, a
de-industrializing process can be inferred in iron and steel, but again this cannot
be measured precisely. As in textiles, the decline in iron seems to have been
concentrated in the production of intermediate goods, namely pig iron, rather
than in the iron products industry. The smelter was more likely than the black-
smith to become unemployed due to imports.
10.2.2 Revival of Handicrafts
The revival of artisan industry dates from around 1900. Although employment in
the crafts continued to fall between 1881 and 1931, the fall affected women
household workers mainly, whereas male full-time workers were unaffected
(Thorner, 1962). Despite the fall, 10 million artisans were reported to be working
in 1901, and 90 per cent of industrial employment remained in handicrafts—that
is, located in households or small workshops using hand tools—and fell outside the
scope of factory acts. Output, income, and wages, too, did not fall in the first half of
the twentieth century, and in some key instances they rose. Detailed national
income statistics of acceptable quality start in 1900. Between 1900 and 1946
total net domestic product in small industry increased slowly (Fig. 10.3 below),
but net product per worker increased by 40 per cent between 1900 and 1935.
Between 1901 and 1939, the production of hand-woven cloth increased from 207
to 406 million square yards, implying a 127 per cent increase in output per loom
and a 200 per cent increase in output per worker. Iron and steel data suggest a
successful import substitution by domestic producers including artisans.
Evidence such as this has spurred scholarship suggesting that artisans should be
seen as an example of industrialization rather than de-industrialization (Roy, 1999).
Factory production grew much faster than handicrafts, but handicrafts remained
stable rather than disappearing (Fig. 10.3). The new scholarship has shown that
artisan textile producers survived because of consumer preference; they served
customers who wanted handmade consumer goods for reasons of status, ritual, or
display, or demanded a high degree of customization and product differentiation.
These traditional preferences, however, were changing from the late nineteenth
century along with migration, urbanization, and the emergence of a middle class.
Artisans met these challenges with a variety of strategies, often by applying trad-
itional decorative skills to modern utilitarian objects. They borrowed technologies
and material from abroad, partly adopted the factory form of work, relocated
towards major markets for their goods, and built close ties with cotton mills or the
world market for the supply of cheap rawmaterials like yarn, dyes, metal thread, and
synthetic fibre. The main sites of the re-organization process were small towns that
received migrant artisans from depressed regions. These towns had easy access to big
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ports and consumer markets, yet avoided the high real estate prices and wages of the
city. Somewhat similarly, artisanal industrialization is called ‘small town capitalism’
in a recent study of handloom weaving in western India (Haynes, 2012).
This scholarship usefully draws a connection between the colonial-period trans-
formation of the crafts and the large number of small industrial firms present in
post-colonial India. Handicrafts represented one root, but not the only root, of
modern small-scale industry. Rural non-farm industry was another. Flourishing
agricultural trade encouraged a variety of agro-processing industries involving rice,
oilseeds, groundnut, or cotton. These tasks were done in small, usually seasonal,
and partially mechanized factories, not of artisanal origin.
10.2.3 Growth of Factories
The third large process is the rise of factories. Officially, the definition of ‘factory’ in
the factory acts was a unit that employed at least 100 workers and used power (1881
Factory Act). Not all large units were covered, however. The seasonal units just
mentioned were not covered until 1911. On the other hand, cotton spinning and
weaving mills, jute spinning and weaving mills, factories manufacturing cane sugar,
paper, and wool textiles, and steel factories using the blast furnace were usually
covered. In short, despite some flexibility in the definition, factories in colonial India
meant units employing mechanical power, usually perennial, hiring on average
several hundred workers, and subject to the application of the factory acts.
Between 1860 and 1940, employment in factories increased from less than
100,000 to 2 million (see Table 10.1 for available data on employment). Between
1900 and 1947, real national income originating in factories rose by 4.3 per cent per
annum, and factory employment at 3.6 per cent (Sivasubramonian, 2000, pp. 201–3,
287–8, 293–4). In 1940, the port cities of Bombay and Calcutta and their immediate
neighbourhoods were homes to about 200,000 factory workers each.
By some benchmarks, the growth of modern mechanized factories in India was
an exceptional phenomenon in the tropical world. India had an earlier start than
most late industrializing countries in the non-Western world. It led the contem-
porary developing world in two major industries of the Industrial Revolution,
cotton textiles and iron and steel. In 1910, 55 per cent of the cotton spindles
installed outside Europe, North America and Japan were installed in India.
Table 10.1. Employment in factories (thousands)




1925 330 1,518 140
1935 295 1,611 270
Source: India, Statistical Abstracts for British India. Calcutta: Government Press, various years.
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In 1935, 50 per cent of the steel produced outside Europe, North America, and
Japan was produced in India (BKS, 1950). There were by then several concentra-
tions of factory workers in the tropics, but possibly none with more factory workers
than Bombay and Calcutta.
The impact of industrialization on the structure of the economy was limited,
possibly more so in India than in the contemporary developing world. For example,
countries in Latin America enjoyed higher inter-war industrial growth rates than
India. As Figs 10.1 and 10.2 show, industry and services (trade, finance, transpor-
tation) experienced growth in the first half of the twentieth century, but the
increase in their share of total GDP was modest. And yet, the extent of structural
change in the fifty years before independence was not very different from that
which occurred in the thirty years after independence (Fig. 10.2). It was only in the
final decade of the twentieth century that the share of agriculture in GDP was











































































Fig. 10.1. Changes in GDP and its components in 1948–9 prices
Source: Sivasubramonian (2000, Appendices 7 and 8).
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reflected the fact that manufacturing enterprises remained concentrated in a few
cities before 1947. The industrial sector was dominated by small-scale and cottage
industry in 1900. In 1947 this still carried the same weight in industrial output as
manufacturing, and it remained a significant part of the industrial sector even in
2000 (see Fig. 10.3). This, along with a slow-moving primary sector and rapid
population growth, implied a disastrous early-twentieth-century economic record
overall.
Nevertheless, the scale of factory expansion was sufficiently large to raise the
question of why it happened at all.
10.2.4 Origin of Modern Industry
In chronological terms, India was a late industrializer. But as a type it was not, if,
following accepted convention, we identify late industrialization with state inter-
vention in exchange or production (Amsden, 1991). In the discourse on inter-
national development, the idea that an activist state could overcome the problems
associated with arriving late lives on as ‘big push’, ‘embedded autonomy’, ‘devel-
opmental state’, and ‘governed market’—some of these labels were coined to

















Agriculture Mining and industry Services
Fig. 10.2. GDP (1948–9 prices) by sector, 1901–2000 (per cent of total)
Source: Sivasubramonian (2000, Appendices 7 and 8).
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manipulates tariffs or regulates banks or manages the import of technology (Chang,
1999). The British colonial state in India was not an activist state in any of these
senses. Not until late in the inter-war period did it set economic development as
one of its goals. Until then a loosely defined notion of ‘improvement’ was some-
times cited by the regime as an aim, but improvement did not have a clear
economic content, far less an industrializing one.
Nor were resource endowments and factor prices favourable for Indian indus-
trialization. Received wisdom states that Britain industrialized under free market
conditions thanks to favourable factor prices—that is, relatively low costs of capital
and energy but high wages—and productive and energy-intensive agriculture
which generated savings for investment and created path dependence in techno-
logical choices (Allen, 2009; Wrigley, 2006). Around 1850 in India, interest rates
were two-to-three times higher than in the financial centres of Europe. The savings
rate was around 5 per cent of GDP in 1920. Indian agriculture was characterized by
some of the lowest yields even in the tropics. India’s artisans may have been skilled
but they had little access to the expensive capital market to start factories.
Why then did India industrialize at all? An answer can be offered using a business
history approach. That is, instead of looking at the cost of resources, we can also
consider transaction costs in factor markets, or the cost of accessing capital and
labour. Port cities in the nineteenth century created the prospect of a unique
encounter between European knowledge and skills on the one hand and India’s
advanced commercial tradition on the other, which reduced the transaction costs in
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Fig. 10.3. Shares of industrial output (per cent)
Source: Sivasubramonian (2000, Appendices 7 and 8).
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In the nineteenth century, the world was transformed by a revolution in
transport and communication, and by industrialization in the British Isles. The
resultant growth in world trade, along with migration of capital and labour, was
directly or indirectly aided by the expansion of British political and military power.
By 1858, the British ruled over much of India. The Indian port cities met these
developments from a position of advantage. During the time that the East India
Company conducted trade from these bases, the cities had grown in population,
shipping, and scale of international and coastal trade. Between 1860 and 1940, the
ports had been connected with the interior by railways and telegraph. They
exported huge quantities of cotton, grain, seeds, indigo, and opium, and imported
British textiles, machinery and metals, and chemicals from Germany and Belgium.
Merchant firms engaged in these businesses were Indian, European, and Indo-
European.
Although Europeans dominated the handicrafts export business, India’s mer-
chant capitalists dominated the export business in agricultural commodities.
Further, because exports were dominated by agricultural goods, overseas trade,
overland trade, and indigenous banking became ever more interdependent in the
nineteenth century. Land trade and caravan trade in textiles, grain or cotton had
been well developed before British rule, and bankers who financed long-distance
trade could be found in the major towns located on rivers and caravan routes.
As the Mughal Empire collapsed from the 1720s, a number of these merchants and
bankers migrated, first to the capitals of rising states such as Hyderabad, Lucknow,
and Pune, and later in the nineteenth century to the British Indian ports. Here, a
string of British and European trading firms purchased agricultural commodities
for export from merchants specializing in overland trade. The merchants them-
selves were financed not by the small number of corporate banks, but by indigenous
bankers and money-lenders. By 1920, the biggest market for rediscounting of
indigenous trade bills, the hundi, was located not in the interior, but in Bombay
and Calcutta. These cities, thus, had an institutional edge over the interior.
The port cities also attracted skilled migrant workers from Britain more easily
than did market towns in the interior of India. Capital and labour migration had
been earlier constrained by the Company’s monopoly charter, which restricted the
establishment of new banks as well as free migration of European artisans, not to
mention private merchants. In 1813, the charter ended in India, and an influx of
European artisans and merchants began. Bombay’s cotton exporters already had
sufficient trading links with Liverpool, and went to England often enough to
consider buying machinery and hiring foremen from there and setting up cotton
mills in Bombay. The growth of modern enterprise, therefore, turned India into a
net buyer of services from abroad. Excluding the government account, the net
balance of payments met (out of a trade surplus) the salaries and pensions
of engineers, foremen, artisans, teachers, doctors, managers, and scientists who
migrated from abroad.
Pioneers in modern industry came from communities that had specialized in
trading and banking activities, with some stake in the port cities. On the western
coast, the Parsis, Khojas, Bhatias, bankers based in Ahmedabad, and the Bombay-
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based Baghdadi Jews, were the owners of mills. Some of these people had earlier
traded in the Arabian Sea. Others, like the Parsis, joined trade after coming into
contact with the Company and people connected with it. In Calcutta, Madras, and
Kanpur, as well as the regions that formed their hinterland, Europeans dominated
import–export trade, banking and insurance, and eventually jute, engineering,
mines, plantations, railways, power, and dockyard. Commodity trade, however,
was not in European hands, but in the hands of Indian traders, chiefly the
Marwaris. By the end of the inter-war period, prominent Marwari firms in Calcutta
had entered the jute industry, and on a smaller scale sugar, paper, cement,
construction, and share broking.
An industrial entrepreneur in 1850 needed to solve two problems: raising large
sums of money cheaply, and running unfamiliar machines. How well did they solve
the problems?
10.2.5 Institutional Features
The financial and commercial origin of industrialists suggests that their key contri-
bution lay in raising money for long-term investment. This was a difficult task in a
world that offered a huge premium for seasonal agricultural loans. The mill-owners
solved the problem of pooling large amounts of capital for investment, initially by
using community networks, and later by adopting andmaking use of the joint-stock
company organization. Corporate law followed these developments (Companies Act
and amendments, 1850, 1857, 1860, 1866, 1882), and made raising money from
the public easier. A particular institutional innovation, the managing agency con-
tract, saved on scarce managerial resources and, by allowing a contracted remuner-
ation to managers, reduced risks of financial loss to the managers.
There were, however, differences in corporate strategy along ethnic lines. Some
authors suggest that Indians and Europeans specialized in different fields, consistent
with their respective information and resource advantages (Morris, 1979; Gupta,
2014). Europeans raised money from London; the shares were purchased by
other Europeans. Indians raised money from family and community resources.
Europeans sold goods in export markets, through a transportation and communi-
cation network centred in London. Indians sold goods in India and China. The
picture of specialization contrasts somewhat with an alternative picture of rivalry.
Bagchi (1997), for example, suggests that in colonial Calcutta there were informal
guilds that developed along ethnic lines that regarded each other with hostility.
Direct evidence on racialist sentiments and how they worked remains scarce and
anecdotal. Legally, race was not recognized in commercial law.
Besides, there were many examples of crossovers and collaborations cutting
across ethnic divisions. In the inter-war period, a growing number of European
capitalists set up small manufacturing firms. In relatively new areas of factory
enterprise, such as sugar mills, Indian and European capital was present almost
equally. The picture of antagonism between Indians and Europeans is largely an
effect of the increasingly tense political situation of the 1930s that eventually
destroyed the foundation of the British Empire in South Asia.
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Although Indian industrialists successfully solved the problem of financing
industrialization in a high-cost capital market, they had a rather poor record in
attaining technical efficiency on the shop floor. Labour productivity and total factor
productivity (TFP) were low in Indian factories, a syndrome variously attributed to
the capitalists’ preference for risk aversion (Tripathi, 1996), quality of labour
(Wolcott, 1994), degree of unionization (Wolcott and Clark, 1999), and labour
market institutions (Roy, 2008; Gupta, 2011a). Although both India and Japan
were low-wage textile producers around 1920, Japanese cotton textiles succeeded in
the Indian market in the inter-war period thanks in part to greater efficiency from
the start, and in part to indigenization of textile machine production, which made a
shift from mule to ring spinning more feasible in Japan (Kiyokawa, 1983). If the
Japanese mill-owners took interest in technology, no such top-down interest in
technology was in evidence in India. Persistence with British standards made for
technological inertia. Such generalizations can seem overdrawn because Bombay’s
mills were extremely heterogeneous in respect of their openness to innovation. But
there is no question that average Indian productivity, however measured, was low.
Too much attention to these Indian ‘failures’ can lead to an oversight of learning
by doing at the work site. In the inter-war period, the percentage of Europeans
among the supervisory staff in cotton mills fell sharply, from well over half to less
than a quarter. Major fields of British-Indian engineering, such as railways, tele-
graphs, and canal construction, reveal numerous instances where British standards
were modified to suit Indian conditions (Derbyshire, 1995). The diffusion of the
stationary steam engine is another example of absorption and adaptation (Tann
and Aitken, 1992). The progressive substitution of Indian foremen for foreign
engineers proceeded apace in railway workshops, arsenal factories, field telegraphs,
cadastral surveys, mineral prospecting, geological surveys, and meteorological
services, along with cotton and jute factories. Civil engineering colleges started
being established from the mid-nineteenth century (Ambirajan, 1995).
By the time independence came in 1947, the indigenous component in the
technical and engineering workforce in the public services was prominent, and
vocal as a lobby, pushing for more public investment in engineering education.
Why did the industrialization drive remain so concentrated in a few locations?
A chronological account can answer that question to some extent.
10.2.6 Major Industries, Industrial Cities, and the World
Wars, 1860–1947
Standard narratives of Indian industrialization are detailed regarding the early
twentieth century, but relatively less clear on the eighteenth-century origins
(Bagchi, 1972; Morris, 1983; Ray, 1979). A connected story drawing on existing
scholarship and other sources is in order.
Calcutta became the capital of the newly acquired Company territories in India
in 1772. By 1800, Calcutta had a sizeable settlement of Europeans and Indo-
Europeans. The Company’s military enterprise as well as the civilian population
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needed goods to be made locally, but that could not be procured easily from Indian
artisans in the required number or quality. Cannons, small arms, hardware,
glassware, cutlery, footwear and saddles, wines and spirits, and carriages, are some
examples. Ships and boats were more easily repaired on the coasts by indigenous
artisans who served the Indian seafaring groups. But the repair of ocean-going ships
and gunships required skills that were not easily available.
Between 1772 and 1813, Henry Watson, a Company officer, James Kyd, an
Indian-born artisan of mixed parents, and officers of the Company in Calcutta,
established docks, shipyards, and ship-repairing stations on the Calcutta riverfront.
They also started a cannon foundry and a distillery (these and other examples are
discussed in Roy, 2013). Some of these enterprises were erected in abandoned
premises that had existed from the early days of British settlement in Calcutta.
Around 1780, a blast furnace was ordered, but not delivered. Some of the pion-
eering modern factory units were started soon after the charter ended in 1813: for
example, the first steam-powered factory producing cotton yarn, which appeared in
a river-front site called Fort Gloster in 1817 or 1818, and the famous charcoal-iron-
smelting workshop in Porto Novo, a small port on the southeastern coast.
In Bombay, the origin of factories was somewhat different. Long before 1813,
the Company’s shipbuilding and ship-repairing tasks had been performed by the
Parsi artisans of Surat and Bombay. Parsis worked in close partnership with the
Europeans, and established a strong hold on ship-repair by keeping apprenticeship
confined to the community. Young members of Parsi shipwright families were
sponsored to be trained in England. These strategies led to an unusual degree of
Parsi dominance in the dockyard in Bombay by 1840. When the charter ended in
1813, the Company sold its ships at a discount, which the Parsis purchased to
conduct trade with Aden, Africa, and China. Profits made in these trades
were redirected at first to real estate and financial speculation, and eventually to
manufacturing industry.
Meanwhile, as warfare became more frequent in northern India, Indian capital-
ists left the moribund and declining cities in the interior and moved to the port
cities under the Company’s control. A number of unusual partnerships resulted
from the joint influx of Europeans and Indians into the port cities. These were
known as ‘agency houses’ in Calcutta. On a more limited scale these European and
Indo-European partnerships appeared in Bombay and Madras as well. Few of these
agency houses engaged in manufacturing or mining, but one or two exceptional
ones did, such as Carr Tagore of Calcutta. In the mid-nineteenth century, more
individuals with a stake in Indo-China trade became interested in factories. When
the administration of India passed to the British Crown in 1857, a new set of
people, who had been engaged in manufacturing or trade in the British industrial
towns, came to India. Some of them had access to the London money market. They
moved into industrial enterprise directly, especially in Calcutta.
The number of cotton textile mills increased from 1854 in Bombay. About the
same time, a jute textile industry began to grow in Calcutta. A cotton mill industry
also began in British-ruled Gujarat, especially Ahmedabad, from a slightly later
date. Although Ahmedabad was not on the overseas trading map, as Bombay and
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Calcutta were, there were specialized banking houses or pedhis in Ahmedabad.
They performed money changing, issued and discounted bills of exchange, lent
to governments, and occasionally took up revenue contracts. In 1880, there were
58 mills in India with an employment of 40,000. By 1914, the number of mills had
risen to 271, and average daily employment to about 260,000.
The Calcutta jute mills were a European enterprise. Jute is a natural fibre grown
mainly in southern West Bengal and Bangladesh. It was used as a raw material for
sacking cloth. The demand for sacks increased in the nineteenth century in
proportion with the volume of the international grain trade. Until the 1870s,
Bengal raw jute was processed into sacking mainly in Dundee and Germany. But
already by then, mechanized jute spinning and weaving had started near Calcutta,
with considerable inflow of capital from Dundee. Between 1869 and 1913, the
number of mills increased from 5 to 64, and employment from 5–10,000 to
215,000.
Between 1860 and 1914, the main market for Indian mill-spun cotton yarn was
among the handloom weavers in China. A broad division of labour was maintained
between Lancashire and Bombay in the Indian market for yarn, the former
specializing in finer counts and middle-quality cloths, and the latter in coarser
counts of yarn. A serious Indianization of the market began only around the turn of
the century when Bombay lost the China market to Japan. Mills in Bombay started
weaving their own yarn, and spinning and weaving finer counts of yarn. Both these
moves brought the Indian mills into direct competition with Lancashire.
In metallurgy and engineering, factories were slow to develop, but emerged from
around the First World War. The drive towards import substitution was always
present in iron, which was one of the biggest import items. The drive had led to a
number of state-sponsored charcoal-iron-smelting enterprises in the early nine-
teenth century being set up by British artisans and adventurers. Almost all of them
failed, mainly because significant iron deposits occurred in regions that were
relatively inaccessible before the railways. Private European-style blast furnaces,
foundry shops, rolling mills, and mechanical forges only became successful around
1900, when sources of coal, manganese, limestone, and iron were linked to the
railway system, and the expansion in demand from the railways for rolling stock,
rails, sleepers, wires, bars, and rods reinforced the drive to promote local produc-
tion. Coke smelting was becoming more common, and the development of mineral
prospecting revealed important information about those inputs necessary in a blast
furnace that were available within the easy reach of railways. An ordnance factory of
Calcutta and a civil engineering school in Roorkee had metalworking shops, and by
the First World War had produced hundreds of locally trained workers with
experience in metallurgy.
Without these developments it would be hard to explain why Tata Steel, a
project conceived in the 1880s, needed more than twenty years before it was
considered ready for implementation. Almost from the start, the company owned
an integrated steel factory, but also mines, transportation, and a coal washery. Judging
by relative factor costs, India should not have gone into steel making. But it did,
thanks to the confidence of Jamsetji Tata, and also to data available from geological
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surveys, an Indo-European advisory team, easy access to European know-how, and
purchase contracts from the European-owned railways.
Large factories were few and far between outside these examples and outside the
port cities. Ahmedabad has been mentioned; Madras developed a European textile
industry. Among the other exceptional ventures of nineteenth-century origin, and
located outside the ports, were two woollen textile mills at Dhariwal in Punjab and
at Kanpur. Kanpur was an emerging factory centre, an important army base, and a
source of army supplies since the Indian mutiny (1857), and both towns were
situated on, or conveniently close to, trade routes in country wool. A few woollen
mills were also set up in Bombay and Bangalore towards the end of the nineteenth
century, after railway connection improved their access to wool originating in the
interior tracts of Rajputana and Mysore.
In the inter-war period, by contrast, the majority of factory enterprises were
small in scale and located away from the ports. Examples include a number of rice
mills on the Madras coast, sugar mills in the Gangetic plains, and brick and
tile works in southwestern India (Yanagisawa, 2010). At the same time, there was
also a significant expansion of cotton mills and cotton gins and presses in the
princely states.
The First World War was a landmark event. Indian jute bags, cotton canvas and
tent cloth, and military clothing were in great demand. But disruption to supplies
of machinery, raw materials, spares, and chemicals normally imported from Britain
or Germany caused inflation. As the war progressed, industry overcame some of
these supply constraints, and began to make large profits. The long-term impact of
the war was a change in official policy. Until the war, the government followed a
hands-off policy in respect of Indian industry, and a buy-British policy in respect of
purchases for defence, railways or administration. Manchester textile interests had
until then successfully countered moves to protect the Indian textile industry. After
the war, the government began to look towards local sources and became more
open to promoting such sources by means of protective tariffs. In cotton, protective
tariffs became available, with the understanding that a new framework of prefer-
ential trade within the empire would minimize the losses to British industry.
The First World War had another effect. It enabled big business to expand, and
made the leading entrepreneurs take an interest in national politics.
10.2.7 Business and Politics in the Inter-war Years
In the 1920s, the nationalist movement for political reform and independence
under M. K. Gandhi’s leadership began to attract funds from Indian merchants and
industrialists. The dependence was mutual, for inter-war India confronted Indian
industrialists with the ever more pressing need to seek political intermediation.
One impetus was the increasingly militant trade unions in the cities; others
included the government’s currency policy, and crises in jute and cotton.
Indian business firms had a long-standing grievance against the empire. They
resented the close control that London exercised on the Indian currency system,
even though Indian rule functioned with a great degree of autonomy in many other
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domains (such as public goods and the fiscal system). Until 1920, London’s control
was justified on the ground that Britain’s economic interests and Indian interests
were compatible, and afterwards on the ground that the world’s biggest money
market was located in London. As the world economy came under strain and
Britain stared at economic decline, that argument lost force and the control
looked more cynical than ever. As the British economy weakened, some
Indian businesses formed partnerships with the nationalists, and joined them in
demanding autonomy.
The Great Depression made divisions within the capitalist class sharper than
before. In jute, the world demand for sacking was growing less rapidly in the 1920s
and 1930s than during the war. Facing depressed conditions, European economic
interests in Calcutta formed an informal cartel (Gupta, 2005). By then, a small
Indian-owned industry had begun, which refused to join the cartel. Europeans tried
to use their proximity to the political elite and the government-backed Bank of
Bengal to demand special privileges. Such attempts broke down because those who
stayed out of the cartel grew faster than those who stayed in. The provincial
government of Bengal temporarily played a partisan role, worsening political
tensions between business communities. By 1940, Indian capitalists who funded
the Congress had developed an uncompromising hostility towards foreign capital.
In the 1940s, when independence was imminent, a blueprint of development
drawn up by Bombay’s magnates and known as ‘the Bombay Plan’ delivered the
message that the future of India should be a closed economy and a state-dominated
economy. It is not quite clear where these two ideas came from. The majority of the
individuals who signed the document had made money in the open economy. Why
they turned their backs on that system must be understood with reference to
politics as well as economics. The most likely explanation was that the plan
represented a compromise between the capitalists and the pro-Soviet socialist
lobby in the main political party, the Congress (Kudaisiya, 2014). Both groups
keenly wanted a policy to industrialize India. The former wanted and were
promised a protected home market. In return, the latter received support for an
enlargement of the role of the federal state as investor and regulator. Thus emerged
the foundation of one of the most aggressive forms of import-substituting indus-
trialization the post-war world would see.
10.3 INDIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE
The newly independent state of India moved away from colonial economic policies.
The first step was to set out an agenda for industrialization that represented a break
with the global economy. Altering the global division of labour was critical to
policy-makers at the time. Similar views were expressed in other parts of the
underdeveloped world following the disruption in trading arrangements during
the Great Depression and Second World War. The Economic Commission for
Latin America raised similar concerns. The newly independent states of South
Korea and Taiwan also adopted industrialization as a goal, which came to be
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guided by developmental states. Newly independent states in Africa moved in a
similar direction a decade later, adopting policies of import substitution as the
way forward.
While Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List had evoked national prestige and
the infant industry argument in motivating economy policy regarding industrial-
ization, the rhetoric in post-colonial countries was to move away from an unequal
exchange between rich industrial nations and economically backward colonies.
Difference in policies between the newly industrializing countries concerned how
to implement import substitution.
Hirschman’s theoretical framework of import substitution saw this as a process
that takes place in stages: first, substitution of imported consumer goods, where
technology was simple, to be followed by substitution of more complex capital
goods. Indian industrialization strategy attempted to jump straight into the
production of capital goods, borrowing as a model that of Soviet industrialization.
Planning for industrialization and modernization was the goal of the first govern-
ment under Nehru, who saw ‘dams as the temples of Modern India’. Nehru’s vision
differed entirely from the Gandhian vision of labour-intensive development that
suited Indian factor endowments, opting instead for a top-down development
strategy based on the experience of Soviet industrialization and relying on much
greater use of capital.
In the Bombay Plan of the 1940s, the principle of public–private partnership was
emphasized: the state was to play a guiding role not only through tariffs and
advantages provided to the private sector, but via a more direct involvement of
the state in building industrial capacity. Existing industrial interests were waiting to
take advantage of policies of import substitution in coordination with the public
sector. In post-independence India, the public sector became the main investor in
the production of capital goods.
Who was to pay for industrialization? While the colonial economy had tried to
deal with capital scarcity via capital flows from Britain, involving both portfolio
investment and entrepreneurship by British investors, independent India chose to
provide the required capital from internal sources. The gap between saving and
investment was to be filled by foreign aid, and entrepreneurship was to be provided
by the state. In 1950–1, gross domestic capital formation (GDCF) and gross
domestic saving (GDS) were in balance. In the second plan GDCF increased to
17 per cent of GDP, while GDS fluctuated between 8 and 13 per cent. The gap was
filled by foreign aid. During 1951–61, 12 per cent of incremental saving, 21 per
cent of incremental investment, and 13 per cent of the increase in national income
was aid-generated. In the second and third five-year plans, external assistance
covered about a quarter of actual plan expenditure in the public and private sectors.
Compared with colonial times, when 70–80 per cent of aggregate investment was
in the private sector, after 1947 the public and private sectors shared investment
about equally. Table 10.2 indicates that the share of machinery in gross fixed capital
formation (GFCF) did not change much, but the share of GFCF in GDP increased
significantly after independence. The data also point to an increasing role of the
public sector in capital formation.
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10.3.1 Planning for Industrialization
The Nehru–Mahalanobis model, as it is known after the statistician who designed
the plan, put development of capital goods production at the heart of economic
policy. It thus questioned the role of comparative advantage and suitability of factor
endowments as the basis for economic growth. The Nehru–Mahalanobis frame-
work held that economic growth depended on the share of investment in national
income, and therefore on the output of investment goods. The economy consisted
of two sectors—capital goods and consumer goods. The higher the share of the
former, the higher would be the rate of growth. Agricultural stagnation was viewed
as a consequence of a lack of capital goods invested in the sector.
A system of five-year plans was adopted, with specific targets set in each plan.
The first plan set targets for infrastructure development. It was the second plan of
1956–61 that implemented the Mahalanobis model by developing capital goods
production in the public sector. The plan regulated the involvement of the private
sector by introducing industrial licensing, and many sectors remained outside the
scope of private investment. This was a significant departure from the limited
public investment in colonial India. The years that followed saw a rise in public
sector investment. The state became a producer in several capital goods industries,
including iron and steel, heavy machinery and machine tools, telecommunications
Table 10.2. Capital formation and the public sector
Gross domestic capital
formation as share of GDP
Share of the
public sector
Share of machinery in gross
fixed capital formation
1850–1 5.0a 2.24 3.3
1860–1 4.8a 2.61 9.2
1870–1 5.1a 14.96 24.5
1880–1 4.8a 25.21 18.5
1890–1 6.2a 17.48 36.8
1900–1 7.0a 21.59 47.5
1910–11 6.6a 25.20 49.5
1920–1 6.2a 32.68 49.5
1930–1 6.3a 31.95 47.3
1940–1 6.7a 19.81 46.4
1951–5 13.1 (11.6a) 25.0 38.2
1956–60 17.3 38.9b 43.1
1961–5 17.7 43.2 44.0
1966–70 19.3 39.2 38.2
1971–5 19.7 40.2 41.5
1976–80 21.2 45.2 43.8




a Refers to the ratio to gross national income in 1980–1 prices.
b Refers to 1961–2.
Sources: Nagaraj (1990); Kohli (2004, 2006); Bina Roy (1996, Tables 46, 52, 55).
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and telecom equipment, minerals, oil, mining, aeronautics, railway equipment, and
electricity generation and distribution. The emphasis was on reducing dependence
on imports and self-sufficiency in industrial output, with unbalanced growth
providing a ‘big push’ to industrialization. There was acceleration in industrial
growth, and also in the growth of agriculture and services.
The Licence Raj, as it came to be known, presided over the regulation of trade,
industry, and investment. A private entrepreneur could apply for a licence to set up
a plant in a ‘permitted’ sector. Protection of domestic industry from external
competition came via regulation rather than the exchange rate. Unlike in many
other newly industrializing economies, such as Brazil and East Asia, multiple
exchange rates were not used to protect some sectors and allow easy imports of
others. The rupee remained overvalued and built an anti-export bias into the
developing economy. Consequently, Indian traditional exports faced declining
competitiveness in the world market, and the products of new industries could
not gain an entry. Indian exports grew at just 2.3 per cent per annum between 1950
and 1973, at a time when world exports were growing at 7.9 per cent per annum.
Exports accounted for 7.1 per cent of GDP in 1951, but only 3 per cent in 1965,
and remained below 4 per cent in 1973.
The resulting foreign exchange shortage was dealt with through quantitative
controls. India had one of the highest tariffs in the world, but the main instrument
for trade regulation was non-tariff barriers (NTBs), making actual protection much
higher. The highest protection rates were in consumer goods. The price mechanism
played little role in guiding India’s industrial development, and ad hoc criteria used to
select the beneficiaries of industrial licences and import licences (Chibber, 2003) led to
corrupt practices in the allocation of foreign exchange and industrial licences. Bhag-
wati’s meticulous work on the effective protection of Indian industries showed high
levels of protection, which over the long run led to inefficiency and rent seeking.
Independent India sought to build an industrial capacity that would make her
self-reliant, and succeeded. The share of imported machinery in gross fixed capital
formation in machinery was close to 40 per cent in 1960, but less than 15 per cent
by 1970 (Rangarajan, 1982). The cost was inefficiency and an early slowdown in
industrial growth, which contributed to low overall growth. The development
literature sees India among the failures of import-substituting industrialization,
in contrast to the successful industrializing economies of East Asia. South Korea
and Taiwan adopted a standard model of import substitution that started with
consumer goods and moved early to export promotion in consumer goods before
moving to the next phase of import substitution in capital goods (Chapter 8).
There is now a consensus that the East Asian miracle did not rely on the market to
determine industrialization, but that a highly interventionist state effectively solved
the ‘coordination problem’ of private investment (Rodrik, 1995). The Indian
industrial sector faced a similar problem requiring state support, but the state
may not have got the intervention right. Neither a lack of demand, nor supply-
side inefficiencies, nor an inability to finance imports due to balance of payments
constraints, slowed down industrial growth in East Asia, but they plagued the
Indian economy from the mid-1960s.
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As Table 10.3 shows, industrial growth was rapid between 1950 and 1965, driven
by the growth in capital goods production. The decline in this sector led to a
growth slowdown in the mid-1960s, a period which also experienced an agricul-
tural crisis. Economic policy became more balanced, without much impact on
industrial performance. The slowdown was also accompanied by a political crisis
that eventually led to a leftward shift in economic policy. Banks were nationalized,
and greater state control was introduced in the financial market. However,
economic growth did not recover and the droughts of 1971–2 and the oil crisis
of 1973 led to stagflation.
10.3.2 Dismantling Regulation
The economic crisis of the 1970s and the decline in the support of the ruling
Congress Party ushered in a period of reforms from 1980, with reforms accelerating
from 1991 onwards. Policy moved towards dismantling the Licence Raj, with an
emphasis on economic growth rather than redistribution. Rather than announcing
an IMF-style structural adjustment, the reforms proceeded by ‘stealth’ (Kohli,
2006). Rodrik and Subramaniam (2005) distinguish between ‘pro-business’
and ‘pro-market’ reforms. In the first phase, the reforms were ‘pro-business’ and
removed many of the barriers faced by the private sector. Industrial policy saw the
greatest change. The list of industries reserved solely for the public sector was
shortened from eighteen to three. Defence aircrafts and warships, atomic energy
generation, and railway transport remained under the public sector. Industrial
licensing by the central government was abolished, except for a few environmen-
tally sensitive industries. At the same time, the long-standing policy of reserving
production of some labour-intensive products such as garments and shoes for the
small-scale sector remained in place.
In the sphere of trade policy, reforms sought to phase out import licensing and
reduce import duties. Table 10.4 shows changes in the protection of Indian
industry using three indicators: effective rates of protection (ERP), non-tariff
barrier (NTB) coverage ratios, and the share of imports in total consumption.











1950–65 9.4 14.4 7.1 4.6 9.5 7.5
1965–76 6.5 2.6 3.0 3.4 6.2 4.1
1981–91 8.0 5.3 11.2 8.9 12.0 6.5
1980–98 7.1 9.1 5.9 5.9 11.0 5.8
Share 1956 22.3 4.7 24.6 48.4
Share 1980 39.4 16.4 20.5 23.6
Note: Basic goods refer to basic materials used in production, which are therefore intermediate goods.
Sources: Sivasubramonian (2000, Tables 9.14 and 9.15); Nagaraj (2003).
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As the economy reduced the incidence of NTBs, the initial effect in the 1980s was a
rise in average tariffs and ERP as many products moved from being protected by
import quotas to being protected by tariffs (Gupta, 1993; Das, 2003). A second
phase brought in ‘pro-market’ reforms that began with the devaluation of the
Indian currency in 1991. Tariff rates began to decline across sectors and capital
goods became freely importable (see Table 10.4).
10.3.3 Assessing Regulation and Reform
We can evaluate industrialization policies according to four criteria: growth;
efficiency; structural change due to industrialization; and comparisons with similar
economies.
Since the dismantling of the regulatory regime, economic growth has increased
significantly, and its variance has declined (Basu and Maertens, 2007). While the
surge in industrial growth from the 1950s was not sustained, growth increased
significantly after 1980 and was followed by faster growth in the 1990s. Rodrik and
Subramanian (2005) argue that the Indian economy was at some distance from the
production possibilities frontier in the 1970s, and that the new environment
incentivized the private sector and encouraged a move towards the frontier.










ERP 101.5 111.6 80.6 48.3
Import coverage ratio 98.3 98.3 41.8 27.6
Import share ratio 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.05
Intermediate goods
ERP 62.8 78.5 54.2 33.3
Import coverage ratio 95.1 77.2 20.5 8.2
Import share ratio 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.14
Capital goods
ERP 147.0 149.2 87.6 40.1
Import coverage ratio 98.7 87.6 45.7 33.4
Import share ratio 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.14
All industries
ERP 101.5 125.9 80.8 48.3
Import coverage ratio 97.6 91.6 38.0 24.8
Import share ratio 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.12
Note: ERP measures the effective rate of protection; import coverage ratio shows the share of imports covered by
NTBs; and import share ratio shows the share of imports in total consumption.
Source: Das (2003, Tables 3, 4, 5).
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The ‘pro-business’ environment created favourable conditions for existing firms
and led to a large productivity increase.
Taking a long-run view changes the assessment of the Licence Raj. GDP per
capita growth during the period was well above the colonial-era growth rate. Tests
for structural breaks in GDP and GDP per capita find the break points to be in the
Nehruvian period, well before the economic reforms (Dongre and Hatekar, 2005;
Gupta, 2011b). Alongside the high variability in secondary sector growth during
first half of the twentieth century was sustained growth in modern manufacturing
after 1920 (Table 10.5). The secondary sector comprises manufacturing in large-
scale units (referred to as manufacturing) and industrial production in unregistered
small-scale and cottage industries (referred as small-scale and cottage industry),
and it is the small-scale sector that experienced high variance. Since this was the
larger component of the secondary sector, its fluctuations had a bigger effect on
growth. The share of large-scale manufacturing only overtook that of the small-
scale units after 1950. Fig. 10.4 shows the relative growth of the two sectors over
the twentieth century.
Most econometric tests looking for evidence of a structural break in industrial
growth consider the period 1950 to 2000. Wallack’s (2003) sectoral analysis does
not find a structural break for industry and manufacturing, while Balakrishnan and
Parameswaran (2007) find a structural break in industrial growth after 1980,
coinciding with estimated break points in per capita GDP growth. Again, taking
a long-run view brings new insights: India’s industrial growth during the Licence
Raj was better than the historical trend. Balakrishnan (2010, pp. 61–72) suggests
that the institutional and policy environment of the colonial government did not
foster industrial development; it was the Licence Raj that solved the coordination
problems involved in building industrial capacity, and raised the rate of investment
by increasing public sector involvement. This interpretation overlooks the steady
growth in manufacturing after 1930 (Table 10.5). However, this growth involved a
sector that was small in absolute size and mainly produced simple consumer goods.
Table 10.5. Sectoral growth over the twentieth century (per cent, per annum)






1901–10 1.0 1.7 5.7 0.5 2.1 0.7 0.7
1911–20 –0.2 –3.5 1.6 –5.7 0.4 –0.5 –0.2
1921–30 0.7 5.6 4.8 6.2 3.4 1.1 –1.9
1931–40 0.0 0.9 7.1 –2.3 1.3 –0.8 –0.1
1940–7 –0.1 2.6 4.3 2.0 –1.4 –1.3 –1.3
1951–65 2.6 6.8 6.7 5.2 4.5 1.9
1966–80 2.7 3.5 4.6 4.4 4.3 1.3
1981–2000 3.2 5.7 7.2 5.9 6.7 3.5
1991–2000 3.1 5.2 8.2 7.4 8.1 4.7
Note: All estimates are in 1948–9 prices.
Source: Sivasubramonian (2000, Tables 7.3 and 9.4).
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The first phases of planning laid the foundation of a more diversified industrial
sector, but did not ensure sustainable industrial growth. The economic reforms of
the 1980s put the economy on a more sustainable growth path.
The capital goods sector had been the focus of the Mahalanobis plan. The sector
did not decline as the focus shifted away from planned industrialization; rather, its
composition shifted towards transport equipment. Machine tools, which were the
key industry of the Mahalanobis plan, declined in importance with a growth rate of
less than 2 per cent per annum in the 1990s (Nagaraj, 2003). Consumer durables
became the most dynamic sector (Table 10.3).
Now we come to the efficiency effects. Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975) have highlighted the misallocation of resources
and industrial inefficiency arising from protection. Estimates of total factor
productivity show negative TFP growth in most industrial sectors during the
period of import substitution, 1959 to 1979. The pro-business reforms of the
1980s led to an increase in industrial TFP growth. The pro-market reforms of
the 1990s, on the other hand, slowed TFP growth in manufacturing from 1.9 per
cent per annum to 0.7 per cent per annum as capital accumulation increased
(Goldar and Kumari, 2003).
DeLong (2003) argued that the failure of economic policies in terms of pro-
moting efficiency during the regulatory regime was largely offset by successes in
mobilizing resources, to a great extent in the public sector. Total private savings
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Fig. 10.4. Industrial output in 1948–9 prices
Source: Sivasubramonian (2000, Appendices 7 and 8).
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1960s, and 23 per cent by the 1980s. The reform years brought a significant
increase in manufacturing and services TFP growth, relative to the period of
regulation (Table 10.6). Notice that TFP growth in manufacturing in the 1980s
was high, as suggested by Rodrik and Subramaniam (2005). However, TFP growth
in Indian industry has in every period lagged behind that of the service sector.
This brings us to the third point, which is one of the most important aspects of
Indian industrialization: India has not followed the standard pattern of structural
change. In most economies the share of agriculture in employment and GDP declines
with industrialization, and industry becomes the largest sector. In India, the declining
share of agriculture in GDP was matched by a rising share of services rather than of
industry. Industry has absorbed only a small proportion of labour re-allocating
from agriculture. India’s service sector-led growth is unique. Broadberry and
Gupta (2010) point to an important difference in human capital between the
industrial and service sectors. In 2000 the service sector had a concentration of
workers with secondary and tertiary education, whereas industry still had a large
number of workers with no basic education. This difference in human capital can
be traced back to 1900 and may account for the differences in labour productivity
between the two sectors.
Now we come to our last point. A comparison with other newly industrializing
countries finds India lagging behind East Asia in capital formation and manufacturing
value added per capita (Tables 10.7 and 10.8). The share of GFCF in manufacturing
Table 10.6. Sources of growth (per cent, per annum)
Output per worker Contribution of
Physical capital Human capital TFP
Agriculture
1960–80 0.1 0.2 0.1 –0.1
1980–2004 1.7 0.4 0.3 1.1
Industry
1960–80 1.6 1.8 0.3 –0.4
1980–2004 3.0 1.6 0.3 1.1
Manufacturing
1960–80 2.0 1.5 0.3 0.2
1980–2004 4.0 2.1 0.4 1.5
1983–7 3.7 1.4 0.3 2.0
Services
1960–80 2.0 1.1 0.5 0.4
1980–2004 3.8 0.7 0.4 2.7
India
1960–80 1.3 0.8 0.2 0.0
1980–2004 3.7 1.4 0.4 2.0
Source: Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani (2007, Tables 4 and 5).
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was comparable to that in other newly industrializing economies in the 1960s, but was
lower by the 1990s; the share of machinery in total manufacturing has been high in
India, reflecting the country’s application of the Mahalanobis model. India is one of
the few late industrializers that developed the machinery sector early. The success
stories of industrialization in the twentieth century, such as South Korea, had a small
machinery sector in the early stages and successfully became exporters of manufactured
consumer goods before moving into the production of capital goods. The Indian
model of industrialization may have got some of the intervention ‘wrong’.
Although the development of Indian manufacturing was impressive in the
colonial period despite the lack of state support, India’s performance does not
compare well with that of the leading industrializing countries in more recent
times. The role of the state in India recently has differed significantly from that of
the developmental state of South Korea. Kohli (2004) points to colonial legacies
regarding the role of the state in the two countries. The Japanese developmental
state actively engaged in developing industrial capacity in South Korea towards the
end of the colonial period, and also developed primary education and suitable
infrastructure for industry. The British colonial state viewed India as an agricultural
producer that met the needs of the imperial economy. Railways were built to meet
the demands of trade, and there was little investment in developing human capital.
The rise of industrial enterprise in India in the colonial period occurred despite the
Table 10.7. Manufacturing value added per capita









Table 10.8. Gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing and the
share of machinery in industrial output
Gross fixed capital formation Share of machinery
1950 1970 1990 1975 1990
Brazil 13.0 19.7 13.5 23.4 24.9
South Korea 13.6 17.0 32.3 14.2 32.2
Malaysia n.a. 26.8 23.9 16.9 28.1
Thailand 25.4 n.a. 48.8 9.6 11.8
India 11.6 27.5 10.4 23.3 23.7
Source: Amsden (2001, Tables 6.3 and 5.2).
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state. In independent India the role of the state in industrialization was interven-
tionist rather than developmental.
Another comparison with the USSR is called for, since Indian policy-makers
drew inspiration from the Soviet model of development. Despite putting the capital
goods sector at the centre of industrialization strategy, the two economies differed
significantly in many respects. The main difference lay in India’s adoption of the
‘mixed’ economy, with a substantial role for private ownership of land, industry,
and other businesses. This allowed the private sector to develop, despite its
inefficiencies. Both countries enjoyed a spurt in industrial growth in the 1950s
and 1960s, but Soviet per capita GDP growth was higher (Chapter 3). As economic
growth slowed in both countries, their policies diverged. In India, economic
reforms were able to incentivize the existing private sector, leading to faster growth.
In the former USSR, in contrast, attempts to reform public enterprises caused
disruption.
10.4 CONCLUSION
Indian industrialization took place against the backdrop of an economy that moved
from a relatively open and unregulated market system in the 1800s, to a state-
dominated and state-directed one in the mid-1900s. The first phase saw a decline of
indigenous industry, a limited revival relying on imported inputs, a rise in British
investment in India, and an increased ability and willingness of Indian merchants to
invest commercial profits in manufacturing industry. The outcome was a growth of
factories concentrated in a few port cities.
The post-independence closed economy phase built on the business and indus-
trial infrastructure inherited from colonial times, adding a mainly state-owned
capital goods sector and an import substitution policy. The autarkic-dirigiste
regime gave rise to problems that are familiar to historians of post-war
industrialization—foreign exchange crises, falling factor productivity, excess cap-
acity, and poor-quality consumer goods. But the strategy did spread the industri-
alization impulse to a wider geographical area than before, strengthened the
commitment of the state to industrialization, and gave political and economic
power to big business of Indian origin.
The ongoing industrial transformation in India, which began with the reforms of
the 1980s, led to efficiency gains and rising growth. However, the industrial sector
in India has lagged behind a dynamic service sector, and the pattern of structural
change in India has a correspondingly unique pattern.
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From Commodity Booms to
Economic Miracles
Why Southeast Asian Industry Lagged Behind
Jean-Pascal Bassino and Jeffrey Gale Williamson
11.1 INTRODUCTION
Three Southeast Asian nations—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—emerged
unexpectedly in the 1960s and 1970s as fast-growing manufacturing countries.1
While starting from very low manufacturing output per capita levels, they eventu-
ally became successful in promoting export-led, labour-intensive manufacturing.
Their manufacturing growth rates closely matched those of Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan for more than two decades, and their performance attracted extensive
foreign direct investment.2 This sudden growth ‘miracle’ took place in the context
of political instability and ethnic tensions, after more than two decades of modest
success with post-independence import-substituting industrialization (ISI) strat-
egies. During the 1950s, these countries experienced low per capita GDP growth
due to the combination of rapid population growth and a slowdown in the
expansion of agriculture and mining, two sectors which had until then been the
main engines of growth. Led by manufacturing, growth accelerated from the 1960s
onwards: the share of manufacturing3 in GDP rose in Thailand and Malaysia from
about 10 per cent in the late 1950s to more than 20 per cent in the late 1970s. In
Indonesia, the upward trend started only in the 1970s but afterwards followed the
same trajectory (Fig. 11.1).4 These achievements were acknowledged by the World
1 We are grateful for help with the data and comments to: Anne Booth, Ian Coxhead, Gregg Huff,
Konosuke Odaka, Kevin O’Rourke, Dwight Perkins, Pierre van der Eng, and participants at the
Oxford Spread Conference (2–4 October 2014).
2 Singapore was the industrial pioneer in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. But since it was
essentially linked to British Malaya before independence, since it benefited from its position as a service
hub for the entire region, since it was a city-state, and since it was of such small size, it is excluded from
our analysis.
3 Manufacturing is defined here as including UN Statistical Office ISIC divisions 15 to 37.
4 The share of manufactures in total exports only increased significantly after the mid-1980s
(Pangestu et al., 2015).
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Bank in its East Asian Economic Miracle report (World Bank, 1993) as almost
matching South Korean and Taiwanese export-led industrial success a bit earlier.5
Neither the emergence of mainland China as an industrial power in the 1990s,
and thus a competitor,6 nor the Asian financial crisis of 1997, had an impact on the
long-term trajectory of these emerging industrial Southeast Asian nations. By the
early 2000s, the share of manufacturing in Thailand’s GDP had reached around
35 per cent, well above South Korea, and it remained at that level for a decade,
while it peaked above 30 per cent in Malaysia and Indonesia, before declining to
25 per cent. In contrast, Turkey’s manufacturing share had followed a trajectory
almost identical to that of Malaysia until the late 1990s, after which it declined
steadily to below 20 per cent in the mid-2000s.7
The view that Southeast Asian countries shared common growth fundamentals
gained more credibility when Cambodia and Vietnam joined the export-led manu-
facturing boom in the 1990s, and when even Myanmar joined the club in the
2000s. The only Southeast Asian nation to miss the ‘miracle’ was the Philippines.
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ThailandMalaysiaVietnamPhilippinesIndonesia
Fig. 11.1. Share of Southeast Asian manufacturing in GDP, 1960–2013 (per cent)
Note: Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15–37. Value added is the net output of a sector
after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is
determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3.
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators website, accessed 9 May 2015).
5 See Chapter 8. 6 See Chapter 9. 7 See Chapter 7.
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century to the 1960s, it stagnated thereafter. Still, the share of Philippine manu-
facturing in GDP reached about 25 per cent by the 1960s.
Before the 1960s,8 Southeast Asian manufacturing had exhibited a dual struc-
ture: on the one hand, small cottage industry workshops using native labour-
intensive technologies; on the other hand, a few medium or large-scale enterprises
mostly involved in processing rice, sugar, tin, oil, and other commodities. These
commodity-processing firms used imported capital-intensive technology and were
owned and operated mostly by Chinese immigrants, Indian immigrants, or West-
erners. Manufacturing accounted for a small share of employment, typically below
10 per cent (including the cottage industries).
Although it did not show signs of rapid industrial growth before the Second
WorldWar, Southeast Asia did experience impressive GDP per capita growth, close
to 1 per cent per annum between 1870 and 1940. GDP grew at about the same rate
between 1940 and 1970 as before 1940, but since population growth accelerated,
GDP per capita stagnated or declined (Maddison, 2007). The share of manufac-
turing in GDP remained constant until the 1960s, from which it follows that
manufacturing output growth barely exceeded population growth. Table 11.1
compares Southeast Asian annual real industrial output growth from 1870 to
2007 with three world leaders—Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, the two Asian giants—China and India—and three East Asian late-
twentieth-century economic miracles—Japan, Korea (South Korea after 1945),
and Taiwan. As in Chapter 2, the industrial history is broken up into two
pre-First World War episodes (1870–96, 1896–1913), the First World War
years (1913–20), the two inter-war decades (1920–38), the ISI years following
the Second World War (1950–73), and the two periods up to the present
(1973–1990, 1990–2007). During this long century, Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan recorded industrial growth rates faster than those of the Western leaders,
and they were the fastest in the periphery. Between 1896 and 1990, the unweighted
average of their growth rates exceeded that of the world leaders by: 2.7 per cent,
1896–1913; 7.1 per cent, 1913–20; and 4.2 per cent, 1920–38—all long before
any post-war growth miracles. The figures were 7.1 per cent, 1950–73, and
7.3 per cent, 1973–90.
Except for the Philippines between 1896 and 1939, Southeast Asia was not part
of this East Asian industrial catching-up until after the Second World War. Before
the 1950s, most industrial sectors in Southeast Asia hardly grew at all. For example,
only 7.1 per cent of the Malayan labour force was employed in manufacturing in
1921, declining to 6.9 per cent in 1931, and rising only modestly to 9.8 per cent in
1947 (Huff, 2002, p. 1082). Industry in Singapore and Thailand started growing
faster than in the Western leaders only from the 1950s onwards, and Indonesia and
Malaysia joined the club only after 1973. Even then, Southeast Asia did not record
industrial catching-up growth rates on Japan or Taiwan until after 1973 and 1990,
respectively, and never on South Korea. The only Southeast Asian country that
8 The 1930s in Indonesia’s case.
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appeared to have joined the fast industrial growth club before the Second World
War—the Philippines10—saw its industrial growth collapse after the ISI years (de
Dios and Williamson, 2015).
What explains this dismal industrial performance in Southeast Asia before
the 1960s? Why did Southeast Asia become a success story of rapid export-led
manufacturing growth after the 1960s? To answer these two questions, we focus
Table 11.1. Industrial output growth, 1870–2007: Southeast Asia and the rest (per cent,
per annum)9
1870–96 1896–1913 1913–20 1920–38 1950–73 1973–90 1990–2007
World leaders
Germany 3.1 3.6 0.4 1.6 6.8 1.3 1.2
United Kingdom 1.9 1.5 0.6 3.0 4.3 0.1 0.8
United States 4.6 4.9 4.5 1.2 4.4 1.9 4.2
Average 3.2 3.3 1.4 1.9 5.2 1.1 2.1
Asian Giants
China 7.8 7.8 9.4 5.3 9.2 8.3 9.8
India 0.9 2.6 4.3 3.4 6.9 5.1 6.5
Average 4.4 5.2 2.6 4.4 8.1 6.7 8.2
East Asian 3
Japan 3.3 5.0 6.5 6.7 12.4 4.1 1.0
Korea 8.0 9.3 7.1 13.6 11.7 7.4
Taiwan 5.1 9.8 4.4 11.6 8.7 4.9
Average 3.3 6.0 8.5 6.1 12.5 8.2 4.4
Southeast Asia
Cambodia 15.9
Indonesia 1.3 1.3 1.0 2.7 3.4 12.8 5.1
Lao PDR 8.5
Malaysia 8.5 7.1
Burma 0.1 3.5 2.6 3.2 3.0 12.0
Philippines 6.3 10.1 3.4 7.0 1.8 3.3
Singapore 16.2 6.9 6.1
Siam 0.9 2.3 1.6 2.3 11.2 8.1 5.9
Vietnam 7.6 1.9 10.7
Average 0.8 2.5 4.1 2.8 8.1 5.4 8.3
Source: Bénétrix, O’Rourke, and Williamson (2015, Table 7).
9 Between 1913 and 1934, industry’s share in GDP rose in the Philippines from 16.1 to 23.8 per
cent (Hooley, 2005, Table A.1), while it rose only marginally in Indonesia and Thailand (Booth and
Deng, 2014, Table 3); manufacturing accounted for around 25 per cent of GDP in the Philippines in
the early 1960s, while the share was around 8 per cent in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Myanmar, and
13 per cent in Thailand. See Fig. 11.1.
10 The very high growth rate observed for China between 1870 and 1920 could mostly reflect the
evolution of the modern sector, as it is likely that the underlying series do not entirely cover the large
traditional cottage industry sector. The same remark may apply to Korea and Taiwan between 1896
and 1938. In the Philippines, the growth rate of the period 1896–1913 could be due to some extent to
a change of coverage of the cottage industry in the transition from the Spanish to the US colonial
administration. Still, such measurement problems existed for all periphery countries with which
Southeast Asia could be compared.
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on Indonesia (Netherlands East Indies until 1947), Malaysia (Malaya, Sabah,
Sarawak, and Straits Settlements before 1957),11 Myanmar (Burma until 1989),
the Philippines, Thailand (Siam until 1939), and Vietnam (part of French
Indochina before 1949). We distinguish four periods: de-industrialization and
commodity export growth before 1913; a modest diversification into manufac-
turing during the First World War and the inter-war years; the development of
consumer goods production under import substitution policies between the
1940s and the 1960s; and finally high-speed export-led industrialization up to
the 1990s, helped greatly by foreign direct investment (FDI) but primarily driven
by improvements in education and the demographic dividend that made young,
literate labour abundant, particularly through the rapid rise of female labour force
participation. To gauge the magnitude of the Southeast Asian industrial lag,
we compare the region with Japan and Korea, the major success stories in Asia
before China’s emergence.12
11.2 SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE FIRST GLOBAL
CENTURY: DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION
AND COMMODITY PROCESSING
The idea that the Third World suffered de-industrialization during the nineteenth
century has a long pedigree.13 However, quantitative evidence on the level of
industrial activity in the nineteenth-century Third World is scant, and Southeast
Asia is no exception. Most de-industrialization assessments rely on very sparse
employment and output data. Manufacturing output is relatively easy to estimate
for commodity processing, as these activities closely followed commodity exports.
In Southeast Asia, they included rice milling in Bangkok, Rangoon, and Saigon, the
three major hubs of the rice-exporting deltas of the Chao Phraya, Irrawaddy, and
Mekong rivers, sugar milling in Java and the Philippines, and tin processing in
Malaysia (joined by rubber processing in the early twentieth century). These
manufacturing activities were undertaken mostly in enterprises owned by foreigners
(Chinese immigrants, along with Indian immigrants in Burma, and Westerners)
and they used imported capital goods such as milling and processing machinery
powered by steam engines. This equipment was imported mostly from Britain,
Germany, and France, and was operated by Western engineers, Chinese and Indian
(in Burma) skilled workers, and local unskilled workers (including Chinese and
Indian immigrants). Commodity export processing was a very large share of
11 The Federation of Malaya was established in 1948 to unify British Malaya and the British
colonies of Sabah (then North Borneo), Sarawak, and Straits Settlements (less Singapore), and became
independent in 1957. Singapore joined Malaya in 1963, to form Malaysia, and then left in 1965.
12 China is not included in the comparison, given the paucity of data available for the pre-Second
World War period.
13 Williamson (2011, Chapters 5 and 6).
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manufacturing output. In 1917, sugar milling was almost 43 per cent of Indonesian
manufacturing, and it was still more than 41 per cent in 1928.14 In 1918,
processing of all commodities accounted for more than 73 per cent of Philippine
‘modern’ manufacturing output, and hemp, copra, coconut oil, sugar, and tobacco
accounted for 92 per cent of its exports (see below).
We do not have enough information to provide a quantitative assessment of the
collapse of domestic textile production in the late nineteenth century as a conse-
quence of the flood of cheap British and Indian cotton yarn, and cheap Japanese
and Chinese silk yarn. But qualitative evidence offers little doubt that a collapse in
domestic yarn production took place all across Southeast Asia. However, much of
Southeast Asian imported (factory-made) yarn was processed into fabrics and dyed
by local artisans.15 Thus, the decline of the indigenous textile industries was partly
offset by the specialization of cottage industry in products enjoying ‘home prefer-
ence’; in the Indonesian case the offset was more than partial, since if we include the
processing of unbleached cloth, total output grew between 1870 and 1913 (van der
Eng, 2007; 2013).
Price data are much more plentiful, and, as a consequence, the terms of trade can
be used as a proxy for the de-industrialization forces facing Southeast Asia up to the
early twentieth century: as manufactured import prices fell—driven by productivity
growth in the industrial leaders—domestic production collapsed, and commodity
export sectors expanded, driven by booming commodity prices pushed upwards by
European demand. Such evidence suggests that while de-industrialization occurred
everywhere in the poor periphery, it was probably much more dramatic in South-
east Asia than elsewhere (Williamson, 2011, Chapter 3). The long commodity
price boom turned around after the First World War, something that should have
favoured re-industrialization, except, as we shall see below, that skill scarcity, strong
Japanese and Chinese competition, and adverse colonial fiscal, monetary, and
commercial policies, all served to mute its impact. While these forces were shared
everywhere in the poor periphery, they were more dramatic in Southeast Asia and
sub-Saharan Africa (Frankema, Williamson, and Woltjer, 2015) than elsewhere.
To make matters worse for local manufacturing, labour was relatively expensive in
this resource-abundant frontier region.
Figure 11.2 plots the net barter terms of trade16 (1900 =100) from 1782 to 1913
for Indonesia, Malaya,17 the Philippines, Siam, and Southeast Asia as a whole. While
the Philippines and Siam underwent a spectacular price boom up to the 1860s,
Indonesia’s boom was more than twice as steep and much longer, peaking in 1896.
Not only was it the biggest terms of trade boom in Southeast Asia, it was also the
14 Based on personal correspondence from Pierre van der Eng (25 June 2015).
15 This is well documented for Java (Boomgaard, 1991; van der Kraan, 1996), central and northern
Vietnam (Gourou, 1955, pp. 460, 527; IGMI, 1943, p. 51), and the Philippines (Legarda, 1999).
16 A country’s net barter terms of trade is simply the ratio of its average export price to its average
import price, where the averages are weighted by the relative importance of the traded goods in total
exports or total imports.
17 Malaya 1882–1913 is plotted in Fig. 11.2, but it starts much too late to be included in the
analysis reported below.
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biggest in the poor periphery. Since the Indonesian population was so large compared
with the rest of the region, its trend dominates the Southeast Asian average.
Did the biggest terms of trade boom produce the biggest de-industrialization
of import-competing manufacturing? The answer is definitely yes. The share of
the home textile market supplied by Indonesian producers dropped from about
82 to 38 per cent from 1822 to 1870, before falling still further to about 11 per
cent in 1913 (Williamson, 2011, Table 5.3). This evidence confirms dramatic
de-industrialization in Indonesia up to the First World War.
Indonesia was not alone in suffering de-industrialization, since it happened
everywhere in Southeast Asia. By the late 1890s, Burma’s ‘textile industry had
suffered a serious decline and it was finally . . . destroyed by the 1920s’ and ‘weaving,
. . . spinning, iron and metal making, pottery . . . and paper making’ had declined in
Siam (Resnick, 1970, pp. 57, 60). Like Indonesia, the Philippines started the
nineteenth century with a well-developed textile industry. Indeed, by 1818 local
cloth accounted for 8 per cent of Manila’s exports:
The province of Iloilo . . . developed valuable piña, dyed in bright and varied colours.
This was woven chiefly with pineapple fibre, but might also contain cotton, silk and
abacá. The industry sucked in migrants from far and wide . . . selling as far afield as




























Southeast Asia Philippines SiamMalaya Indonesia
Fig. 11.2. Net terms of trade, 1782–1913
Source: Williamson (2011, Fig. 3.9).
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However, by 1847 almost 60 per cent of Philippine imports were textiles, and they
increased ninefold over the half-century that followed (Legarda, 1999, pp. 149–50). By
the 1880s, ‘native textiles were in a sad state’ (Legarda, 1999, p. 155). Spanish
authorities did not use tariffs to fend off the flood of European manufactures. Indeed,
the Philippine tariff systemwas thoroughly liberalized in the late 1860s (Legarda, 1999,
pp. 198, 205), as it was in Indonesia (Booth, 1998, pp. 215–16). In short, it does
indeed appear that Southeast Asia underwent the biggest terms of trade boom, the
biggestDutchDisease, and thus the biggest de-industrialization in the global periphery.
Although commodity export prices (and thus terms of trade) boomed up to the
First World War, Southeast Asia was subjected to great terms of trade volatility and
thus investment uncertainty in all sectors including manufacturing. Table 11.2
documents that terms of trade volatility between 1865 and 1913 was 2.7 times
greater than that of the three industrial leaders, and 1.5 times greater even in the
turbulent inter-war decades. The four Southeast Asian countries which had the most
commodity price volatility included Burma and Thailand (both major rice exporters).
Malaya did not have a long enough time series to be included in Table 11.2, but its
two key exports, rubber and tin, had great price volatility and thus so did its
economy.18 The same applies to Vietnam, with rice accounting for about 70 per
cent of total exports from the late nineteenth century to 1945.19 The role of
commodity price volatility in suppressing incentives in import-competing industries
has been well established by economists (Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2005; Fatás
and Mihov, 2006; Loayza et al., 2007; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2009) and
Table 11.2. Terms of trade volatility in Southeast Asia, 1865–1939
1860s–1900s Relatives 1910s–1930s Relatives 1860s–1930s Relatives
Southeast Asia 8.091 2.744 10.985 1.503 9.538 1.859
Burma 6.945 2.356 13.463 1.841 10.204 1.989
Indonesia 9.558 3.242 6.904 0.944 8.231 1.604
Philippines 7.823 2.654 10.004 1.368 8.914 1.738
Thailand 8.036 2.726 13.569 1.856 10.803 2.106
Three Colonizers 2.948 1.000 7.311 1.000 5.130 1.000
France 4.038 1.370 6.728 0.920 5.383 1.049
Germany 2.089 0.709 7.380 1.009 4.735 0.923
United Kingdom 2.716 0.921 7.825 1.070 5.271 1.027
Note: Volatility is measured by the Hodrick–Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter=300. The regional averages
are unweighted.
Source: Data underlying Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007).
18 By the late 1920s, rubber and tin accounted for 68.6 per cent of total Malayan merchandise exports
(Huff, 2002, p. 1077). New terms of trade data for Malaya confirm huge price volatility there from 1870
to 1913. Since doing the analysis, Professor Huff has shared with us new terms of trade data for Malaya
1872–1939 (6 May 2015). To give some sense of the immense volatility, peaks and troughs were: 1872,
100; 1878, 46.6; 1888, 111.6; 1896, 49; 1911, 141.7; 1925, 93.3; 1931, 33.5; and 1939, 69.3.
19 Brenier (1914) and Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine (various years).
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economic historians (Huff, 2002; Williamson, 2011, 2012), so there is no reason to
doubt its role in Southeast Asia.
An additional factor explaining the decline of Southeast Asian manufacturing
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is expensive labour relative to
competitors such as Japan. Most of Southeast Asia was land abundant and labour
scarce, as evidenced by the very low population density there compared with North-
east Asia (Table 11.3). The only exceptions were Java (in Indonesia), the Red River
delta (in northern Vietnam), and the western part of Luzon (in the Philippines), but
even these areas were close to extensive agricultural margins. In addition to high land/
labour ratios, Southeast Asia enjoyed high labour productivity in agriculture by Asian
standards (van der Eng, 2004). As urban and rural labourmarkets were well integrated
throughout Southeast Asia, this resulted in relatively high wages in urban cottage
industries and commodity processing manufacturing. The massive inflow of Chinese
and Indian workers was not sufficient to induce a convergence of labour costs within
the region and between it and the labour-abundant sources of its immigrants: the land
frontier remained wide open until at least the 1920s in the midlands and highlands
surrounding the high-density areas of Java, the Red River delta, or central Luzon, and
until the 1960s in the rest of Southeast Asia. Nominal daily wages of unskilled
workers, measured in grams of silver, were higher in Bangkok, Jakarta, Penang,
Rangoon, Singapore, and Surabaya than in Tokyo in the 1890s (Bassino and van
der Eng, 2013). Since the skill premium was much lower in Japan than in Southeast
Asia, Japanese skilled labour remained cheaper than in most Southeast Asia cities until
at least the 1910s. Under these circumstances, the most profitable manufacturing
activities involved commodity processing, particularly milling and mining, but cer-
tainly not labour-intensive manufacturing. Southeast Asia simply had no comparative
advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing prior to the inter-war years.20
Table 11.3. Population density in Southeast Asia, Japan, and Korea (inhabitants per square
kilometre)
1820 1870 1913 1950 1970 2000
Indonesia 9 17 27 43 61 107
Malaysia 1 2 9 20 33 66
Myanmar 5 6 18 29 40 65
Philippines 7 17 31 70 129 271
Thailand 9 11 17 39 72 120
Vietnam 20 32 59 77 129 240
Japan 82 91 137 222 276 335
Korea 63 65 71 138 211 311
Note: Population data for Myanmar unadjusted for changes in territory (lower Burma only up to 1890, including
upper Burma thereafter).
Sources: World Bank for land area (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2); Maddison (2010) for
population.
20 The same was true of Sub-Saharan Africa. See Chapter 14 by Austin, Frankema, and Jerven in
this volume.
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11.3 SLOW INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA IN THE INTER-WAR YEARS
After the First World War, commodity prices collapsed, the terms of trade fell with
them, and the relative price of import-competing manufactures rose in domestic
Southeast Asian markets. Between 1913 and 1932, the terms of trade for Indonesia
and the Philippines fell by 40.6 and 76 per cent, respectively, and they had not
recovered by 1949 (still 22.9 and 34.7 per cent below 1913). The rice exporters
Burma and Thailand suffered more modest declines from 1913 to 1932 (Burma
down 12.6 per cent, and Thailand down 27 per cent), and both had surpassed 1913
levels by 1949 and the subsequent run-up to the KoreanWar peak. Malayan rubber
prices fell by 86 per cent from 1910/19 to 1930/39, and its terms of trade fell by
51.1 per cent (see n. 18). But in spite of the rise in the relative price of import-
competing manufactures, Southeast Asian manufacturing did not expand by much.
Industrial growth in inter-war Southeast Asia was mostly slow due to the
combined effects of colonial exchange rate appreciation policy, skill scarcity,
expensive unskilled labour, and Japanese and Chinese competition. Nevertheless,
some diversification and deepening of modern manufacturing did occur during the
inter-war decades.21 And in some cases, modest pro-industrial colonial policy (for
example, in 1930s Indonesia) did expand industrial output, and help pave the way
for the post-war ‘miracles’.
First, it is important to keep in mind the role of commodity price volatility when
searching for causes of lagging industrial development. Pre-Second World War
Southeast Asian economies were exposed to enormous world price shocks. The
volatility of commodity prices already reported for the pre-1913 years was even
greater between 1913 and 1940 (Table 11.4). For example, the international
demand for rice from Burma, Indochina, and Siam, and sugar from Java,22 declined
sharply in the 1930s, and countries such as Indonesia found themselves excluded
from key export markets. Their export bundles were dominated by just one or two
Table 11.4. Terms of trade bust, 1913–49 (1900 =100)
Burma Indonesia Philippines Thailand
1913 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1918 137.9 103.9 90.0 134.1
1929 113.2 72.5 54.7 105.1
1932 87.4 59.4 34.0 73.0
1939 99.5 70.9 39.8 89.4
1949 164.2 77.1 65.3 175.9
Source : Data underlying the series in Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007).
21 For instance, in the mid-1920s, Vietnamese production of cement, chemical products,
explosives, glass, paint, paper, porcelain insulators, and matches in industrial plants employing a
hundred or more workers expanded (Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine, 1928).
22 Philippine sugar exporters had access to a protected US market.
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commodities (Table 11.5), reflecting their specialization, so the price behaviour of
one commodity was not offset by the behaviour of others. In addition, exports were
a very large share of GDP. Between 1901 and 1938, that share (in per cent) was
30–48 in Burma, 28–34 in the Philippines, 18–25 in Vietnam, and 12–26 in
Indonesia (Table 11.6). Since so much of rural household output was not market-
ed, the export share in marketed value added might have been double these figures.
Second, it is important to keep in mind that there were three kinds of manu-
facturing in the commodity-exporting economy—import competing, commodity
processing, and local non-tradable. Commodity price booms suppressed import-
competing industrial growth (the relative price of manufactures fell) but boosted
commodity processing. Commodity price busts (the relative price of manufactures
rose) improved the profitability of import-competitive manufacturing, but hurt
commodity processing and local production of non-tradables—since local demand
shrank during the bust. Total manufacturing in the inter-war years was dominated
Table 11.5. Export concentration in Asia around 1900




Burma Rice, oil products 92
Indonesia Sugar, coffee 60




Ceylon Tea, coffee 100
India Rice, jute 35
South Asia 68
China Silk, tea 78
Japan Silk, cotton goods 79
East Asia 79
Note: All regional averages are unweighted.
Source: All based on data underlying Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007),
except Vietnam proxied using share of rice in total export of French Indochina,
based on data reported in Brenier (1914).
Table 11.6. Share of exports in GDP, 1901–38 (per cent)
Indonesia Thailand Philippines Vietnam Burma
1901 12 28 19 30
1916 22 17 32 18 35
1926 26 22 25 36
1938 17 25 34 22 48
Note: Thailand 1916=1913, 1926=1929; Philippines 1901=1902, 1916=1918.
Source: Booth (2003, Table 2, p. 431).
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by the latter two, so manufacturing was hurt by commodity price busts. To give
one example, the share of sugar milling in Indonesian industrial output fell from
41.2 per cent in 1928 to less than 12 per cent in 1935. In contrast with resource-
poor China, Northeast Asia and much of the European periphery, where commod-
ity processing was less important, any analysis of Southeast Asia (and Sub-Saharan
Africa) must focus on the mix between those three manufacturing activities.
Third, the secular decline in Southeast Asia’s net barter terms of trade between
the world wars should, other things constant, have stimulated import-competing
activities. But, as we shall see, other things were not constant.
Dutch Disease models are common in the development and growth literature,
and they have been used to inform the ‘resource curse’ debate as to whether an
abundant resource endowment implies poor growth prospects.23 But that debate is
not about manufacturing but rather about income per capita growth, and the latter
was not slow in Southeast Asia over the first three quarters of the twentieth century.
Indeed, three of the five regions where GDP can be documented—Malaya, the
Philippines, and Singapore—had jumped over the Kuznets modern economic
growth hurdle—namely, per capita income growth of 1 per cent or higher during
a sustained period—for the quarter-century 1913–38. The GDP per capita growth
rates were 2.4 per cent for Indonesia and 3.5 per cent for the Philippines 1902–13
(Maddison, 2010). For the six decades 1913–73, four Southeast Asian nations had
jumped over the Kuznets hurdle. So, with the exception of Burma, the ‘curse’
certainly wasn’t manifested by poor GDP per capita growth in pre-Second World
War Southeast Asia. Rather, it was manifested by slow or even non-existent
industrial growth (Table 11.1).
To account for this poor industrial performance, it is conventional to start with
colonial policy. Britain was opposed to industrial development in its colonies on
ideological free trade grounds. The French may have been a little less so, but neither
wanted to lose their colonial markets for their exports. America forged free trade
arrangements with the Philippines during the inter-war years. So, protection of
domestic manufacturing was excluded there. Colonial tariffs were raised a bit in the
1930s to shore up collapsing colonial revenues, but this certainly didn’t constitute
an industrial development policy, except late in the decade.24 Nor were subsidies
used to help import-competing industries, no doubt partly because they would
have been a drag on net colonial revenues. Colonial policy also muted any pro-
manufacturing forces. To understand these forces, we find the Dutch Disease
model which Gregg Huff applied to pre-Second World War Malaya most helpful
(Huff, 2002). Although Huff draws extensively on the larger Dutch Disease
literature—led by Max Corden and Peter Neary (1982) and Corden (1984)—he
adds three colonial dimensions that make the de-industrialization forces powerful
even during commodity price busts: credit scarcity, shrinking domestic markets,
and the absence of currency depreciation, since colonial commitments to sterling
exchange and gold standards made the latter impossible. On credit scarcity and
23 It is somewhat of an irony that the term ‘Dutch Disease’ applies best to the Dutch East Indies.
24 Indonesia provides one exception to this statement.
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shrinking domestic markets, Huff has this to say about Malaya during commodity
price busts:
[A]lthough would-be industrialists benefited from a favorable [relative manufacture’s
price] and so a more attractive cost-price structure, a downward shock to credit supply
and accompanying shrinkage in the size of the Malayan market effectively worked
against any shift to manufacturing. (Huff, 2002, p. 1093)
On the inability of colonial economies to depreciate their currencies during a
commodity price bust, Anne Booth (1998, pp. 231–3) offers the best Southeast
Asian example—namely, that Indonesia’s real exchange rate appreciated during
most of the pre-Second World War years.25 French Indochina offers another
example. Colonial authorities took into account the importance of China as the
main market for Indochinese rice, and therefore kept the piaster on a silver standard
but shifted their monetary policy to adopt a French franc peg in 1930. The decision
was ill advised, since the franc became a gold exchange standard currency, and the
Indochinese rice exporters underwent a loss of competitiveness due to the appre-
ciated piaster. The story of fixed colonial exchange rates was pretty much the same
elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Booth, 2003, pp. 439–56; Huff, 2003). One can only
imagine how much these colonial policies suppressed industrial growth in South-
east Asia, given modern econometric studies of developing country performance
since the 1950s (Rodrik, 2007; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). Thus, one of the
reasons that Southeast Asia had to wait so long to start its industrial catch-up on the
leaders was that it first had to gain control of its exchange rate and trade policy.
Colonial attitudes towards local industry began to change during the 1930s,
especially in Indonesia and Indochina. With the collapse of commodity prices,
diversification into industry became the catchword (Shepherd, 1941). Indeed, in
the face of the flood of Japanese manufactures into Southeast Asian markets (the
Japanese share of Indonesian textile imports rose from 26 to 75 per cent between
1928 and 1933: van der Eng, 2013, p. 9), colonial authorities raised tariffs. They did
so in part because of the decline in commodity export revenues, but they also set
quotas. Both quotas and tariffs may have been used more to defend these markets for
imperial manufactures (Booth, 2015, p. 46), but they also protected domestic
industry. Indeed, the ‘colonial government abandoned the principle that Indonesia’s
tariff served only fiscal purposes’ also because the flood of Japanese textiles was
destroying a new local weaving industry. These new policies ‘gave the colonial
government unprecedented powers to steer industrial development in Indonesia
[up to] 1939’ (van der Eng, 2013, pp. 10–11). With post-war independence,
Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia were able to exploit this experience.
The cost of labour in Southeast Asia offers an additional explanation for the slow
development of its import-competing industries. As we pointed out above, nominal
unskilled wages were higher in Southeast Asia than in Japan up to the 1920s
(Bassino and van der Eng, 2013), and they were much higher than in China and
25 It should be noted, however, that the Indonesian colonial debt was denominated in gold-based
currency, so the policy eased the debt service burden (van der Eng, 1998).
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India throughout the inter-war years. In addition, due to skill shortages in South-
east Asian cities, their nominal skilled wages were greater than those of Tokyo
throughout the inter-war years,26 and far above those of Bombay and Shanghai.
It is not surprising, therefore, that most foreign direct investment received by
Southeast Asia in the 1920s and 1930s concentrated on plantations and mines
(Lindblad, 1997), and that local manufactures had difficulty competing with
Japanese imports, especially in the 1930s after the depreciation of the yen.
In spite of these difficulties, the inter-war period did witness a gradual trans-
formation of Southeast Asian manufacturing, including the diffusion of modern
technology to the traditional sector. The literature on industrial development and
industrialization in emerging nations typically focuses on modern industry—that
is, on large-scale, capital- and energy-intensive factories producing consumption
importables, such as textiles, and capital goods importables, such as machinery—
even though small labour-intensive operations that used little or no inanimate
power remained dominant for a number of decades. The emerging and large-scale
factories using modern technologies did not immediately destroy the small-scale
workshop using traditional technologies: they co-existed during the transition so
that dualism characterized early industrial development. Only at more advanced
stages did large-scale, capital-intensive, and energy-intensive technology become
ubiquitous. Understanding this transition is important to understanding industrial
development more generally, and especially in Southeast Asia.
How the industrial output mix is measured matters in understanding the transition.
In the inter-war and immediate post-Second World War years of anti-global policies
and closed economies, distinguishing between capital and consumption goods pro-
duction mattered in accumulation and growth debates (Domar, 1957;
Bronfenbrenner, 1960). For the 1913–50 years, as we pointed out above, the
distinction that matters for Southeast Asia and other commodity exporters is between
commodity-processing, import-competing, and non-tradable domestic manufactur-
ing. This tri-part distinction matters, since the three often or even typically offset each
other, yielding little net industrial growth. Since Southeast Asia specialized in the
export of commodities until the post-SecondWorldWar era, its industrial growth was
based largely on commodity processing. To repeat the argument above, commodity
price booms triggered commodity processing (and the production of the capital goods
that did the processing), while the country suffered de-industrialization in the manu-
facture of importables like textiles. Unless they had some natural protection27 or could
build tariff barriers, import-competing manufactures collapsed. Some protective bar-
riers did emerge in the 1930s, but most of Southeast Asia had to wait until post-war
political independence to decide how high those barriers would be.28
26 The skill premium was even higher in resource-abundant and land-scarce Sub-Saharan Africa
during the same period (Frankema and van Waijenburg, 2012, Table 1).
27 A large share of manufacturing activity in early stages of industrialization is that which is
protected from foreign competition by distance, high weight-to-value ratios, consumer preferences,
and perishability.
28 Even earlier in the 1920s, there was a change in colonial policy that began to favor agricultural
productivity growth, education, and health, led by the ‘progressive’ US policies in the Philippines and
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Inter-war industry mix and industrial dualism in Southeast Asia is best docu-
mented for the region’s fastest industrial grower, the Philippines. There were four
key exports reported in the 1918 Philippine Census: coconut oil and copra
accounted for 27 per cent of all exports, manila hemp for 43 per cent, sugar for
12 per cent, and tobacco products for 10 per cent.29 While the Philippines was a
net rice importer for most years, that commodity needed to be cleaned and then
sent to the rice mills. These commodity export-processing industries grew three
times as fast as the rest of manufacturing between 1903 and 1918, by which time
they accounted for 73.4 per cent of ‘modern’ industrial output (industrial output
excluding household or cottage industry).30
Philippine sugar mills were 51 per cent steam or water power driven by 1918,
offering a good illustration of technology dualism in the transition to modern
industrial growth. In another good illustration, cottage industry—or what the
Philippine Manufacturing Census called ‘household industry’ or HH in what
follows—accounted for 55.5 per cent of total manufacturing output in 1918.
While this share may seem big, it was smaller than in China where in 1933 it
accounted for three-quarters of total manufacturing value added.31 Furthermore,
the role of HH production varied considerably across industries. Many labour-
intensive activities had been forced by foreign competition to retreat to isolated
rural HHs: in 1918, 92 per cent of total textile output and 46 per cent of the hats
were produced by HHs. Many industries had converted to factory organization
(tobacco, corn milling, furniture, tanning, footwear, vegetable oils, rice mills, soap,
sugar mills, brick and tile, abaca processing, pasta making, fish salting), and could
report only trivial HH shares in total production. Some industries remained in
dualism: HHs accounted for 55.9 per cent of copra drying, 53.9 per cent of textile
dying, and 70.7 per cent of pottery production. All of these HH shares were much
smaller in the 1939 Manufacturing Census.
Industrial dualism can also be observed in other Southeast Asian countries. For
example, the share of power looms in total looms had risen in Indonesia from
nothing to 18 per cent in 1940–1 (van der Eng, 2013, Table 1, p. 28), but it was
still small. To take another example, shipbuilding had both traditional workshops
and modern shipyards for repairing steamers in the main Southeast Asian ports
of Jakarta, Surabaya, Haiphong, Saigon, Singapore, and others. Although they
recorded lower manufacturing growth rates than did the Philippines, most South-
east Asian countries experienced some diversification of industrial activities. In the
the pro-growth attitudes of Japan towards its new colonies Korea and Taiwan. See Landes (1998,
p. 437), Booth (2012, pp. 3–7) and Booth and Deng (2014).
29 These four items needed processing before export: copra was dried and then pressed for the oil;
sugar cane was processed at the mill; manila hemp was converted to rope, rugs, wall coverings, and
other products in factories; and tobacco was dried, cut, and made into cigars and cigarettes. All of these
were then packed for shipment.
30 The import-competing growth estimates have an upward bias, since so many were under-
reported or unreported in either 1903 or 1918. Qualitative evidence suggests that under-reported or
unreported import-competing industries with high cottage industry shares were textiles, spinning, bags
and sacks, iron agricultural implements, hats, and umbrellas.
31 Chapter 9 in this volume.
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export hub of Saigon, rice milling was a relatively capital-intensive industry in
1926–7 using steam-driven machines (GGI, 1928), but it was small scale and
powered by hand or animals in rural areas. In northern Vietnam, manufacturing
activities using capital-intensive and steam-driven technologies (powered by cheap
local coal) included cement, glass, brewing, tobacco processing, printing, and paper
mills, while others producing for the local market were cottage industries using
hand-driven technologies.
Although it was more modest, the same industrial diversification and emerging
dualism was apparent in Burma, at least as measured by the number of factories
(Hlaing, 1965, Table 8, p. 32). Since it was factories and not cottage industry being
reported by these official statistics, one can plausibly assume that fast factory growth
rates meant a rising ‘modern’ share of industry: between 1899 and 1940, the
number of factories grew by 5.2 per cent per annum. And the industry mix
diversified as well, although modestly. The share of factories that processed export
commodities (rice and saw mills, cotton ginning, petroleum refining, metal smelt-
ing) was huge in 1899, at 94.2 per cent. But that share fell to 86.7 per cent in 1940,
domestic non-tradable producers (vegetable oil and flour mills, cement, printing)
rising from 4.3 to 9.6 per cent, and import-competing manufacturers (spinning,
weaving, knitwear, rubber goods) from 1.4 to 3.8 per cent.
In short, while there were some pro-industrial forces at work in Southeast Asia
during the inter-war period, they were modest at best: the industrial share in GDP
(including mining, manufacturing, construction, and utilities) only rose from 16.1
to 17.6 per cent in Indonesia, and from 17.1 to 17.3 per cent in Thailand (Booth
and Deng, 2014, Table 3, p. 43).
11.4 TRANSITION: HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
AND ISI FROM THE LATE 1930S TO THE LATE 1960S
In the 1930s, Southeast Asia experienced a steady rise in public investment in
education and some early attempts to promote ISI. Both were amplified during the
Second World War and in the two post-war decades. Although these policies did
not have a big immediate impact on industrial production, they paved the way for
‘miracle’ manufacturing growth after the 1960s.
Economists think that primary schooling is a critical ingredient of labour-
intensive manufacturing in early stages of modern industrial growth, and that
secondary schooling helps move countries up the industrial ladder to more skill-
intensive activities. A large macro-econometric literature on modern East Asia
supports that view (Jones, Ogawa, and Williamson, 1993; World Bank, 1993;
Radelet, Sachs, and Lee, 2001; Lee and Hong, 2010).32 Each of these studies finds
that schooling is a central contributor to economy-wide per capita income and
labour productivity growth after controlling for capital accumulation, good
32 The literature is extensive, but see also Bils and Klenow (2000), Glewwe and Kremer (2006), and
Manuelli and Seshadri (2014).
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government, openness, and other variables. A recent study of Southeast Asia
covering the four decades between 1970 and 2010 finds, once again, that schooling
has been an important determinant of GDP per worker growth (Phung, Coxhead,
and Chang, 2015). Our strong prior is that it has been an even more important
determinant ofmanufacturing output per worker growth, since the latter is certainly
more schooling-intensive than agriculture and traditional services.33
This literature motivates the question: if schooling has mattered to Southeast
Asian industrial growth since 1970, what was the source of that favourable
schooling endowment? Available evidence suggests that much of Southeast Asia
under foreign rule was severely disadvantaged by colonial policy before the 1940s
(Sopheak and Clayton, 2007; Chaudhary, 2009). Table 11.7 reports that—with
the exception of American colonial policy in the Philippines (Gomez and Pedro,
1992)34—primary enrolment rates in schools controlled by colonial administra-
tions were very low in Southeast Asia in the 1920s. Again excluding the Philippines,
Table 11.7. Mean primary schooling enrolment rates in Southeast Asia, 1880–1960
(per cent)
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1935–40 1950/2 1960/1
Burma 9.4 8.5 11.5 11.8 10.3 13.4 13.3
Indochina 0.5 1.0 2.8 6.9 10.8
Indonesia 1.0 2.0 2.5 3.7 7.0 12.2 13.3 38.1
Japan 30.3 34.5 49.3 59.2 60.3 60.9 60.5 61.5 58.4
Korea 1.1 3.8 10.8 23.4 58.2
Malaysia 7.5 8.9 19.4 24.6 69.2
Philippines 19.3 28.4 35.8 32.4 44.8 70.6 53.8
Taiwan 2.0 3.1 19.5 26.1 52.8 83.0
Thailand 0.5 5.8 7.1 24.1 52.6 39.3 36.4
Japan = 100
Burma 31.0 24.6 23.3 19.9 17.1 22.0 22.0
Indochina 1.0 1.7 4.6 11.3 17.9
Indonesia 3.3 5.8 5.1 6.3 11.6 20.0 22.0 65.2
Korea 1.9 6.3 17.7 38.7 99.6
Malaysia 12.7 14.8 31.9 40.7 118.5
Philippines 48.0 59.4 53.2 74.0 114.8 92.1
Taiwan 5.2 32.3 42.9 87.3 142.1
Thailand 9.8 11.8 39.6 86.9 63.9 62.4
Source: Benarot and Riddle (1988, Appendix, pp. 205–6) and Mitchell (1995: primary school enrolment (000s)
from pp. 958–67, and children aged 5–14 (000s) from pp. 23–7).
33 Oddly enough, there is no study, to our knowledge, of the econometric determinants of
manufacturing labour productivity growth in Southeast Asia.
34 It should be noted, however, that enrolment rates were not insignificant in late-nineteenth-
century Philippines. In 1866, the number of children attending primary school was 542 per 10,000
inhabitants, implying an enrolment rate of about 5 or 6, and the ratio of girl to boy students was a
surprisingly high 0.72 (Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903, vol. 2, p. 591). The same source reports
that 20.2 per cent of the population above 10 was able to read and write (ibid.: 81–2). The American
pro-school colonial policy could to some extent be viewed as a continuation of Spanish colonial policy.
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primary enrolment rates in Southeast Asia at that time were everywhere less than a
sixth of Japan’s (Table 11.7). This was especially true of French colonial primary
school enrolment rates (Indochina 2.8),35 but also Dutch colonial rates (Indonesia
7.0), and British colonial rates (Burma and Malaya 9.6). Enrolment rates were low
even in Korea (6.3) and Taiwan (11.8). But they rose very steeply to 1935–40 as a
result of Japanese colonial policy (38.7 in Korea and 87.3 in Taiwan).
Perhaps influenced by both American and Japanese pro-schooling colonial
policies, primary school enrolment rates rose dramatically everywhere in colonial
Southeast Asia up to the Second World War. Indeed, there was even impressive
convergence on Asia’s industrial leader, Japan (Table 11.7). Between 1910 and
1940, primary school enrolment rates rose from 1.7 to 17.9 per cent of Japan’s
in Indochina, from 6.3 to 22 per cent in Indonesia, from 12.7 to 40.7 per cent in
Malaya, from 48 to 74 per cent in the Philippines, and from 9.8 to 86.9 per cent
in Thailand. While it takes some time for the schooling rates of children to convert
an adult industrial labour force from illiterate to literate, the process was certainly
well under way in the inter-war years. What about the industrial growth leader in
Southeast Asia? The primary school enrolment rate in the Philippines was 44.8 in
1935–40, at a time when Japan’s was 60.5, so that the Philippines was already at
74 per cent of the Asian schooling leader. But the Philippines was not alone: late
1930s primary school enrolment rates were even higher in Thailand (Table 11.7:
52.6), having risen steeply from 1920.36
Enrolment rates could be misleading if official statistics do not record the
number of children attending informal schools supported by private initiative
(e.g. religious institutions) or by village authorities.37 Similar to Meijii Japan,
Buddhist temple schools in Thailand and Cambodia were reformed in the
early twentieth century to offer a more comprehensive curriculum (Sopheak and
Clayton, 2007). But it was only with the establishment of public schools that most
Thai girls gained access to primary education. In all Southeast Asian cities, Chinese
communities established privately funded primary schools for boys and girls. The
fact that pro-school policies emerged in the inter-war period as part of the core
political programme of the only Southeast Asian country that had remained
independent, Thailand, says something about the lack of such policies in most of
35 Share of school-aged children enrolled.
36 Using age heaping as a numeracy index, Crayen and Baten (2010) find that late-nineteenth- and
early-twentieth-century Southeast Asian levels were not too far below those of Northwest Europe,
North America, and Northeast Asia, and well above those of South Asia. However, differences in
numeracy across Southeast Asia do not correlate well with school enrolment in the early twentieth
century.
37 The return of an official survey on illiteracy undertaken in 1938 in two districts of central
Vietnam, regarded by the authorities as representative, indicates that the percentages of boys between
10 and 20 able to read Romanized Vietnamese were 55 in one district and 22 in the other (22 and
18 per cent were able to read French); while the percentages of girls able to read Romanized
Vietnamese were 60 and 28. The percentages were lower at higher ages, for both men and women,
but around 30 per cent of men aged 51 to 60 were able to read Vietnamese in Chinese characters
(Trinh, 1995, pp. 36–7).
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colonial Southeast Asia until the 1930s. Primary schools played a major role in the
nation-building agenda of all post-colonial Southeast Asian countries after 1945.38
With a lag of a couple of decades behind primary school enrolment rates,
secondary school enrolment rates rose steeply in Southeast Asia after 1940. By
1970 and the start of modern ‘miracle’ growth, secondary school enrolment rates
were 53 per cent of Japan in Malaysia and almost 48 per cent in the Philippines. By
1960, there is enough demographic and schooling data to say something about the
average years of schooling achieved by adults aged 25–64 (a stock), not just the
enrolment rates of children (a flow). That there was a revolutionary increase in
Third World schooling after 1900 is well documented (Easterlin, 1981; Go and
Lindert, 2010). That the revolution really took off in the periphery between 1960
and 1980 is also well documented (Schultz, 1987; Williamson 1993, pp. 147–52).
Table 11.8 documents just how dramatic it was in Southeast Asia. Taking the Asian
industrial leader, Japan, as our standard, between 1960 and 2010 average years of
schooling of adults 25–64 rose from 15.7 to 39.3 per cent of Japan in Burma, from
13.4 to 59.7 in Indonesia, from 23.8 to 71.3 in Malaysia, from 43.5 to 76.1 in the
Philippines, and from 25.8 to 64.6 in Thailand.
By the end of the 1960s, most of Southeast Asia was well endowed with educated
labour ready for other forces to trigger an industrial ‘miracle’. To the extent that
schooling is a prime mover of modern industrial growth, Southeast Asia was under-
equipped for it before the Second World War. But school enrolment rates were on
the rise during the inter-war decades, and took off in the post-Second World War
era up to 1970. The Southeast Asian schooling constraint was loosened in the
1920s and 1930s, and broken after 1950. However, the growth of schooling was
not sufficient by itself to promote rapid manufacturing development.
ISI became explicit policy in Southeast Asia only in the 1950s, but it had two
precedents. The first occurred in the inter-war period as Chinese entrepreneurs
Table 11.8. Average years of schooling aged 25–64, 1960–2010
Years of schooling Japan=100
1960 1970 2010 1960 1970 2010
Korea 3.552 5.710 13.324 41.3 58.1 101.1
Japan 8.598 9.829 13.181 100.0 100.0 100.0
Burma 1.349 1.118 5.182 15.7 11.4 39.3
Indonesia 1.148 2.367 7.864 13.4 24.1 59.7
Malaysia 2.043 3.126 9.400 23.8 31.8 71.3
Philippines 3.744 4.727 10.030 43.5 48.1 76.1
Thailand 2.219 2.731 8.516 25.8 27.8 64.6
Source: Data underlying Cohen and Soto (2007, in electronic appendix cls-database).
38 Thailand offers a post-war puzzle, since enrolment rates fell from 1935–40 to 1960–1, but they
rose everywhere else in Southeast Asia. True, the rise in the Philippines was modest, but it was already
at a relatively high level.
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established workshops in Southeast Asia using imported Chinese technology,
Chinese skilled workers, and native unskilled labour for producing goods such as
affordable chinaware or fireworks that were directly competing with imports from
China. As we have seen, manufacturing received some stimulus by the switch to a
less anti-industrial colonial policy in the 1930s. The second precedent occurred
during the Second World War when, during Japanese occupation, Southeast Asia
improvised a response to the disappearance of European and North American
manufactured imports, and to the inability or unwillingness of Japan to fill the
gap. Indeed, it was Japanese imperial policy to make Southeast Asia self-sufficient
(Huff and Shinobu, 2013). Although these policies were introduced as an emer-
gency response to exceptional conditions, they paved the way for the more formal
post-independence policies introduced under post-war ISI.
ISI has been viewed as a response to the newly independent governments’ desire
to jump-start modern industrial growth.39 But in Southeast Asia, it had another
stimulant, the secular decline of commodity processing. Given the absence of
adequate manufacturing data before the late 1950s, the decline cannot be measured
directly, but it can be inferred by using export data. Fig. 11.3 shows the volume of
some of the main commodities exported between 1930 and 1970 relative to total
population (kg per capita). Rice exports fromMyanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, as
well as coffee and sugar exports from Indonesia, peaked in the inter-war years. Since
so much of Southeast Asian manufacturing was based on commodity processing,













Indonesia (coffee; right scale)
Fig. 11.3. Exports of main agricultural products (kg per capita) between 1930 and 1970
Sources: Mitchell (1995) for export volumes; Maddison (2010) for population, except Vietnam 1930–49 from
Banens (2000).
39 Comprehensive discussions of ISI can be found in Chapter 10 on India and Chapter 13 on South
America.
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cheap workforce, Southeast Asian manufacturing found it impossible to compete
with Japanese textiles and other consumer goods without protective barriers in the
1950s and 1960s.40 ISI under tariff protection seemed to be the only option to
enhance the profitability of domestic manufacturing in Southeast Asia. The ISI
strategy had some success, at least in the short run: cotton yarn output per capita
grew briskly between 1950 and 1970, as did electricity output per capita.
11.5 ECONOMIC MIRACLES: CHEAP SCHOOLED
LABOUR, TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFER,
AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Southeast Asian per capita incomes diverged dramatically from the 1960s to
the 1990s as a result of the successful industrial drive of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand (ASEAN 4) versus the disappointing performances of
the Philippines and the stagnation of war-torn Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and
Vietnam. The successes were celebrated as the Southeast Asian part of the Asian
economic miracle when the World Bank (1993) compared the ASEAN 4 with
South Korea and Taiwan, highlighting the importance of export-led industrial
growth. However, the World Bank overlooked the divergence in per capita
incomes across the region, illustrated best by Thailand (the biggest winner) and
the Philippines (one of the biggest losers). In 1960, per capita GDP in Malaysia
and the Philippines was 50 per cent higher than in Indonesia and Thailand
(Maddison, 2010). By 1990, Thailand had a per capita GDP twice as high as the
Philippines, and the income gap between Malaysia and Indonesia increased from
50 to 100 per cent.41
In confronting the causes of this uneven performance, we first consider shares of
manufactured goods in total exports and then the stock of foreign direct investment
(FDI) relative to GDP. Fig. 11.4 shows that Malaysia and Thailand followed the
same upward trend in their shares of manufactured goods in total exports between
the 1960s and the 1990s, both catching up with Singapore. Of course, these trends
also imply a dramatic decline in commodity export dependence. And the relatively
low percentages until the 1970s are consistent with the gradual transition from slow
ISI to fast export-led industrialization reported in the previous section. Indonesia
underwent a comparable trend but with a lag of almost 20 years, largely due to the
Dutch Disease impact of its oil boom, and thus stagnation in its share of manu-
factured goods in total exports at very low levels until the late 1980s. Vietnam was
later still, but its delayed trend was just as dramatic.
40 The fact that the yen–US$ exchange rate was fixed at a yen-depreciated level helped Japanese
producers maintain strong price competitiveness until the 1960s, in addition to non-price
competitiveness resulting from the increasing sophistication of their production process.
41 Within-country regional inequality also increased in Southeast Asia, as manufacturing was
concentrated in urban areas where agglomeration economies could be exploited. See Chua et al.
(2014, Table 2).
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In order to exploit modern manufacturing technologies, market size is, of course,
crucial. Southeast Asian domestic markets were very small in the inter-war years, and
they could not compete with cheap Japanese consumer goods even in their own
markets, let alone in world markets. Small domestic market size placed Southeast Asia
at a disadvantage until the late ISI years. We use GDP as our proxy for domestic
market size (Maddison, 2010). No doubt it might be a better proxy if GDP were
interacted with urbanization—since most of the demand for local manufactures was
generated by urban incomes—but it serves adequately enough to indicate the
disadvantage. The proxy confirms that, with the exception of Indonesia, every
Southeast Asian country had tiny domestic markets, much smaller than Japan, Brazil,
Russia, and other countries which were catching up leaders in their regions before the
Second World War. In 1929, domestic markets in Burma, Malaya, the Philippines,
and Thailand ranged between about 6 to 14 per cent of Japan’s domestic market. The
market sizes of China, India, and Japan were eleven to twenty-four times larger than
the average of the four Southeast Asian countries just listed, Russia was twenty times
larger, and Brazil was more than three times larger. Indonesia was bigger and suffered
a smaller scale disadvantage, but its domestic market was still only an eighth of the
Russian domestic market. Given small domestic markets at the start, going open
would have had a bigger impact on small Southeast Asian nations than on large
emerging industrial nations, like Brazil or India.
Since every Southeast Asian country benefited from Japanese, US, and, to a
lesser extent, European market access, the delayed expansion of manufacturing
in Indonesia and the poor performance of the Philippines calls for alternative


















Fig. 11.4. Manufactured goods as percentage of merchandise exports
Note: Manufactures comprise commodities in SITC sections 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures), 7 (machinery
and transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods), excluding division 68 (non-ferrous metals).
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators website, accessed 9 May 2015).
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explanations. Indonesia presented unattractive features, in particular some of the
most extreme forms of crony capitalism, and a chronic waste of financial resources
due to over-investment in poorly managed state-owned enterprises during the oil
booms (Robison, 1992). But the deregulation of investment barriers in the 1980s
resulted in a rapid rise in the share of manufacturing in GDP.42 Analysts have
offered many explanations of the poor Philippine performance. One paper has
described its experience as a ‘perfect storm’ of economic disasters, including:
political instability, overlong protection, corruption, immigrant-remittance-in-
duced Dutch Disease, and the rejection of all things Japanese, including their
FDI (de Dios and Williamson, 2015). Indeed, all of these forces resulted in only a
trickle of foreign capital into the Philippines.
These capital inflows were mostly FDI since international portfolio investment
only became a significant source of financing for local investors in the 1990s (with
the exception of Singapore). The stock of inward FDI accounted for a small and
only slightly increasing percentage of GDP in Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand up to the late 1990s (Fig. 11.5). Singapore and Malaysia had the highest
FDI stock to GDP ratios before the 1990s. Although there are no sector break-
downs available, it seems likely that the high levels for Singapore were partly due to
previous investments in finance and other services there. The high levels for
Malaysia were mostly due to mining. We stress FDI since economists long ago
reached the conclusion that this form of foreign investment is a carrier of technol-
ogy, organizational efficiency, and managerial skills. This conclusion is confirmed
























Fig. 11.5. Inward foreign investment stock as percentage of GDP
Source: UNCTAD (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx).
42 This evolution can be compared with India’s resulting from deregulation policy in the 1980s,
discussed in Chapter 10 of this volume.
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[T]he East Asian FDI boom continues to benefit [Southeast Asia] . . .These benefits
originated from having export-oriented industries with improved labor skills and
technological transfers, productivity growth and economic efficiency [following] the
massive investment inflows from Northeast Asian economies. (Phung, Coxhead, and
Chang, 2015, p. 80)
Needless to say, the larger the gap between best-practice technology in rich
countries and traditional technology in poor countries, the better the chance that
FDI will trigger a manufacturing miracle. Productivity growth in Southeast Asian
manufacturing resulted from the combined effects of human capital investment
and technology imported through FDI. Indeed, some time ago Alwyn Young
argued that:
once one accounts for the dramatic rise in factor inputs, one arrives at estimated
total factor productivity growth rates that are closely approximated by the historical
performance of many of the OECD and Latin American economies. (Young, 1995,
p. 644)
Another possible explanation for the heterogeneity of Southeast Asian industrial
performance might be demography. Developing countries going through the
middle stage of their demographic transitions have increasing shares of young
working age populations (Bloom and Williamson, 1998). This so-called demo-
graphic dividend played a major role in the development of East Asia (Krugman,
1994; Bloom andWilliamson, 1998), and we argued above that it also hastened the
schooling revolution that helped carry the miracles. However, its contribution in
Southeast Asia has been more limited (Williamson, 2013) and it cannot account for
the region’s uneven industrial performance.43
We are persuaded that one of the most powerful explanations of the uneven
Southeast Asian industrial performance lies with differences in access to modern
technology imported through FDI. Southeast Asia received only modest volumes of
FDI until the 1980s.44 However, these early inflows had an important impact on
the development of manufacturing using labour-intensive technology compatible
with Southeast Asian endowments—that is, cheap human capital. Japanese FDI
played a much bigger role than did US and European FDI, since the Japanese
manufacturing technology of the 1950s and 1960s was less capital intensive. It
was also becoming obsolete in Japan just when it was appropriate for Southeast
Asia. It was characterized by low capital requirements, and high primary and
secondary schooling requirements, and was well suited for high female workforce
participation.
43 Between 1965 and 1990, working age population grew faster than total population in Southeast
Asia, although the difference was much lower than in East Asia; this resulted in higher investment in
human capital, saving, and female labour force participation than in South Asia and the rest of the
developing world (Bloom and Williamson, 1998).
44 Due to their concentration in manufacturing, Japanese FDI flows had a major effect on ASEAN
manufactures exports (Urata, 1993). Manufacturing accounted for 45 per cent of total Japanese FDI to
ASEAN in the period 1951–89, compared to 35 per cent of the total for South Korea, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong, and only 27 per cent for the world as a whole (Urata, 1993, Table 10.1, p. 280).
279From Commodity Booms to Economic Miracles
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/1/2017, SPi
Compared with South Korea, Southeast Asia was initially a second-best option for
Japanese manufacturing firms,45 but these countries became increasingly attractive
as their comparatively cheaper workforce became almost as well equipped with
primary schooling as in East Asia.
The flow of Japanese manufacturing FDI into Southeast Asia can be document-
ed with company-level data reported in the annual Toyo Keizai survey. Fig. 11.6
indicates the total number of manufacturing subsidiaries established by decade.
Thailand and Malaysia appear as the major recipients of Japanese manufacturing
FDI, suggesting that these flows played an important role in contributing to
their fast manufacturing growth. By contrast, the small number of Philippine
subsidiaries indicates that it did not benefit much from Japanese technology
transfer through FDI.
Available case studies illustrate a winning strategy based on the creation of joint
ventures between local trading companies providing marketing know-how and
foreign investors bringing modern (but labour-intensive) technology and organiza-
tional skills. In the case of Japanese FDI in Thailand, two of the most successful
joint ventures of the early 1960s were the one linking Siam Motors with Nissan













 Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand
Fig. 11.6. Number of Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries established by decade
Source: compiled from individual data reported in Tōyō Keizai (2006), CD-ROM version.
45 Perhaps mainly for political reasons, South Korea remained almost entirely closed to Japanese
FDI up to the late 1990s, and the same remark applies to China until the 1980s. The economies of
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore were too small to absorb the huge flows of outward Japanese FDI
resulting from the rise in labour costs in Japan and the strategy of Japanese manufacturers to expand
their activity overseas, particularly in lower-income countries. Southeast Asia benefited as a result.
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the Sukree Group with Shikibo Spinning and Nomura Trading companies, starting
with cotton spinning and weaving in 1963, and moving rapidly to synthetic yarns
in 1968 (Suehiro, 1992, pp. 55–6). In addition to textile products, automobiles,
and motorcycles, the list of production activities of these early Japanese subsidiaries
also includes chemicals (cosmetics, plastics, rubber products, ink, and paint), and
electric consumer durables (fans, radios, and TV sets). This suggests that the ISI
experience with consumption goods production was an important precursor of
subsequent export processing as it nurtured a generation of local entrepreneurs that
gradually became accustomed to managing joint ventures with foreign partners,
with a wide range of new manufacturing technologies. Furthermore, Southeast Asia
had to leapfrog to comparatively capital-intensive export processing (chemicals,
electric machinery, and transportation machinery) because Japanese manufacturers
had previously located their most labour-intensive processing in Taiwan and Hong
Kong, such as the assembly of toys, cheap watches, and low-quality garments. The
first wave of FDI took advantage of local markets behind tariff and non-tariff
barriers in Malaysia and Thailand. As these countries liberalized in the 1970s
and 1980s, FDI rose substantially (Fig. 11.5). Indonesia was an important excep-
tion since it received comparatively little FDI, but nevertheless it experienced
productivity gains and rising competitiveness in manufacturing (Amiti and
Konings, 2007).
11.6 CONCLUSION: FACTOR ENDOWMENTS,
SECOND-BEST INSTITUTIONS, FOREIGN
MARKETS, AND GOOD LUCK
Resource-abundant and skill-scarce Southeast Asia has been a latecomer to modern
manufacturing development. As long as nominal wages of skilled and unskilled
workers were lower in resource-scarce and labour-abundant Japan or Korea, South-
east Asian manufacturing was limited to commodity export processing and some
modest success with ISI-induced domestic manufacturing of consumer goods. The
fundamental secular force at work seems to have been the evolution of this
resource-abundant, labour-scarce, and skill-scarce region into a labour-abundant
and skill-abundant region. But it also appears that Southeast Asia benefited from an
extraordinary window of opportunity from the 1960s to early 1980s when China
was entirely closed to foreign investment and unwilling to consider any kind of
economic integration with the rest of Asia or the world. Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand were lucky that China was stubbornly engaged in an autarkic policy
during these decades. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, rapid industrial growth
occurred in much of Southeast Asia in spite of inadequate economic institutions. It
is telling that when the World Bank 1993 Economic Miracle report assessed
Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese success, it highlighted the importance of sound
institutional environments. Yet, abundant examples of corruption and crony
capitalism could be found then even in the best Southeast Asian performers, like
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Thailand and Malaysia (Suehiro, 1992, p. 50), let alone the Philippines (de Dios
and Williamson, 2015). Southeast Asia did not undergo its industrialization drive
because it had virtuous institutions but because public and private agents managed
to play by some ‘rules of the game’ that can be described as second-best institutions
(Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004; Rodrik, 2008). An oil boom and some
dysfunctional aspects of the Indonesian economy (Robison, 1992) were sufficient
to delay the expansion of manufacturing there but not to prevent it, perhaps
because other countries considered as potential targets for FDI had even worse
institutions.
The fact that Vietnam joined the Southeast Asian manufacturing growth
club in the 1990s, with Cambodia and Myanmar following in the 2000s, and
all with labour costs lower than China and with comparable second-best
institutions, suggests that the region retains a comparative advantage vis-à-vis
Latin America, North Africa, the Middle East, Southern Asia, and Sub-Saharan
Africa. These advantages were complemented by the gradual liberalization of
trade policies, abundant and relatively cheap human capital, small gender gaps
in education, high rates of labour force participation, and a willingness to
participate in win–win regional cooperation. The impact of all of these factors
was amplified by the ability to exploit FDI and the technology transfers it
always carries.
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Industrialization and Growth in Peru
and Mexico, 1870–2010
A Long-Term Assessment
Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato and Graciela Márquez Colín
12.1 INTRODUCTION
Mexico and Peru share a similar pre-colonial and colonial past, being the two largest
pre-Hispanic civilizations in Latin America, and later the two wealthiest viceroyal-
ties of Spain.1 They both had a relatively substantial number of natives who
survived contact with the European colonizers, similar extractive economic insti-
tutions, and great inequality. Both countries had a rich endowment of mineral
resources, and their exploitation shaped early economic development. They also
had a rugged geography that generated high transport costs, inhibited economic
integration, and isolated a large part of the population that has historically been
poorly integrated into the modern economy and has endured lower standards of
living. Yet the economic connection between regions has been greater in Mexico as
a result of less imposing geographical barriers, as well as the fact that the capital and
largest metropolis lies in the centre of the country. In both countries, traditional
and modern sectors co-existed, and despite significant efforts to diminish this
duality, particularly in the twentieth century, it persists to the present.
Two significant differences between Peru and Mexico rest in the size of their
markets. A territory five times bigger than Peru and a large border with the US
poses different challenges and opportunities in shaping Mexico’s manufacturing
growth. Relative to Latin America as a whole, Mexico began to industrialize earlier,
reaching higher levels of manufacturing GDP per capita and a greater share of
manufacturing exports (see Figs 12.1 and 12.2). In contrast, Peru seems closer
to the classic late-nineteenth-century commodity exporter and has followed the
so-called primary-goods-exports model for a longer period. In this chapter we will
assess the differences and similarities between the two countries with regard to their
respective manufacturing development, and try to understand the reasons for these.
1 We thank Jeff Williamson, Kevin O’Rourke, and the participants of the conference Industrialization
in the Global Periphery 1870–2008 (Oxford University, 2–4 October 2014) for their comments.
All remaining errors are ours.
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Fig. 12.2. Manufacturing exports as percentage of total exports
Source: See Appendix.
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12.2 PERU AND MEXICO IN THE EXPORT-LED
GROWTH ERA, 1880–1929
Mechanized manufacturing developed in Mexico exceptionally early relative to
other countries in the periphery. Modern textile mills appeared in 1835, before
any other country outside of Europe or British North America, except Egypt.
Brazil, the other early industrializer in Latin America (see Chapter 13), established
its first mills in the 1840s. Yet by 1853 it had only eight mills with 4,500 spindles,
whereas ten years earlier, Mexico’s textile manufacturing included fifty-nine mills
with more than 100,000 spindles. Despite political turmoil and constant war
during the nineteenth century, Mexico’s textile manufacturing continued to grow
and modernize. In 1879 domestic textile production claimed 60 per cent of the
local market, which compares well with countries like India (35–45 per cent in
1887) and the Ottoman Empire (11–38 per cent in the 1870s), which had been
important textile producers at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Mexico’s
cotton textile industry continued being the most important in Latin America until
the 1920s when it was surpassed by Brazil (Gómez-Galvarriato, 2013, p. 15).
Manufacturing development emerged in other sectors as well. During the 1880s
Mexico regained access to the international financial system after settling its foreign
loans, in default since 1829. Political stability and institutional changes encouraged
foreign investment that financed communications and transport infrastructure. All
these factors promoted growth as well as an increasing integration of the national
economy and of Mexico into world markets. Manufacturing grew at a faster rate,
modernized, and diversified. Between 1892 and 1910 its production expanded at
an average annual rate of 4.3 per cent, almost 50 per cent above total GDP growth
(see Table 12.1).
The 1902 industrial census reported 6,234 manufacturing establishments with
at least five workers each, spread throughout the country and predominantly
powered by steam (Peñafiel, 1903, p. 99). Mexican manufacturing development
between 1880 and 1930 went beyond export processing: by 1929 domestic
manufacturing supplied almost two-thirds of consumer goods, more than one-
third of intermediate goods, and more than one-fifth of capital goods (Cárdenas,
1987, p. 105).
Beginning in 1890, mineral processing increased as a result of the passing of the
McKinley tariff in the United States, which imposed heavy duties on unrefined
imports but exempted refined metals. In 1905 there were fifty-three metal foun-
dries in Mexico, and in 1913 the country had forty-five of the 124 blast furnaces
working in North America. The share of unprocessed raw minerals in total mining
exports declined from 55 per cent in 1890 to 10 per cent in 1912, and to only 3 per
cent in 1927. By this last year, 75 per cent of mineral exports were metallurgic
products, such as bars, and 22 per cent were concentrated minerals. Apparently, the
main reason why the metallurgic industry did not deepen further was the scarcity of
coal, which was gradually surmounted at the beginning of the twentieth century
(Kuntz, 2010, pp. 536–41). The founding of Mexico’s first integrated iron and
steel company in Monterrey in 1903, more than forty years before any other in
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Latin America, cannot be explained without taking into account the spill-over
effects of metal processing in northern Mexico (Gómez-Galvarriato, 1997, p. 202).
In Peru, the extraordinary export earnings induced by the guano boom
(1840–77) generated a boom-and-bust export dependence. The currency became
chronically overvalued and its detrimental effects on domestic manufacturing were
further aggravated by the adoption of radical free trade policies (Gootenberg, 1991,
pp. 132–4). The War of the Pacific (1879–83) triggered a severe crisis, since Peru
lost nitrate deposits that could have compensated guano’s decline. There was
practically no development of mechanized manufacturing other than sugar and
ore processing until the late nineteenth century. Most of the modern textiles
factories dated from the 1880s and they only operated 1,015 looms in 1902
(Thorp and Bertram, 1978, p. 123). From 1890 until the outbreak of the First
World War, manufacturing grew at a yearly rate of 4.8 per cent, relatively high
because of its low initial levels. Expansion continued after 1914 at a similar rate
(4.3 per cent) and accelerated to 5.5 per cent between 1920 and 1929 (see
Table 12.2 and Chapter 2).
Concentrated around Lima, sugar mills, tanneries, and flour mills, as well as
soap, pasta, and textile factories were the only mechanized establishments besides
ore processing. In 1905, the number of factories was estimated at 291, a figure that
rose to 505 in 1918 and 572 in 1923. A cotton textiles output spurt is apparent
in the growing share of the domestic market supplied locally, from 5 per cent in
Table 12.1. Mexico: manufacturing indicators




Average yearly growth rate (per cent) Average share (per cent)
1870–90 – 1.3 – –
1890–1913 2.9 4.3 10.7 –
1913–20 0.5 1.9 – –
1920–38 1.7 4.2 12.8 12.1
1920–9 1.7 4.5 11.3 7.9
1929–32 6.8 11.5 12.9 11.9
1932–8 6.3 12.6 14.4 15.7
1938–50 6.1 7.8 17.2 18.3
1938–45 6.0 9.2 17.3 17.2
1945–50 6.3 5.9 17.2 23.0
1950–73 6.4 7.8 20.2 21.7
1973–90 3.7 4.0 21.5 30.0
1973–81 6.7 6.7 22.6 26.4
1981–90 1.1 1.7 20.5 31.2
1990–2010 2.7 2.5 25.5 75.7
1990–2000 3.5 4.4 20.1 73.5
2000–2010 1.9 0.5 30.5 78.6
Source: See Appendix: calculations made according to the following availability of data. GDP: 1895–1910,
1921–2010; manufacturing GDP: 1877, 1892–2010; manufacturing exports: 1925–50, 1962–2010.
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1891 to 20 per cent in 1898, 40 per cent in 1902, and more than 50 per cent in
1930. Likewise, the share of consumer goods in total imports (excluding foodstuffs)
declined from 58 per cent in 1891 to 29 per cent in 1930 (Thorp and Bertram,
1978, pp. 34, 119–20).
Mexico and Peru exhibited labour scarcity throughout the nineteenth and the
early twentieth centuries: thus, modern industry in both countries faced relatively
high wages. Although real wages in Mexico fell from the mid-eighteenth to the early
twentieth centuries relative to Western European nations, they were well above
those in China and Japan (Challú and Gómez-Galvarriato, 2015).2 In 1911, for
instance, daily earnings per worker in a similar textile mill were US$0.46 in Mexico
and US$0.18 in Japan (Gómez-Galvarriato, 2013, p. 62). There are no similar
studies for Peru, but we know that daily wages in the sugar industry were US$0.67
by 1915, and US$0.58 in 1924 (Hunt, 2011, p. 210). Moreover, during this
period there was substantial immigration of Chinese and Japanese workers to Peru
and, though less so, also to Mexico (Ota, 1997, pp. 108–9; Yamawaki, 2002,
pp. 52–3). In short, relatively high real wages made it difficult for these economies
to produce labour-intensive manufactured goods for export, as Japan did during
this period. Technical and skilled workers were even scarcer in both countries
Table 12.2. Peru: manufacturing indicators




Average yearly growth rate (per cent) Average share (per cent)
1870–90 3.0 3.8 11.6 –
1890–1913 4.5 4.8 11.6 –
1913–20 3.8 4.3 11.1 –
1920–38 3.9 3.6 11.1 –
1920–9 6.0 5.5 11.1 –
1929–32 7.8 8.5 10.9 –
1932–8 6.9 7.1 11.2 –
1938–50 3.1 5.0 12.4 –
1938–45 1.9 3.0 11.9 –
1950–73 5.4 7.3 15.5 1.1
1950–60 5.5 5.8 14.0 –
1960–8 5.7 8.7 15.4 0.7
1968–73 4.6 8.2 18.5 1.5
1973–90 0.7 0.6 18.3 11.6
1973–81 3.7 1.8 19.2 7.7
1981–90 1.9 2.6 17.4 15.2
1990–2010 4.9 5.4 17.2 17.8
1990–2000 4.2 4.8 16.5 18.1
2000–10 5.7 6.0 17.9 17.8
2 Real wages are deflated by consumer price indexes. In order to compare competitiveness levels it
would be better to deflate them by the price of manufactures, but unfortunately these are not available.
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because of low educational levels, implying that virtually all technical employees
were foreign. However, illiteracy rates declined in Mexico from 82 per cent in 1895
to 61.5 per cent in 1930, and in Peru from 76 per cent in 1900 to 63 per cent
in 1930.
The 50 per cent fall in silver prices during the 1880s and 1890s fostered
the development of manufacturing in both Mexico and Peru. As Figs 12.3 and
12.4 show, terms of trade fell in both countries during these decades, but more
in Mexico since this metal represented half of Mexico’s exports, and only around
one-fifth of Peru’s. Since Peru and Mexico were on the silver standard, and silver
depreciation was not coupled with an increase in domestic prices, they enjoyed
several years of currency undervaluation that encouraged manufacturing growth.3
At the same time, cost-reducing technological changes in silver mining increased
output and thus compensated for declining silver prices (Beatty, 2000). However,
by the turn of the century international price volatility was overshadowing the
benefits of silver depreciation, leading both countries to adopt the gold standard,
Peru in 1897 and Mexico in 1905.
A further compensating effect of falling terms of trade came from the diversifi-
cation of the export basket, which incorporated non-precious metals and tropical
crops and, after 1910, petroleum. Therefore, manufacturing production associated
with export processing continued its expansion. Peru experienced an earlier recov-
ery of its terms of trade than Mexico, together with overlapping export cycles
(copper and lead, sugar, wool, rubber, cotton, and petroleum) that provided the
basis for the continuation of export-led growth into the 1910s and 1920s, and
contributed to the reduction of economy-wide volatility.
Tariff protection complemented the effect of a depreciating currency on local
producers. As in other Latin American countries, between 1890 and 1913 Peruvian
and Mexican tariff levels ranked among the highest in the world (above 30 per cent:
Coatsworth and Williamson, 2004). Although the average nominal tariff declined
in the late nineteenth century, Mexican policy-makers increased import duties
selectively to promote manufacturing production by means of a cascading tariff
structure (Márquez, 1998). In contrast, in the early 1900s booming cotton prices
and a strong agricultural lobby led to a reduction in Peruvian tariffs. Between 1893
and 1903 the average tariff level declined from 39 per cent to 23 per cent (Bardella,
1989, pp. 149–51).
For Mexico, the impact of the First World War is difficult to separate from that
of the Mexican Revolution (1910–20). Oil and sisal production grew significantly
in response to increasing wartime demand, but manufacturing production dwin-
dled as a result of the dislocation of the transport, monetary, and financial systems
induced by the revolution. In spite of all these difficulties, Mexico was able to
export some iron and steel products to the United States and even to Japan. Still,
internal turmoil made it difficult for the manufacturing sector to take advantage of
3 A similar phenomenon to that found for several developing countries between 1950 and 2004
(Rodrik, 2007).
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Fig. 12.4. Mexico: level of openess and nominal tariff rates
Source: See Appendix.
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First World War demand. Instead, manufacturing production declined by
1.9 per cent yearly between 1913 and 1920.
The export booms during the First World War contributed to the strengthening
of the Peruvian pound and it therefore appreciated substantially when the author-
ities set the gold parity before the end of the war (Pastor, 2012, p. 9). While export-
processing products benefited from the export bonanza (in 1918 industrial exports
represented almost one-third of total exports and half of total industrial produc-
tion), the difficulties facing import-competing sectors reduced manufacturing
growth to 4.3 per cent yearly between 1913 and 1920.
During the 1920s, Mexican manufacturing recovered the production levels of
the 1900s, increasing at an annual rate of 5 per cent, well above GDP growth (see
Table 12.1). However, it fell behind other Latin American nations, since foreign
and domestic investment fell, and labour costs increased. Moreover, the cascading
structure of protection faded away as workers, merchants, and industrialists lobbied
in favour of their interests while the government was keen to fulfil their demands
(Márquez, 2007, pp. 389–96). Nonetheless, the depreciation of the real exchange
rate by 36 per cent between 1920 and 1929 fostered domestic manufacturing.
Peruvian manufacturing accelerated its rate of growth during the 1920s, growing
annually at 5.5 per cent. The processing of exports together with an ambitious
public works programme, financed through foreign lending, fed the demand for
consumer and intermediate goods (Caravedo, 1976, pp. 38–44). Local and foreign
investors established new ventures or expanded existing ones to supply this rising
demand with locally produced manufactures that the tariff reform of 1923 sought
to protect. At the onset of the world depression, manufacturing in Peru was closely
linked to the export sector. Only in few instances, usually when exchange rate or
tariff policies favoured it, did it spread to import-competing sectors.
12.3 1929–73: FROM EXPORT-LED GROWTH TO ISI
The Great Depression marked the end of the first era of globalization. Latin
American countries were strongly hit by a collapse in the demand for their exports
and suffered from the interruption of external capital flows and foreign direct
investment (FDI). In order to seek a way out of the crisis, governments widened
their participation in the economy. The falling trend in the terms of trade contrib-
uted to a yearly decline of GDP between 1929 and 1932 of 6.8 per cent in Mexico
and of 7.8 per cent in Peru (see Fig. 12.3 and Tables 12.1 and 12.2). However, a
diversified export basket and the stabilization of the terms of trade after 1932
guaranteed a swift recovery. Between 1932 and 1938 annual average GDP growth
surpassed 5 per cent in both countries and that of manufacturing reached 7.1 per
cent in Peru and 12.6 per cent in Mexico. The exchange rate policies adopted in the
midst of the world depression (abandonment of the gold standard and large
devaluations) not only alleviated the balance-of-payments crisis but also stimulated
manufacturing growth (Díaz Alejandro and Seibert, 1979, p. 150).
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The Mexican government followed moderately expansionist economic policies,
mostly through investment projects in infrastructure, which complemented private
investment and increased productivity. Between 1929 and 1939 more than half of
the manufacturing growth can be explained by the rise of domestic demand, 37 per
cent by the substitution of imports, and only 4 per cent by an increase in foreign
demand (Cárdenas, 1987, pp. 112, 248). The share of consumer non-durables
imported fell from 18 to less than 7 per cent, whereas the share of consumer
durables and intermediate goods imported declined from 82 to 66 per cent and
from 64 to 53 per cent, respectively. In contrast, the share of capital goods imported
increased from 79 to 84 per cent, as a consequence of the demand of the growing
manufacturing sector (Cárdenas, 1987, pp. 112, 116).
In Peru, the rapid recovery of export earnings increased aggregate demand by
themselves, so the government did not need to carry out expansionist fiscal policies
(Thorp and Bertram, 1978, pp. 184–5). The share of industrial goods in total
imports declined from almost 50 per cent in 1933 to 36 per cent six years later,
while most manufacturing growth focused on consumer goods. The market share
of locally produced cotton textiles increased from 55 to 60 per cent, and that of
cement went from 46 to 87 per cent, between 1930 and 1940 (Caravedo, 1976,
p. 43; Thorp and Bertram, 1978, pp. 192–3).
The Second World War was another major external shock for Latin America,
disrupting trade and financial flows. The shortage of manufactured goods fostered
import substitution. Although Peru’s terms of trade increased slightly between
1938 and 1945, its exports declined, and annual GDP growth slowed to 1.9 per
cent. Manufacturing output growth reached an annual rate of 3 per cent, but was
seriously limited by difficulties in importing capital and intermediate goods and the
size of the market. Taking advantage of the high-quality cotton grown in the
country, the domestic production of cotton textiles increased as a percentage of
total consumption from 60 to 93 per cent (Thorp, 1979, p. 193).
Thanks to its proximity to the United States and the signing of a commercial
treaty in 1942, the war offered Mexico the possibility of exporting manufactures.
These increased their share in total exports from 8.6 per cent in 1938 to 38 per cent
in 1945, despite the overvaluation of the peso (see Fig. 12.2), explaining more than
three-quarters of manufacturing growth. Textiles drove most of this rise, represent-
ing around 60 per cent of manufactured exports and 15 per cent of total exports.
The good performance of the manufacturing sector was also facilitated by an
increase in public investment, which grew at an annual rate of 15 per cent, financed
by rising foreign trade revenues (Cárdenas, 2003, pp. 250–3). When the Second
World War ended, the favourable conditions for Mexican manufacturing exports
also ended, and the balance of payments worsened. In order to cope with the
external deficit, in 1947 Mexico terminated the commercial treaty with the United
States and raised trade barriers. As a consequence, the degree of openness (the sum
of exports and imports relative to GDP) started a long decline, from a level of 27 to
8.4 per cent at its nadir in 1972 (see Fig. 12.4). These measures marked the
entrance of Mexico into the protectionist ‘inward-looking’ import-substituting
industrialization (ISI) club, in which it remained during the following three
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decades. The sharp increase in protectionism stimulated manufacturing growth,
further reinforced by devaluations in 1949 and 1954.
Between 1950 and 1973, Mexico witnessed an annual growth of manufacturing
output of 7.8 per cent, catching up with the fastest-growing countries in Latin
America and increasing the manufacturing share of GDP from 17.9 to 23.2 per
cent (see Fig. 12.1 and Table 12.1). Most of this expansion resulted from import
substitution based on protectionist policies. In order to jump over the protectionist
barrier, several multinationals established Mexican plants to produce appliances
and cars. In addition, the government invested heavily in infrastructure, and
widened the access to credit of manufacturing firms through development banks.
In the early 1960s the government imposed a 49 per cent foreign ownership limit
on new FDI in order to ‘mexicanize’ industry (Cárdenas, 2003, p. 255).
The fixed exchange rate policy followed by the Mexican authorities provoked a
repetition of the devaluation–appreciation–devaluation cycle in 1948 and 1954 (and
later in 1976). In each of these episodes the (temporary) stimulus to the manufactur-
ing sector emerged only as a by-product of an exchange rate policy designed to correct
trade deficits, but expansionary fiscal and monetary policies did not allow the
undervaluation to persist. By 1960 the substitution of consumer goods was practically
complete, so ISI policy focused on the substitution of intermediate and capital goods.
Between 1950 and 1970 the share of intermediate products in total manufactures
increased from 17.6 per cent to 29.2 per cent, and that of capital goods rose from 8.5
per cent to 17.6 per cent (see Table 12.3). These industries were generally less labour
intensive, required a larger scale and thus a larger market, and demanded more
imported inputs. The promotion of these types of industries often implied the
establishment of state-owned enterprises as well as a less competitive economic
structure that generated an increasing foreign trade deficit, and provided fewer jobs.
In order to cope with increasing trade deficits, in 1961 the Mexican government
began a systematic export promotion policy, earlier than other Latin American
nations. In 1962 it financed and promoted export-manufacturing through a financial
trust (FOMEX) and specialized offices abroad (Bancomext, 1987, p. 235). Then in
Table 12.3. Mexico and Peru: manufacturing structure, 1929–2010
Mexico
Sector 1929 1939 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Consumption goods 83% 79% 74% 61% 53% 53% 52% 39% 40%
Intermediate goods 15% 15% 18% 25% 29% 29% 30% 29% 29%
Capital goods 2% 6% 9% 14% 18% 18% 17% 32% 32%
Peru
Sector 1995 1960 1970 1980 1998 2008
Consumption goods – – – 59% 63% 60% 49% 53% 50%
Intermediate goods – – – 39% 33% 33% 40% 38% 41%
Capital goods – – – 3% 5% 7% 11% 8% 9%
Source: See Appendix.
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1965 Mexico established the Border Industrialization Programme, meant to provide
jobs to workers unemployed as a result of the end of the bracero programme
(negotiated in 1942). In-bond assembly plants, known as maquiladoras, benefited
from duty exemptions on inputs and machinery as long as they exported all output,
while the US government granted privileged access to its market. Unlike other firms
in Mexico, maquiladoras could be 100 per cent foreign owned. Initially, they were
required to locate within 20 miles of an international border or coastline, but in 1972
the franchise extended to the rest of the country (Taylor Hansen, 2003, p. 1054).
From 1965 to 1974 the number of maquiladoras soared from 12 to 455, and their
employment went from 3,000 to 75,977 workers, most of them women (Martínez
del Campo, 1985, pp. 273–6). Between 1970 and 1974, maquiladoras’ value added
increased yearly by 55 per cent, producing mostly electrical and electronic equip-
ment, shoes, and apparel (ECLA, 1978, pp. 63–8).
The export promotion and maquiladora programmes proved fruitful as manu-
facturing performance in foreign markets improved considerably and expanded
well above the rest of the economy. Between 1965 and 1974, non-maquiladora
manufactured exports grew yearly by 18 per cent, with machinery, electrical, and
transport equipment the fastest-growing industries, while maquiladora labour-
intensive exports rose yearly by 36 per cent. By 1974, the share of manufactures
(including those originated in maquiladoras) in total exports exceeded two-thirds.
However, manufacturing exports did not alleviate trade imbalances, since other
manufacturing sectors were intensive in imported inputs (ECLA, 1978, pp. 20–3).
In contrast to a firmly rooted ISI policy in Mexico, manufacturing development
in Peru followed a different path characterized by the coexistence of export-led
growth and milder industrial promotion policies up until the late 1950s. Thus,
Peru remained an exceptionally open economy, as powerful export interests lobbied
in favour of free trade (see Fig. 12.5). Another salient feature of the Peruvian
economy was the implementation, from 1949, of a dual fluctuating exchange
rate system, which avoided devaluation–appreciation–devaluation cycles. Remark-
ably, manufacturing in Peru achieved considerable progress, considering that the
country never abandoned the export-led growth model and lagged behind the
adoption of industrial promotion policies. An annual growth of 5.8 per cent
between 1950 and 1960 increased the manufacturing share in GDP, reaching
14.2 per cent in 1961. One of the most successful endeavours was the development
of the labour and resource intensive fishmeal industry, oriented primarily towards
foreign markets and with strong linkages to the rest of local manufacturing
(Bardella, 1989, pp. 436–42). Reinvestment of profits was the major financial
source of domestic manufacturing, while the government-funded Banco Industrial
granted loans primarily for the acquisition of machinery, equipment, and real
estate. The welcoming attitude towards foreign investment was also crucial in the
provision of funds supporting manufacturing growth.
Breaking with a long tradition of little intervention in the economy, in the late
1950s the Peruvian government implemented policies to foster manufacturing
growth, which strengthened after the 1968 military coup (the so-called Peruvian
Revolution) and extended up until 1975. Manufacturing growth rates between
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1960 and 1968 reached 8.7 per cent, and between 1968 and 1973, 8.2 per cent
annually (see Table 12.1). Manufacturing was stimulated by the devaluation of
1958, but this effect faded away with the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime
in 1960. The increasing appreciation of the currency ended with a large devaluation
and the reintroduction of the dual exchange rate in 1968 (Pastor, 2012, p. 44).
The 1959 Industrial Act brought more lasting effects by implementing tax
incentives, hikes in import duties on consumer goods, and reductions on inputs
and capital goods. The 1970 Industrial Promotion Act reinforced the government’s
role in the economy by reserving exclusively to the state the production of cement,
paper, basic chemicals, steel, fertilizers, and refined oil. Seeking to redistribute
income and wealth in favour of wage earners and the rural poor, the government
implemented land reform programmes and established cooperatives within private
enterprises (Thorp, 1979, p. 114; Roca and Simabuko, 1999, p. 74).
The most dynamic sectors in Peru before 1970 were the inward-oriented
assembly industries (cars and home appliances) as well as export-processing
sectors, all of them with significant FDI presence. State-owned enterprises took
the lead in the production of cement, steel, and fertilizers. Financing came
primarily from the Banco Industrial, which supplied one-fourth of total credit


























































































































































































Fig. 12.5. Peru: level of openess and implicit tariff rates
Source: See Appendix.
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important role financing medium and small enterprises, whereas American,
Canadian, and German private banks funded the expansion of the fishmeal
industry (ECLA, 1967, pp. 27–36).
Between 1968 and 1975 the military regime enhanced protectionism, controlled
the main export commodities, imported industrial inputs and basic staples, and
established more rigid labour regulations. Consumer goods accounted for more
than 60 per cent of total output, and intermediate and capital goods together
maintained their share below 40 per cent; chemicals, household durables, and
vehicles were the more dynamic industries (Fitzgerald, 1979, pp. 262–3).
In 1970, the share of semi-manufactured exports in total exports rose to 68.5 per
cent, reflecting the boom in fishmeal exports, while the share of manufactured
exports increased slightly to 1 per cent.
By the early 1970s the share of manufacturing in GDP had peaked in Mexico
and Peru, at 23.2 per cent in 1973 and 21.1 per cent in 1974, respectively.
However, serious constraints had been building up that would pose major chal-
lenges to manufacturing growth in the following decades. In both economies, the
manufacturing sector reduced its capacity to absorb manpower, since the more
dynamic industries (chemicals, non-durable goods) were capital intensive. Rela-
tively high wages in Peru and Mexico reduced the competitiveness of manufactures
in world markets. Wage increases were not driven by productivity growth but
rather by increasingly powerful unions. Between 1958 and 1970, Mexican and
Peruvian wages were on average around four times those in South Korea and
Taiwan.4 This wage gap also characterized Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
and Venezuela (Mahon, 1992, p. 254; Chapter 13 in this volume).
Educational levels did not keep up with those in Asian competitors either, nor
did productivity. Literacy rates did improve steadily from the early twentieth
century onwards, reaching 70.4 per cent in Peru and 76.3 per cent in Mexico in
1970, but the development of other technical skills proved less satisfactory. The
average years of schooling in 1970, 3.7 in Peru and 2.9 in Mexico, were below the
3.9 average years in Latin America, let alone the 5.2 years in South Korea. Mexico
retained a labour cost advantage relative to the United States, though: a study from
the early 1960s indicates that the ratio of value added per worker to the wage in
manufacturing was 4.08 in Mexico and 2.62 in the US. This study also shows that
Mexico’s manufacturing exports relied not only on cheaper labour but also on
cheaper raw materials to compete internationally (Bancomext, 1965, p. 399).
Finally, growing fiscal and trade deficits were increasingly financed by external
indebtedness, generating great macroeconomic vulnerability. During the 1960s
Mexican foreign debt doubled relative to GDP, and by 1970 Mexico’s foreign debt
service represented 23.4 per cent of total exports (Cárdenas, 2003, p. 267). In Peru
debt service payments soared from about 13 per cent of export receipts in 1968–72
to about 30 per cent by 1975–6 (Pastor, 2012, p. 53).
4 For Mexico, the gap was largest in 1966, when its hourly wage was 0.5 dollars as compared with
South Korea’s 0.06 dollars and Taiwan’s 0.11 dollars.
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12.4 ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE COLLAPSE OF ISI
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system together with the 1973 oil price shock
caused uncertain financial conditions that gravely affected Latin America, because
of higher energy costs, a recession in their export markets, volatile terms of trade,
and excess liquidity abroad that greatly increased the availability of foreign lending.
In both countries, the combination of expansionary demand policies and rising
energy costs accelerated inflation, appreciated the real exchange rate, and aggravated
the trade deficit (see Tables 12.3 and 12.4). In Mexico, the discovery and exploit-
ation of vast amounts of oil deposits fuelled economic growth for several years,
but the government failed to implement appropriate demand management
policies. Between 1973 and 1981 Mexico’s terms of trade increased at an annual
rate of 7.3 per cent and real GDP grew at 6.7 per cent, driven by oil exports (see
Tables 12.1 and 12.3). Instead of sterilizing part of the oil bonanza, the govern-
ment increased its expenditure from 13.4 per cent of GDP in 1972 to 31.6 per cent
in 1982, mainly on non-tradables. More than half of public investment went to the
oil sector, and very little was devoted to strengthening the production of agricul-
tural or manufacturing tradable goods. Moreover, the growing overvaluation of the
peso brought about a sharp rise in imports, mostly of capital and intermediate
goods, which resulted in a huge current account deficit that reached 70 per cent of
merchandise exports in 1982. Dutch Disease effects were exacerbated by a large
increase in the external public debt that went from 10.2 per cent of GDP in 1973
to 32.7 per cent in 1982. Foreign borrowing brought about an even more severe
stagnation of the non-oil tradable sector via an additional appreciation of the real
exchange rate (Usui, 1997).
Manufacturing GDP grew at an annual rate of 6 per cent between 1973 and
1982, but the manufacturing share of GDP fell by 9 per cent. The Mexican
economy did not ‘petrolize’, as happened in Venezuela, since oil production
represented only between 10 per cent and 14 per cent of GDP in this period.
However in 1981, oil represented two-thirds of total exports and 25 per cent of the
government’s revenue. In 1982, when oil prices declined and international interest
rates increased, the situation became unsustainable and Mexico defaulted on its
foreign debt, generating a financial crisis. GDP decreased by 0.5 per cent and
manufacturing production by 2.9 per cent.
Peru faced severe economic difficulties even before the outbreak of the inter-
national debt crisis. After 1973, economic instability worsened the outlook for
foreign investors, who were already alienated by the interventionist climate
and expropriations. The rise of a new military government in 1975 shifted the
economic strategy, with most extreme forms of government intervention in the
economy being abandoned. The contraction of domestic demand resulting from
the adjustment plans lowered manufacturing growth to 1.8 per cent between 1973
and 1981, but intermediate and capital goods slightly increased their share in total
manufacturing production during this period (see Table 12.3).
The weaknesses of the Peruvian economy exacerbated as it entered into the ‘lost
decade’ of Latin American development of the 1980s. A modest revival of FDI
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receded in the face of the nationalistic policies that reappeared in the second half of
this decade. The country reached hyperinflation levels of 7,482 per cent in 1990
(see Table 12.2). Between 1981 and 1990 Peru’s real GDP fell by 1.9 per cent
per annum, while manufacturing GDP declined by 2.6 per cent annually.
Mounting economic and financial problems in the early 1980s masked signifi-
cant increases of manufacturing exports throughout the 1970s and 1980s, taking
advantage of regional integration efforts. In Peru, semi-manufactured exports’ share
in total exports declined from 68 to 40 per cent between 1970 and 1980, while that
of manufactures increased from 1 to 15.6 per cent (ECLA, 1991, p. 119). In 1987,
after several years of severe economic and financial troubles, semi-manufactures’
and manufactures’ contribution to total exports reached 61.4 per cent. The Andean
Pact (later called Andean Community) allowed specialization and enlarged the
market for mature Peruvian industries such as textiles.
Total factor productivity growth in Mexican manufacturing increased on average
by 3.64 per cent per annum between 1963 and 1981. Its TFP growth during
this period compares well with those of Japan, Korea, Turkey, and Yugoslavia
(2.04, 3.71, 1.33, and 0.48 per cent per annum respectively: Samaniego, 1984,
pp. 21–2). In the early 1970s, Mexican semi-manufactured and manufactured
products amounted to 28.4 per cent and 27 per cent of total exports respectively.
Together they comprised more than half of total exports (ECLA, 1991, p. 111).
This experience in world markets is fundamental to better understanding the
export boom that accompanied liberalization in Mexico and Peru during the last
three decades.
12.5 LIBERALIZATION AND A NEW ERA
OF EXPORT-LED GROWTH
Mexico and Peru liberalized their economies at a very fast rate, as part of the
emergency economic policies meant to overcome their deep economic troubles.
The main concern was to control inflation and to reduce their fiscal and trade
deficits, and these objectives were placed above all others. Throughout the 1980s
the manufacturing sector was severely hurt by skyrocketing interest rates, the
abrupt opening up of the economy, and an overvalued exchange rate used to
restrain inflation. Industrial policy was demonized, so few endeavours were carried
out to strengthen domestic capabilities, and seek and develop areas of dynamic
comparative advantage.
In Mexico, liberalization policies began in 1982 as a response to economic
turmoil. Following a balance of payments crisis in 1982, the country eased
restrictions on maquiladoras, which led to a large increase in export-processing
trade with the United States. In 1985, Mexico broadened its opening to trade by
joining the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which entailed
cutting tariffs across the board and eliminating non-tariff barriers. From 1983
to 1987 the percentage of goods that required import permits was reduced from
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100 per cent to 3.8 per cent, and the average nominal tariff declined from 27 to
10 per cent (see Table 12.1).
From 1984 the government gradually allowed the establishment of firms with
majority or total foreign ownership, at first in some capital-intensive activities with
a high export potential, and later in all productive activities (Moreno-Brid and Ros,
2010, pp. 775–6). The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed
in 1994, consolidated and extended these reforms and tied them to reciprocal access
to the US and Canadian markets. As Fig. 12.4 shows, the level of openness
increased radically after the mid-1980s.
Between 1981 and 1987 manufacturing output declined at an annual rate of
0.4 per cent, ending a half-century of continuous expansion that had started in 1932.
From 1982 to 1988 exports grew more than imports for the first time in several
decades (see Table 12.4). In addition, the export mix changed dramatically with oil
exports declining from 77.6 per cent of total exports in 1982 to 42.2 per cent in
1987, and the share of manufacturing exports increasing from 15.9 to 51 per cent.
The growth in manufacturing exports was the result of the exploitation of underused
installed capacity, the undervaluation of the exchange rate (that reached 37.7 per cent
in 1987 relative to 1977), and a drop in real wages (see Table 12.5). While in 1982












Average yearly growth rate (per cent) Percentage
1870–90 4.4 8.5 4.8 1.7 3.0 – – –
1890–1913 1.8 2.6 0.0 0.3 2.6 19.4 28.1 2.7
1913–20 4.0 16.5 1.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 25.4 0.0
1920–38 3.5 4.9 4.0 14.5 0.6 19.8 22.5 3.9
1920–9 3.9 2.2 4.0 9.2 2.9 20.0 24.0 2.9
1929–32 16.0 16.4 13.2 – 4.4 16.8 28.7 3.1
1932–8 14.3 2.6 0.4 – 4.2 20.6 19.1 5.2
1938–50 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.3 9.7 21.4 12.2 3.2
1938–45 0.5 0.2 5.0 0.5 9.8 21.3 14.1 4.5
1945–50 1.3 1.2 9.0 1.2 9.8 21.4 10.0 1.3
1950–73 1.4 4.1 0.4 3.4 6.1 12.4 14.0 2.2
1973–90 1.8 10.4 0.7 1.7 47.7 18.5 10.3 0.6
1973–81 7.3 12.0 6.5 0.1 25.8 12.0 10.9 2.4
1981–90 2.9 9.0 7.6 3.1 68.6 24.2 9.7 3.0
1990–2010 1.0 8.2 0.6 1.4 11.3 45.2 3.2 1.1
1990–2000 1.9 13.6 2.5 1.2 17.6 40.0 4.4 1.2
1990–2010 0.1 3.1 1.4 1.6 4.6 51.1 1.5 1.0
Note: Calculations made according to the following availability of data. Terms of trade: 1870–2010; exports:
1880–2013; real exchange rate: 1886–1913, 1917–2010; tariff rate: 1893–2000, 2003–8; real wages:
1886–1913, 1917–29, 1939–2010; prices: 1886–1913, 1917–2010; openness, 1895–1910, 1921–2010; trade
balance/GDP: 1895–1910, 1921–2010.
Sources: See Appendix.
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monthly wages in Mexico (US$327) were higher than in South Korea (US$277) and
Singapore (US$306), by 1984 they had fallen to US$265, lower for the first time
than in South Korea (US$304) and Singapore (US$306). By 1988 wages had
declined further to less than US$100 (Villarreal, 2005, pp. 439, 471–4).
Maquiladora employment grew from 180,000, to 451,000 workers between
1984 and 1990, and to 1.3 million in 2000, over one-quarter of Mexico’s total
manufacturing labour force. Maquiladoras’ real value added increased from $330
million pesos in 1990 to $1.5 billion in 2000. During the early 1990s maquiladoras
generated more than half of manufacturing exports (Moreno-Brid and Ros, 2010,
p. 780). These plants were concentrated along the Mexico–US border, which in
2002 accounted for 83 per cent of maquiladora employment (Hanson, 2002).
Before NAFTA, the US offshore assembly programme gave maquiladoras an
advantage over integrated Mexican producers, since the importing firms were
required to pay import duties only on the value added abroad. NAFTA apparently
ended this special status for maquiladoras by giving all Mexican firms duty free
access to the US market. However, new programmes were implemented to provide
attractive fiscal and customs benefits to export manufacturing assembly firms.5












Yearly growth rate (per cent) Percentage
1870–90 0.02 – – – – – – –
1890–1913 0.86 7.7 7.2 – 2.3 44.4 28.5 3.2
1913–20 5.40 1.8 10.3 – 11.4 44.7 14.9 9.8
1920–38 3.77 5.3 11.4 – 0.3 42.7 16.5 13.3
1920–29 2.31 7.7 17.0 – 0.4 45.6 15.8 0.1
1929–32 14.90 12.3 22.7 – 4.4 39.0 19.6 14.9
1932–8 0.04 11.8 24.1 0.2 1.3 39.4 16.7 17.3
1938–50 2.15 1.3 4.4 – 12.4 34.1 9.3 9.1
1938–45 0.39 2.9 21.0 – 8.0 34.6 11.2 12.1
1950–73 0.33 5.0 10.1 – 8.7 35.4 13.8 2.5
1950–60 2.25 7.5 11.7 – 8.2 35.2 9.5 3.6
1960–8 1.66 6.5 3.4 – 10.2 38.8 14.4 2.2
1968–73 3.52 2.1 31.9 – 9.0 31.1 20.9 0.002
1973–90 0.71 1.5 3.3 3.5 696.8 26.7 38.7 0.9
1973–81 1.34 5.3 1.8 1.8 42.4 28.1 18.5 3.0
1981–90 0.16 1.8 7.7 11.2 1223.6 26.0 56.1 0.6
1990–2010 2.03 6.7 1.2 5.9 386.0 37.7 15.4 0.2
1990–2000 0.20 7.2 0.3 1.6 734.8 32.8 20.8 3.3
2000–10 4.32 6.3 2.1 1.6 2.5 42.5 7.7 2.7
5 After 2006 the programme was renamed Industria Maquiladora y Manufacturera de Exportación
(IMMEX).
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Since these programmes linked many of the benefits to the import of foreign inputs
(such as exempting them from sales taxes), they generated a bias against the
incorporation of domestic inputs.
After NAFTA, Mexico became increasingly linked to the United States: 76 per
cent of Mexico’s manufacturing exports went to the US in 1990 and 90 per cent in
2000 (Martínez, 2012, p. 24). Such concentration made Mexico very vulnerable to
US economic cycles. During the 1990s low wages in Mexico were key to attracting
multinational firms wishing to set up export assembly operations. Real wages fell
during this decade, due in large part to a severe recession in 1995 (in which real
GDP contracted by over 6 per cent in a single year). In 2000, wages in the United
States were four or five times wages in Mexico (Hanson, 2002).
Perhaps one of the most salient impacts of liberalization was substantial FDI
oriented towards export production. Manufacturing exports’ share of total exports
went from 44 to 83.5 per cent between 1990 and 2000 (see Fig. 12.2). Mexico’s
high-technology exports increased by 45 per cent during this decade, one of the
highest growth rates in the world, and considerably faster than China’s, which grew
by 33 per cent (Lall, Albaldalejo, and Mesquita Moreira, 2004, p. 25). They surged
in transport equipment and parts, and electrical and electronic equipment, precisely
the same sectors that had grown faster in the 1970s (Martínez del Campo, 1985,
pp. 262–3). Medium- and high-technology manufactured exports as a share of total
manufacturing exports increased from 62 to 76 per cent between 1990 and 2000,
whereas resource-based manufactures decreased from 24 per cent to only 7 per cent
(Lall, Albaldalejo, and Mesquita Moreira, 2004, pp. 57–60). This contrasts with
the rest of Latin America, for which medium- and high-technology manufactures
represented only 36 per cent of manufactured exports in 2000. As a result, the share
of capital goods in total manufacturing production increased from 17 per cent in
1990 to 32 per cent in 2000 (see Table 12.5). Although the Mexican export sector
has been characterized as ‘high technology’, when it is analysed according to its
locally generated value added it has specialized in relatively uncomplicated phases of
assembly, distribution, and sales which are ‘low technology’ activities (Fujii and
Cervantes, 2014, p. 10).
Total factor productivity and labour productivity in manufacturing practically stag-
nated between 1984 and 1987, increasing at the low annual rates of 0.8 per cent and 0.7
per cent respectively. Yet, between 1987 and 1990, as manufactures were increasingly
destined for foreign markets, total factor productivity grew strongly, by 10.5 per cent
annually (Brown andDomínguez, 1994, p. 284).However, it grew only by 1.2 per cent
per annum between 1993 and 2000. Manufacturing industries varied widely as regards
performance. Plant TFP fell by 4.3 per cent per annum in the apparel industry, but it
rose in the machinery and equipment, computing equipment, and precision industries
at annual rates of 5 per cent, 7.3 per cent, and 5.5 per cent respectively. Plant
productivity in traded industries grew on average by 2 per cent per annum, while it
stagnated in non-traded industries. Econometric analysis indicates that falling tariffs, an
increase in the share of manufacturing industry participating in world markets, and
increasing FDI flows to industry, explain productivity growth. However, the use of
imported intermediate goods in the production process, which increased steadily
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from 28.5 per cent to 34.7 per cent of all non-wage costs of production during this
period, had an adverse impact on productivity growth, particularly among foreign firms
(López-Córdova, 2003, pp. 69, 80–5).
In Peru liberalization arrived later than in Mexico, but took place at an even
faster rate. The disastrous economic experience of the 1980s paved the way to a
radical opening-up of the economy and to market-oriented policies. Fujimori’s
government (1990–2000) implemented an extreme version of the so-called
Washington Consensus. His government cancelled all previous industrial, labour,
and income policy schemes, eliminated the main tax exemptions, reduced tariff
protection, and lifted price controls, while financial, exchange, and trade regula-
tions were liberalized. Job tenure was also eliminated and labour legislation was
made more flexible, reducing union power. While real wages had been declining
since 1974, between 1990 and 2000 they fell by 1.6 per cent annually (see
Table 12.4). As in Mexico, Peruvian policy-makers advocated a radical government
downsizing programme through privatization and lifted all restrictions on the
inflow or outflow of foreign private capital (Roca and Simabuko, 1999, p. 74).
In addition, the government reassured investors by bringing down inflation and
carrying out policies to make foreign investment welcome once again. Consequent-
ly, investment and industrial production rose strongly.
Trade liberalization allowed manufactured imports to rise considerably
through the first half of the 1990s, diminishing several lines of production
such as automobiles, electrical equipment, and paper products. However, eco-
nomic opening did not set back the industrial sector in an absolute sense.
Rather, its output grew at annual rates of 5 per cent between 1990 and 2000
and 6 per cent between 2000 and 2010, the highest rates since 1950–73.
Manufacturing growth was supported by relatively low real wages and higher
investment rates. It took place mostly in resource-based sectors such as fishmeal,
frozen seafood, sugar, jewellery, and zinc and copper metallurgy, but the apparel
industry also saw important growth. Between 1990 and 2000 manufacturing
value added increased at an annual rate of 3.6 per cent, and manufactured
exports at 5.2 per cent yearly. The structure of manufactured exports remained
unchanged during this period; around 70 per cent of Peruvian manufactured
exports were resource based, while medium- and high-technology exports ac-
counted for 5 per cent of manufactured exports (Lall, Albaldalejo, and Mesquita
Moreira, 2004, pp. 57–8).
The spectacular rise of China’s economic growth in the 2000s had a deep
economic impact on the Mexican and Peruvian economies. China’s growth gener-
ated a negative trade shock for manufacturing exporters and a positive shock for
mining and agricultural exporters. According to Artuç, Lederman, and Rojas
(2015), the net effect of China’s foreign trade from 2001 to 2011 was to decrease
Mexico’s net manufacturing exports by 11 per cent, while it reduced those of Peru
by only 2.5 per cent. At the same time, Chinese foreign trade expansion increased
mining net exports by only 8 per cent in Mexico, but by 25 per cent in Peru, and
agricultural net exports by 2 per cent in both countries. Argentina and Brazil, like
Peru, also experienced a positive overall effect.
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Mexico was one of the countries in Latin America hardest hit by Chinese
economic growth, particularly after China’s entrance to the WTO in 2001. More
than in other Latin American countries, Mexico’s export basket resembled that
of China, particularly in those products where China was gaining market share.
In contrast, Peru’s economy was fostered by Chinese growth. During 2008–12 over
a third of Peru’s copper exports, 64 per cent of gold exports, and 22 per cent of
other mineral commodities went to China. A correlation of 0.5 has been found
between Peru’s real GDP growth and China’s investment growth during
1995–2012, transmitted mostly through its impact on Peru’s terms of trade
(IMF, 2014, pp. 53–6).
Mexico’s manufacturing exports per capita grew by 15.3 per cent per annum
between 1995 and 2000, slowing to 4.4 per cent from 2000 to 2010, which was
still high by world standards. Yet, the growth of manufactured exports translated
only modestly into overall economic growth. Mexico’s GDP increased yearly by
3.5 per cent in the 1990s, and by only 1.9 per cent in the 2000s, making it one of
the slowest-growing Latin American countries during this decade. While manufac-
turing production increased by 4.4 per cent during the 1990s, it almost stagnated
in the 2000s, growing by only 0.5 per cent per annum during that decade
(see Table 12.1). The slowdown was partly a result of the 2008 financial crisis
that hit Mexico harder than other Latin American countries because of its high
synchronization with the US economic cycle.
Mexico’s slow growth can be partly explained by the low domestic value-added
content in its manufacturing exports, and by the fact that most of the indirect
domestic value added was concentrated in non-manufacturing sectors. The domes-
tic value added in Mexico’s manufacturing exports did not increase between 1995
and 2011. However, there is some hope that the domestic value-added content of
Mexican exports might increase in the future, since the most dynamic export
sectors, such as the automobile and aeronautic industries, also had a greater growth
in terms of their domestic value added (Martínez, 2012, p. 49; Fujii and Cervantes,
2014, p. 6).
During the 2000s Peru became one of the fastest-growing economies in Latin
America, reaching an annual GDP growth rate of 5.7 per cent. Once again,
commodity exports were the driving force behind this economic performance.
They increased at an annual rate of 7.2 per cent between 1990 and 2000, and at
6.3 per cent between 2000 and 2010 (see Tables 12.2 and 12.4). The terms of trade
rose annually by 4.3 per cent in the latter period, driven by an increase in mining
prices. In 2011 about 18 per cent of Peru’s GDP came from the extraction and
export of natural resources (IMF, 2014, p. 6). In contrast to Mexico, Peru’s export
markets were diversified: in 2013, 23.7 per cent of its exports went to the European
Union, 17.6 per cent to the United States, 17.5 per cent to China, and 14.3 per
cent to the Andean Community, Mercosur, and Chile (INEI, 2014). However,
Peru’s economic activity became increasingly vulnerable to a Chinese investment
slowdown: in 2014 it was estimated that a one standard deviation decline in
China’s investment growth was likely to reduce Peru’s real GDP growth by
about 0.4 per cent (IMF, 2014, p. 62).
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As in past export booms, manufactured exports were closely associated with
primary products processing. By 2010, processed copper and fishmeal comprised
15 per cent of Peruvian total exports and labour-intensive knitted underwear
exports 2.5 per cent. While the concentration in a handful of products was already
a well-established pattern at least since the early 1960s, when fishmeal, sugar, and
processed copper were the only manufactures listed amongst Peru’s ten major
exports, the rise of textile manufactures indicates a certain degree of diversification
away from mineral- or agricultural-processing lines.
Real wages stagnated in both countries as a result of a reduction in the wage
premium on education and working experience through this period. This took
place because the more dynamic sectors in both countries demanded low-skilled
workers, while the supply of more educated workers had increased. Although
wages for low-skilled labour increased, the decrease in skilled-labour wages
generated an overall stagnation of wages, while the labour income share in
GDP decreased in both countries (Paz and Urrutia, 2014; Lustig, López-Calva,
and Ortiz-Juárez, 2013).
In 2010, Mexico’s manufacturing sector continued to be stronger than that of
Peru, as it was one century earlier. In that year, the manufacturing value added
per capita of Mexico (US$1,007.9) was more than twice that of Peru (US$448.6),
and Mexico’s manufactured exports per capita were 3.5 times higher (US
$2,166.2). Moreover, the share of medium- and high-technology manufactured
exports in total manufactured exports was more than 15 times higher in Mexico
(78.7 per cent) than in Peru (5.2 per cent), but the share of their value added was
only 2.6 times higher in Mexico (38.5 per cent) than in Peru (15 per cent).
Mexico was ranked in 22nd place (above all Latin American countries) in
UNIDO’s competitive industrial performance index (UNIDO, 2013), and
Peru in 63rd place. While Mexico’s larger market size was an important factor
explaining the different manufacturing performances of both nations until the
1980s, it was their geographical location and their natural resource endowments
that shaped the different paths taken by each nation. However, at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, industrial development was no longer closely linked to
economic development.
12.7 CONCLUSIONS
The comparative study of manufacturing growth in Mexico and Peru over the long
run tells us that Mexico’s larger market and its proximity to the United States were
crucial for its greater manufacturing development. Peru based its economic growth
more on commodity exports, and manufacturing was slower to develop. Moreover,
while Mexico concentrated most of its trade on the United States, Peru always had
more diversified markets. Until the 1980s both countries had relatively high wage
levels by international standards, inhibiting the development of labour-intensive
manufacturing exports. At the same time their population lacked the educational
and skill levels required to produce more sophisticated manufactures that could
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compete internationally in spite of their higher wage levels. Mexico and Peru had to
rely on primary goods exports to generate the trade surpluses that could pay for the
machinery and other intermediate goods that the manufacturing sector increasingly
required. However, exports of semi-manufactures intensive in natural resources
have been underestimated, since they are considered primary products in the
statistical trade data.
This chapter shows that primary goods export-led growth was a driving force for
manufacturing development rather than a hindrance when exports were diversified
and the government conducted sound fiscal and monetary policies. Commodity
export growth was only detrimental to manufacturing when commodity booms
were concentrated in a single product, and were coupled with macroeconomic
mismanagement that led to overvaluation, and excessive foreign indebtedness, as
happened during Peru’s guano boom of the mid-nineteenth century and Mexico’s
oil bonanza of 1978–81.
In both Mexico and Peru, ISI policies fostered manufacturing growth when they
were coupled with macroeconomic stability, and policies that promoted domestic
and foreign investment. However, ISI policies generated structural trade deficits
that became more acute as import substitution progressed from consumer to
intermediate and capital goods. Thus, when ISI policies were complemented
with other policies that fostered, or at least did not hinder, the growth of exports,
they were successful. In Mexico, this was the case during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries and from the 1930s until the mid-1960s, and in Peru
during the 1890s and from 1950 until the early 1960s. During these periods,
governments prevented overvaluation and invested in areas that increased the
country’s international competitiveness (such as transport infrastructure and edu-
cation). The successful outcomes of ISI policies in countries such as Turkey and
Southeast Asia show the feasibility of this strategy.
This chapter argues that macroeconomic stability is a necessary condition
for achieving manufacturing development. In Peru and Mexico, real exchange
rate appreciation, high interest and inflation rates, together with anti-private and
anti-foreign business policies, which began in the late 1960s, undermined the
development of manufacturing in the following decades. However, such economic
disarray was not a consequence of ISI policies themselves, but rather the result of
macroeconomic policies that sought to redress increasingly difficult political and
social problems in countries with very high inequality. These policies were only
feasible because the international bonanza of foreign lending in the 1970s nur-
tured them.
In contrast to the more successful East Asian countries, Mexico and Peru failed
to use import substitution to build competitive capabilities, by underinvesting in
education and infrastructure and by undermining the development of manufac-
turing exports through overvaluation and excessive tariff protection. Moreover, the
severe economic mismanagement that produced periodic economic crises after
1973 destroyed some of the competitive capabilities that had been built during
the previous years, as a result of hikes in interest rates, and collapses in demand, that
forced many firms into bankruptcy.
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After the 1980s crisis, Mexico and Peru liberalized much faster than East Asian
countries. Mexico developed manufacturing exports through the maquiladora
industry, and Peru went back to relying on commodity exports. Following the
‘Washington Consensus’, these two countries relied excessively on free markets to
drive industrial growth and competitiveness. In contrast, in East Asia governments
implemented policies to address market deficiencies, such as missing and incom-
plete capital markets; deficient or asymmetric information; unpredictable learning
costs and externalities; and scale economies, imperfect competition, and informa-
tion failures hampering investment in sectors of future comparative advantage (Lall,
1996; Stiglitz, 1996).
Mexico’s slow rates of post-liberalization economic growth suggest that in order
for export-led manufacturing growth to drive economic growth, it is necessary that
exports have high domestic value added with strong production chains, and that the
internal market be driven by income derived from exports—something that did not
take place until 2010 (Fujii and Cervantes, 2014, p. 3). Moreover, Mexico’s
manufacturing export-led growth model does not seem to have reduced the
country’s vulnerability to external shocks relative to the old commodity export-
led growth model, given its extreme reliance on only one foreign market. On the
other hand, Peru appears to have returned to the old commodity-export-led growth
model. Although it has provided high GDP growth in recent decades and a





Peru: 1870–1949, Seminario (2014), pp. 817–20; 1950–2013, INEI, www.inei.gob.pe/
estadisticas




Peru: 1870–2012, Seminario (2014), pp. 817–20.
Mexico: Linked series using: 1877–1910, El Colegio de México (1960), p. 106; 1911–25,
own calculation built with data from Presidencia de la República (1963), pp. 81–92, and
Gómez-Galvarriato (2013), pp. 18–19; 1926–50, Pérez López (1960), pp. 588–99;
1951–60, manufacturing GDP (pesos of 1960), INEGI, Estadísticas Históricas de México,
2014, Producto interno bruto total y por gran división de actividad económica, Table 8.3,
http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/cgi-win/ehm2014.exe/CI080030010; 1961–70, manufactur-
ing GDP (pesos of 1970), INEGI, Table 8.4, http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/cgi-win/
ehm2014.exe/CI080030020; 1971–93, manufacturing GDP (pesos of 1980), INEGI,
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Table 8.5, http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/cgi-win/ehm2014.exe/CI080030030; 1994–2003,
manufacturing GDP (pesos of 1993), Table 8.6, INEGI, http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/cgi-
win/ehm2014.exe/CI080030040; 2004–10: INEGI, Banco de Información Estadística,
http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/bie/default.aspx. Cuentas Nacionales. Producto
Interno Bruto Trimestral. Valores a precios de 2008. Actividades Secundarias. Industria
Manufacturera.
Manufacturing exports
Peru: 1962–2013, CEPALSTAT, http://moxlad-staging.herokuapp.com/home/es
Mexico: 1925–40, Cárdenas (1987), pp. 230–1; 1940–50, Ortíz Mena et al. (1953),
p. 399; 1962–2013, CEPALSTAT.
Structure of manufacturing production
Peru: 1955 and 1960, Weeks (1985), pp. 103–10; 1970, 1980, and 1988, Portocarrero,
Beltrán, and Romero (1992), pp. 27–8; 2008, INEI, www.inei.gob.pe/
estadisticas/indice-tematico/economia/
Mexico: 1929–60, Villarreal (2005), pp. 254–5; 1960–2011, INEGI, Sistema de
Cuentas Nacionales de México.
Real exchange rate
Peru: Banco Nacional de Reserva de Perú, Series Históricas, http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/
estadisticas/cuadros-anuales-historicos.html
Mexico: Estimated using US price index, Lindert and Sutch (2006), Table Cc1–2,
nominal exchange rate, INEGI (2010), Vol. II, pp. 1376–7; 1990–2012, Banco de
México, Tipos de Cambio, http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet
Prices
Peru: Banco Central de Reserva de Perú, Series Históricas, http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/
estadisticas/cuadros-anuales-historicos.html
Mexico: 1885–1929, Gómez Galvarriato-Musacchio (2000), pp. 78–91; 1930–43, Bach
y Reyna (1943) p. 51; 1943–62, Mexico, Presidencia de la República (1963), p. 109;
1963–8, Mexico, INEGI (2010), pp. 809–10; 1969–2014, Banco de Mexico, Indice de
Precios al Consumidor.
Terms of trade
Peru: 1880–1928, Seminario (2014), pp. 648, 719 and 721; 1929–70 (1976); Moxlad,
http://moxlad-staging.herokuapp.com/home/es
Mexico: 1880–1928, Kuntz (2010); 1929–70, ECLA (1976); 1970–2010, CEPALSTAT,
http://moxlad.fcs.edu.uy/es/basededatos.html
Wages
Peru: 1969–2008, International Labor Organization, http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest
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Mexico: 1885–1900, Challú and Gómez-Galvarriato (2015); 1900–29, Challú and
Gómez-Galvarriato (2015); 1939–75, Bortz (1988); 1975–80, International Labor
Organization; 1980–2013, CEPALSTAT, http://moxlad.fcs.edu.uy/es/basededatos.html
Tariffs
Peru: 1885–1934, import customs revenue over total imports; 1934–79, Boloña (n.d.),
pp. 287–8; 1980–97, Boloña and Illescas (1997), p. 40; 1998–2010, World Bank,
World Economic Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/
tableview.aspx
Mexico: 1893–1910, estimated from Carmagnani (1994) and Mexico, SHCP, Estadís-
tica Fiscal, various years; 1911–29, estimated from Cosío Villegas (1932); 1930–40,
estimated from Cárdenas (1987); 1941–2008, estimated from Mexico, INEGI (2010),
pp. 1040, 1045–6, 1092, 1096–7.
Openness
We use as a measure of openness: (exports + imports)/GDP.
Peru: Seminario (2014), pp. 719–21; PWT 7.1, Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and
Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.1.
Mexico: Own calculations with data from 1895–1929, Kuntz (2010); 1929–79, INEGI
(2010), pp. 665–6; 1980–2010, CEPALSTAT, http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat
Manufactured exports as percentage of total exports
Mexico, Peru, and Latin America: 1962–2013, CEPALSTAT, http://moxlad.fcs.edu.
uy/es/basededatos.html
Mexico: 1925–40, Cárdenas (1987), pp. 230–1; 1939–50, Ortíz Mena et al. (1953),
p. 399.
Exports and imports
Peru: Seminario (2014), pp. 783–8.
Mexico: 1870–1929, Kuntz (2007), pp. 72–3; 1929–50, ECLA (1976), p. 51;
1950–80, ECLA (2009), Table 7.2.13; 1980–2008, ECLA (2009), Table 9.2.14;
2009–13, CEPALSTAT, http://moxlad.fcs.edu.uy/es/basededatos.html
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Industrial Growth in South America
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, 1890–2010
Xavier Duran, Aldo Musacchio, and Gerardo della Paolera
13.1 INTRODUCTION
Between the late nineteenth century and the 1970s, the largest economies in South
America had one of the most impressive rates of industrial catch-up in the world
(Bénétrix, O’Rourke, and Williamson, 2015; Williamson, 2006).1 Yet, despite the
fact that these South American countries are all commodity exporters and share a
similar culture, religion, and colonial origin, there is wide variation in their rates of
industrial growth. They industrialized not only at different points in time, but also
at different speeds.
In this chapter we take a long-term view and examine the patterns of industri-
alization in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. Rather than trying to provide a
single explanation of how specific shocks or policies shaped the industrialization of
the region, we show that there is too much heterogeneity for a single theory to
work. Thus, we provide a range of alternative explanations, arguing that differences
in initial conditions explain differences in pre-1930 industrial growth, while
external shocks and macroeconomic and trade policy seem to explain the variation
in rates of industrialization from the 1930s onwards.
The traditional history of the industrialization of Latin America has unfortu-
nately been studied by periods, and the data used has often been estimated
differently across the periods, thus leaving us with no readily available long-term
series. Therefore, writing a South American industrial history required us to put
together long-term series of manufacturing value added (i.e., industrial GDP),
manufacturing labour productivity, and the manufacturing labour force from
1900 to 2010 (see the Data Appendix). Our manufacturing series cover industrial
establishments of all sizes, different technologies (artisan vs mechanized), and a
wide range of products. Most of our series reflect true manufacturing value added,
after the first industrial census in the country concerned. However, Colombian data
before 1953 are estimates of the quantum of manufacturing production, and for
1 Maria de la Paz Ferro and Daniel Habermacher provided superb research assistance for this
work.
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Brazil the early industrial GDP indices are proxies using data on raw materials and
statistics on textile production (Haddad and Contador, 1975). In addition to the
data on manufacturing value added, we gathered information on population,
openness to trade, exchange rates, terms of trade, and other series.
This new database allows us, for the first time, to uncover variation across
countries and over time that the existing literature had either ignored or studied in
piecemeal fashion at the country level. Our main insight is that industrial growth in
South America has not been homogeneous. For instance, Argentina and Brazil, the
largest economies in the region, enjoyed rapid catch-up before the 1930s, while only
Brazil and Colombia saw very rapid and sustained catch up on the US, the global
leader, in the 1930s. The post-Second World War golden age of growth was
experienced in the four countries studied, but only Brazil and Colombia saw faster
industrial growth than the industrial leaders in Europe and Japan. During the 1980s
and early 1990s industrial growth slowed in most of the region, barring Colombia,
but by the first decade of the twenty-first century most of the economies started to
speed up again, but not sufficiently fast to catch up on the industrial leaders.
With our new time series in hand, we cannot find evidence to support most of
the traditional hypotheses that have been used to explain the industrialization of
South America. There are four basic explanations in the literature. First, there is the
‘adverse shocks’ hypothesis (Tavares, 1972; Nations/ECLA, 1951; Prebisch, 1950;
Furtado, 1959), which argues that as a consequence of adverse international shocks,
such as wars, downturns, or commodity price shocks, the relative price of exports
decreased and/or import scarcity rose, financing channels were interrupted or there
was a scarcity of foreign exchange, and the terms of trade declined. This hypothesis
is related to Dutch Disease forces in the sense that it posits that Latin America de-
industrialized when there were commodity booms because of Dutch Disease
effects, while the region re-industrialized when the terms of trade declined and
the local price of manufactures rose. The second hypothesis has been characterized
as the ‘endogenous industrialization view’, seeing industrialization as a product of
export-led growth (Diaz-Alejandro, 1976; Dean, 1969). This thesis argues, in sharp
contrast to the previous one, that South America industrialized when commodity
exports thrived, because the export boom attracted foreign investment and, via an
income effect, stoked the growth of domestic industrial demand. Thus, commodity
booms led to increases in manufacturing value added, but also to improvements in
industrial productivity (Lederman, 2005; Haber, 2006; Williamson, 2011a).
A third hypothesis sees industrial growth as the product of import-substituting
industrialization (ISI), or explicit policies that included tariff protection, exchange
controls, special preferences for firms importing capital goods for new industries,
preferential import exchange rates for industrial raw materials, and an ample set of
industrial policy tools that ranged from subsidies, targeted credit, pressure on
foreign companies to open plants in the region, or the direct establishment of
state-owned enterprises (Hirschman, 1968; Baer, 1972). Most of these policies
were not undertaken simultaneously until after the Second World War, yet a
modified version of the ISI model was applied before the 1930s (Versiani, 1980;
Coatsworth and Williamson, 2004). Finally, there is the ‘stagnationist’ hypothesis.
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It argues that even if protection did lead to increases in manufacturing value added,
it did not provide the incentives for firms to improve productivity over time: even
when manufacturing value added increased, labour productivity stagnated. Thus,
the ‘stagnationist’ hypothesis sees ISI as a policy that only succeeded in the short to
medium term (Colistete, 2009; Macario, 1964; Diaz Alejandro, 1970; Krueger,
1978; Haber, 2006; Bulmer-Thomas, 2003).
Because our data show that none of these hypotheses explains all cases during the
whole century, we argue that the industrialization of Latin America cannot be
understood by appealing to a single theory. The drivers of industrial growth in each
country are not the consequence of a common shock, or the adoption of a single set
of policies. In fact, the evidence suggests that the most important external shocks,
such as the First World War, the Great Depression, the Second World War, and
the 1980s debt crisis, had heterogeneous effects on industry in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Colombia. While some countries were damaged by some of these
shocks, others thrived.
Our argument is that the timing of the industrial take-off was powerfully
influenced by initial conditions rather than by policies or external shocks, but
that the subsequent variation in industrial growth and de-industrialization experi-
ences was due to the response of policy to changes in external conditions. Market
size, literacy, and infrastructure development at the end of the nineteenth century
all favoured industrial growth in Argentina and Chile, but not in Brazil and
Colombia, which were slower at developing infrastructure and integrating their
markets. Later on, market size, the spread of infrastructure, trade policy, and
macroeconomic policy explain why industrial growth sped up in Brazil and
Colombia after the 1930s, while it slowed in Chile and Argentina. Finally, we
argue that favourable terms of trade and economic liberalization explain relative
de-industrialization in South America between 1990 and 2012.
The heterogeneous nature of industrial growth in Latin America can be seen in
Tables 13.1 and 13.2. In Table 13.1 we compare manufacturing value added
growth rates in South America with those in the industrial leader, the United
States, and three other key early industrializers (the United Kingdom, Germany,
Table 13.1. Industrial GDP growth rates, South America vs global leaders (per cent, per
annum, annual averages)
Leaders (average) GER UK USA JAP ARG BRZ CHL COL
1900–19 3.2 2.7 1.0 5.8 4.8 9.8 2.4
1920–30 2.6 1.0 2.9 3.9 6.5 2.6 1.5 3.1
1931–43 4.9 2.2 2.7 9.9 6.3 3.3 10.0 7.5 8.9
1944–72 5.6 4.7 4.3 3.1 10.2 5.3 8.7 5.4 6.9
1973–90 2.2 1.8 0.8 1.7 4.5 0.6 4.0 1.8 3.9
1991–2009 0.8 0.03 0.4 2.9 0.4 2.9 2.2 3.6 2.2
Notes: GER = Germany, JAP = Japan, ARG = Argentina, BRZ = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia.
Source: See Data Appendix. Developed country growth rates from Bénétrix, O’Rourke, and Williamson (2015).
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and Japan). The wide dispersion in growth rates between our four Latin American
countries, especially in the first three periods, can be seen immediately.
On the left-hand side of Table 13.2 we present these same South American
growth rates, minus the average growth rate of the four leaders. Positive entries in
the table imply industrial catching-up, while negative entries imply that the country
in question’s industry is falling further behind the leaders. The right-hand side of
the table presents similar data, this time subtracting the industrial growth rate of the
United States alone, rather than of all four industrial leaders.
13.2 PRE-1920 INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
IN SOUTH AMERICA
The period before 1920 has always been considered the Belle Époque of GDP and
industrial growth in Latin America. However, the phrase ‘Belle Époque’ refers to
Latin America’s performance in that epoch, relative to other periods, rather than to
Latin America’s growth performance compared with that of the developed world.
When industrial growth in South America is compared with that of the industrial
leaders, only Brazil and Argentina have an outstanding performance. When the
South American performance before 1920 is compared with the United States (on
the right-hand side of Table 13.2), only Brazil fares favourably. Thus, the Belle
Époque was indeed an important period of initial industrial take-off for Argentina
and Brazil, yet was a period of rapid catch-up only for Brazil.
Argentina was the industrial front-runner in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, despite the fact that it experienced a sustained commodity
export boom. Its industrial growth rate before the First World War was between 6
and 11 per cent (but the war years lowered the 1900–19 average to 4.8 per cent, as
shown in Table 13.1). This early industrialization was an endogenous, private
sector-led process driven by the dynamism of the export economy. The industrial
boom was tightly linked to the development of agriculture, which produced
Table 13.2. Convergence/divergence among South American nations and the developed
country leaders
Growth in Latin America
minus growth in leaders
Growth in Latin America
minus US growth
Leaders (average)
ARG BRZ CHL COL ARG BRZ CHL COL
1900–19 3.2 1.6 6.6 –0.8 –1.0 4.0 –3.4
1920–30 2.6 3.9 0.0 –1.1 0.5 2.6 –1.3 –2.4 –0.8
1931–43 4.9 –1.6 5.1 2.6 4.0 –6.6 0.1 –2.4 –1.0
1944–72 5.6 –0.3 3.1 –0.2 1.3 2.2 5.6 2.3 3.8
1973–90 2.2 –2.8 1.8 –0.4 1.7 –2.3 2.3 0.1 2.2
1991–2007 0.8 2.2 1.5 2.9 1.5 0.0 –0.7 0.7 –0.7
Source and notes: As in Table 13.1.
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forward and backward linkages, accelerating urbanization rates, and giving rise to a
new consumer class that demanded manufactured goods. The initial industrial
boom was dominated by the production of food, beverages, textiles, wool and
leather, tobacco, and glass, with some important firms competing successfully with
consumer goods imports. This was the beginning of what has been called an ‘easy’
import substitution process. During this first phase, the production of consumer
goods represented 72 per cent of total manufacturing output. However, there were
natural resource obstacles to the development of a competitive ‘heavy’ industry.
These obstacles included the scarcity of coal, iron, and other minerals, which
precluded the development of large-scale machinery and metallurgical firms.
Firms thus relied heavily on imported intermediate and capital inputs (Rocchi,
2005; Diaz-Alejandro, 1970; Barbero and Rocchi, 2003).
Industrial growth in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia began later (much later in
Colombia). In the 1910s Chile’s industrial output was growing at a modest annual
rate of 3 per cent, while Brazilian industry was growing at 14 per cent. The rapid
Brazilian industrial take-off seems to have started at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Textile and other industrial firms enjoyed buoyant internal demand
associated with coffee booms (and coffee valorization programmes2), while they
also had easy access to foreign and local equity and debt finance between 1905 and
1914, helping firms finance machinery imports. The result was a rapid spurt in
industrialization during the fifteen years before the First World War (Haber, 1991;
Suzigan, 1986; Musacchio, 2009). Cano (1977) highlights the importance of the
almost forced import substitution during the First World War, when the disrup-
tion to shipping and capital inflows led to a shortage of foreign exchange and
imported goods. Domestic producers took up the slack by increasing capacity
utilization (Suzigan, 1986).
In Chile, Palma (2000) argues that in spite of a virtual world monopoly of
sodium nitrate exports, the Chilean economy avoided Dutch Disease forces in the
1890s by implementing an active policy of manufacturing protection that propelled
the local industry.
We do not have data for Colombian industrial GDP growth in this initial period,
but we know that there were two coffee booms, following the valorization pro-
grammes in Brazil (in 1906 and after the late 1920s). The coffee booms, combined
with increased protection for manufacturing, created a long-lasting non-durable
consumer products industry for the first time, as well as a few shorter-lived coffee
machinery producers. Moreover, it was during the second coffee boom that
2 The coffee valorization programmes in Brazil, and later on in Colombia, were government
programmes restricting the supply of coffee by stockpiling it to keep international prices stable. The
first programme operated from 1906 to 1914, and subsequent programmes were tried in the 1920s,
until Brazil began burning large amounts of coffee in 1931. By World War II Colombia and Brazil had
organized a cartel under the Inter-American Coffee Agreement and by 1962 the cartel was global, with
quotas for two dozen countries. These programmes stabilized the terms of trade and made coffee the
most important source of foreign exchange for Brazil and Colombia throughout most of the twentieth
century. For a detailed description of the programmes see Bates (1998).
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manufacturing was able to take advantage of the rise in market size due to
investments in infrastructure (Echevarria, 1993).
In Argentina and Brazil, labour productivity growth was faster than that in the
US during this period (Table 13.3). This supports the argument that Argentina and
Brazil experienced endogenous industrialization with significant improvements in
productivity (Haber, 2006).
13.2.1 Initial Conditions
What explains the early start of Argentina and the late start of Colombia? The
heterogeneous timing of industrial take-off cannot be explained by any one of the
industrialization hypotheses presented above. Instead, we argue that the explan-
ation lies in the heterogeneity of their initial conditions, external conditions, policy,
and outcomes. That is, heterogeneous initial conditions and the speed of technol-
ogy adoption (related to absorptive capacity and market demand) explain the
timing of industrial take-off better than any of the theories presented above. The
rest of this section thus focuses on how initial conditions such as the stock of
human capital, market size, and transportation structures determined the timing of
industrial take-off in South America.
By 1900, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia had all consolidated their
status as independent countries. Colombia still waged a civil war, but it would
soon be finished, and there followed a long period of relative peace. The inflow of
migrants and capital from Europe was at its peak, contributing to expanding
domestic markets and integration into the world economy (Obstfeld and Taylor,
2004; Stone, 1999; O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Williamson, 2011b).
A casual inspection of the demographic and educational data in Table 13.4
shows that initial conditions (at the beginning of the twentieth century) differed
greatly between our four countries. Argentina and Chile were closer to European
levels of literacy, while Brazil and Colombia lagged behind. As Sokoloff and
Engerman (2000) remind us, low literacy rates retarded economic growth and
might have been a crucial obstacle that postponed the take-off of the industrializa-
tion process. The adoption of new technologies and the capacity to innovate is
Table 13.3. Average labour productivity growth rate: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, and the United States
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia US
1900–19 1.4 4.8 3.9 1.0
1920–30 5.4 6.1 0.4 –2.5 4.4
1931–43 –1.4 5.6 4.3 5.5 3.5
1944–72 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.7 2.1
1973–90 1.6 3.7 –0.5 2.7 2.6
1990–2009 1.3 2.6 3.5 1.1 3.9
Source: See Data Appendix.
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1900 4.7 41 40 3,572.8 n.a. 18.0 n.a. 65 851.6 n.a.
1920 8.9 54 32 3,981.7 n.a. 27.4 n.a. 65 1,041.3 n.a.
1930 11.9 57 25 3,192.5 17.8 33.6 n.a. 61 967.5 3.6
1940 14.2 60 18 2,913.6 28.7 41.1 31 56 833.1 5.1
1950 17.2 64 12 2,499.4 4.2 53.4 36 51 686.4 n.a.
1960 20.3 72 9 2,164.8 3.8 69.6 45 40 550.3 7.1
1970 24.0 79 7 1,665.3 8.4 95.7 56 32 332.8 11.9
1980 28.4 83 5.6 1,201.2 n.a. 123.0 66 25 241.1 n.a.
1990 33.0 87 4.3 1,082.2 n.a. 151.2 75 19 200.6 n.a.
2000 37.3 89 3.2 957.6 5.8 176.3 81 15 172.4 11.2
Chile Colombia
1900 3.0 43 47 1,471.4 n.a. 4.0 n.a. 61 142.1 n.a.
1920 3.7 47 37 2,205.5 n.a. 6.2 n.a. 56 216.8 n.a.
1930 4.3 49 25 2,094.9 8.4 7.9 n.a. 48 329.7 3.0
1940 5.1 60 27 1,702.9 7.1 9.2 29 43 363.5 2.5
1950 6.1 61 21 1,396.0 n.a. 11.6 43 38 304.2 n.a.
1960 7.4 68 16 1,137.2 7.4 15.4 48 30 204.6 n.a.
1970 9.4 75 12 883.9 6.8 21.4 57 22 160.3 2.3
1980 11.1 81 8 568.1 n.a. 26.6 64 16 127.8 n.a.
1990 13.1 83 6 521.9 n.a. 33.0 70 11 64.1 n.a.

























partly dependent upon a labour force (and management) that could learn new
techniques.
Some have argued that the type of education imparted might also have been a
deterrent to the adoption of sophisticated technologies. For example, Maloney
(2002) shows that these countries failed to establish technical education during
most of the nineteenth century. ‘By 1926, Australia had twenty-seven times more
graduates of technical schools per capita than Argentina, perhaps the most educated
country in Latin America’ (Maloney, 2002, p. 127). If this was the case, the genius
to industrialize might have been embodied in European migrants who came with
technical skills. In 1914, foreigners propelled industrial initiative in Argentina.
More than 65 per cent of firms in Argentina were initiated and owned by first-
generation immigrants (Diaz Alejandro, 1970).
Literacy and higher-order human capital may be good predictors of increases in
per capita income levels, but they are insufficient to drive sustained manufacturing
growth. Literacy and engineering rates alone would have led us to predict that
Argentina and Chile, instead of Brazil, would be the industrial leaders by the mid-
twentieth century (see Table 13.4 and Maloney, 2002).
Yet that did not happen. Brazil took the lead in terms of industrial sophistication
and sheer size in the second half of the twentieth century. It started as a laggard: the
initial industrialization of Brazil, between 1890 and 1930, did not have the kind of
skill-biased technologies associated with the second industrial revolution (Goldin
and Katz, 1996; Musacchio, Martínez Fritscher, and Viarengo, 2014). Brazil
started rather with labour-intensive industry. Thus, the industrialization levels of
Brazilian states in 1920 and 1940 are not correlated with educational levels. The
Brazilian government did not introduce the kind of technical education necessary
for the development of more sophisticated industries until the 1950s. The National
Council for Research, a Brazilian version of the National Science Foundation, and
the Technological Institute for Aeronautics (ITA) were launched in 1950, the
National Institute of Applied Math (IMPA) in 1951, and the State University of
Campinas—with a strong emphasis on engineering—was not founded until the
early 1960s. The expansion of national laboratories and research centres continued
in the 1970s and coincided with the dramatic changes in manufacturing revealed in
Table 13.5 below, and with the rise of Brazil as a leader in innovation in areas such
as agricultural research (e.g. with the creation of the Brazilian National Agricultural
Research Company, known as Embrapa in 1973) and aeronautics.3
In any case,monocausal explanations of Latin American industrialization are always
going to be insufficient to explain variation over time and across countries. Industri-
alization is a complex process that requires a multivariate explanation. For instance,
one has to consider not just education, but urbanization levels, market potential,
infrastructure, protectionist policies, and a variety of other important factors.
For instance, it is well known that urbanization is closely associated with
increases in per capita income. Several studies even suggest that an increasingly
3 To develop a native aeronautics industry, ITA worked closely with the Brazilian air force and the
state-owned airplane manufacturer Embraer, which adopted key technologies from foreign firms.
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urban economy promotes industrial growth (due to the benefits of agglomeration
effects). However, the increases in rents experienced by an increasingly productive
natural resource sector can generate two types of urban employment: tradables, like
consumer goods; and non-tradables, such as services. South America’s leading
cities, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Sao Paulo, Medellín, and Rio de Janeiro were
hybrids. Initially they relied more on the stimulus of internal demand based on
exports, than on a supply-side push. Firms located in urban enclaves dealt first with
processing and later with the substitution of imports. The Brazilian and Colombian
urbanization processes came much later, but their industrial catch-up was extremely
fast. After 1940, the acceleration of urbanization was probably caused by an
industry-led boom attributable to the artificial change in relative prices favourable
to manufacturing. This was certainly the case for Argentina and Chile, and in the
Southeast of Brazil.
In Colombia urban concentration of the scale found in our other countries came
much later. By 1912 there were two important urban centres, Bogotá andMedellín.
The former was the political capital of Colombia, with 120,000 inhabitants, and
focused on the production of foods. Medellín, with 70,000 inhabitants, had
manufacturing focused on food, beverages, and textiles (Melo, 1987). Buenos
Aires had 1.2 million inhabitants in 1910, Santiago 390,000 in 1900 and São
Paulo 240,000 in 1900.
Moreover, the market potential for manufactured goods was not only deter-
mined by urbanization, but also by transportation costs (involved both in selling
manufactured goods and in importing raw materials) (Krugman, 1993). Buenos
Aires and Santiago, the key industrial hubs in Argentina and Chile, had the initial
advantage of being close to the coast, and thus faced lower transportation costs for
raw materials and enjoyed easier access to internal and external markets (by boat).
In contrast, São Paulo, Bogota and Medellín had, initially, more difficult access
to the coast. Until the early part of the twentieth century, the railway lines
connecting the coast to the interior plateau of São Paulo were not fully developed.
In Colombia, the location of the major urban centres of Bogotá andMedellín in the
Andes probably made trade with the rest of the world, and within the country itself,
harder than it was in any of the other three countries in our sample.
One way to gauge the transportation challenges of Colombia and Brazil is to look
at their railway and road densities during the take-off period (Herranz-Loncán,
2014). Table 13.4 shows that Chile and Argentina had an initial advantage. Brazil,
with its scattered population, was at a disadvantage and its transportation infra-
structure did not compare well to those of Argentina and Chile, on a per capita
basis, until after the Second World War. In Colombia, the poor rail and road
infrastructure and the challenging topography complicated market integration until
the second half of the twentieth century, when the large urban centres provided
markets big enough for large-scale domestic industries to flourish. The road
network in Colombia was small in relative terms even in the year 2000; comparable
to the density of roads Brazil had had at the turn of the century.
Population size may be another factor determining the extent of specialization
and diversification in manufacturing in these four countries. Murphy, Shleifer, and
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Vishny (1989) described the benefits of size in models of ‘take-off ’ or ‘big push’
industrialization, in which the take-off phase is characterized by a transition from a
slow growth, constant returns to scale technology to endogenous growth and an
increasing returns to scale technology. Size may also enhance industrial growth
because it promotes product competition.
As we can see from Table 13.4, the Argentine economy had a size advantage
when it came to its major urban centre (Buenos Aires). The country was more
urbanized than any other country in the region and most of the population lived in
the larger Buenos Aires area. That may explain Argentina’s initial take-off and
initial leadership as the early industrializer in South America. Brazil, despite its
larger population, was a much more rural country and before 1900 most of the
population centres were scattered around the country, with extremely poor com-
munication and road networks.
Rapid population growth and urbanization in Brazil and Colombia after 1940
help to explain those countries’ positive and sustained industrial performance and
catch-up with Argentina in terms of manufacturing value added per capita. Popu-
lation growth in Argentina and Chile did not keep pace with Brazil and Colombia.
13.3 INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE DURING
THE INTER-WAR PERIOD
Industrial growth during the 1920s varied across South America. Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile experienced growth spurts during the first half of the decade, but average
growth rates then declined. For Argentina, the 1920s saw the most rapid industrial
catch-up in the twentieth century. Industry grew at an average annual rate of
6.5 per cent, the result of export-led manufacturing demand and positive terms
of trade. Incumbent firms in the ‘traditional’ sectors (food, beverages, tobacco,
meatpacking houses, sugar mills, and tanning firms) experienced important cap-
acity expansion and structural transformation, and new sectors developed, such as
rubber products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery, and electrical equipment.
The ‘front-runner’ was entering a second phase of industrialization. The share of
the new sectors in manufacturing output increased from 13 to 21 per cent between
1920 and 1930. This process took place well before any implementation of an
explicit state-led import-substitution strategy (Pineda, 2009). Argentina’s perform-
ance during the 1920s supports the endogenous industrialization hypothesis.
The decline in the Chilean nitrate industry in the 1920s was due to the
improvement in the production of synthetic nitrates in the core countries. The
decade started with a 50 per cent nominal devaluation and increased protection that
produced a transitory spurt in manufacturing. However, as the real exchange rate
appreciated in the long run, the rate of manufacturing growth diminished and even
became negative in some years (Palma, 2000; Muñoz, 1968). Thus, the 1920s
proved to be the weakest for manufacturing growth in Chile.
Brazil enjoyed rapid industrial growth in the 1920s, driven to a large extent by
the rapid advance of coffee exports and national income. The decade saw favourable
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terms of trade, a large importation of machinery for manufacturing, and a rapid
expansion in coffee exports toward the end of the decade. According to Stein
(1957) and Musacchio (2009), textiles continued to expand rapidly during this
decade. At the end of the 1920s, the government instituted a coffee valorization
programme to keep global prices high, while fixing the exchange rate to prevent its
rapid appreciation. These measures not only provided an impetus for endogenous
industrialization after the second half of the decade, but also allowed Brazil to
maintain stable-to-favourable terms of trade during the Great Depression (Suzigan,
1986; Furtado, 1959).
The 1920s were years of unstable manufacturing expansion in Colombia.
Industrial growth was fuelled by coffee booms, and large inflows of international
capital after the Central Bank was set up in 1923. Incumbent firms expanded
capacity and adopted modern management techniques. Foreign direct investment
also helped to diversify the industrial sector by expanding oil manufactures. The
development of the railroad network during the second half of the decade reduced
the cost of transportation and its construction also increased the demand for
manufactures. Qualitative evidence suggests that a mild process of endogenous
industrialization was taking place in Colombia, aided by moderate protection.
Industrial output grew between 7.5 and 10 per cent per annum between 1931
and 1941 in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, faster than in Europe and Japan, but not
the US. In contrast, Argentina had industrial growth rates of only 3.3 per cent per
annum, making it the only country of the four diverging from the industrial leaders.
Brazil and Colombia were not as hard hit by the depression thanks to the rapid
recovery of their terms of trade, largely due to their coffee valorization programmes.
In fact, Colombia experienced industrial growth of almost 9 per cent per annum
during the 1930s and the Second World War, largely because of increasing coffee
exports, a large depreciation in the exchange rate, protectionist policies, and an
improved transportation infrastructure set up in the 1920s. This industrial
growth spurt mostly involved consumer non-durable industries (Ocampo and
Montenegro, 2007; Echevarría, 1993).
Chile probably suffered the most during the Great Depression: exports declined
by 50 per cent between 1929 and 1932, imports by 83 per cent, and the terms of
trade by more than 50 per cent. Chile needed to pursue another model and the
policy reaction was immediate. The government engineered a devaluation of more
than 300 per cent between 1932 and 1935, resulting in an increase of the real cost
of imports of about 100 per cent. The result was an acceleration in average annual
industrial output growth of 7.5 per cent (Muñoz, 1968). Manufacturing began an
important structural transformation. In 1927 consumption goods still represented
83 per cent of manufacturing output, and Chile was unambiguously in its first
phase of industrialization. However, the share of intermediate, heavy, and capital
goods output in total manufacturing rose from 7.7 per cent in the early 1930s to
12.8 per cent by 1950, almost doubling. That is, the Great Depression accelerated
the move towards import substitution of more sophisticated manufactures in Chile,
and ISI policies played a big role in this. In 1938 the state development financial
agency, CORFO (Corporacion de Fomento), was created to develop strategic plans
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for agriculture, industry, and mining, and to develop domestic technology research
(Ffrench-Davis et al., 2001).
The adverse shocks hypothesis, which sees negative shocks as opportunities for
industrialization, finds some support during this period. Not only did industrial
output grow fast in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, but labour productivity did as
well. The only exception was Argentina, which suffered a terrible blow to its terms
of trade and had, overall, negative labour productivity growth in the decade.
Why was the Great Depression an obstacle for Argentina while it acted as a boost
for the remaining three countries? The front-runner was already attempting its
second industrial revolution by the 1920s, and needed access to foreign markets
and a continued inflow of foreign capital to finance the structural change. These
were unavailable during the 1930s, while the post-depression years delivered a fatal
blow to temperate climate crop prices, and international capital flows to developing
countries were almost nil. Thus, Argentina followed a very different path than did
Brazil or Colombia, due more to bad luck than to bad policy.
13.4 THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND IMPORT-
SUBSTITUTING INDUSTRIALIZATION
The golden era of import substitution industrialization was 1944–73, when gov-
ernments in the region implemented explicit protectionist policies to promote the
substitution of consumer goods, and to some extent intermediate goods in Brazil
(Leff, 1968). Rapid industrial growth during this period has also been attributed to
rapid urbanization; manufacturing surpassed agriculture as the most important
employer (although Argentina underwent this process earlier in the century)
(Hirschman, 1968; Baer, 1972; Baer, 2008).
While Colombia, Chile, and Brazil continued deepening their industrialization
in the 1930s, expanding their textile sectors and beginning to develop other
industries (Stein, 1957; Lederman, 2005), Diaz Alejandro (1970) argues that
Argentina missed an opportunity to implement a targeted industrial policy that
would have enabled that country to follow a smooth transition to a more advanced
industrial structure. According to Diaz Alejandro, since Argentina never experi-
enced another export boom (its terms of trade in the post-1945 period was much
lower than in 1900–30), the endogenous industrial growth phase was over. Instead
a new phase began, during which the country faced recurrent current account
deficits and external disequilibria. According to Diaz Alejandro, after the 1930s
Argentina experienced a long period of drifting away from its South American
front-runner status (Taylor, 1998). Although Argentina’s terms of trade continued
to decline, and it never experienced endogenous industrialization again, it did
exhibit a relatively stable industrial growth rate after the Second World War,
ranging between 4 and 6 per cent per annum. Brazil’s industrial growth rate ranged
between 7 and 11 per cent, Chile’s was over 5 per cent, while Colombia maintained
almost 7 per cent. The four countries were catching up on the world leader, the US,
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but only Brazil and Colombia managed to keep converging on the UK, Germany,
and Japan.
13.4.1 Protectionism and Industrialization
Students of ISI in Latin America stress that such policies were intended to promote
industrialization in stages. That is, governments would sequentially promote new
industries with increasingly high value added and ever greater technological com-
plexity. Consumer goods and basic buildingmaterials industries would be promoted
first because of their simple technology and their low capital requirements. Then
governments would support more complex consumer goods industries, which
required more sophisticated technologies and higher capital requirements. Finally,
governments were to target consumer durables, steel, engineering, chemicals, and
other heavy industries (e.g. Brazil and Argentina ventured into aerospace) (Baer,
1972; Love, 2005). This sequencing could include as a final link the development of
a domestic capital goods sector, or a complex sector of industrial raw materials. In
practice, the sequence did not work like this. Instead, some industries lobbied
governments to avoid developing intermediate goods that could lead to expensive
inputs (Baer, 1972).
The golden ISI years in Argentina lasted from the 1950s to the early 1970s. The
Peron administration (1946–55) opted—by default—for an inward-looking indus-
trialization model that accelerated under the leadership of Arturo Frondizi
(1958–62), an advocate of the so-called ‘desarrollismo’ (‘developmentalist’
approach). Already in 1960, state-owned enterprises controlled basic sectors of the
economy such as iron, steel and petroleum, energy generation, telecommunications,
and transport. Multinational corporations were engaged in the production of
vehicles, pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, tobacco, agricultural equipment, and
food processing (Katz and Kosacoff, 2001). Structural change in industry was
significant between 1950 and 1970: the share of heavy industry in total manufac-
turing increased from 20.5 to 32.4 per cent, while the share of capital goods
manufacturing jumped from 9.7 to 22 per cent. In contrast, the share of consumer
goods production dropped by a third. By the mid-1960s, a domestic ISI model was
in place; the question by then was whether the battery of protectionist and fiscal
policies supporting it were sustainable.
Table 13.5 depicts the change in industrial structure in Brazil during the post-
1945 period. We separate manufacturing from the extractive industries, and
subdivide it into groups that broadly represent the stages predicted by the
import-substituting industrialization hypothesis. Brazil made the largest leap in
industrial sophistication during the post-Second World War period. Manufactured
consumer goods (associated with the first stage of import substitution) fell from
60 per cent of the total in 1939 to less than 30 per cent by the 1970s. In contrast,
the share of heavier industries producing metals, chemicals, plastics, and pharma-
ceuticals (associated with the second stage of import substitution) almost doubled
between 1939 and 1980, going from 17 to 30 per cent of total manufacturing. The
rapid increase in these Stage II industries during the 1960s and 1970s is associated
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with the explicit development plans of the military government (1964–85) pro-
moting heavy industries. Finally, industries associated with Stage III, such as
mechanical industries, electrical and telecommunications equipment, and trans-
portation equipment (automobiles and airplanes), gained momentum after the
1950s and reached 24 per cent of total manufactures by 1980. This was the heyday
of industrial policy in Brazil, when the government provided the subsidized
financing, infrastructure, and raw materials needed to develop some of the most
sophisticated industries in the country. State-owned enterprises were key to devel-
oping the airplane, petrochemicals, electricity, and telecommunications sectors
(Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014).
By 1949 the local capital goods industry provided over 60 per cent of the
domestic demand for industrial equipment. This development is especially impres-
sive given that the nascent capital goods industry developed despite competition
from foreign imports until at least the 1960s, during which time machinery imports
benefited from preferential exchange rate treatment and duty-free importation. In
fact, the development of the Brazilian capital goods industry was so impressive that
the ‘domestic supply coefficient [for capital goods] was more than three times larger
than in Argentina during the same years’ (Leff, 1968, p. 8).
In Colombia, ISI policies also involved the development of industrial banks and
creative exchange rate devaluation mechanisms to reduce the chance of recurrent
foreign exchange crises. Manufacturing underwent a significant transformation
between 1955 and 1970 (see Table 13.5). The production of durables and inter-
mediate goods increased rapidly, rising from 4.6 and 16 per cent of manufacturing
value added to 14 and 39 per cent, respectively. These shares would then remain
constant for most of the twentieth century.
An additional important fact about the post-Second World War period is that
our ‘front-runner’, Argentina, lagged behind, at least relative to Brazil, Colombia,
Table 13.5. Industrial value added by type of industry, Brazil and Colombia, 1940–95
(per cent)
c.1940 c.1955 c.1970 c.1980 c.1990 c. 1995
Brazil
Transformation of natural resources: 14 15 13 11
Consumer products (durables and non-durables) 59 41 34 28
Heavy industry and industrial inputs 17 24 27 30
Capital goods and high-technology products 5 15 20 24
Others 1 2 2 4
Colombia
Consumer products (non-durables) n.a. 66.3 30 32 31 33
Consumer products (durables) n.a. 4.6 14 15 16 18
Intermediate goods n.a. 16 39 34 36 34
Capital goods n.a. 12 9 10 9 8
Transportation equipment n.a. n.a. 7 9 8 7
Sources: Brazil, compiled from IBGE (1990, p. 386). Colombia from ECLA (1957, p. 274); Garay (1998, p. 463).
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and itself. Since there was no threat of external competition, Argentinian manu-
facturers focused on the domestic market and, according to Krugman (1993),
experienced growth rates below their potential. But most importantly, ISI was an
‘incomplete model’ as the inadequate growth of industrial exports during this whole
period was still an obstacle. Furthermore, attempts to develop large-scale, heavy
industry required a continuous injection of public subsidies.
During the ISI golden age Chile was catching up on the US but lost the
opportunity of catching up even faster, as did the UK, Germany, Japan, Brazil,
and Colombia. Between 1950 and 1972, manufacturing grew at 5 per cent per
annum in a context of very high monetary instability and stop–go macroeconomic
policies. Chile did not implement a smooth ISI strategy, and the results were not
stellar (Ffrench-Davis et al., 2001; Muñoz, 1968; Cortes Douglas, Butelmann, and
Videla, 1981).
Having described the policy context and industrial performance in these four
countries, we can now focus on the heated debates regarding the causes and limits
of industrialization in Latin America during the ISI period. At least two important
issues should be highlighted. First, the measurement of protection to domestic
industrial producers is complex, and its correlation with industrial growth is
debated. Second, there is still a debate as to what the right counterfactual is for
Latin America in the post-Second World War period. Did Latin America indus-
trialize rapidly because of ISI policies, or despite them? Could industrial growth
rates have been higher if another set of policies had been implemented?
13.4.2 Overall Effect of ISI Policies
The contrasting performance of Brazil and Colombia on the one hand, and
Argentina and Chile on the other, raises a puzzle. Was protection for domestic
manufacturing behind the stellar performance of the former two countries? If it
was, why did Chile and Argentina not achieve the same outcomes? In order to shed
some light on this puzzle, Fig. 13.1 plots what we call real distorted import price
indices for the four countries. These are the prices that local producers would have
observed for competing imports. The index is the ratio of import prices (in
domestic currency) to domestic prices. The prices of foreign goods in the domestic
market are calculated by multiplying the import price index by the average tariff
and the nominal exchange rate. Domestic prices are measured by the domestic price
index for industrial goods (or the industrial GDP deflator). After a base year is
selected, increases in the index above 100 imply that local producers faced greater
protection from imports. The index is a useful but incomplete measure because it
considers the effects of quantitative trade restrictions only via its effects on the
domestic industrial price index.
Fig. 13.1 shows the log scale of the real distorted import price index (1939=100).
We focus on trends rather than on levels and interpret the evolution of the index for
each country. In Brazil macro and trade policies generated increasing protection for
domestic producers up to 1980. Protection in Colombia was roughly increasing
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between 1950 and 1990. In Argentina it increased up to 1950, and declined
thereafter. In Chile, the index declined between 1948 and 1972 and increased
thereafter. It is surprising that the Pinochet government seems to have implement-
ed a set of policies that, although they included substantial trade liberalization,
overall tended to protect domestic industrial producers.
To understand the overall effects of ISI policies it is important to derive
synthetic indices such as the ones plotted in Fig. 13.1. The different macro and
trade policies implemented during the ISI period generated complex effects on the
economy, and it is even possible that their overall effect did not involve protection
from import competition. The point seems even more important to take into
consideration when one considers the complex political economy influencing ISI
policies (the impact of trade unions, shifts from left to right, dictatorships, etc.).
However, it seems that when a country aligned macro and trade policies so as to
deliver truly effective industrial protection, it also experienced higher industrial
growth. Thus, there seems to be suggestive evidence that increasing protection was
indeed associated with increasing industrial growth. The period from the 1940s to
the 1970s was characterized by a catch-up of industrial output and productivity on
the leaders. Even though not all of our countries experienced faster industrial
output growth than the US, they all experienced labour productivity growth that
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Fig. 13.1. Real distorted import price indices for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia,
1900–2012 (1939=100)
Note: The real distorted import prices index = ((1+ avg. tariff)  nominal exchange rate  import price index)/
domestic industrial price index. We then index this series taking 1939 as the base year (1939=100).
Source: See Data Appendix.
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13.4.3 The Post-Second World War Period
as a Missed Opportunity
Did increasing protection lead to the highest possible industrial growth rates, or
were there lost opportunities available that South American did not take, but that
other regions at similar stages of development took? Fig. 13.1 suggests that more
distortions were correlated with faster industrialization in Colombia and Brazil, but
less so in Chile. Industrial catch-up on the US could be considered a clear
indication of the success of ISI policies. But compared to other latecomers, how
good were those ISI policies?
There are at least three reasons why the post-Second World War period could be
considered a missed opportunity and/or a period of not so stellar industrial growth.
First, using Asia as a counterfactual makes us question the importance of protec-
tionist policies in promoting industrialization in Latin America. Second, the
measures we have of industrial growth, the share of manufacturing in GDP, and
labour productivity in manufacturing, are distorted by the fact that protectionism
led to higher domestic prices for domestic producers. These rents were not
necessarily a sign of progress for everyone in the economy. Third, protectionist
policies also ended up hurting the capacity of South American countries to promote
regional markets. Finally, the timing of the decline in manufacturing as a share of
GDP (in the late 1970s) casts doubt on the hypothesis that ISI policies led to
successful industrialization in the region.
In Northeast Asia the ISI policy mix included more incentives for domestic
producers to export and compete in global markets, and more targeted tariff
protection. For instance, in South Korea, even if tariff protection was spread around
the same sectors as in Argentina or Colombia, tariffs were lower on average—for a
shorter time—and were more targeted to promote specific industries or companies
(Wade, 1990). The result of these policies was faster industrial growth than in the
United States. In fact, manufacturing value added in South Korea grew at an
average of 11.2 per cent in the post-1945 period, and continued at an accelerated
pace in the 1980s (above 12 per cent per year) and in the post-1990 period (7.7 per
cent per annum).
Comparisons with South Korea suggest that we need to improve our knowledge
in at least two ways in order to better understand South America’s ISI experience.
First, what is the right counterfactual for Latin America? More precisely, is
industrial catch-up on the US enough, or should we develop a measure of potential
catch-up to judge our countries’ performance during this period? Industrial catch-
up on the world industrial leader may mask faster potential catch-up. After all, the
industrial leaders were all on the brink of de-industrialization. Second, the East
Asian ‘gang of four’ (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) were
growing faster than Argentina and Chile. In addition, all four South American
countries exhibited faster productivity growth in the 1930s than during the golden
age of ISI (except for Argentina), which suggests that the potential for faster catch-
up was there, but not achieved. If this conjecture is correct, our evidence may
support the ISI stagnationist hypothesis.
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Beyond this counterfactual using Asia, we know that the price distortions
depicted in Fig. 13.1 were high for Brazil and Colombia, and that high protection
is correlated with faster industrial growth. However, we also know that the shares of
industrial value added in GDP were larger during this period, but in part because
there were large rents in the protected industries. That is, value added and
productivity figures may be inflated by the presence of such rents. With distortions
such as tariff protection came high internal prices that made value added seem
higher than if prices had been set in international markets.
Moreover, the distortions introduced by governments in South America also
affected their capacity to promote a regional market for manufactures. In contrast
with East Asia, where some manufactured products had to be competitive in
international markets, the prices of Latin American manufactured goods were
uncompetitive on world markets; furthermore, they could not be exported to
neighbouring countries either, because they also wanted to develop their own
industries using a similar policy mix. Thus, Latin America missed important
opportunities to spur interregional trade: low productivity and high trade barriers
became major obstacles, especially for intra-regional manufacturing trade (Badia-
Miró, Carreras-Marín, and Meissner, 2014). Interregional integration and indus-
trialization did not progress, despite efforts such as the 1940 Pinedo Plan, the 1944
John Hopkins report on ‘Cooperación para la promoción del Intercambio in
Argentina’, which proposed the creation of a regional free trade area, or the Andean
Pact between Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
All in all, maybe with the exception of Brazil, until the 1960s South American
manufacturing production was mostly to satisfy domestic demand. The manu-
facturing sector in the region was a net importer, requiring foreign exchange
continuously, which produced recurrent balance of payments crises. But the
exclusively inward-looking characteristic of industry started to change by 1970:
the share of manufacturing in total exports increased, governments lowered
average tariffs, and some quantitative restrictions were removed. In addition,
the creation of the free trade areas of ALADI (1980), which all four countries
joined, and MERCOSUR (1990), which changed the export profiles of Argen-
tina, Brazil, and to a lesser extent Chile, also allowed the region to expand
manufactured exports.
Finally, the timing of de-industrialization also casts doubt on the hypothesis
that ISI policies led to successful industrialization in the region. In the 1970s,
all four countries experienced a deceleration of their industrial growth rates from
4 to 2 per cent. This implies that de-industrialization, measured as a declining
share of manufacturing in total GDP, started for most countries before their
governments dismissed ISI policies and before the crisis of the 1980s. That is,
de-industrialization happened not as a consequence of the demise of ISI, but
during the ISI period. De-industrialization started in Chile in 1971 (while
Salvador Allende was still in power, and before any major change to ISI policies),
and in Argentina and Colombia by 1975, also before any important departure
from ISI programmes. In contrast, Brazil did not engage in any major liberaliza-
tion until the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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13.5 THE 1980S DEBT CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT
IN SOUTH AMERICA
The 1980s is again a period with mixed results. On the one hand, for Brazil and
Argentina this is a decade of crisis. With the rapid rise in interest rates in the United
States and the debt default of Mexico, capital markets were closed for these South
American nations and their governments could not refinance their foreign debt.
During this decade, industrial GDP growth rates decreased across the board, and
despite rapid exchange rate depreciations, domestic industry suffered because of the
contraction in domestic demand and the sudden stop in capital inflows (Frieden,
1991). Argentina and Brazil, in fact, ended up running hyperinflationary policies in
the late 1980s, which forced their governments to open up and to establish fixed
exchange rate regimes (in order to anchor prices). On the other hand, Chile and
Colombia went through the crisis relatively unscathed, with moderate macroeco-
nomic imbalances.
In all four countries, manufacturing output and productivity growth rates slowed
substantially, and manufacturing as a share of GDP accelerated its decline. Simul-
taneously, the world leader, the US, and the close followers, the UK, Germany, and
Japan, all experienced industrial output and productivity growth deceleration.
Therefore, in relative terms Brazil and Colombia managed to catch-up, while
Argentina and Chile increased its gap with these industrial leaders.
13.6 THE 1990S AND BEYOND
During the 1990s, a period of rapid structural change, we observe a rebound from
the dismal 1980s, but with extremely modest rates of growth. The industrial
complex in Argentina and Brazil maintained average growth rates close to 2 per
cent, while Chile’s industrial performance improved substantially, reaching average
growth rates of 7 per cent. The success of Chile in the 1990s stems from the fact
that its manufacturing sector gained international competitiveness, mostly in the
so-called extractive industries, but also in some of the medium- and high-
technology industries. According to our estimates, the Chilean manufacturing
sector was the best performer of the 1990s and 2000s, with an average annual
rate of growth of close to 4 per cent per year. This may be related to the fact that the
Chilean terms of trade substantially improved after 1995, when the government
ran a nominal exchange rate crawling peg to avoid sharp swings in the real exchange
rate (Huelva and Núñez, 2010).
The 1990s were Colombia’s worst decade of the twentieth century in terms of
industrial growth, which stood at just over 2 per cent average growth per annum.
While trade and capital market reform advanced and the terms of trade improved,
there was a cycle of exchange rate appreciation–depreciation–appreciation that ended
up hurting manufacturing growth (Tovar, 1998; Ocampo and Montenegro, 2007).
Finally, during the first decade of the twenty-first century, Brazil, Chile, and
Colombia experienced modest average manufacturing growth while Argentina’s
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output experienced a sharp decline, followed by a sharp rebound after 2005.
During this period Chile’s industrial growth rates were higher than in both the
US and the other industrial leaders, while Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia did not
lose too much ground on the US, and experienced industrial catch-up on the other
industrial leaders (see Table 13.3).
13.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter has constructed new long-run series of industrial GDP growth and
labour productivity growth, as well as a set of variables related to initial conditions,
international trade, and macroeconomic policy. We have used these data to test
four popular hypotheses: industrialization promoted endogenously by exports via
an income effect in the domestic economy; industrialization occurred under adverse
shocks that induced policies promoting industrialization; import-substituting-
industrialization induced rapid manufacturing productivity growth; and import-
substituting industrialization promoted uncompetitive domestic firms.
Industrial catch-up on the global leaders (the US, the UK, Germany, and Japan)
did take place. But catch-up was not experienced during the whole period, and its
pace was uneven over time and across countries.
The initial conditions facing these countries in 1900 were varied, and had an
important impact on their subsequent industrial development. Argentina was
characterized by higher human capital, and urbanization and transportation ad-
vantages, compared to the other three countries, and had begun its industrial
development earlier. Brazil’s size was not an advantage at this time: its large
population was still poor, illiterate, sparsely located, and far from water transport.
Strong industrial development only started at the turn of the twentieth century.
Chile was relatively well endowed with human capital and low transport costs, but
it had a small domestic market that was only moderately urbanized. It industrialized
slowly. Like Brazil, Colombia’s population was relatively illiterate, poor, sparsely
located, and far from water transport. It was the industrial latecomer of this group.
There was an important heterogeneity across countries and periods in terms of
the causes of industrialization and the policies adopted. Brazil’s experience high-
lights the very different sources of industrial growth over time: strong endogenous
industrialization (1900–30), an adverse shock and export boom (1930–44), ISI
(1944–80), and weak endogenous industrialization (1991–2010). Chile’s failure to
catch-up on the US and the other industrial followers in the early stages of the
twentieth century highlights the fact that industrialization via exporting was not
automatic, even if many initial conditions had been already achieved. Argentina’s
failure to converge during the decade of fastest convergence in Latin America, the
Great Depression, shows that even if most countries adopt similar policies, some
are lucky and export and industrialize, while others do not. And Colombia’s
impressive Great Depression and ISI industrial performance highlights the import-
ance of combining protectionist policies with interventions to reduce the disad-
vantages of initial conditions.
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This chapter thus highlights the importance of considering the international
context, internal policies, initial conditions, and the nature of the country’s export
products, in understanding industrialization. The point is particularly important in
the context of the literature on Latin America’s industrialization, as this has
emphasized policies, while downplaying the importance of these other factors, as
well as the heterogeneity of country experiences within the region.
Finally, the share of manufacturing in GDP followed an inverse U-shape in
South America during this period. The relative importance of the industrial sector
increased rapidly after the Great Depression, peaked in the 1970s, and then fell
during a period of relative de-industrialization. We have seen that industrialization
in most countries required protectionism. With a few exceptions, there was a large
retrenchment from manufacturing once these economies started opening up to the
world economy after the 1990s. We do not argue that the policies that promoted
industrialization before 1980 should be tried again. On the contrary, our estimates
show that the de-industrialization of South America started before the demise of
ISI. Latin American policies before 1970 enjoyed only short-term success, and only
in some industries did the region develop long-term comparative advantage.
DATA APPENDIX
Series on manufacturing value added for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia have been
produced by researchers and agencies at various times. The most frequently used sources
include the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WB) and the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America (ECLA). A project initially based at Oxford University and now
at the Universidad de la República, Montevideo, collected and collated substantial ECLA
data and has made it easily accessible for free via an internet website named MOxLAD
(MOxLAD, 2014). The data on this website are slightly different from what we collected
directly from ECLA reports (ECLA, 1966). After careful analysis, we decided to use
manufacturing value added series put together by local experts in each country, rather
than the MOxLAD or ECLA data. These series are usually longer, behave similarly to the
ECLA series, and incorporate substantial local knowledge. That is, they purge distortions
associated with political manipulation of the data from the series.
We have made additional adjustments to these manufacturing value added series. For
Argentina we use manufacturing GDP in constant 1960 local currency units (LCU),
constructed by Orlando Ferreres for 1875–2012 (Ferreres, 2005). For Brazil, we use
IPEA’s series of industrial value added in current LCU, deflated by the GDP deflator, for
1908–70. We then link this to the IPEA’s real industrial value added series in LCU (deflated
using the industrial GDP deflator) for 1971–2012 (IPEA, 2014). For Chile, we use the
Díaz, Lüders, and Wagner (DLW) manufacturing value added series (in 1996 constant
LCU) for the period 1900–2004, and extrapolate this to 2005–12 using real manufacturing
GDP growth rates from Banco Central de Chile (Díaz, Schwarzenberg, and Wagner, 2007).
Finally, for Colombia, we use the real manufacturing GDP for 1925–2012 from Banco de la
República (1998). The four series are converted into indices with 1960 as the base year
(1960=100).
We calculate growth rates of manufacturing value added and manufacturing labour
productivity in LCU. Since we do not have PPP exchange rates for the whole period, we
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prefer to assume that policy-induced nominal exchange rate distortions are (eventually)
translated into inflation, and are therefore accounted for in local currency series. Although
this is not ideal, estimating century-long PPPs for the four countries is beyond the scope of
this chapter. Furthermore, hyperinflation and exchange rate events in Argentina and Brazil
suggest that this is probably the best way forward, as we know that the local expert series
have taken hyperinflation, the adoption of new currencies, and exchange rate events into
account. Thus, average long-term growth rates are comparable across countries and over
time, although care was taken if important exchange rate or inflationary events took place
precisely at the cut-off dates of our periodization.
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Patterns of Manufacturing Growth
in Sub-Saharan Africa
From Colonization to the Present
Gareth Austin, Ewout Frankema, and Morten Jerven
14.1 INTRODUCTION
Currently, Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest manufacturing output per capita of
any inhabited region on the planet. Most African economies, in contrast to the
Asian NICs, have so far failed to supplement agricultural and extractive output by
raising average productivity through the creation of a substantial number of jobs in
higher-value-added manufacturing industries. From the perspective of mainstream
growth theory, this appears to be an important proximate cause of comparative
African poverty. This view has received new impetus from a recent study docu-
menting unconditional convergence between leaders and followers in manufactur-
ing labour productivity since the 1960s (Rodrik, 2013). The key message of the
study is that failure to catch up in aggregate economic terms is not because
manufacturing industries in the ‘periphery’ are underperforming, but rather
because the proportion of industrial workers in the total labour force has remained
too small to offer a substantial push to aggregate growth.
If industrialization of the global economic periphery is crucial to a sustained
decline of global economic inequality in the twenty-first century, the case of
Sub-Saharan Africa deserves special attention. Assessments of African economic
development have become more optimistic recently due to encouraging rates of
aggregate economic growth since c.1995 (IMF, 2012; Young, 2012; UNECA,
2013). While initial studies of the boom were largely silent on manufacturing
growth, the matter has now begun to receive more attention (de Vries, Trimmer,
and de Vries, 2013; McMillan and Harttgren, 2014; Rodrik, 2014; Diao and
McMillan, 2015; Jerven 2015).
There are few signs yet that African countries are copying the Asian success-
formula of moving up the value chain by promoting export of labour-intensive
manufacturing produce (Sugihara, 2007; Austin and Sugihara, 2013). Nor do the
growth rates of manufacturing output in the past decades offer encouragement.
The more successful Asian and Latin American economies in the industrial
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convergence club have recorded annual average rates of manufacturing output
growth surpassing 5 per cent for at least half a century and sometimes even over
a full century (e.g. Japan, China, and Chile: see Bénétrix, O’Rourke, and
Williamson (2015) and Chapter 2 in this volume). The only Sub-Saharan African
country that achieved a more extended period of accelerated manufacturing output
growth is South Africa (1924–78) during the heyday of its segregation and
apartheid regimes. When other African countries caught the manufacturing train,
it was for considerably shorter journeys. Moreover, among all the countries in the
sample that have recorded a ten-year annual average growth rate of manufacturing
output exceeding 5 per cent since 1980, not one has managed to sustain this
acceleration to the present. Indeed, in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the share of
manufacturing in aggregate output actually declined between 1980 and 2010
(UNECA, 2013, pp. 7, 74).1
This chapter reviews the historical development of ‘modern’ manufacturing in
Sub-Saharan Africa, including the transition from ‘pre-modern’ to ‘modern’ forms
of manufacturing. We define ‘modern’ as production based on inanimate sources of
energy, which began during colonial rule. Its promotion has been an object of
government policy mainly since independence from overseas rule. It was adopted
by South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) under white minority
regimes in 1924 and 1933 respectively, and in many of the other countries when
they escaped from European rule around 1960. Modern manufacturing began later
in sub-Saharan Africa than in some parts of Asia, Latin America, North Africa, and
the Middle East, and its diffusion was certainly slower during the long twentieth
century. Yet, for a deeper understanding of African manufacturing growth it is not
sufficient to state that Africa is simply ‘later’ than the rest; the crucial question is
whether there are signs that the nature of African industrial growth was or is
different from experiences elsewhere. Only by exploring the deeper characteristics
of the process, apart from rates of growth, may we hope to offer some cautious
predictions for its future trajectory.
Bénétrix, O’Rourke, and Williamson (2015) have argued that Sub-Saharan
Africa was no exception to their rule that, once ‘peripheral’ countries began to
industrialize, their catching-up on the industrial leaders was ‘unconditional’ (see
also Rodrik, 2013). However, arguably their historical sample is biased, in that for
Sub-Saharan Africa it includes only the few countries in the sub-continent that
achieved some notable scale of manufacturing before the 1950s (South Africa,
Southern Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo). We maintain, rather, that the story to
date is more accurately summarized as interrupted industrial growth rather than
catch-up growth; certainly for the Congo and Zimbabwe, but even, arguably, for
South Africa. Moreover, taking account of the broader African experience, we argue
1 The report of the UN Economic Commission for Africa gives two sets of figures on this, which
agree on the fact of relative decline but differ on its magnitude, for reasons that seem unclear. The share
of manufacturing value added in GDP is reported to have fallen from 16.6 per cent to 12.7 per cent in
Sub-Saharan Africa, while rising in North Africa from 12.6 per cent to 13.6 per cent (2013, p. 74).
Elsewhere in the document, the share of manufacturing in the aggregate output of the continent as a
whole is given as slipping from over 12 per cent in 1980 to about 11 per cent in 2010 (p. 7).
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that while ‘unconditional convergence’ in manufacturing output growth remains a
dream, the conditions for achieving it are better at present than they were in the late
nineteenth century, or even at the time when most African countries achieved
independence from colonial rule (c.1960).
We explore the determinants of manufacturing growth in Sub-Saharan Africa by
focusing on the interaction between changing factor endowments, global economic
relationships, and government policies. Our argument is as follows. The sub-
continent entered the colonial period with an emerging comparative advantage in
land-extensive production, agricultural and mineral, which colonial governments
and (in the ‘peasant’ colonies at least) African farmers and entrepreneurs proceeded
to deepen. Colonial and post-colonial government policies contributed to the
growth of population and human capital, which by the end of the twentieth
century had greatly eroded the region’s long-running characteristic of land abun-
dance and labour scarcity. This historical transformation in the region’s endow-
ment structure facilitated the expansion (or in some areas, creation) of wage labour
markets (Sender and Smith, 1986). Colonial governments and enterprises also
enhanced capital formation and the development of consumer markets, including
new financial institutions. Africa’s known ‘resource wealth’ has been progressively
augmented by a combination of the search for commercially valuable minerals and,
more so, by technological innovations outside the continent which have created
new markets for materials and fluids found in Africa, even as mining and pumping
have reduced these reserves. In the setting of these changing endowment structures,
the crucial issue for any prospective late-industrializing country is whether the
ruling elite has had the capacity to adopt and the dedication to sustain policies that,
in effect, defied—and, implicitly, sought to modify—the country’s existing com-
parative advantage in primary production, by using its fiscal and regulatory powers
to promote industrialization (Gerschenkron, 1962; Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1992).
We argue further that the changing dynamics of politics and international
competition for resources and markets have played an important role in shaping
the conditions for such commitments and policy agendas. The fact that white
minority regimes were the first actively to encourage manufacturing development
was because they had become independent (South Africa) or autonomous (South-
ern Rhodesia) first. The South African government started its programme in
1924, followed within a decade by Southern Rhodesia. The start of commercial
copper mining in the 1920s in Katanga, in the southeast of the Belgian Congo,
also spurred investments in complementary manufacturing industries. Following
the independence of most of Africa around 1960, a larger number of tropical
African countries adopted industrialization as a policy objective, despite relatively
high costs for unskilled and especially for skilled labour. Import-substituting
industrialization (ISI) polices were adopted by regimes with ‘socialist’ as well as
‘capitalist’ sympathies. But ISI policies were renounced when the same countries
participated in economic liberalization programmes (‘Structural Adjustment’) in
the 1980s and 1990s. Escalating government debts and conditional foreign aid
reduced the opportunities for African governments to design independent
economic policies.
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Meanwhile, however, factor ratios within the sub-continent continued to move
towards a relatively abundant and better educated labour force. This creates
opportunities for labour-intensive industrialization (Austin and Sugihara, 2013),
of which Mauritius has become the regional pioneer (Teal, 1999), with Ethiopia
now looking to follow on a larger scale. Part of the reason why African economies
have not (yet) been able to turn changing relative factor prices to their benefit is the
tough competition they face from emerging economies in a neo-liberal global
economic order.
Any long-term analysis of African economic development suffers data-availability
constraints. There are relatively long manufacturing output series only for three
countries, which happen to be the ones with significant early manufacturing growth:
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo (Clarence-Smith, 1989;
Mitchell, 2007). The scattered pre-war surveys of manufacturing published in the
colonial blue books of British Africa are notoriously incomplete. For the post-
colonial era there are many gaps in the data as well, and there is little or no
quantitative data on the value of production in ‘informal’ manufacturing, which
includes small-scale brewing and tool-making workshops. Thus, substitution effects
between the informal and formal sectors remain invisible in the official data sources
(Jerven, 2013). In an earlier study of colonial patterns of industrialization, Kilby
noted that there was ‘incomplete coverage of agricultural processing, cottage craft
production, artisan industries and smaller establishments’ (Kilby, 1975, p. 471),
which not only limits comparisons across time, but makes it particularly hazardous
to compare the industrial share of GDP from country to country, because ‘defin-
itions of industrial vary’ (Austen, 1987, p. 247; see also Vandewalle, 1966, p. 39).
Riddell, editing a volume on manufacturing growth in Africa, noted that ‘little can
be done . . . except to state at the outset that it throws considerable doubt about
all the aggregate data used subsequently’ (1990, p. 10). This is no less true for our
study.
Within the framework of interactions between factor endowments, global
economic relations and government policy, the following sections focus on the
reasons for the abrupt discontinuity between pre-colonial handicraft production
and the modern manufacturing introduced under colonial rule (section 14.2); the
spatially and temporally uneven spread of modern manufacturing during the
colonial period (section 14.3); a case study of interrupted manufacturing growth
in the Belgian Congo (section 14.4); the widespread attempts to promote import-
substituting industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s (section 14.5); and manu-
facturing performance during the subsequent era of economic liberalism, including
recent trends (section 14.6). Section 14.7 concludes.
14.2 FROM PRE-COLONIAL HANDICRAFTS
TO MODERN MANUFACTURING
On the eve of the European partition, c.1880, the two most important manufac-
turing activities were textiles plus iron smelting and smithing. While sizeable parts
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of Africa, such as Namibia and much of South Africa, including the Zulu kingdom,
had predominantly pastoral economies, the arable and mixed-farming regions
invariably had artisanal manufacturing of some sort. The biggest centre in absolute
terms, and seemingly also as a share of output, was the central emirates of the
Sokoto Caliphate, based in what is now northwest and north-central Nigeria. With
some 6 million people around 1900, the Sokoto Caliphate was probably the most
populous state in tropical Africa (Lovejoy, 2005, p. 8). From Kano, which became
its commercial and manufacturing hub, cotton cloth was exported all over West
Africa, and even to North Africa, as the German explorer Heinrich Barth reported
from his visit in 1851 (1857, reprinted 1965, p. 511).
Rodney (1972, pp. 112–14) famously claimed that African handicraft industries
such as textiles and iron smelting shrank even before colonial rule, because of
growing competition from foreign imports. However, this view has been increas-
ingly overtaken by new research. In West Africa the quality of African iron
(Goucher, 1981), as well as of high-end weaving (such as Akan kente cloth from
what is now Ghana), was such as to retain consumer loyalty even throughout the
colonial period (for a fuller discussion, see Austin, 2008). In East-Central Africa,
locally wovenmachila cloth produced in the lower Shire valley of Malawi continued
to enjoy widespread popularity through the 1880s at least. More importantly,
Frederick (2014) has estimated that the quantities imported (per capita yards of
cotton cloth) before the twentieth century were too limited to have a significantly
destructive impact. This changed at the outset of colonial rule, when per capita
imports increased about fivefold between 1896 and 1913.2
The question arises why there was no direct transition from the handloom to the
power loom, under the same entrepreneurs in the same workshops. Why—
especially in contrast to Japan, the first non-Western industrializer—did the
traditions of handicraft production apparently make little or no contribution to
the origins of modern manufacturing, in the twentieth century, even in Nigeria?
At one level, it may have been because machines using inanimate energy were
introduced by foreign firms that had already moved beyond human-powered tools.
In other words, for African entrepreneurs the technology gap was simply too large
to bridge. But this is an insufficient answer, when we note that African entrepre-
neurs were among the first importers and users of motor lorries in Ghana and
Nigeria, and were therefore pioneers of the adoption of mechanization in transport
(Heap, 1990; Drummond-Thompson, 1993). Why would they not copy or import
power-looms as well?
A more fundamental answer emerges when we take a closer look at the endow-
ment structure of African economies. Cultivable land was relatively abundant in
most areas, but the natural environment imposed severe constraints on its product-
ive uses. Just as opportunities to substitute capital for labour in agriculture and
transport were constrained by trypanosomiasis, which prevented the use of large
2 The de-industrialization thesis should be distinguished from the much more plausible argument
that imported Indian and English cottons hindered proto-industrialization of the cotton industry, at
least in West Africa, c.1650–c.1850 (Inikori, 2009).
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animals in the tropical forests, and extensive if shifting bands of savannah, the rarity
of coal and shortages of the kind of tree suitable for charcoal limited the production
possibility frontier for iron. Despite the quality of local iron, and the existence of
specialized iron-smelting communities engaged in iron trade, iron was scarce, and
hence expensive, until the bottleneck was eased by imports.
Meanwhile, in West Africa especially, the narrow loom was preferred to the
broad loom: at first glance a perverse choice because it reduced the quantity of
output per hour. The explanation owes much to a combination of taste and
environmentally conditioned constraints on the supply of yarn (Austin, 2008;
2013). Though cotton was very widely grown in the savannahs of tropical Africa,
further expansion of output entailed a severe trade-off with food growing, as food
crops and cotton had to be planted in the same short season (Tosh, 1980). In
addition, the preference for the narrow loom was facilitated by the extreme
seasonality of rainfall in much of tropical Africa, which meant that, despite the
general scarcity of labour during the agricultural year, in the heart of the dry season
the opportunity cost of labour was low (Austin, 2008; 2013; cf. Curtin, 1973).
The combination of inelastic supplies of raw cotton and high-quality weaving
and dyeing explains the African practice of unpicking imported cloth to re-weave
the threads with which it was made. As far as the finishing of cloth is concerned, it is
notable that the initial exports of Manchester cloth to Kano, in the late nineteenth
century, were of un-dyed cloth, which was then dyed in Kano for sale in local and
regional markets ( Johnson, 1976).
A demand-side explanation may be considered as well. African labour scarcity
created incentives for the adoption of labour-saving production techniques, but the
investments required for capital-embodied technologies (e.g. power looms) also
correspond with higher minimum efficient scales, particularly if machines are suited
for the production of lower-quality (bulk) cloth. Consumer markets in West Africa
were not only considerably smaller than in Europe in terms of number and
purchasing power of consumers, their development was also hampered by higher
transportation costs. The transport constraint was partly eased by the construction
of railways under colonial rule, but the same railways also cleared the way for
expanded European textile imports. The rail networks, soon followed by motor
roads, served as a key instrument of the characteristic colonial division of labour,
under which Africa exported primary products in return for importedmanufactures.
This division of labour has often been attributed to colonial policy (Rodney,
1972). However, while this division seemed natural as well as welcome to European
politicians representing textile interests, it was not necessarily inevitable, if it had
contradicted comparative advantage, especially in the ‘free-trading’ British empire
of the early colonial years (in contrast to the more protectionist policies of Portugal
and France). After all, the interests of Manchester mill-owners did not stop Indians
from developing a modern cotton textile industry under British rule (Chapter 10).
Moreover, as Kilby (1975, pp. 495–6) has shown for Nigeria, the market for
manufactured goods in certain colonies was large enough to support local factories
in several industries many years before such factories were established. On the other
hand, Unilever established a soap factory in Nigeria in 1923, but it struggled in the
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face of competition from a British-based rival, as well as because of having to pay
excessive prices for materials from a fellow Unilever subsidiary (Fieldhouse, 1978,
pp. 345–79).
A fundamental obstacle to competitiveness for factories in Nigeria and other
peasant colonies remained the high cost of labour. African comparative advantage
was shaped by labour and capital scarcity and land abundance. The reservation
wage of labour, hypothetical or actual, was relatively high, to the point that
coercion (taking the form of slavery, pawning, and corvée) was a prerequisite for
the existence of a labour market in parts of nineteenth-century West Africa (e.g.
Austin, 2005, pp. 155–70, 495–8). As shown in Fig. 14.1, day wages of unskilled
labour were considerably higher in British West Africa (Accra and Lagos) than in
the major textile producing centres of British India (Bombay and Calcutta),
especially before 1940. However, colonial responses to labour scarcity differed
and it did not translate into high wages in major parts of East and Southern Africa,
where labour coercion was more severe (Frankema and van Waijenburg, 2012).
In the mining regions of Southern Africa, labour coercion became particularly
harsh. At the beginning of the South African gold mining industry, according to
Harries, real earnings of black workers on the Rand and at Kimberley, who were
often migrants from newly conquered areas or from the (at the time, lightly
governed) Portuguese colony of Mozambique, ‘compared favourably’ to those of
British agricultural workers (Harries, 1982, pp. 143, 161n). From the 1890s to the
1910s, however, black miners’ wages were driven down by a combination of state
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Fig. 14.1. Unskilled urban labourers’ wages in pence per day, 1880–1960
Source: Wage and price data from Frankema and van Waijenburg (2012).
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wage labour to white employers, and the creation of monopsonistic recruitment
arrangements for mining companies (e.g. Lipton, 1986; Feinstein, 2005). Such
reductions may already have occurred in the older British colonies of South Africa.
According to de Zwart (2011, p. 65), nominal wages of black workers in Natal
during the closing decades of the nineteenth century were lower than those paid in
the capitals of at least some of the colonies that had been established further north,
ranging between 5 and 9 pence per day, despite higher consumer price levels. In real
terms, these wages were thus barely sufficient for subsistence. Wages paid in
Nairobi were even lower and largely comparable with the rates observed in British
India. By the 1950s the gap in nominal wages between British West Africa and
India had largely been closed, owing much to the increasing political clout of the
Indian independence movement.
Austin has argued that, in a context of labour and capital scarcity, the logical
next step in expanding African economies was specialization in land-extensive
production in agriculture and mining. Indeed, African entrepreneurs in coastal
West Africa had already revealed a comparative advantage in these areas
(Austin, 2013; 2015), and it was further spurred by a favourable shift in the
net barter terms of trade of African export commodities that followed the
British Industrial Revolution (Hopkins, 1973; Law, 1995; Williamson, 2011;
Frankema, Williamson, and Woltjer, 2015). As the Atlantic slave market shrank,
from 1807, the demand for industrial inputs such as palm oil, gum, and oilseeds
such as groundnuts rose. African producers responded to rising prices by increas-
ing supplies. A similar transition to ‘legitimate commerce’ began in Angola and
other areas when the external slave trade was eventually suppressed there as well.
In the so-called ‘peasant’ colonies, African entrepreneurs were relatively free to
mobilize and invest sufficient capital, and they themselves deepened the com-
parative advantage in agricultural exports, notably by the adoption of the exotic
crop cocoa in Nigeria and Ghana, and by pioneering the adoption of the motor
lorry there.
The result was not a wholesale handicraft de-industrialization. In southeast
Nigeria, during the age of ‘legitimate commerce’ female weavers in the town of
Akwete, just outside the palm oil-exporting zone, developed a new, more expensive
style of cloth for the expanding market provided by the growth of exports (Kriger,
2006, pp. 45–7). During the early colonial decades, female dyers in Abeokuta,
southwest Nigeria, sold their dyed cloth to the cocoa farmers of Nigeria and Ghana
(Byfield, 2002). However, there was a widespread transfer of labour from low-
productivity dry-season manufacturing, especially cotton spinning but also weav-
ing, to what was now the more rewarding activity of export agriculture. Even so, in
French Soudan (Mali), handicraft weavers (most of them seasonal) fought off the
competition of factory-made cloth throughout the colonial period, outbidding
French merchants for the most of the colony’s cotton crop as late as 1948–9
(Roberts, 1996). In East African cotton growing regions such as Uganda and
Nyasaland, local cloth production fared worse, as Indian and British firms bought
up nearly all the cotton. Meanwhile, foreign imports of metal and metalware were
largely unchecked by artisanal production; but this was not because African iron
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lacked quality, but rather because African producers increasingly ran out of the
charcoal they needed for smelting (Goucher, 1981).
14.3 THE UNEVEN SPREAD OF MODERN
MANUFACTURING
Modern manufacturing emerged widely during the colonial period, but in most
cases the process was slow, and it remained largely confined to the production of
lighter consumer goods for domestic markets. As Table 14.1 shows, by the end of
the colonial era, excluding South Africa, the largest manufacturer in Sub-Saharan
Africa was Nigeria, reflecting the fact that it had much the largest GDP, which in
turn was based on a combination of by far the largest population and considerable
agricultural (and some mineral) exports. As of 1960, for the sample of the larger
countries shown in Table 14.1, the shares of manufacturing in GDP varied from
3 per cent in Tanganyika to c.9–10 per cent in Kenya and Senegal, 14 per cent in
the Belgian Congo, and 16 per cent in Southern Rhodesia. In South Africa,
manufacturing was about 20 per cent of a much larger GDP (Lipton, 1986,
p. 402).3 The majority of the African countries absent from Table 14.1 must
have had shares below 5 per cent, if only because of small market size, given that
locational advantage could be important. According to the same source as that












Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 16.0 3.6 751 206 120.2
Belgian Congo 14.0 14.1 910 58 127.4
Senegal 9.5 3.1 678 218 64.4
Kenya 9.5 8.1 641 79 60.9
Uganda 6.5 6.7 583 87 37.9
Ghana 6.3 6.8 1,503 222 94.7
Cameroun 6.0 4.7 511 109 30.6
Ethiopia 6.0 20.7 1,021 49 61.3
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) 5.5 3.2 511 155 28.1
Côte d’Ivoire 5.3 3.2 584 181 31.0
Sudan 4.8 11.8 909 77 43.6
Nigeria 4.5 40.0 3,500 88 157.5
Angola 4.3 4.8 726 151 31.2
Tanganyika 3.0 9.6 671 67 20.1
Source: Kilby (1975, p. 472, Table 112—Population, income and manufacturing output in selected African
countries, 1960).
3 Note that this figure comes from a different series from that used in Table 14.1.
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underlying Table 14.1, as late as 1965 Dahomey, with a population of 2.4 million,
had a 2.6 per cent share of manufacturing in GDP (though Gabon with 400,000
people had 6.1 per cent) (Kilby, 1975, p. 472).
Most of tropical Africa’s progress in manufacturing occurred after the Second
World War. Elsewhere, for example in Southeast Asia, the world wars and the
Great Depression, along with the associated slowdowns in world trade, gave some
impetus to local industry in various colonies (see Chapter 11). In particular, the
French response to the Depression—of pursuing autarky on an imperial scale—
provided protection for manufacturing investments, as was seen with textile mills in
Indochina. In Senegal a groundnut-refining industry promptly emerged (producing
shelled nuts and groundnut oil). However, its growth was soon curtailed by the
French government, which limited exports to France to 5,900 tonnes a year, and
effectively prohibited new entries to the industry (Boone, 1992, pp. 47–9).
By the end of the Second World War, the British Colonial Office was seeking to
include the promotion of manufacturing in state-supported development pro-
grammes, but this was rejected by a more powerful ministry, the Treasury, partly
because they saw African development as a means of assisting the recovery of the
British economy, rather than increasing overseas competition for British firms, and
partly because they thought that any infant industries in Africa were unlikely to
grow up (Butler, 1997). On the last point, a partly similar attitude was shown by
the Watson Commission, which investigated the causes of riots in the Gold Coast
in 1948. While recommending an accelerated timetable for political independence,
it observed: ‘At every turn we were pressed with the cry of industrialisation. We
doubt very much if the authors of this cry really understood more than their vague
desire for something that promised wealth and higher standards of life.’ While
accepting that ‘there is clearly room for many secondary industries which would
enrich the country’, they were ‘unable to foresee, in any circumstances, the Gold
Coast emerging as a unit of heavy industries in the world markets’ (Great Britain,
1948, p. 54).
Still, from a very low base, the 1950s saw a spurt in the growth of manufacturing
across British and French Africa. In part, this responded to the growth of consumer
markets, underpinned by expanded earnings from export agriculture, and in some
cases also from mining wages, facilitated by the Korean War boom. In part, too,
European firms were responding to the accelerated process of decolonization.
British trading companies sought to establish themselves in manufacturing before
they were excluded from retailing by nationalist governments. French manufactur-
ers, though still not expecting early independence, decided on direct investment to
pre-empt competition from cheaper foreign producers. In both Senegal and
Nigeria, the 1950s spurt in manufacturing mainly comprised French and British
companies seeking to protect existing markets (Hopkins, 1973; Kilby, 1975;
Boone, 1992).
The consumer industries that spread most widely across colonial Africa were
food and beverages, cigarettes, cotton textiles, footwear, furniture, soap, and
perfume. Export processing of cash crops (including cotton ginning and oil-seed
crushing), ore smelting, sawmilling, and cement production could also be found.
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Viewing industrial development in a wider sense, there was also considerable
investment and works associated with the construction of railways. However,
outside South Africa, and to a lesser extent Southern Rhodesia, there were only
very limited developments in the iron and steel, engineering, machinery, transport
equipment, and chemical sectors. Hence, most of the growth in manufacturing was
based on the processing of food, cash crops, and raw materials; there was little
production of intermediate products and virtually none of capital equipment
(Kilby, 1975).
To understand the temporal and geographic disparities in the spread of manu-
facturing growth, it is useful to consider the differences between settler, concession,
and peasant colonies. In the peasant colonies, land remained overwhelmingly under
African ownership and control, allowing space for African entrepreneurship, albeit
with European oligopolies or monopolies in some sectors. In settler and concession
economies, a large or even overwhelming proportion of land was alienated, respect-
ively, for the use of European settlers or, mainly, for European companies. The
presence of relatively large European populations broadened and deepened the
market for manufactured consumer goods. In Senegal, for instance, it stimulated
the growth of small factories producing carbonated drinks, biscuits, and bricks as
early as the 1920s (Boone, 1992, p. 48). Substantial European populations also
enhanced supplies of relevant manufacturing skills (Kilby, 1975). The latter applied
obviously to settler economies, but also to the part-concession, part-settler econ-
omy of the Belgian Congo and to the capital of French West Africa, Dakar. The
growth of modern manufacturing in the colonial era owed much to locational cost
advantages. These evolved from proximity to raw materials or from natural protec-
tion for products with high transportation costs per unit value, such as beer and
cement. Until oil became readily and cheaply available, access to coal to generate
electricity was a major locational advantage as well, in South Africa, Southern
Rhodesia, and Nigeria.
But differences in government systems in settler and non-settler colonies made a
decisive difference to the extent of political and financial investment in manufac-
turing, and made significant differences to the outcomes. The largest manufactur-
ing industries were created in areas where a locally resident population, albeit a
white minority, controlled the government: South Africa became effectively inde-
pendent within the British Empire in 1910, while Southern Rhodesia became
autonomous in 1923 under a parliament largely elected by settlers. In contrast,
following Salazar’s establishment of a dictatorship in Portugal in 1926, the large
Portuguese populations in the colonies were formally excluded from government,
restricting—though not extinguishing—their ability to lobby for manufacturing or
anything else (Clarence-Smith, 1989, pp. 177–8). This does much to explain why,
in 1960, manufacturing constituted only 4.3 per cent of Angola’s GDP. Again,
Ghana, which had been a ‘peasant colony’, or more appropriately, an ‘indigenous
rural capitalist’ colony, had the highest per capita income in tropical Africa as of
1960, but the share of manufacturing in GDP was only 6.3 per cent (Table 14.1).
Along with Kenya, which was basically a settler colony until the 1950s but one in
which the administration remained under metropolitan control, South Africa and
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Southern Rhodesia had seen a determined effort by the government to make
unskilled labour artificially cheap. By a series of measures mostly unavailable to
pre-colonial states (even had they wanted to adopt them), the above-mentioned
alliance of governments and mining companies had driven down the cost of
labour to well below the reservation wage of un-coerced labour. The most import-
ant measures were the reservation of land for European use, the imposition of
native direct taxes, and bans or restrictions on African tenancy: obliging Africans to
offer their labour for sale (Arrighi, 1973b; Mosley, 1983; Frankema and van
Waijenburg, 2012).
In South Africa, systematic labour coercion meant that the real wages of black
gold miners were not only lower in 1911 than they had been in the late nineteenth
century, but higher than they would be again until the early 1970s (Lipton, 1986,
p. 410). Feinstein (2005, pp. 109–12) has provided a quantitative illustration of
the importance of this policy. Without it, the mining industry in South Africa
would have been a fraction of its actual (historical) size, at least until the 1930s. For
governments, mining revenues provided the war chest necessary for subsidizing
electricity production, and if necessary other industries, in pursuit of the interests of
white settlers and workers. The latter, expressing themselves through the Labour
Party in South Africa, wanted the guarantee of more, and more skilful, jobs. The
former were willing to pay higher prices for consumer goods if it meant a more
diversified economy, less dependent on the metropole. Once the Pact government
in South Africa (Nationalist and Labour), elected in 1924, had implemented
protectionist measures as part of its comprehensive programme of promoting
manufacturing, the South Rhodesia parliament felt obliged to respond with a
similar programme of import-substituting industrialization, launched in 1933
(Phimister, 2000). The South African case, in particular, fits the paradigm of a
‘developmental state’ with regard to manufacturing, though certainly not in terms
of the welfare of most of the population. Afrikaner nationalism and white labour
made for a highly motivated industrial lobby. Both in South Africa and, from 1944,
in Southern Rhodesia, the state subsidized the creation of iron and steel plants (cf.
Fine and Rustomjee, 1996).
Manufacturing growth in the Belgian Congo was also partly driven by the
consumption demands of a sizable white minority (about 90,000 people in
1960), but primarily by the needs of the mining industry (Buelens and
Cassimon, 2013). Without the ‘discovery’ of vast copper reserves in the Katanga
province and the acute demand for it during the First World War, sending world
market copper prices through the roof, the area would have been one of the least
attractive places to invest in manufacturing. Katanga was underpopulated, it had no
wage labour markets or consumer markets of any significance, and the area was
tucked away in the vast Congolese interior, a thousand miles from the Atlantic
coast. But with the development of the mines, the locational disadvantage turned
into a high degree of natural protection for manufacturing industries that were
needed to cater to the mines and the mine-workers. That said, labour and land
policies were the key in Congo as well to turning copper mining into a commer-
cially feasible proposition. The powerful mining companies, especially the Union
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Minière du Haute-Katanga (UMHK), financed the colonial state and could exert
great influence on labour-recruitment practices, as it did with labour stabilization
(paying higher wages to enable migrant male workers to become, with their
families, permanent urban dwellers). We will return to the Congo case below to
illustrate how interrupted industrial growth has worked in practice.
While the settler regimes were effective in combating the problem of a physical
scarcity of labour that in itself pointed to high labour costs, cheap migrant labour
was not necessarily efficient for manufacturing. Hence factories, preceded by some
of the mining companies, sought to ‘stabilize’ their African workforces by offering
‘family’ wages rather than ‘bachelor’ wages. Pioneered by the South African
Chamber of Mines, the implementation of this policy in South Africa—which,
to be profitable, required opening semi-skilled and even some skilled jobs to
blacks—was long delayed by the resistance of organized white labour. Though
the white union’s violent protests (the Rand Revolt) were defeated in 1923, the
white Labour Party got revenge in the elections of the following year, which put it
into power in coalition with the National Party, forming the government that
adopted ISI as policy. After that, black workers’ real wages in manufacturing did
creep up somewhat, despite the rigorous repression of miners’ wages (Lipton,
1986), suggesting that some stabilized labour emerged even in South Africa.
Meanwhile, from the late 1920s, in Katanga the Belgian mining companies, and
soon Belgian manufacturers, implemented labour stabilization, in the interests of
labour productivity. This example was followed in Southern Rhodesia, especially in
the 1950s (Arrighi, 1973b, pp. 216–17). Meanwhile, as independence approached
in most countries, African economies remained largely dependent on imports of
manufactured goods financed by exports of unprocessed primary products.
14.4 INTERRUPTED GROWTH: THE CASE
OF THE CONGO
The development of modern manufacturing in the Belgian Congo (later known as
Zaïre and Democratic Republic of Congo) presents a particularly dramatic case of
interrupted industrial growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the mechanisms steering
growth, stagnation, and, eventually, a full collapse were important aspects of a
wider African pattern. Especially important were low investment in African human
capital, the strong connections between the mining and manufacturing sectors, and
the great vulnerability of African manufacturing to world market shocks.
Compared to the disruptive kleptocratic style of economic governance that
emerged under Leopold II (until he was deposed in 1908), industrial and infra-
structural investments after the First World War (by which time the Congo had
become a Belgian colony instead of a private royal fiefdom) contained the promise
of a more sustainable road towards economic growth. GDP per capita in the Congo
was distinctly higher in 1960 than in neighbouring countries (Maddison, 2010),
while the Congolese population had recovered from a serious collapse and enjoyed
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notably higher living standards than around 1900. Part of this long-term process of
welfare growth (and recovery) resulted from structural economic change.
The growth of modern manufacturing in the Congo may be loosely divided into
two periods (Lacroix, 1967). During the first phase from c.1920 to c.1940, copper
mining gained momentum, railway infrastructure expanded, and commercial
centres emerged. Foreign firms (mostly Belgian and British) invested in plantation
cultivation of tropical cash crops such as cotton, palm oil, coffee, cacao, and
tobacco. To feed, clothe, and house a rapidly expanding but now stabilized male
wage labour force and their families, the mines and plantations needed processed
foods from grain mills and slaughter houses, beer, soap, cotton fabrics, cement,
electricity, and specific chemicals to be used in mining operations (Buelens and
Cassimon, 2013, p. 234). In addition, raw copper ore also had to undergo several
stages of refinement to lower transport costs per unit value.
Manufacturing growth benefited from the phenomenal profit margins generated
by the copper industry. Buelens and Marysse (2010) have estimated that the equity
shares of colonial companies yielded an average annual rate of return of 7.2 per cent
between 1920 and 1955, which was about 2.5 times the return on Belgian stocks
(2.8 per cent). The lure of big profit also spurred investments in large-scale
infrastructural projects. The Congolese railway network covered over 5,000 kilo-
metres by the end of the colonial era, twice as much as in Nigeria (Mitchell, 2007,
pp. 721–2). The inauguration of the ‘voie national ’ by King Albert I in 1928,
connecting the mines in Katanga to the Congo river in Ilebo (Port Francqui) over a
distance of about a thousand miles through the tropical forest, symbolized the
intertwined forces of colonial extraction and investment.
The second phase, from 1940 to 1960, differed from the first as it entailed a
move towards ISI policies (motivated by the experiences of the Depression and the
Second World War), increasing investments in energy infrastructure (hydro-
electricity in particular) and a modest shift in manufacturing production from
consumer goods to intermediate and capital goods (iron and steel, machinery).
After a severe setback during the Great Depression, when copper prices collapsed,
industrial growth picked up again during the war. The Congo was an important
supplier of strategic raw materials (copper, uranium) to the Allied war effort, while
on the other hand the drastically reduced availability of manufacturing supplies
from Europe enhanced investment in a wide range of local industries. The index of
manufacturing production in the Belgian Congo given in Table 14.2 shows the
Table 14.2. Volume index of manufacturing production in the Belgian Congo, 1939–57
(1947–9 = 100)
Year Food Textiles Chemicals Construction Others Total
1939 41 21 35 19 10 29
1948 100 102 76 105 95 99
1957 296 618 473 492 387 377
Source: Centrale Bank van Belgisch-Congo en Ruanda Urundi (1959, p. 4).
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impact of the war boom and the continued acceleration of manufacturing growth
during the 1950s. From the 1940s to the early 1970s international copper prices
were high, especially compared to the 1930s, and the Congo was well on its way to
becoming an African economic ‘powerhouse’. The number of officially registered
industrial enterprises rose to about 12,000 in the early 1950s (Buelens and
Cassimon, 2013, p. 237). Table 14.3 shows that, in comparison to the metropole
(with a comparable population size of c.10 million), the volume of industrial
production in the Belgian Congo was indeed substantial.
We lack the space to give a detailed reconstruction of the collapse of Congolese
manufacturing, and offer a brief summary instead. Political instability occurred
almost immediately after the official transfer of power. The Katanga secession war
led to turmoil in the newly independent country, and put a halt to investment.
Only after Mobutu had fought his way to power in 1965 did the dust start to settle,
for a period of about eight years. In his early years in office, Mobutu pursued the
grand development schemes which had come to the drawing table in the final years
of Belgian rule (1958–60). He introduced an open door policy to foreign investors
by granting tax exemptions. Foreign investors (e.g. General Motors, Good Year,
Fiat) came in and industrial output grew by about 50 per cent during 1966–72
(Chomé and Komitee, 1977, p. 120). But Mobutu’s investments in various mega-
projects lacked economic common sense. The Inga Falls project, a gigantic hydro-
power dam in the lower Congo, turned into an outright failure and became a
serious drain on the government budget. The economy hit reverse gear when
international copper prices went into free fall in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis.
Copper prices did not recover to pre-1973 levels until the end of the twentieth
century (Abbeloos, 2013, p. 264). The shock laid bare one of the fundamental
weaknesses of the Belgian colonial state: the budget relied predominantly on direct
Table 14.3. Industrial production in Belgium and the Belgian Congo, 1957
Commodity Units Belgium Belgian
Congo
Congo as per cent
share of Belgium
Electricity Million kWh 12,611 2,320 18.4
Sugar Tons 369,335 19,332 5.2
Beer Thousand hl 10,185 1,382 13.6
Water and lemonade Thousand hl 2,966 320 10.8
Margarine Tons 95,253 669 0.7
Cigarettes Millions 10,546 4,045 38.4
Cement Tons 4,705,000 463,952 9.9
Lime Tons 29,249,000 100,460 0.3
Bricks Thousands 2,242,933 293,876 13.1
Ceramics Thousand m2 1,625 137 8.4
Shoes Thousand pairs 12,117 2,851 23.5
Tissues Thousand m2 702,105 52,982 7.5
Blankets Thousand pieces 11,768 1,976 16.8
Source: Buelens and Cassimon (2013, Table 11.2). Data obtained from Centrale Bank van Belgisch-Congo en
Ruanda-Urundi (1959).
359Patterns of Manufacturing Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 16/1/2017, SPi
and indirect receipts from copper exports. Mobutu’s response may perhaps best be
summarized as denial. He overloaded the state with foreign debt, increasingly
allowed his personal clientele to strip state assets, and plunged the country into
an extended period of hyperinflation from 1988 to 1996, eroding the macro-
economic conditions required for a recovery. During the 1990s and early 2000s
the country was caught up in endemic warfare, creating the conditions for millions
of excess deaths as a result of disease and undernourishment (Prunier, 2009).
Primary school enrolment rates, which had approximated 100 per cent in 1970,
plummeted to under 40 per cent in 2000 (Frankema, 2013, p. 161).
To be sure, even in the context of widespread post-colonial conflict across the
continent, the Congolese economic and political collapse represented a worst case.
But this does not mask one of the fundamental problems of industrial growth in
Africa’s former concession and settler colonies: the detrimental impact of racial
discrimination on the socio-economic mobility and human capital accumulation of
native Africans. Forced labour programmes were focused on supplying the mines
and plantations with manual labour power, while higher-skilled jobs and manage-
ment positions were exclusively reserved for whites. The colour bar was also strictly
applied in education. Primary education was almost entirely left to Catholic and
Protestant missionary schools. The few public schools in the larger urban centres
would offer lower-grade secondary education to Congolese children, but nothing
more (Depaepe and van Rompaey, 1995; Dunkerley, 2009; Frankema, 2013).
The colonial government started to reform the education system in the late
1940s, by allowing tiny numbers of Congolese children to attend European
secondary schools and reducing the education monopoly of the Christian missions.
Yet, ironically, when the first university opened its doors in 1954 near Leopoldville
(Kinshasa), the first cohorts of Congolese students had yet to complete secondary
school. By 1960 only a few hundred Congolese were in university, of whom
thirteen were enrolled in natural sciences and eighteen in engineering (Mantels,
2007). Frankema (2013) has argued that this legacy of racial discrimination in
education had a detrimental effect on the quality of post-colonial governance. After
dropping out of secondary school, Mobutu received a two-year training in account-
ing and secretarial work in the army. He was among the best educated of his
generation. Technical and engineering skills were thus barely available after the
Belgians had retreated, and the few highly educated Congolese usually preferred
salaried careers in the public sector.
14.5 FROM IMPORT SUBSTITUTION TO
‘STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT ’
On the eve of independence, many African politicians anticipated that industrial-
ization would go hand in hand with the development of new independent nation
states (Mytelka, 1989). As in other developing regions in the 1950s to 1970s, the
early post-colonial African states adopted ISI policies in an attempt to kick-start
industrial development (see Chapters 8, 10–13). The policies usually consisted of a
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combination of infant industry protection, increased investments in key infrastruc-
tures (transport, energy), and more or less ambitious output targets to secure a rapid
replacement of manufacturing imports by domestically produced manufactures
(Killick, 1978). Indeed, the key objective of ISI was to achieve self-sufficiency in
the production of domestic consumer goods, rather than obtaining stakes in export
markets by developing internationally competitive industries. This development
agenda was not only embraced by ‘socialist’ governments, notably Ghana under
Nkrumah (1951–66) and Tanzania under Nyerere (1961–85): it was also sub-
scribed to by ‘capitalist’ governments, such as Côte d’Ivoire under Houphouët-
Boigny (1960–93). Indeed, another staunchly capitalist regime, Kenyatta’s in
Kenya (1964–78), adopted five-year plans to promote industrialization and adopt-
ed protectionist policies to curb import competition.
Yet there were important differences in the degree of state intervention across
early post-colonial African economies. Most of the former French colonies, includ-
ing Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon, remained within the franc zone. Most of the
former British colonies, together with Sekou Touré’s Guinea and Congo-Zaïre,
opted for monetary independence. In many cases (including Ghana, Guinea,
Tanzania, Congo-Zaire, and Zambia), the latter route became associated with
increasingly overvalued, largely non-convertible currencies and a battery of quantity
and price controls, not only on imports but also on internal markets. Structural
macro-economic disequilibria resulted in hyperinflation by the 1980s. Kenya
steered a middle path, with an independent currency but periodic devaluations,
which largely prevented major price distortions.
In theory, currency overvaluation provided an indirect subsidy to domestic
manufacturing enterprises, as it permitted them to acquire imported raw materials,
intermediate goods, and capital goods below world prices. This happened to some
extent in Kenya, but in the likes of Ghana extreme currency overvaluation func-
tioned as a punitive tax on exports, which not only reduced the incentive to
re-invest in export agriculture, but also eroded foreign reserves and produced
structural current account imbalances. This eventually resulted in acute shortages
of strategic import products. Ironically, the government which made the strongest
rhetorical commitment to industrialization, Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah and
some of his successors, ultimately delivered less of it than those such as Côte
d’Ivoire under Felix Houphouët-Boigny, whose policies merely aimed at the
gradual growth of light consumer goods industries around a continued growth of
export agriculture (Table 14.5).
In the former peasant colonies, state intervention in the promotion of manufac-
turing represented a break with colonial economic policies. This policy reform may
be called a partial success (in its defence, see Sender and Smith, 1986, pp. 67–109).
Certainly it created economic rents, facilitating the politicization of employment in
public enterprises and allowing foreign as well as state enterprises to enjoy domestic
markets without striving to improve their efficiency (e.g. Boone, 1992). But it also
enhanced the availability of capital to local manufacturing industries and offered
the latter protected access to growing (especially urban) consumer markets. To
illustrate the substitution effects of ISI policies and the associated process of capital
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accumulation, Fig. 14.2 presents both the per capita value of capital goods imports
and their share in total manufacturing imports in Senegal since 1961. It serves to
illustrate a common pattern among ISI adherents in Africa: after a rapid rise in
capital goods imports, both in (nominal) per capita terms and as a share of
manufactured imports, the economic downturn of the late 1970s to early 1990s
interrupted this process of capital formation. Although the share of capital goods
imports in total manufacturing imports remained higher than in the early 1960s,
the declining per capita values were not replaced by increasing domestic output of
capital goods.
Table 14.4 indicates that aggregate rates of annual manufacturing growth in
post-independence Sub-Saharan Africa stayed above population growth (2–3 per
cent) until the start of the 1980s. Although we lack data for the colonial era, it is
probably safe to say that the 1960s and 1970s saw the highest rates of growth of
manufacturing during the twentieth century. At the same time it should be noted
that African manufacturing industries failed to capture even a modest share of the
international market for manufacturing merchandise. Exports remained largely
confined to some cross-border trading among neighbours.
Even South Africa, where the manufacturing share in GDP had surpassed
agriculture and mining by 1946, and where the capital goods industry made a
























































































































































































































































































































Capital goods Basic manufactures % share of capital goods
Fig. 14.2. Composition of imports in Senegal, 1961–2012
Notes: Left-hand vertical axis: per capita value of basic manufactures and capital goods in constant 1980 USD. Right-
hand vertical axis: Percentage of capital goods in total imports. Capital goods imports corresponds to SITC 2
category 7: machinery and transport equipment. Basic manufactures corresponds to SITC 2 category 6, comprising a
large range of intermediate and finished consumer manufactures such as textiles, leather, wood, cork, paper, metals,
and rubber products. Total manufacturing imports comprises SITC categories 5 to 8, including chemicals (5) and
miscellaneous manufactures (8).
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (several issues 1964–2013). Population data from
UN, World Population Database, accessed 1 October 2014.
Gareth Austin, Ewout Frankema, and Morten Jerven362
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 16/1/2017, SPi
exporter of manufactures (mainly supplying its neighbours) into a global manufac-
turing exporter. For South African manufacturers the advantage of low-waged
unskilled labour was increasingly outweighed by the disadvantages of a domestic
market restricted by the low purchasing power of the vast majority of the popula-
tion, and artificially expensive skilled labour. The supply of the latter was restricted
by lack of investment in black education, as well the colour bar which curtailed its
use (Lipton, 1986; Feinstein, 2005).
South Africa was not the only country where idiosyncratic factors mattered. It is
important to take account of such country-specific features, and to emphasize the
large inter-country differences in manufacturing growth. Table 14.5 presents the
growth rates of manufacturing output during 1965–88 in the most populous
twelve countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (all those with populations of 10 million
or more by 1988) besides South Africa. The first sub-period, 1965–73, covers ISI
policies before the first oil crisis, showing modest convergence in manufacturing on
the world leaders in the majority of countries. The second sub-period, 1973–80,
brought the exogenous shock of higher oil prices, offset a few years later in some
countries by a boom in beverage crop prices. Higher oil prices enabled governments
of oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria to increase direct and indirect subsidies to
manufacturing. But in the oil-importing majority of African countries, the net
effects on manufacturing were negative, reducing the capacity to import inputs, and
depressing the domestic market.
The third sub-period, 1980–8, saw the transition to structural adjustment
programmes (SAPs): schemes of economic liberalization promoted by the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund that were voluntarily and involuntarily
adopted by African governments for a range of reasons. The dates at which
individual countries began ‘adjustment’ varied. Ghana made the move in 1983,
Nigeria and Tanzania in 1986; Zambia vacillated.
The former settler economies did not escape the trend towards economic
stagnation or decline that took hold in many countries at some stage in the
1970s and 1980s, albeit for different reasons. Rhodesian industry was initially
stimulated by the reduced competition it faced during the period of international
sanctions imposed during the settler regime’s unilateral declaration of independ-
ence from Britain in 1965, but stopped growing in the 1970s. Above all, South
Table 14.4. Aggregate annual average growth rates of industry and manufacturing in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 1961–2000
Sub-Saharan Africa Industry (annual per cent
growth)







Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2003). 2001–10 calculated with data from World Development
Indicators (2013). Jerven’s calculations based on ten-year averages.
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African manufacturing, after decades of expansion facilitated by repression of black
labour (low wages, reinforced by the ban on black trade unions) and tariff protec-
tion, entered a productivity crisis primarily resulting from the artificially high cost
of skilled labour mentioned above. The marginal efficiency of investment shrank
steadily during the last twenty years of apartheid (Lewis, 1990). The ingrained
contradiction of the apartheid economy between the promotion of capital accu-
mulation through artificially cheap unskilled labour, and the political incapacity to
invest in the skills required to move manufacturing on to a path of rising total factor
productivity, underlay the stagnation of the economy during the last fifteen years
before the end of the apartheid regime in 1994 (Feinstein, 2005). This economic
morass was reinforced, rather than caused, by international sanctions when they
began to bite in the 1980s.
The first decade of economic liberalization was one of stagnation or net decline
at the level of Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, despite dramatic recoveries in the two
most successful adjusters, Ghana and Uganda. In the majority of African countries,
macro-economic conditions continued to worsen, especially as a result of unman-
ageable debt accumulation. It took most countries until the late 1990s to resched-
ule their debts and implement all the liberalization and privatization programmes
prescribed by the Washington Consensus. While aggregate regional GDP per
capita growth picked up from the mid-1990s, the overall policy model remains
the economic liberalism established in the 1980s. Under this model, the region as a
whole experienced at least a ‘lost decade’, in terms of growth of both manufacturing
and GDP, to c.1995, followed by—to date—twenty years in which GDP has
outpaced population, by about 2 per cent a year. The most plausible explanation
for this contrast in performance under the same policy regime is that, as before,
African economic growth rates primarily respond to external demand for African
commodities ( Jerven, 2011; 2014).
While the current wave of economic expansion in Africa is more widespread and,
in aggregate, apparently faster than any previous one, with the possible exception of
Table 14.5. Average annual growth rate of manufacturing output (per cent)
1965–73 1973–80 1980–8
Sudan n.a. 6.7 5.0
Ethiopia 8.8 2.6 3.7
Kenya 12.4 6.9 4.6
Tanzania 8.7 2.6 –2.5
Uganda 4.0 –12.4 2.3
Nigeria 15.0 17.2 –2.9
Senegal 4.0 1.5 3.4
Ghana 6.5 –2.8 3.1
Côte d’Ivoire 10.9 8.3 8.2
Cameroon 7.4 9.0 6.2
Zaire (Congo DRC) n.a. –5.7 1.7
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe n.a. 0.4 2.1
Sources: 1965–80 from World Bank (1989, Table 2); 1980–8 from World Bank (1990, Table 2).
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1890–1914, it would be unimaginable without the (this time Chinese-led) boom
in the prices of primary commodities that started in the mid-1990s, after nearly two
decades of price weakness ( Jerven, 2010). It should be added that further technical
advances in mining and oil drilling reinforced Africa’s comparative advantage in
extractive industries, for example by allowing re-filtering of iron ore slag in Sierra
Leone and elsewhere, and permitting deep-water oil drilling off West Africa. The
South African economy has also resumed growth since the advent of majority rule
in 1994, but at a very modest rate, despite South African companies taking
advantage of the opportunity to enter markets in the rest of Africa on a much
larger scale than before. Manufacturing, overall, has expanded in absolute terms but
declined in relative terms (UNECA, 2013). This is not very surprising, given that
the problem of a lack of international competitiveness in manufacturing has not
been resolved: how would these industries thrive without a shield?
14.6 WILL MANUFACTURING SUSTAIN AFRICA’S
GROWTH REVIVAL?
Despite Africa’s long history of labour scarcity, factor endowments have been
moving, and continue to move, in a direction that facilitates labour-intensive
industrialization. Population rose six times over the twentieth century, and popu-
lation growth rates accelerated especially after 1945. Moreover, increasing invest-
ment in education and public health counts as one of the biggest achievements of
post-independence governments (Sender, 1999): poor though the African record
still looks in cross-sectional terms, it was much better in 1980 than in 1960, and,
despite retrogression in some countries during economic liberalization in the
1980s, on the whole there has been further progress since the mid-1990s. Yet, to
date, Africa’s growth revival has been led not by labour-intensive manufacturing,
but rather, as with earlier growth episodes, by commodity exports (Jerven, 2010).
Though there is fragmentary evidence that labour costs in Africa have fallen
relative to other parts of the world, Teal’s comparison of Ghana and Mauritius at
the end of the last century (Teal, 1999) illustrates a generalization that still largely
applies today: without significant advances in labour productivity, continental
African real wages remain too high to be internationally competitive in manufac-
turing. Teal estimated that the wages paid in Mauritius, a sugar plantation econ-
omy that successfully transformed itself to become a manufacturing exporter
(mainly of textiles) after 1970, were about six times higher than in Ghana; but
that this gap was still insufficient to offset a labour productivity gap of over 600 per
cent (1999, p. 991). It is not encouraging to note that even the Mauritian textile
industry has struggled since, in the face of intensified competition (Joomun, 2006).
The industry’s share of Mauritian exports declined from 55 per cent in 1995 to
16 per cent in 2010; a fall in the overall contribution of manufacturing to exports
that was only partly compensated by a rise in ‘miscellaneous manufactured goods’
from 0 to 20 per cent of exports during the same years (Sannassee, Seetanah, and
Lamport, 2014).
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Fig. 14.3 shows the official minimum monthly wages in 2010–11 for a selection of
African and Asian countries, expressed in US dollars using official exchange rates.
While the enforcement of minimum wage legislation probably varies across the
sample, the figure shows that there is no apparent clear-cut labour cost advantage in
African economies compared to emerging Asian economies such as India or
Vietnam. In some cases (notably Kenya and Nigeria), the minimum wages are
distinctively higher. Chinese wages have only recently surpassed the upper bound
of Sub-Saharan wages. The reasons for this are unclear. Exchange rate overvaluation
may explain part of this phenomenon, but it can hardly be the result of trade union
power, which is generally weak in the neo-liberal era, and if ‘efficiency wages’ are
being paid (wage premiums to encourage worker commitment in the absence of
cheap and effective supervision), as has been suggested (Austin, 2013, p. 219), they
have yet to have a discernible effect at the macro level.
It remains extremely hard to pin down to what extent sources other than
commodity exports are driving African growth. Having examined survey data on
real material consumption per household for 1990–2006—thus including several
years before the start of the boom indicated by the GDP figures—Young (2012)
found that such consumption was growing fast enough (3.4–3.7 per cent per year)
for him to proclaim an ‘African growth miracle’. But other studies take a more
cautious approach. McMillan and Harttgen (2014) report that part of recent
African growth stems from structural change, but also note that structural change

























































Fig. 14.3. Minimum wages in a selection of African and Asian countries, 2010–11 (US
dollars per month)
Source: Official minimum nominal monthly wages taken from ILOSTAT, converted into US dollars using exchange
rates from World Development Indicators (2014).
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employed in agriculture in African countries declined on average by 10 per cent
between 2000 and 2010, but only a fifth of this decline was absorbed by manu-
facturing. The rest went into services, formal and informal. As people move out of
the lowest productivity sector, agriculture, structural change contributes to growth
(see also Diao and McMillan, 2015). Yet, to what extent consumption growth
and structural change operate independently from the commodity export boom
remains difficult to assess.
Surely, the rising concentration of Africans in urban centres opens up new
opportunities for scale economies and specialization, including a ‘von Thunen’
type of agricultural transformation in the vicinity of growing consumer markets,
which may be further supported by the recent ‘communication revolution’ which
releases spatial constraints that were innate to the historically dispersed settlement
patterns in the region (Frankema, 2014, pp. 22–3). Rodrik’s view is largely in line
with the historical account we have provided:
the African pattern of structural change is very different from the classic pattern that
has produced high growth in Asia, and before that, the European industrializers. Labor
is moving out of agriculture and rural areas. But formal manufacturing industries are
not the main beneficiary. Urban migrants are being absorbed largely into services that
are not particularly productive and into informal activities. The pace of industrializa-
tion is much too slow for the convergence dynamics to play out in full force. (Rodrik,
2014, p. 9)
If African real wages continue to fall relative to those in the current ‘workshop of
the world’, China, there remains the question of whether entrepreneurs will convert
this into manufacturing growth. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been rising
recently, some of it in the traditional form of Western-owned breweries for
domestic markets, but also export-oriented shoe and cotton yarn factories in
Ethiopia, owned by Chinese and Indian participants. The explanation for the
apparent rise of Ethiopia as the first African country to attract considerable inflows
of (Asian) FDI in modern labour-intensive manufacturing industries may be
historical: Ethiopia represents the oldest peasant society south of the Sahara, has
by far the longest record of state centralization, and was one of the two countries
that remained independent from European colonial rule. Moreover, its relatively
high population densities currently convert into relatively low minimum wages
(Fig. 14.3). It is not inconceivable that the exceptional historical path of Ethiopian
‘development’ has given rise to a favourable combination of labour costs, discipline,
and diligence that is hard to find elsewhere in the continent (Frankema and van
Waijenburg, 2015).
FDI in extractive industries in Africa has also increased, especially in oil. In the
past, transnational corporations investing in Africa had a capital-intensive bias,
reflecting not local labour-market conditions so much as their own habit of using
the same techniques of production wherever they operated (Arrighi, 1973a,
p. 113). This habit may be a liability in the context of falling costs of labour,
including skilled labour. As comparative experience shows, it is difficult to maxi-
mize productivity without congruence between the technologies employed and the
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resources and culture of the economies and societies in which the investment takes
place (Abramovitz, 1986). African enterprise has the advantage of offering poten-
tially greater linkages with the rest of the economy than foreign investment (even
including investment by foreign minorities, such as Indians and Levantines in East
and West Africa respectively, and now Chinese almost all over the sub-continent).
But it is perhaps only in Nigeria that there is a history going back even thirty years
of private (not privatized) factories employing several hundred people under
African ownership (Forrest, 1994). African capitalists are mostly small scale,
whether in trade, agriculture or manufacturing.
Regarding the latter, an important feature of the last century was the emergence
of new forms of small-scale manufacturing, such as motor repairs and motor parts.
Such industrial growth in Nigeria and Ghana has not yet emerged clearly in the
national income accounts (Dawson, 1991; Forrest, 1994). The Ghanaian popula-
tion census of 2000 recorded just over 1 million people working in manufacturing,
with just over half of them women. Whatever their actual contribution to national
output, small firms in Africa today, as in the colonial era, operate almost invariably
in markets characterized by low entry costs and ‘excess competition’, making it hard
to accumulate profits (Austin, 2013). African firms may occasionally be created big,
but they rarely start small and grow big; and, again with the partial exception of
Nigeria, they rarely outlive their founders (Iliffe, 1983).
To judge from both African and East Asian history, if there is one thing that could
assist both foreign and indigenous manufacturing enterprises in Africa, it would be
the presence of states with the capacity and dedication to promote structural change
in the cause of long-term growth. Mkandawire (2001) has argued plausibly that the
absence of the ‘developmental state’ in Africa has been exaggerated. Several of the
current governments in the sub-continent may be viewed as ‘developmental’.
However, in the most populous country, Nigeria, the state is still a long way from
delivering certain basic public goods, such as security and, even for urban areas,
reliable electricity. Clearly, there is much neglected business for many African
governments to undertake if they want to facilitate the growth of manufacturing.
14.7 CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the progress of manufacturing in the colonial and post-colonial
economies of Sub-Saharan Africa in the framework of the interactions between the
region’s specific endowment structures, global economic relationships, and govern-
ment policies. In a diverse sub-continent, it is possible to make the following nine
generalizations about ‘the’ African case within the global spread of modern manu-
facturing. First, as of c.1900 resource endowments—both in terms of aggregate
factor ratios (land abundance, labour scarcity), and on a disaggregated view (power-
ful environmental obstacles to the full utilization of the land and labour)—favoured
neither a Western-style capital-intensive route of development, nor an East Asian-
style labour-intensive one. This helps explain the second feature, a striking discon-
tinuity between handicraft and machine-based production: artisanal manufacturing
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had been based primarily on a seasonal abundance of labour, which was reduced or
eliminated by the growth of primary-product exports, while factories were implant-
ed from outside—where they were introduced at all. Handloom weaving, in
particular, survived in some areas, but thrived mostly where its difference from
factory-made cloth could be maximized, by artisans specializing in luxury handmade
products. Third, in the decades before the European Scramble for Africa, African
producers—especially but not exclusively in West Africa—were already responding
to the export opportunities created by industrialization in the West in ways that
revealed a deepening comparative advantage in land-extensive agriculture and
mining. Fourth, colonial governments reinforced that specialization, notably
through their infrastructural investments and regulations.
It is thus unsurprising that, fifth, only independent or self-governing regimes
invested heavily in promoting manufacturing, whether calculating that it was
possible to shift the comparative advantage of the country concerned to industry,
or simply in the hope that defying the existing pattern of comparative advantage
would not be costly. The first such regimes were the white-minority governments
of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which adopted import-substituting indus-
trialization having already taken drastically coercive measures to reduce the cost of
African unskilled labour. They achieved considerable manufacturing growth, espe-
cially South Africa. But labour repression contained its own limitations: the early
growth was replaced by stagnation in the 1980s, by which time productivity growth
was stymied by the high cost of artificially scarce skilled labour. Elsewhere in Africa,
many of the majority-rule governments that followed the colonial regimes that
departed around 1960 also embarked on import-substituting industrialization, in
defiance of relatively high labour costs, and generally without the resources or
commitment to carry it through.
Our sixth generalization is that the main achievement of these governments was
better provision of education and health services, which greatly improved upon the
modest achievements of colonial governments in increasing the supply, and
improving the preparation, of future workers. Seventh, colonial companies and
governments, sooner or later, undertook policies of labour stabilization. This move
in itself made sense from the perspective of both capital- and labour-intensive paths
of development. The former path required skilled or semi-skilled workers, whom
an itinerant, shifting workforce could not supply. The labour-intensive path entails
cheap labour as a starting point, but goes on to require investments in labour
quality (Austin and Sugihara, 2013). Eighth, so far large foreign companies in
Africa have tended to use the capital-intensive technologies they apply elsewhere,
without worrying about congruence with local conditions. It remains to be seen
whether, helped by a relatively cheaper and better-educated workforce, this
approach will contribute to more sustained industrial growth in future. Finally,
while private African manufacturing enterprises are mostly small, occasionally (in
Nigeria) medium sized, they tend to be labour intensive, benefiting from greater
labour abundance. But they need government intervention, especially the provision
of public goods, making it easier for them to accumulate profits, if they are to
become a leading force in a twenty-first-century industrialization of Africa.
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